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
Sabine Schmidtke

# The Theology of al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325)

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KLAUS SCHWARZ VERLAG · BERLIN · 1991



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To my parents

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CONTENTS

## INTRODUCTION

During the last decades, scholars have made extensive progress in investigating the nature of the relationship between Mu$^c$tazilism and Imamism.[1]

W.Madelung began this advance when he offered a general outline of the development of Shi$^c$ite theology in relation to the corresponding Mu$^c$tazilite theological developments.[2] M.McDermott investigated the views of the three important theologians Ibn Babūya (d. 381/991), Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 413/1022) and $^c$Alam al-Hudā al-Murtaḍā (d. 436/1044) in a very detailed study.[3] Further significant contributions to the study of Imamite theology were made by D.Sourdel in his two articles on al-Mufīd.[4]

It can therefore be safely stated that the relationship between Mu$^c$tazilism and Imamism has been surveyed up to $^c$Alam al-Hudā al-Murtaḍā with whom the fusion of Imamism and Mu$^c$tazilism reached its final shape.[5]

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[1] Prior to this, $^c$Abbās Iqbāl's Khānadān-i Nawbakhtī (Iranian Culture and Literature, no.43. Tehran: Tahurī, 1966) had already been published. The first edition was in 1932.

[2] W.Madelung, "Imāmism and Mu$^c$tazilite Theology," in Le Shī$^c$isme imamite (edited by T.Fahd. Colloque du Centre d'études supérieures spécialisé d'histoire des religions de Strasbourg. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970), 13-30. See also idem., "Religiöse Literatur in arabischer Sprache: Die Šī$^c$a," in Grundriß der arabischen Philologie (edited by Helmut Gätje. Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1987), 2:366-7.

[3] M.J.McDermott, The Theology of al-Shaikh al-Mufīd (d. 413/1022) (Recherches. Nouvelle Série: A.Langue arabe et pensée islamique, vol.10. Persian Studies Series, no.9. Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1978).

[4] D.Sourdel, "L'Imamisme vu par le Cheikh al-Mufīd," Revue des études islamiques 40 (1972):217-296. This article includes a translation of al-Mufīd's Awā'il al-maqālāt. Idem, "Les conceptions Imāmites au début du XI$^e$ siècle d'après le Shaykh al-Mufīd," in Islamic Civilisation 950-1150 (edited by D.S.Richards. Oxford: Cassirer, 1973), 187-200.

[5] Madelung, "Imāmism," 27.

Some time after Shaykh al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067), who was a student of al-Murtaḍā and who followed his master in theological questions,[6] the last Imamite Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilite school started to develop, about which until now not much has been known. W.Madelung has remarked that this development was largely under the influence of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and his followers.[7]

Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044), who was a student of the Qāḍī <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025), had developed independent theological views which set him apart from the school of Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā'ī (d. 321/933).[8] Despite much criticism by the Bahshamiyya and later heresiographers that he introduced philosophy under the cover of kalām,[9] Abū l-Ḥusayn's views were successful to the extent that his school established itself side by side with the Bahshamiyya.[10] His views were later adopted by some of the

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[6]His theological views can be learnt from his Iqtiṣād al-hādī ilā ṭarīq al-rashād (edited by Ḥasan al-Sa<sup>c</sup>īd al-Tihrānī. Qum: al-Khayyām, 1400/1980) and his Kitāb tamhīd al-uṣūl fī <sup>c</sup>ilm al-kalām (edited by <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Muḥsin Mishkat al-Dīnī. Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tehrān, no.1835. Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1362/1983) which is a commentary on the section on theology of al-Murtaḍā's Jumal al-<sup>c</sup>ilm wa-l-<sup>c</sup>amal.
[7]Madelung, "Imāmism," 27-8; idem, "Šī<sup>c</sup>a," 365ff.
[8]See W.Madelung, "Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī," Encyclopaedia of Islam (2nd edition. Edited by H.Gibb et al. Leiden: Brill, 1960-), Supplement Fasc. 1-2:25-6; idem, "Religiöse Literatur in arabischer Sprache: Der Kalām," in Grundriß der arabischen Philologie (edited by Helmut Gätje. Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1987), 2:329. D.Gimaret, "Abo 'l-Ḥosayn al-Baṣrī," Encyclopaedia Iranica (edited by E.Yarshater. London, Boston and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985-), 1/1:324ff. Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā b. al-Murtaḍā, Kitāb ṭabaqāt al-mu<sup>c</sup>tazila (edited by S.Diwald-Wilzer. Bibliotheca Islamica, vol.21. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1961), 119.
[9]Ibn al-Murtaḍā, 119.
[10]Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, for example, states that in his time the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and the Bahshamiyya are the last active of the Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilite schools; see Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, I<sup>c</sup>tiqādāt firaq al-muslimīn wa-l-mushrikīn (edited by Taha <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Ra'ūf Sa<sup>c</sup>d and Mustafā al-Hawārī. Min turāth al-Rāzī, no.2. Cairo, 1398/1978), 42.

Zaydī Mu^c^tazilites[11] and to a much greater extent by the Imamite Mu^c^tazilites;[12] as a result they survived longer than the teachings of the Bahshamiyya.

The sources for the reconstruction of the theological views of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, all of whose works on theology are lost,[13] are the writings of a later follower of his school, Rukn al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. al-Malāḥimī (d. 536/1141), viz. the shorter Kitāb al-fā'iq fī uṣūl al-dīn[14] and the more extensive Kitāb al-mu^c^tamad fī uṣūl al-dīn[15] which is only partly extant. A further valuable source is the Kitāb al-kāmil fī l-istiqṣā' fīmā balaghanā min kalām al-qudamā' by Taqī al-Dīn al-Najrānī (or al-Baḥrānī) al-^c^Ajālī (vocalization uncertain) about whom no further biographical details are known.[16] This work, which highlights the differences between the Bahshamiyya and the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, was written between 536/1141 and 675/1276-7.[17]

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11 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, 119; W.Madelung, Der Imām al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm und die Glaubenslehre der Zaiditen (Studien zur Sprache, Geschichte und Kultur des islamischen Orients, neue Folge, vol.1. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1965), 222.
12 Ibn al-Murtaḍā, 119.
13 For his lost theological works, see W.Madelung, "Abū l-Husayn al-Baṣrī," Encyclopaedia of Islam, Supplement Fasc. 1-2:25.
14 Rukn al-Dīn b. al-Malāḥimī, Kitāb al-fā'iq fī uṣūl al-dīn (MS Ṣan^c^ā', al-Jāmi^c^ al-kabīr, ^c^ilm al-kalām 53).
15 Rukn al-Dīn b. al-Malāḥimī, Kitāb al-mu^c^tamad fī uṣūl al-dīn (edited by M.J.McDermott and W.Madelung. London: Al-Hoda, 1991).
16 Taqī al-Dīn al-Baḥrānī (or: al-Najrānī) al-^c^Ajālī (vocalization uncertain), al-Kāmil fī l-istiqṣā' fīmā balaghanā min kalām al-qudamā' (MS Leiden OR 487). Excerpts of this work have been edited and published by Elsayed Elshahed, Das Problem der transzendentalen sinnlichen Wahrnehmung in der spätmu^c^tazilitischen Erkenntnistheorie nach der Darstellung des Taqīaddīn al-Naǧrānī (Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, vol.86. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 1983). For this edition, see also W.Madelung, "Review of Das Problem der transzendentalen sinnlichen Wahrnehmung by E.Elshahed," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 48 (1985):128-9.
17 Ibid., 128.

There are safe indications that the Imamite Mu^c^tazilites had already adopted the doctrine of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī towards the end of the 6th/12th century. Sadīd al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. ^c^Alī b. al-Ḥasan al-Ḥimmaṣī al-Rāzī (d. after 600/1204) is the first known Imamite follower of this school.[18] The development of this last Imamite Mu^c^tazilite school reached its peak with Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274), Kamāl al-Dīn Mītham b. Mītham al-Baḥrānī (d. 699/1300), and Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325) who is usually known as al-^c^Allāma al-Ḥillī.

From among these scholars, al-Ḥillī has been the most outstanding and fruitful writer on theological questions; indeed, his fame as a theologian lasts until today. One of his more concise works, for example, the Bāb al-ḥādī ^c^ashar, together with al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī's (d. 826/1423) commentary on it, not only serves today among Shi^c^ites as a basic textbook on theology, but is also well known in the western world from W.M.Miller's English translation.[19] In addition to numerous concise books, al-Ḥillī also composed a considerable number of extensive theological works. We have, therefore, a large number of his writings which allow us to investigate his theological views in great detail. This does not apply to the same extent to Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī who seems to have been more of a philosopher than a theologian, and whose few theological writings are too concise to be suitable for a thorough

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[18] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Mu^c^tamad, introduction, viii.

[19] Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, al-Bābu 'l-Ḥādī ^c^Ashar. A Treatise on the Principles of Shi^c^ite Theology (translated by W.M.Miller. London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1928).

study.[20] Mītham al-Baḥrānī whose theological views are laid down only in a single work, the Qawā^cid al-marām fī ^cilm al-kalām, also offers too limited a field.[21]

During the centuries between the time of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and al-Ḥillī, a number of significant developments had occurred in Islamic thought which must also be taken into consideration in an investigation of al-Ḥillī's doctrine.

Most significant among these was the growing interest among the different theologians in the philosophical thought of Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037), who was a contemporary of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. Although the theologians traditionally opposed all those philosophical principles which disagreed with their theological views, they tended nevertheless to adopt more and more philosophical terminology, and even elements of philosophical teachings, as long as they could possibly be brought into agreement with their theological doctrine.

Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, who seems to have studied philosophy and the sciences with the Christian Abū ^cAlī b. al-Samḥ,[22] was considered by later writers such as al-Shahrastānī (d. 548/1153) and Ibn al-Qifṭī (d. 646/1248)

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[20] His most important theological writings are his "Tajrīd al-^caqā'id" (together with Hasan b. Yūsuf al-Ḥillī's Kashf al-murād fī sharḥ tajrīd al-i^ctiqād. Qum: Maktabat al-mustafawī, n.d.), his Fuṣūl fī l-uṣūl (edited by Shākir al-^cĀrif and Ḥamīd Khāliṣī. Al-^cAqā'id al-islāmiyya, vol.1. Baghdad, 1960), and his "Qawā^cid al-^caqā'id" (together with Ḥasan b. Yūsuf al-Ḥillī's "Kashf al-fawā'id fī sharḥ qawā^cid al-^caqā'id," in Majmū^cat al-rasā'il, 2-97. Qum: Maktabat Āyat Allāh al-^cuẓmā al-Mar^cashī al-Najafī, 1404H.)

[21] Kamāl al-Dīn Mītham al-Baḥrānī Qawā^cid al-marām fī ^cilm al-kalām (edited by Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī. Min makhṭūṭāt maktabat Āyat Allāh al-Mar^cashī al-^cāmma, no.3. Qum, 1406H.)

[22] See S.M.Stern, "Ibn al-Samḥ," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1956):31-44.

to have been deeply influenced by the concepts of the philosophers.[23] Yet this opinion is disputed among modern scholars and certainly requires further investigation.[24]

The profound impact of the philosophical tradition can easily be found in the work of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209). He is famous for having fully developed what had been initiated by his predecessor al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), and what Ibn Khaldūn called the "method of the moderns" (ṭarīqat al-muta'akhkhirīn)[25] in Ashᶜarite theology, through freely mixing philosophical and theological concepts and terminology.

However, despite this adoption of elements of the philosophical tradition, al-Rāzī usually displayed a highly critical attitude towards basic philosophical doctrines when he held on to the traditional Ashᶜarite views. An exception is his Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya which he wrote in his youth and in which he usually follows the philosophical views of his teacher Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. after 560/1164-5).[26]

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[23] Muhammad b. ᶜAbd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī, al-Milal wa-l-niḥal (edited by ᶜAbd al-ᶜAzīz Muhammad al-Wakīl. Cairo, 1387/1968), 1:85; idem, Nihāyat al-aqdām fī ᶜilm al-kalām (edited by A.Guillaume. Oxford, 1934), 221; Jamāl al-Dīn Abū l-Hasan ᶜAlī b. al-Qiftī, Ta'rīkh al-ḥukamā (edited by J.Lippert. Leipzig, 1903), 293-94.

[24] D.Gimaret ("Abo 'l-Hosayn al-Basrī," Encyclopaedia Iranica, 1/1:324) doubts whether S.Stern's identification of Abū l-Husayn with a homonymous student of Ibn al-Samḥ is correct without offering any arguments for his assumptions. He further considers the allegations of al-Shahrastānī and Ibn al-Qiftī about the impact of philosophy on Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Basrī as exaggerated.

[25] Abū Zayd ᶜAbd al-Rahmān b. Muhammad b. Khaldūn, Muqaddima (edited by ᶜAlī ᶜAbd al-Wāhid Wāfī. Cairo, 1376-1382/1957-62), 3:1048. Although Ibn Khaldūn maintained that al-Ghazālī founded this new method of theological thinking, his contribution should not be overestimated. Despite his study of philosophy which resulted in the composition of his Maqāsid al-falāsifah (a neutral exposition of philosophial views) and his Tahāfut al-falāsifah (a refutation of the philosophical positions), al-Ghazālī's main interest did not lie in theology. Moreover, in his theological exposition, the Iqtiṣād fī l-iᶜtiqād, he maintains somewhat conservative views. It was rather Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī who fully developed this modern method.

[26] S.Pines, "Abū 'l-Barakāt," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 1:113.

A further significant peculiarity of al-Rāzī's theology is that he often adopted the theological concepts of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī although modifying and interpreting them in such a way that they support the Ash$^{c}$arite rather than the Mu$^{c}$tazilite point of view.[27] Owing to the impact of the philosophical tradition, al-Rāzī often employed philosophical terminology to express his views, which are otherwise directly based on the positions of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Bāṣrī. There are safe indications that al-Rāzī was thoroughly acquainted with the positions of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī; during his visit to Khwārazm al-Rāzī was involved in debates with Mu$^{c}$tazilites who were most likely followers of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, possibly even direct students of Ibn al-Malāḥimī.[28] He moreover frequently mentioned the views of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and Ibn al-Malāḥimī and even quoted at times from Abū l-Ḥusayn's *Kitāb al-taṣaffuḥ*.[29]

Al-Rāzī's theological doctrine can be learnt from his extensive theological works which have been published, such as his *Kitāb al-arba$^{c}$īn fī uṣūl al-dīn*,[30] his *Muḥaṣṣal*,[31] his *Ma$^{c}$ālim uṣūl al-dīn*[32] and his *Maṭālib al-$^{c}$aliyya min al-$^{c}$ulūm al-ilāhiyya*. His *Tafsīr* is a further valuable source of his thought.[33] His *Nihāyat al-$^{c}$uqūl fī dirāyat al-uṣūl* is extant in manuscript.

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[27] Ibn al-Murtaḍā (119), for example, points out that al-Rāzī followed Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and Ibn al-Malāḥimī in the 'subtle (*laṭīf*)' points of theology not touching, however, basic doctrine.

[28] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Mu$^{c}$tamad*, introduction, vff.

[29] E.g. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Maṭālib al-$^{c}$aliyya min al-$^{c}$ulūm al-ilāhiyya* (edited by Aḥmad Ḥijāzī al-Saqqā'. Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-$^{c}$arabī, 1407/1987), 3:326-7.

[30] Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Kitāb al-arba$^{c}$īn fī uṣūl al-dīn* (Ḥyderabad: Dā'irat al-ma$^{c}$ārif al-$^{c}$uthmāniyya, 1353/1934).

[31] Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Muḥaṣṣal afkār al-mutaqaddimīn wa-l-muta'akhkhirīn* (edited by Ṭaha $^{c}$Abd al-Ra'ūf Sa$^{c}$d. Min turāth al-Rāzī. Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-$^{c}$arabī, 1404/1984).

[32] Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Ma$^{c}$ālim uṣūl al-dīn* (edited by Taha $^{c}$Abd al-Ra'ūf Sa$^{c}$d. Min turāth al-Rāzī, no.3. Cairo, 1979).

[33] Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Tafsīr al-kabīr* (Beirut: Dār al-fikr, 1405/1985). For the chronology of his works, see D.Gimaret, *Théories de l'acte humain en théologie musulmane* (Etudes musulmanes, vol.24. Paris: Vrin, 1980), 136-7.

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate to what degree al-Ḥillī's doctrine is directly based on the views of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and his followers, and to what extent the thought of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and the Avicennan tradition had an impact upon his theology. In regard to the influence of the philosophical tradition, it will be of interest to compare al-Ḥillī's reception of it with the position of his master Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, who must be considered as a philosopher rather than as a theologian.

## CHAPTER I

## THE BIOGRAPHY OF AL-ʿALLĀMA AL-ḤILLĪ

### 1.Dates of Life and Family

Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, called al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī, was born in 648/1250 in al-Ḥilla. This is confirmed by al-Ḥillī himself although a minor disagreement occurs concerning the exact date. In his *Khulāṣa*, he reports the date as 29 Ramaḍān/25 December[1] but in his *Ajwibat al-masā'il al-muhanna'iyya*, he says that according to a statement by his father he was born on 27 Ramaḍān/23 December.[2] Al-ʿĀmilī suggests that this difference may be the result of a writing error since the numerals 7 and 9 look very similar.[3]

Al-Ḥillī died either on 20 or 21 Muḥarram 726/27 or 28 December 1325 in his home town al-Ḥilla.[4] All biographers agree on this year except al-Afandī who erroneously reports that al-Ḥillī died in the same year as Uljaytū, i.e. in 716/1316.[5]

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[1] Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, *Rijāl al-ʿAllāma* (edited by Muḥammad Ṣādiq Baḥr al-ʿUlūm. Najaf: al-Ḥaydariyya, 1961), 48.
[2] Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, *Ajwibat al-masā'il al-muhanna'iyya* (Qum: al-Khayyām, 1401H.), 139.
[3] Muḥsin al-Amīn al-ʿĀmilī, *Aʿyān al-shīʿa* (Damascus, 1946-1982), 24:222.
[4] Al-ʿĀmilī, 24:223; see also ʿAbd al-Nabī b. ʿAlī al-Kāẓimī, *Takmilat al-rijāl* (edited by Muḥammad Ṣādiq Baḥr al-ʿUlūm. Najaf: al-Ādāb, 1971), 1:315, who reports the 29 Muḥarram/5 January 1326. Muḥammad Bāqir al-Khwānsārī, (*Rauḍāt al-jannāt*. Qum, 1987, 2:282) and Nūr Allāh al-Shushtarī (*Majālis al-mu'minīn*. Tehran, 1365sh, 1:574) report the 21 Muḥarram/29 December. Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Astarābādī (*Manhaj al-maqāl fī taḥqīq aḥwāl al-rijāl*. Tehran, 1306/1889, 109) reports the 19 Muḥarram/26 December. This may also be the result of an error; see al-ʿĀmilī, 24:223. See also al-Ḥillī, *Rijāl*, 49 n. 1, where Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn is said to have given the 11 Muḥarram/18 December as the date of his father's death.
[5] ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿĪsā al-Afandī, *Riyāḍ al-ʿulamā'* (edited by Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī. Min makhṭūṭāt maktabat Āyat Allāh al-Marʿashī al-ʿāmma, no.5. Qum: al-Khayyām, 1401/1981), 1:363. Uljaytū died on 27 Ramaḍān 716/13 December 1316.

Al-Ḥillī's father was Sadīd al-Dīn Yūsuf b. ᶜAlī b. Muḥammad b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī[6] about whom not much is known, not even the date of his death. In 665/1267 he was still alive. He is said to have written several works on ḥadīth and uṣūl,[7] but no titles are known.

The information which al-Ḥillī provides about his father indicates that he must have been a very learned man and in his time one of the leading personalities of al-Ḥilla. He reports that Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī visited al-Ḥilla shortly after the fall of Baghdād on 4 Ṣafar 656/10 February 1258 in his position as a minister of Hūlākū. On this occasion, he asked the Muḥaqqiq al-awwal who of the scholars of al-Ḥilla was the most excellent. Following al-Muḥaqqiq's answer that all of them were excellent, Naṣīr al-Dīn specified further, asking who was the best with respect to theology and legal methodology. Al-Muḥaqqiq named al-Ḥillī's father together with Mufīd al-Din Muḥammad b. Jahm (d. 680/1281-2).[8] A further indication that Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar must have been a learned man derives from al-Ḥillī's teaching permits (ijāzāt) where he cites his father frequently as an authority for his own knowledge.[9]

Al-Ḥillī's report on the role which his father played in the surrender of al-Ḥilla to the Mongol conquerors in 656/1258 suggests that he was one of the leading personalities of al-Ḥilla. When, after the fall of Baghdad, the remaining inhabitants of al-Ḥilla and Kūfa decided to surrender to the conquerors, Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar together with Majd al-Dīn b. Ṭāwūs and Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-ᶜIzz are reported to have delivered the proposal of

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[6] About him, see al-Afandī, 5:395ff.
[7] Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, "al-Ijāza al-kabīra al-maᶜrūfa li-Banī Zahra al-Ḥalabī," in Biḥār al-anwār by Muḥammad Bāqir al-Majlisī (edited by Jawād al-ᶜAlawī et al. Tehran, al-Maktaba al-islāmiyya, 1376-1405/1957-85), 62; Muḥammad b. Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn, "Ijāza li-l-Sayyid Muhannā' b. Sinān," ibid., 151.
[8] Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 64. For this instance, see also R.Strothmann, Die Zwölfer-Schi'a (Hildesheim/New York: Olms, 1975), 47ff; al-Afandī, 5:395-6.
[9] See later.

surrender to Hūlākū. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar then went at the request of Hūlākū to the latter's residence and convinced him of the sincerity of the motives of the people of al-Ḥilla.[10]

Al-Ḥillī's mother was a descendant of the Banū Sa$^{c}$īd.[11] His brother Raḍī al-Dīn $^{c}$Alī,[12] who was the author of *al-$^{c}$Udad al-qawiyya*,[13] was 13 years older and is reported to have died before him.[14] Al-Ḥillī also had a sister who was married to Majd al-Dīn al-Fawāris.[15] This couple had five children,[16] two of whom, $^{c}$Amīd al-Dīn $^{c}$Abd Allāh al-A$^{c}$rajī al-Ḥusaynī (681/1282-3-754/1353) and Ḍiyā' al-Dīn (683/1284-5 - after 740/1339-40), became students of al-Ḥillī and wrote commentaries on a number of his works.[17]

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[10] Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, *Kashf al-yaqīn fī faḍā'il Amīr al-mu'minīn* (Najaf: Dār al-kutub al-tijāriyya, 1371/1951), 28. For this incident, see also $^{c}$Abd Allāh b. Faḍl Allāh Waṣṣāf, *Kitāb-i mustaṭāb-i Waṣṣāf* (Tehran, 1338/1959), 36; $^{c}$Abd al-Muḥammad Āyatī, *Taḥrīr-i ta'rīkh-i Waṣṣāf* (Tehran, 1346/1967), 19; Strothmann, 42ff. Kamāl al-Dīn $^{c}$Abd al-Razzāq b. Aḥmad b. al-Fuwaṭī (*Al-Ḥawādith al-jāmi$^{c}$a wa-l-tajārib al-nāfi$^{c}$a fī l-mi'a al-sābi$^{c}$a*. Edited by Muṣṭafā Jawād. Baghdad: al-Maktaba al-$^{c}$arabiyya, 1351/1932, 330) does not mention Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar.

[11] Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, *Nahj al-ḥaqq wa-kashf al-ṣidq* (edited by Faraj Allāh al-Ḥusaynī and Riḍā al-Ṣadr. Beirut, 1982), introduction, 8.

[12] About him, see Yūsuf b. Aḥmad al-Baḥrānī, *Lu'lu'at al-Baḥrayn* (edited by Muḥammad Ṣādiq Baḥr al-$^{c}$Ulūm. Najaf: al-Nu$^{c}$mān, 1386/1966), 266; al-Khwānsārī, 4:344-5 (no.408).

[13] See Muḥammad Muḥsin Āghā Buzurg al-Ṭihrānī, *al-Dharī$^{c}$a ilā taṣānīf al-shī$^{c}$a* (Tehran, 1355-1405H.), 15:232 (no.1514).

[14] Al-Baḥrānī, 266 n. 1; on 28 Muḥarram 703/11 September 1303 Raḍī al-Dīn issued an *ijāza* to Zayn al-Dīn al-Astarābādī (see Āghā Buzurg, *Dharī$^{c}$a*, 1:223 (no.1170); idem, *Ṭabaqāt a$^{c}$lām al-shī$^{c}$a* (Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-$^{c}$arabī, 1971-5), 5:139); the date of his death is therefore between the beginning of 703/1303 and the beginning of 726/1325.

[15] About him, see al-Baḥrānī, 199-210 (no.76).

[16] Al-Baḥrānī, 199 n. 16.

[17] See later.

## 2. His Teachers

At first al-Ḥillī studied in his home town al-Ḥilla mainly under the guidance of his father[18] and Najm al-Dīn Jaᶜfar b. Muḥammad b. Saᶜīd al-Ḥillī, known as al-Muḥaqqiq al-awwal (d. 676/1277),[19] who was his maternal uncle.[20]

From his teaching permits (ijāzāt) which were issued later to some of his pupils, it is possible to establish the contents of his studies at this time. In regard to traditions, he studied the Shiᶜite legacy such as the Kāfī of al-Kulīnī and the various collections of al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī and Ibn Bābūyā,[21] together with the important Sunnite collections such as the Muwaṭṭa' of Mālik b. Anas,[22] the Ṣaḥīḥ of al-Bukhārī,[23] the Musnad of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal[24] and the Sunan of Abū Dāwūd.[25] His studies with his father also included the science of ḥadīth criticism.[26]

In theology he was introduced to the works of the earlier Shiᶜite Muᶜtazilites such as al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, ᶜAlam al-Hudā al-Murtaḍā and al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī. In all these fields, his father appears to have been his most important teacher.[27] In his legal study, al-Muḥaqqiq al-awwal,

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[18] Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 62.
[19] Ibid., 62-3; about him, see al-Afandī, 1:103ff.
[20] Al-Afandī, 1:359; also al-Khwānsārī, 2:277.
[21] Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza li-l-Sayyid Muhanna' b. Sinān," in al-Majlisī, Biḥār, 107:146.
[22] Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 90.
[23] Ibid., 88-9.
[24] Ibid., 86.
[25] Ibid., 92.
[26] Ibid., 88, 95.
[27] Al-Ḥillī, Rijāl, 282; idem, "Ijāza kabīra," 68-70;135-7.

one of the most outstanding scholars of law of his time,[28] also played an important part.[29] Al-Ḥillī also studied Qur'ān exegesis[30] and grammar[31] with his father.

Among his teachers in this period were further the brothers Jamāl al-Dīn b. Ṭāwūs (d. 673/1274)[32] and Raḍī al-Dīn b. Ṭāwūs (d. 664/1266)[33] who were descended from an important family of Imamite scholars in al-Ḥilla.[34] In addition to their own writings, both are also said to have taught him the works of the former Shiᶜite authorities such as Ibn Bābūyā, Shaykh al-Mufīd, al-Murtaḍā and al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī. From the ijāzas it is evident that Raḍī al-Dīn b. Ṭāwūs was of less importance in al-Ḥillī's education than his brother Jamāl al-Dīn.[35] The reason for this was presumably Raḍī al-Dīn's involvement in politics. In 661/1262-3 he was appointed syndic of the Ṭālibīds in Iraq (Niqābat al-ṭālibiyyīn),[36] a post which he held for three years and eleven months,[37] and probably until his death. He left al-Ḥilla, therefore, when al-Ḥillī was only 13 years old.

Another scholar whom al-Ḥillī mentions as his teacher was Mufīd al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Jahm (d. 680/1281-2).[38] Al-Ḥillī wrote[39] that in the time when Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī visited al-Ḥilla, al-Muḥaqqiq described him, together with his father Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar, as the foremost scholar in

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[28] See H.T.Modarressi, An Introduction to Shīᶜī Law: A Bibliographical Study (London: Ithaca, 1984), 65-70 for a list of his legal works.
[29] Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza li-Muhanna' b. Sinān," 144-6; idem, "Ijāza kabīra," 68-9; see also al-Khwānsārī, 2:277-8.
[30] Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 91-2.
[31] Ibid., 102.
[32] About him, see al-Baḥrānī, 235-45 (no.85).
[33] About him, see ᶜUmar Riḍā al-Kaḥḥāla, Muᶜjam al-mu'allifīn (Beirut, 1376-81/1957-61), 7:248; al-Khwānsārī, 4:325 ff; Strothmann, 88-168.
[34] Al-Baḥrānī, 236 n.17.
[35] Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza li-Muhanna' b.Sinān," 144-6 (for Jamāl al-Dīn); idem, "Ijāza kabīra," 68-9 (for Jamāl al-Dīn), 136-7 (for Jamāl al-Dīn and Raḍī al-Dīn).
[36] ᶜAbbās al-ᶜAzzāwī, Tā'rīkh al-ᶜIrāq bayn al-iḥtilālayn (Baghdad, 1353-/1934-), 1:246.
[37] Strothmann, 93.
[38] Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 64; about him, see al-Baḥrānī, 265 (no.92).
[39] "Ijāza kabīra," 64.

theology and legal methodology.[40] From this notice and from the reports that Mufīd al-Dīn died in al-Ḥilla,[41] it is evident that al-Ḥillī studied under his guidance during this early stage of his education in al-Ḥilla.

The same applies to another teacher of al-Ḥillī, Najīb al-Dīn Yaḥyā b. Yaḥyā b. Saᶜīd al-Hudhalī (d. 689/1290 or 690/1291),[42] a cousin of the Muḥaqqiq al-awwal. Although he was born in Kūfa, Najīb al-Dīn moved later to al-Ḥilla where he is reported to have died. Since he primarily was a lawyer and the author of a legal compendium entitled _Jāmiᶜ al-sharā'iᶜ_,[43] al-Ḥillī probably studied law with him.

Although al-Ḥillī does not indicate who were his authorities for the theological works of Ibn al-Malāḥimī, it is most likely that he became acquainted with these during the first stage of his studies; Ibn al-Malāḥimī's writings were very famous and known even to such opponents of Muᶜtazilism as Raḍī al-Dīn b. Ṭāwūs.[44] Similarly he does not indicate when he was introduced to the _Kitāb al-kāmil_ by Taqī al-Dīn. Yet there is no doubt that he was familiar with this work.

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[40] Ibid., 64.

[41] Mudarris Riḍawī, _Aḥwāl wa-āthār...ustādh al-bashar wa-ᶜaql hādī ᶜashar Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Ṭūsī_ (Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tehrān, no.282. Tehrān: Tehrān University Press, 1334sh), 129.

[42] Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 64; about him, see al-Baḥrānī, 252-3 (no.88); Āghā Buzurg, _Dharīᶜa_, 1:263-4; al-Afandī, 5:334-342; al-Khwānsārī, 2:182 ff (no.170).

[43] See Modarressi, 70.

[44] See Ibn al-Malāḥimī, _Muᶜtamad_, introduction.

At the next stage of his studies, al-Ḥillī's teachers were Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274)[45] and the Shāfiʿīte scholar Najm al-Dīn ʿAlī b. ʿUmar al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī (d. 675/1277).[46] The former founded the observatory in Marāgha in 657/1258-9 during the reign of the Ilkhan Hūlākū.[47] This observatory not only served its technical purpose[48] but was also a kind of academy which attracted many scholars,[49] such as Ibn al-ʿIbrī from Antioch and Tumaji from China,[50]

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[45] Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 62; about him, see ʿAbbās b. Muḥammad Riḍā al-Qummī, al-Kunā wa-l-alqāb (Najaf: al-Ḥaydariyya, 1376/1956), 3:216-8; al-Baḥrānī, 245-7 (no.86); Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Khalīl b. Aybak al-Ṣafadī, al-Wāfī bi-l-wafayāt (edited by H.Ritter and S.Dedering et al. Bibliotheca Islamica, vol.6. Istanbul, 1931-), 1:179ff; Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. Shākir al-Kutubī, Fawāt al-wafayāt (edited by Muḥammad Muḥyi al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd. Cairo, 1951-3), 2:307ff (no.369); al-Mustawfī al-Qazwīnī, Ta'rīkh-i guzīda (edited by ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn Nawa'i. Tehran, Mu'assasat-i intishārāt-i Amīr kabīr, 1362/1987), 705-6; al-Khwānsārī, 6:300-319; al-ʿĀmilī, 46:4ff (no.2444); also Strothmann, 16-87; Quṭb al-Dīn Yūnīnī, Dhayl mir'at al-zamān (Hyderabad: Dā'irat al-maʿārif al-ʿuthmāniyya, 1374-80/1954-61), 3:79-80; Āghā Buzurg, Ṭabaqāt, 4:168-70; Ismāʿīl b. ʿUmar b. Kathīr, al-Bidāya wa-l-nihāya (Cairo: al-Saʿāda, 1351-8/1932-5), 13:267-8.

[46] Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 66; about him, see al-Qummī, 3:86-7; al-Kutubī, 2:134; M.Mohaghegh, "Al-Kātibī," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 4:762.

[47] Al-ʿĀmilī, 46:10.

[48] For the scientific importance of the observatory, see E.S.Kennedy, "The Exact Sciences in Iran under the Saljuqs and Mongols," in The Cambridge History of Iran (edited by J.A.Boyle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 5:668ff.

[49] Abū l-Faraj b. al-ʿIbrī, Mukhtaṣar ta'rīkh al-duwal (edited by A.Ṣāliḥānī. Beirut, 1890), 500; Ibn Kathīr, 13:268.

[50] ʿAbd Allāh al-Niʿma, Falāsifat al-shīʿa (Beirut: al-Ḥayyāt, 1962), 484; see also J.A.Boyle, "The Longer Introduction to the 'Zij-i-Ilkhani' of Nasīr ad-Dīn Ṭūsī," Journal of Semitic Studies 8 (1963):253; al-ʿĀmilī, 46:11; H.J.Seemann, "Die Instrumente der Sternwarte zu Marāgha nach den Mitteilungen von al-ʿUrḍī," Sitzungsbericht der physikalisch-medizinischen Sozietät zu Erlangen 60 (1928):119.

together with numerous other students.[51] It contained a large library which is said to have contained 400,000 volumes which Naṣīr al-Dīn collected from various Islamic countries.[52]

Al-Kātibī was one of the four co-founders of the observatory who were invited to Marāgha by Hūlākū at the request of Naṣīr al-Dīn. Besides al-Kātibī, there were Mu'ayyid al-Dīn al-ᶜUrḍī from Damascus (d. 664/1265-6),[53] Fakhr al-Dīn al-Khilāṭī (d. 680/1281-2)[54] from Tiflīs and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Marāghī (d. 667/1268-9) from Mauṣil.[55]

There seem to be no reports confirming al-Ḥillī's presence at Marāgha. One of the best informed biographical sources which would probably say more about this, the Talkhīṣ majmaᶜ al-ādāb of Ibn al-Fuwaṭī (d. 723/1323),[56] is partly lost and with it the section containing al-Ḥillī's biography.[57] Al-Ḥillī mentions Naṣīr al-Dīn and al-Kātibī as

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[51]See Ibn Kathīr, 13:268; Kamāl al-Dīn b. al-Fuwaṭī, Talkhīṣ majmaᶜ al-ādāb fī muᶜjam al-alqāb (edited by Muṣṭafā Jawād. Baghdad, 1962), 4/1, introd.,17; al-ᶜĀmilī, 46:11; Muṣṭafā Jawād, "Ihtimām Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī bi-iḥyā' al-thaqāfa al-islāmiyya ayyām al-mughūl," in Yādnāmeh-i Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tehran, no.416. Tehran: Tehran University Press 1336sh.), 97-8; Sāyīlī, "Khwāja Naṣīr Ṭūsī wa-rasdkhāne-yi Marāgha," ibid., 66-7, Āghā Buzurg, Ṭabaqāt, 4:170.

[52]Al-Ṣafadī, 1:179; also Boyle, 247; Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, Majmaᶜ, 4/2, introd., 17; al-ᶜĀmilī, 46:11; Mudarris Riḍawī, Aḥwāl, 31; for this purpose it was helpful that he was the minister of endowments (Ibn al-ᶜIbrī, 500) since as such he could transfer the endowment books from other places to Marāgha.

[53]About him, see Seemann, 111-4.

[54]About him, see Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, Majmaᶜ, 4/3:215-6 (no.2175).

[55]Boyle, 247; al-Mustawfī al-Qazwīnī, 590; Ibn al-ᶜIbrī, 501; Khwāja Rashīd al-Dīn, Jāmiᶜ al-tawārīkh (edited by Bahman Karīmī. Tehran: Iqbal, 1338/1959), 2:718; see also Mudarris Riḍawī, Aḥwāl, 27-28; Niᶜma, 483-4 for other scholars who worked at Marāgha.

[56]Ibn al-Fuwaṭī stayed at Marāgha from 660/1261-2 for 13 years during which time he studied mainly philosophy and astronomy with Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī; see Nājī Maᶜrūf, Ta'rīkh ᶜulamā' al-mustanṣiriyya (Baghdad: al-ᶜĀnī, 1379/1959), 288. For ten years he acted also as the librarian at the Marāgha observatory; see ibid. 299.

[57]For the extant portions of the work, see F.Rosenthal, "Ibn al-Fuwaṭī," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 3:769.

his teachers but does not state where he met them. From the existing evidence, however, it can safely be assumed that he studied in Marāgha. Naṣīr al-Dīn worked in Marāgha from 657/1258-9 and left the town a few times only to inspect religious endowments in his function as minister of endowments.[58] Moreover, the Ilkhan Abaqa sometimes demanded Naṣīr al-Dīn's company as a political advisor on his journeys. In the year 662/1263-4 Naṣīr al-Dīn is said to have visited many places in Iraq to inspect the endowments and to collect books for the library in Marāgha.[59] In 672/1273-4 he visited Qūsān, Wāsiṭ and Baghdad together with the Ilkhan Abaqa to inspect the endowments and the situation of the teachers and the lawyers.[60] Since Naṣīr al-Dīn is known to have died in the same year in Baghdad,[61] he presumably died during this visit. Al-Ṣafadī reports that this second visit to Baghdad lasted some months and that during this time Naṣīr al-Dīn took with him some students from Marāgha and taught them in Baghdad until his death;[62] but no other historian confirms this.[63] Al-Ḥillī, therefore, must have studied under Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī in Marāgha but his opportunity to do so must have been limited to a few years only as he died when al-Ḥillī was only 24 years old.

It is most likely that al-Ḥillī met al-Kātibī similarly at Marāgha. Although it is reported that al-Kātibī left Marāgha shortly before his death to teach at Juwayn,[64] no exact dates are mentioned for his departure. In 670/1271-2, five years before his death, he must still have been in Marāgha.[65]

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[58] Ibn al-ᶜIbrī, 500.
[59] Al-ᶜAzzāwī, 1:247.
[60] Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, Ḥawādith, 375.
[61] Ibid., 380; also Muhammad Mudarrisi Zanjānī, Sargudhasht wa-ᶜaqā'id-i falsafī-yi Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (Tehran: Mu'assasat-i intishārāt-i Amīr kabīr, 1363/1984), 75ff.
[62] Al-Ṣafadī, 1:183; see also al-Kutubī, 2:312.
[63] See e.g. Ṣāyīlī, 64.
[64] Mudarris Riḍawī, Aḥwāl, 137.
[65] See Maᶜrūf, 63, where a report is given on Muḥyi al-Dīn al-ᶜAbbāsī who arrived in 670/1271-2 in Marāgha to study with both Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and al-Kātibī; also Mudarris Riḍawī, Aḥwāl, 151; Zanjānī, 210ff.

The influence of these two scholars on al-Ḥillī must be considered as formative. He states that he studied philosophy and especially the Ilāhiyyāt of Ibn Sīnā's Kitāb al-shifā under Naṣīr al-Dīn[66] and he further mentions having read Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's al-Tadhkira fī ᶜilm al-hay'a with him.[67] Moreover, al-Ḥillī wrote commentaries on two of the latter's works on theology, the Tajrīd al-aqā'id and the Qawāᶜid al-aqā'id and on his Manṭiq al-tajrīd on logic, and a note in his Muntahā al-maṭlab seems to indicate that he also studied law under Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī.[68] This, however, is most unlikely.

Under the guidance of al-Kātibī, al-Ḥillī studied philosophy and also logic.[69] Later he wrote commentaries on both of al-Kātibī's important works, the Risāla al-shamsīyya on logic and the Ḥikmat al-ᶜayn on metaphysics and natural sciences. Al-Kātibī also introduced al-Ḥillī to three important earlier writers. One of these was Athīr al-Dīn Mufaḍḍal b. ᶜUmar al-Abharī (d. 663/1264),[70] an important philosopher, mathematician and astronomer and author of Hidāyat al-ḥikma and Kitāb al-Īsāghūjī. He further taught al-Ḥillī the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209).[71]

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[66] Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 62; see also ᶜAbd al-Ḥayy b. Aḥmad b. ᶜImād, Shadharāt al-dhahab fī akhbār man dhahab (Cairo: al-Qudsī, 1350-1/1931-2), 5:340 where the importance of the teaching of the philosophy of Ibn Sīnā at Marāgha is noted.

[67] Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 62.

[68] See Zanjānī, 41; some biographers, however, state that Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī studied law under al-Ḥillī, see Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Ḥurr al-ᶜĀmilī, Amal al-āmil (edited by Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī. Najaf: al-Ādāb, 1385H.), 2:81; S.Ẓāhir, "Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī," Revue de l'Académie Arabe de Damas 36 (1961):241. This is very unlikely.

[69] Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 66.

[70] Ibid., 67-8; also Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn, "Ijāza li-Muhanna' b. Sinān," 151; about him, see Zanjānī, 189ff.

[71] Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 68; also Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn, "Ijāza li-Muhanna' b. Sinān," 151. Al-Kātibī wrote commentaries on the Muḥaṣṣal and the Mulakhkhaṣ of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī; see M.Mohaghegh, "Al-Kātibī," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 4:762.

Also with al-Kātibī, al-Ḥillī read the writings of Muḥammad b. Nāmāwar b. ᶜAbd al-Malik al-Khūnjī (d. 646/1248)[72] who wrote on astronomy and logic.

It is also possible that al-Ḥillī met Mītham al-Baḥrānī (d. 699/1300)[73] who was an important philosopher and theologian. Since Mītham al-Baḥrānī was a student of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and held frequent discussions with him,[74] it is likely that he stayed in Marāgha for some time.

It is not known when al-Ḥillī left Marāgha but there is no reason to assume that he stayed there after the death of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī in 672/1274.[75]

During the following twenty years, until the beginning of the eighth/fourteenth century, al-Ḥillī stayed partly in al-Ḥilla[76] where he mainly taught, and partly in nearby Baghdad where he met some more of the scholars whom he mentions as his teachers.

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[72] Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 67-8; there appears to be some disagreement about the date of his death. Al-Kahhāla (12:73) reports 646/1248 while Ibn ᶜImād (5:236-7) reports 647/1249-50.

[73] Mītham al-Baḥrānī is usually mentioned by biographers as one of al-Ḥillī's teachers (e.g. al-Khwānsārī, 2:278; al-Afandī, 1:359); however, al-Ḥillī does not include him in the list of those who issued an ijāza to him; about Mītham al-Baḥrānī, see al-Afandī, 5:226ff; al-ᶜĀmilī, 49:98-9 (no.11109); al-Khwānsārī, 7:216ff; al-Baḥrānī, 253-61 (no.89). Some biographers report 679/1280 as the date of his death (see Brockelmann, Geschichte der arabischen Literatur Supplementband (Leiden: Brill, 1937-49), 1:713 (hereafter cited as GALS and GAL); Mudarris Riḍawī, Aḥwāl, 115). However, Āghā Buzurg showed that the date 699/1300 is correct, since Mītham al-Baḥrānī did not complete his smaller commentary on the Nahj al-balāgha until 681/1282-3 (Ṭabaqāt, 4:188).

[74] Al-Baḥrānī, 255.

[75] This seems to be confirmed by the fact that al-Ḥillī is not mentioned among those who continued the work at the Marāgha observatory after Naṣīr al-Dīn's death in 672/1274; see Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, Majmaᶜ, 4/1, introduction, 21.

[76] That al-Ḥillī usually taught in al-Ḥilla is indicated when he designates himself as "al-Ḥillī maulidan wa-maskanan"; see his Rijāl, 45.

One of these was the Shāfiᶜīte scholar Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Kīshī[77] who is reported to have started teaching in Baghdad in 665/1266-7 at the Niẓāmiyya College[78] where he remained until he was called to Isfahan by the minister Shams al-Dīn al-Juwaynī.[79] He died in 695/1296 in Shīrāz.[80] Al-Kīshī was the author of a compendium on grammar together with some other treatises[81] and is known to have had a correspondence with Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī.[82] Having studied under the guidance of the Sufi Ḍiyā' al-Dīn Abū l-Ḥasan Masᶜūd b. Maḥmūd (d. 655/1257-8), he was well-acquainted with the works of Ibn al-ᶜArabī. Some time between 678/1279-80 and 685/1286, al-Kīshī regularly attended the Sufi circle in Shīrāz which was founded by Najīb al-Dīn ᶜAlī Buzghush Shīrāzī (d. 678/1279-80).[83] Although mysticism had no impact upon al-Ḥillī's theological thought, it is likely that through al-Kīshī he became thoroughly acquainted with the views of Ibn al-ᶜArabī. It is probable that he was already to some extent familiar with Sufi ideas since his stay at Marāgha where the Sufis were represented in large numbers.[84]

Another of al-Ḥillī's teachers was Burhān al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Nasafī (d. 687/1288) who wrote several works mainly on disputation (jadal/ ᶜilm al-khilāf).[85]

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[77] Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 65-6; about him, see al-Ṣafadī, 2:141 (no.493); Mudarris Riḍawī, Aḥwāl, 106-8.
[78] Al-ᶜAzzāwī, 1:263; Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, Ḥawādith, 358.
[79] Al-ᶜAzzāwī, 1:263; Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, Ḥawādith, 358; see also Mudarris Riḍawī, Aḥwāl, 106.
[80] Al-Ṣafadī, 2:141; another report mentions 694/1294-5 as the date of his death, see al-ᶜAzzāwī, 1:371; also H.Landolt, "Der Briefwechsel zwischen Kāšānī und Simnānī über Waḥdat al-Wuǧūd," Der Islam 50 (1973):34.
[81] Mudarris Riḍawī, Aḥwāl, 107.
[82] Ibid., 108; Zanjānī, 198ff; Landolt, 34 n.21.
[83] See Landolt, 34-5.
[84] One of the outstanding mystics at Maragha, for instance, was Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (d. 710/1311) who arrived there in 658/1259-60; see Ibn Fuwaṭī, Majmaᶜ, 4/4:716-7 (no.2927).
[85] Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 66-7; about him, see al-Kaḥḥāla, 11:297-8; al-Ṣafadī, 1:282-3 (no.185); Brockelmann, GAL, 1:615; GALS, 1:849.

He is reported to have come to Baghdad in 675/1276-7[86] where he taught, probably at the Mustanṣiriyya college, until his death in 687/1288.[87] With him, al-Ḥillī studied disputation.[88]

In addition he studied grammar with Jamāl al-Dīn b. Āyāz al-Naḥwī (d. 681/1282-3),[89] who is known to have been a lecturer in grammar at the Mustanṣiriyya college in Baghdad.[90] Al-Ḥillī records having read with him the works of the celebrated grammarian Jamāl al-Dīn b. al-Ḥājib (d. 646/1249).[91] Another of his teachers was ᶜIzz al-Dīn Abū l-ᶜAbbās b. Ibrāhīm b. ᶜUmar al-Fārūthī al-Wāsiṭī (d. 694/1292-3)[92] who is said to have come from Damascus to Iraq in 692/1292-3.[93] Al-Ḥillī presumably met him during the two years of his stay in Iraq. Since al-Wāsiṭī was a student of Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 586/1190), it is likely that al-Ḥillī studied the latter's works with him. While there are no indications that al-Suhrawardī's doctrine of illumination made any impact upon him, he was certainly interested in the latter's philosophical works, indeed he even wrote a commentary on the Kitāb al-talwīḥāt.

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86 Al-Safadī, 1:283; al-ᶜAzzāwī, 1:343.
87 Ibid., 1:343-4. According to Ibn ᶜImad, (5:385), he died in 684/1285-6. Kātip Çelebi (Keşf-el-zunūn (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, 1941-3, 1:865, 882) reports the date 688/1289 for his death.
88 Al-Hillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 66-7.
89 Husayn b. Badr b. Āyāz b. ᶜAbd Allāh Abū Muḥammad, known as al-ᶜAllāma Jamāl al-Dīn. About him, see Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, Bughyat al-wuᶜāt fī ṭabaqāt al-lughawiyyīn wa-l-nuḥāh (Cairo, 1384/1964-5), 1:532 (no.1103).
90 Maᶜrūf, 157; al-Suyūṭī, Bughya, 1:532.
91 Al-Hillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 104; about him, see H.Fleisch, "Ibn al-Ḥādjib," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 3:781.
92 Al-Hillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 67; about him, see al-ᶜAzzāwī, 1:371; Ibn al-ᶜImād, 5:425; Ibn Kathīr, 13:342; Shams al-Dīn Abū l-Khayr M. b. M. b. al-Jazarī, Ghāyat al-nihāya fī ṭabaqāt al-qurrā' (edited by G.Bergsträsser. Bibliotheca Islamica, vol.8 a-c. Cairo: al-Saᶜāda, 1933-5), 1:34-5 (no.140).
93 Ibn al-ᶜImād, 5:425.

Al-Ḥillī further states that he studied under the guidance of the Ḥanafīte scholar Taqī al-Dīn ᶜAbd Allāh b. Jaᶜfar b. ᶜAlī al-Ṣabbāgh al-Kūfī.[94] With him, he read the Qur'ān commentary al-Kashshāf ᶜan ḥaqā'iq al-tanzīl of Jār Allāh Maḥmūd b. ᶜUmar al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144).[95]

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[94] Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 67; Ṣāliḥ b. ᶜAbd Allāh b. Jaᶜfar b. Ṣāliḥ al-Asadī, known as Ibn al-Ṣabbāgh who was born in 639/1241; the date of his death is unknown. See about him al-Kaḥḥāla, 5:8; Ibn al-Jazarī, 1:333 (no.1449).

[95] Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 103.

## 3.Al-Ḥillī at the Court of Uljaytū

Ghāzān (d. 703/1304), Uljaytū's brother and predecessor, became a convert to Islam in 694/1295.[96] This was a decisive step towards the revival of the Muslim community in Iran and Iraq which had suffered greatly during the reign of his predecessors who had been hostile towards Islam.[97] He attempted to restore the dominant position of Islam by re-establishing Islamic schools and mosques[98] which had been destroyed by his predecessors. Although he adhered to Sunnite Islam he also paid special attention to the Shiᶜites in Iran and Iraq.[99]

After his accession in Dhū al-Ḥijja 703/July-August 1304, Uljaytū, who had been baptized as a child[100] and had later become a Buddhist,[101] declared Islam the religion of state.[102] At this time he adhered to the Ḥanafīte school of law.[103] This was apparently due to the fact that while governor of Khurāsān[104] he was surrounded mainly by Ḥanafītes.[105] After

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[96]See A.Bausani, "Religion under the Mongols," in The Cambridge History of Iran (edited by J.A.Boyle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 5:541-2; B.Spuler, Die Mongolen in Iran (Leiden: Brill, 1985), 154. The Ilkhān Aḥmad (d. 683/1284) who ruled from 680/1282 until 683/1284 had already converted to Islam. However, he did not succeed in spreading Islam among the other members of the ruling society; see Spuler, 69ff.

[97]Concerning the religious situation of Iran and Iraq under the Mongols, see Spuler, 165ff; also Bausani, 538ff.

[98]Bausani, 542-4; also Abū l-Qāsim ᶜAbd Allāh b. ᶜAlī Qāshānī, "Ta'rīkh-i Uljaytū," translated by Maryam Parvisi-Berger, in "Die Chronik über den Ilchan Öljaitu (1304-16)" (Ph.D.Diss, Göttingen, 1968), 31.

[99]Qāshānī, 84ff; Bausani, 543; ᶜAbd Allāh b. Luṭf Allāh Ḥāfiẓ al-Abrū, Dhayl-i jāmiᶜ al-tawārikh-i Rashīdī (edited by Khān Bābā Bayānī. Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tehrān, no.88. Tehran, 1350/1971), 101 n.1.

[100]Spuler, 158, 184.

[101]Ibid., 158.

[102]Al-Mustawfī al-Qazwīnī, 606.

[103]Qāshānī, 89.

[104]Spuler, 90; Ismāᶜīl b. ᶜAlī Abū l-Fidā, The Memoirs of a Syrian Prince Abu 'l-Fidā', Sultan of Ḥamāh (672-732/1273-1331) (translated by P.M.Holt. Freiburger Islamstudien, vol.9. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1983), 18, 24-5;

703/1304 when he succeeded his brother as Ilkhan, he came under opposing influences at court. The first minister, Rashīd al-Dīn, who was a Shāfi$^{c}$īte and in conflict with the Ḥanafītes at court,[106] attempted to break their influence. For this purpose, he introduced in Ramaḍān 707/February-March 1308 the Shāfi$^{c}$īte scholar Niẓām al-Dīn $^{c}$Abd al-Malik al-Marāghī at court[107] who engaged the Ḥanafīte scholars in frequent debates.[108] Subsequently, he gained the confidence of the Ilkhan and was appointed the chief judge (qāḍī al-quḍāt) of Iran.[109] He held this position until his death in Sha$^{c}$bān 716/October-November 1316.[110] Apparently under his influence, Uljaytū was converted to the Shāfi$^{c}$īte school of law in 707/1308.[111] Disputes between the two groups, however, did not end.[112] This apparently upset the Ilkhan so that he decided to abandon the Shāfi$^{c}$īte school also.[113] Eventually he joined Shi$^{c}$ite Islam in Sha$^{c}$bān 709/January-February 1310[114] and ordered that the names of the twelve Imams be mentioned in the Friday prayers[115] and that they be substituted for the

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A.K.M.d'Ohsson, Histoire des Mongols depuis Tchinguiz-Khan jusqu'a Timour Bey ou Tamerlan (Amsterdam, 1852), 4:536.

[105] Qāshānī, 28, 34; Shushtarī, 2:356; also $^{c}$Abbās Zaryāb, "Struggle of the Religious Sects in the Ilkhanid Court," in La Persia Nel Medioevo (Rom, 1971), 465.

[106] Qāshānī, 89.

[107] Ibid., 74, 89.

[108] Ibid., 89; Shushtarī, 2:357; Ḥāfiẓ al-Abrū, 101 n.1; d'Ohsson, 4:537.

[109] Qāshānī, 74.

[110] Ibid., 190.

[111] Ibid., 89.

[112] Ibid., 89-90.

[113] Ḥāfiẓ al-Abrū, 101 n.1 (on p.102); d'Ohsson, 4:537-8.

[114] Qāshānī, 93; no exact date of the conversion is known. However, in Sha$^{c}$bān 709/January-February 1310 (ibid., 93), the Ilkhān ordered the change of the coinage. Thus the date of his conversion must be either identical with, or precede, this event. (See also Ibn Abī l-Faḍā'il al-Mufaḍḍal, "Histoire des sultans Mamlouks," (edited and translated by E.Blochet) Patrologia Orientalis 20 (1929):171-2 who reports also 709/1310 as the year when the conversion took place.) Other sources give earlier dates. Al-$^{c}$Azzāwī (1:489), who does not mention the earlier conversion from the Hanafite to the Shāfi$^{c}$īte school, dates the conversion in 707/1307-8. According to al-Afandī (1:361), Uljaytū joined Shi$^{c}$ism in 708/1308-9.

[115] Ḥāfiẓ al-Abrū, 101 n.1 (on p.103); d'Ohsson, 4:541; Ghāzān already intended to exclude the names of the first three

names of the first four Caliphs on the coinage.[116] Uljaytū apparently tried unsuccessfully to convert the entire population of Iran and Iraq to Shi$^{c}$ism.[117]

The sources differ about al-Ḥillī's role in connection with the Ilkhan's last conversion. Some biographical accounts of al-Ḥillī suggest that he was mainly responsible for convincing him of the truth of Shi$^{c}$ism[118] and they offer two versions of how he attracted the Ilkhan's attention.[119]

One version[120] says that Uljaytū in a state of anger divorced his wife, which he soon regretted deeply. The lawyers at court, however, could not find any way to nullify this divorce according to their laws and the only suggestion they could offer was that a Shi$^{c}$ite lawyer would be able to annul it. Consequently, al-Ḥillī was summoned to court where he engaged in discussions with Sunnite scholars. His success in defeating his opponents in the debate made such an impression upon Uljaytū that he adopted Shi$^{c}$ism.[121] According

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caliphs from the Friday prayers but failed to do so following the advice of Rashīd al-Dīn (Qāshānī, 87-8).

[116] Spuler, 159; Ḥāfiz al-Abrū, 101 n.1 (on p.103); d'Ohsson, 4:541.

[117] Muḥammad b. $^{c}$Abd Allāh b. Baṭūṭa, The Travels of Ibn Baṭṭūta, A.D.1325-1354 (translated with revisions and notes from the Arabic text edited by C.Defrémery and B.R.Sanguetti by H.A.R.Gibb. Cambridge, 1958-71), 2:58-9; Abū l-Maḥāsin Jamāl al-Dīn Yūsuf b. Taghrībirdī, al-Nujūm al-zāhira fī mulūk Miṣr wa-l-Qāhira (Cairo: Dār al-kutub al-miṣriyya, 1348-92/1929-72), 9:238; see also Zaryāb, 466 where a summary of the account of Shāh Tahmāsp Safawī's Takmilat al-akhbār is given; also Ibn Kathīr, 14:77; Spuler, 202 n.78. Apparently, Uljaytū was more successful in motivating the members of the court to embrace Shi$^{c}$ism; see Qāshānī, 92.

[118] E.g. al-Afandī, 1:361.

[119] Al-Khwānsārī, 2:279 ff; al-$^{c}$Āmilī, 24:231ff.

[120] Al-Khwānsārī, 2:279-80.

[121] The historical sources do not report such an event. However, in Muḥarram 707/July 1307 a debate took place between Niẓām al-Dīn $^{c}$Abd al-Malik and his Ḥanafīte opponents on adultery and the legality of marriage with a mother and her daughter (Qāshānī, 89-90). During this debate, which was initiated by the Ḥanafītes in order to defeat Niẓām al-Dīn, both sides displayed extreme fanaticism. This event induced Uljaytū to turn away from both schools of law (ibid.). The version of the Shi$^{c}$ite biographers may be based on this event, although it took place before al-Ḥillī's time.

to the other version,[122] the Ilkhan called scholars of several Islamic schools to court and ordered them to debate various theological questions. Owing to the impression al-Ḥillī made on Uljaytū, the latter embraced Shi$^{c}$ism.

The historical sources of the period do not confirm these reports. Some of these sources attribute a decisive role in Uljaytū's conversion 709/1310 to another Shi$^{c}$ite, Tāj al-Dīn al-Awjī from Mashhad[123] who was the appointed minister of religious affairs.[124] According to another report, Uljaytū had a dream during his visit to Mashhad $^{c}$Alī in Rajab 709/December 1309 which moved him to adopt Shi$^{c}$ism.[125] A thunder clap is also said to have influenced him to convert.[126] There are reports that Amīr Tarmatāsh, who has been a close advisor of Ghāzān[127] with sympathies for the Shi$^{c}$ites,[128] induced Uljaytū to embrace Shi$^{c}$ism; when Uljaytū abandoned the Shāfi$^{c}$īte school of law Amīr Tarmatāsh suggested that he should consider the possibility of joining Shi$^{c}$ism.[129]

The sources differ also about the date of al-Ḥillī's arrival at court. Al-Afandī states that he was already at court in 708/1308-9.[130] Those sources, according to which al-Ḥillī played a decisive role in the conversion of the Ilkhan to Shi$^{c}$ism, imply that al-Ḥillī arrived at court before Sha$^{c}$bān 709/January 1310. In contrast, Qāshānī reports that al-Ḥillī and his son, together with some other

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[122] Al-Khwānsārī, 2:279; Ibn Baṭūṭa also ascribes to al-Ḥillī a decisive role in Uljaytū's conversion to Shi$^{c}$ite Islam; see Ibn Baṭūṭa, 2:57; similarly Ibn Kathīr, 14:77.

[123] Ḥāfiẓ al-Abrū, 101, 101 n.1; see also al-Mustawfī al-Qazwīnī, 608; al-$^{c}$Azzāwī, 1:409; Shushtarī, 2:358; Ibn Taghrībirdī, 9:238.

[124] Qāshānī, 116. On 2 Dhū al-Hijja 711/10 April 1312, he was executed because of his relations with Sa$^{c}$d al-Dīn, Rashīd al-Dīn's opponent at court. The immediate occasion for his execution was a measure which Tāj al-Dīn took in his function as minister of religious affairs, which Rashīd al-Dīn disliked (ibid., 116-7).

[125] Qāshānī, 92; Shushtarī, 2:359; Ḥāfiẓ al-Abrū, 101 n.1 (on p.102).

[126] Qāshānī, 91.

[127] Ibid., 91.

[128] Ibid., 87.

[129] Ibid., 81.

[130] Al-Afandī, 1:361.

Shi$^{c}$ite scholars, were summoned to court only after the conversion of Uljaytū to Shi$^{c}$ism.[131] From among those, Uljaytū chose al-Ḥillī as an advisor while the other scholars were permitted to return home.[132] Al-Ḥillī subsequently had many discussions with Uljaytū on theological issues and introduced him to the teachings of Shi$^{c}$ism.[133] These discussions confirmed the Ilkhan in his decision to join this persuasion.

Despite the contradictory reports of the different historians, there are a number of sound indications that al-Ḥillī arrived at court before the conversion. In Rabī$^{c}$ II 709/September-October 1309 he issued a teaching permit (ijāza) to Tāj al-Dīn $^{c}$Abd al-Wāḥid al-Rāzī in Sulṭānīyya,[134] the city which Uljaytū had chosen for his future capital.[135] Moreover, according to the account of Rashīd al-Dīn[136] al-Ḥillī accompanied the Ilkhan in Rajab 709/December 1309 on a visit of the tomb of Salmān Fārisī. On the basis of this evidence it is likely that he had some influence in the conversion of Uljaytū.

During their stay at court, al-Ḥillī and his son were frequently engaged in theological discussions with other scholars. There is evidence that they took part in a lengthy debate at court on 25 Dhū al-Qa$^{c}$da 710/14 April 1311,[137] which Uljaytū himself proposed. In the course of the debate, the value of poverty was discussed.[138] The Shi$^{c}$ite biographical

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[131] Qāshānī, 93.
[132] Ibid., 93. According to Ibn al-Fuwaṭī (Majma$^{c}$, 4/3:318-9), Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn stayed at court only from 710/1310-1 onwards.
[133] Qāshānī, 92.
[134] Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza Tāj al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-Rāzī," in al-Majlisī, Biḥār, 107:142.
[135] Qāshānī, 52ff.
[136] Khwāja Rashīd al-Dīn, "Fā'idat-i ziyārat," Farhang-i Īrānzamīn 23 (1357/1978):75.
[137] See J.van Ess, Der Wesir und seine Gelehrten (Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, vol.XLV.4. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1981), 44.
[138] See van Ess, Wesir, 44; also Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Maḥmūd Āmulī, Nafā'is al-funūn fī $^{c}$arā'is al-$^{c}$uyūn (edited by Abū l-Ḥasan Sha$^{c}$rānī. Tehran, 1377-79/1958-60), 2:259.

accounts of al-Ḥillī portray his superiority in this kind of debate over his Sunnite opponents and especially over Niẓām al-Dīn ᶜAbd al-Malik.[139]

During his stay at court, al-Ḥillī dedicated his Risāla al-saᶜdīyya to the minister Saᶜd al-Dīn who was an enemy of Rashīd al-Dīn. This is surprising since al-Ḥillī was on general on good term with Rashīd al-Dīn. The quarrels between the latter and Saᶜd al-Dīn had apparently started in 710/1310-1.[140] On 10 Shawwāl 711/19 February 1312 Saᶜd al-Dīn was executed for embezzlement.[141] On 2 Dhū al-Ḥijja 711/10 April 1312, Tāj al-Dīn al-Awjī, his two sons and some other men were executed because of their close relations with Saᶜd al-Din.[142] However, al-Ḥillī's relations with Rashīd al-Dīn do not seem to have deteriorated. In a list of proposed recipients of presents from Rashīd al-Dīn written in 712/1312-3, al-Ḥillī is shown as due to receive a riding-horse with a saddle, a shoulder-belt and 2000 dīnār.[143]

Rashīd al-Dīn's competence as a scholar and his desire to exchange views with other scholars are evident in several of his works where he collected his correspondence with the representatives of various disciplines.[144] Al-Ḥillī's name

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[139] Al-Shushtarī, 1:571-2; also Ḥāfiẓ al-Abrū, 101 n.1 (on p.103); however, Niẓām al-Dīn's performance cannot have been entirely unsatisfactory since he held his position as Qāḍī al-quḍāt until his death in 716/1316 (see supra, p.24). Moreover, Qāshānī reports that Uljaytū continued to appreciate his presentations after his conversion (Qāshānī, 101).

[140] Ibid., 109ff; see also al-ᶜAzzāwī, 1:418; Ghiyāth al-Dīn Khwāndamīr, "Dastūr al-wuzarā'," (translated by Ḥarbī Amīn Sulaymān, in al-Mu'arrikh al-īrānī al-kabīr Ghiyāth al-Dīn Khwāndamīr, by Ḥarbī Amīn Sulaymān. Cairo: al-Hay'a al-miṣriyya al-ᶜāmma li-l-kitāb, 1980), 373ff; Ḥāfiẓ al-Abrū, 97ff.

[141] Qāshānī, 114; Spuler, 94; Ḥāfiẓ al-Abrū, 98.

[142] Qāshānī, 116.

[143] Khwāja Rashīd al-Dīn, Mukātabāt-i Rashīdī (edited by Muhammad Shafīᶜ. Lahore, 1364/1945), 61 (no.15); the dating of this letter in 712 was proposed by J.van Ess ("Biobibliographische Notizen zur islamischen Theologie," Die Welt des Orients 9 (1978):267).

[144] For these works, see van Ess, Wesir; in the introduction to his Kitāb bayān al-ḥaqā'iq, Rashīd al-Dīn stresses his own quality as a scholar and claims that he often defeated other scholars in discussions; see van Ess, Wesir, 39. Evidence for

occurs several times in the lists of scholars with whom he held discussions, or exchanged letters.[145] On one occasion, al-Ḥillī himself addressed Rashīd al-Dīn with two questions. First, he requested him to explain the apparent contradiction between a statement of the prophet in Qur'an XX:114 and a tradition from the Imam ᶜAlī. Secondly, he asked how the contradictions between Qur'an XV:92 and XXXVII:24 on the one hand and Qur'an LV:39 on the other in regard to man's responsibility for his sins might be resolved.[146] The fact that al-Ḥillī, a scholar with a high reputation, posed questions to Rashīd al-Dīn, a Jewish convert to Islam, and recorded them together with the answers,[147] indicates his eagerness to ingratiate himself with the vizier. The latter's appreciation of al-Ḥillī is in turn reflected by his inclusion of him in the list of those entitled to receive presents. With the sum of 2,000 dīnār assigned to him, al-Ḥillī appears to have been particularly favoured by Rashīd al-Dīn, since several others received only 1,000 dīnārs, and nobody more than 2,000 dīnārs.[148]

The relationship between Uljaytū and al-Ḥillī was apparently excellent.[149] Uljaytū seems to have been most eager to acquire religious knowledge.[150] Al-Ḥillī was highly regarded by him as a scholar and through him, the Ilkhan was

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Rashīd al-Dīn's thorough acquaintance with philosophy can equally be found in al-Ḥillī's Kashf al-khafā' where he frequently mentions the vizier's views on philosophical questions.

[145] See van Ess, Wesir, 47 (C 9).

[146] See ibid., 47-8.

[147] Hasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, "Risāla fī su'ālayn sa'ala ᶜanhumā Khwāja Rashīd al-Dīn," in: Farhang-ī Īrānzamīn 19 (1352/1973):106-117.

[148] See Rashīd al-Dīn, Mukātabāt, 57-69; the financial recompense which he and other scholars received for their services was apparently generous; see Shihāb al-Dīn Abū l-Faḍl Aḥmad b. ᶜAlī al-ᶜAsqalānī b. Ḥajar, al-Durar al-kāmina fī aᶜyān al-mi'a al-thāmina (edited by Muhammad Sayyid Jādd al-Ḥaqq. Cairo: Dār al-kutub al-ḥāditha, 1966-7), 2:158 (no.1618); Ibn Ḥajar then goes on to say polemically that al-Ḥillī was miserly.

[149] See e.g. Aḥmad b. ᶜAlī al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk li-maᶜrifat duwal al-mulūk (edited by Muhammad Mustafā Ziyādeh. Cairo, 1934-58), 2/1:278; al-Khwānsārī, 2:281.

[150] Van Ess, Wesir, 39.

introduced to Shi^c^ite theological dogmatics.[151] For this purpose, he frequently held conversations with al-Ḥillī.[152] Moreover, he appointed al-Ḥillī as a teacher in the mobile school, the madrasa sayyāra, a position which was apparently reserved for scholars with a very close relationship with the Ilkhan.[153] This school was apparently founded at the suggestion of Rashīd al-Dīn[154] for the purpose of accompanying the Ilkhan wherever he went.[155] Other scholars who were probably not so close to him were appointed to teaching positions in the numerous schools founded by him in Sulṭāniyya.[156] There is also evidence that al-Ḥillī used to accompany the Ilkhan on his journeys independently of the school.[157] On several occasions, the Ilkhan addressed a specific question to al-Ḥillī about which the latter then wrote a treatise for him. This was the case concerning the question of the abrogation of religious law,[158] the merit of the veneration of tombs[159] and a question related to the Imamate.[160] During his stay at Uljaytū's court he also wrote several polemical works which he dedicated to the Ilkhan. These were his Nahj

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[151] Qāshānī, 93.
[152] Ibid., 93.
[153] Al-Khwānsārī, 2:281. Apart from his the other teachers were Niẓām al-Dīn ^c^Abd al-Malikal-Marāghī (d. 716/1316), Nūr al-Dīn ^c^Abd al-Rahman al-Ḥākim al-Tustarī, Burhān al-Dīn al-^c^Ibrī (d. 743/1343) and ^c^Aḍud al-Din al-Ījī (d. 756/1355); Ḥāfiẓ al-Abrū (101 n.1 (on p.104)) and al-Shushtarī (2:300) also include Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn among the teachers.
[154] Ḥāfiẓ al-Abrū, 104.
[155] Al-Shushtarī, 2:360; Ghiyāth al-Dīn Khwāndamīr, Ta'rīkh-i ḥabīb-i siyar fī akhbār-i afrād-i bashar (edited by Jalāl al-Dīn Humā'ī. Tehran: Kitabkhāna-yi Khayyām, 1333/1954), 3:197.
[156] Āmulī, 2:258; Qāshānī, 52.
[157] See supra, p.27 for the visit at the tomb of Salmān Fārisī in 709/1309; in Ramaḍān 712/December 1312 al-Ḥillī reports having stayed with the Ilkhan in Jurjān; see Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, al-Alfayn al-fāriq bayn al-ṣidq wa-l-mayn (edited by Husayn al-A^c^lamī. Beirut: Mu'assasat al-A^c^lamī, 1402/1982), 445.
[158] Jawāb al-su'āl ^c^an ḥikmat al-naskh fī l-aḥkām al-ilāhīyya, this treatise is lost.
[159] See van Ess, Wesir, 42.
[160] Qāshānī, 93-6.

al-ḥaqq wa-kashf al-ṣidq, the Minhāj al-karāma fī l-imāma, the Istiqṣā' al-naẓar fī l-qaḍā' wa-l-qadar and the Kashf al-yaqīn fī faḍā'il Amīr al-mu'minīn.

It is noteworthy that al-Ḥillī's son, Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn, also gained high esteem at court while still relatively young - in 709/1309-10 he was only 27 years old. Although it is not certain that he was also appointed a teacher in the madrasa sayyāra, Rashīd al-Dīn mentions that he was occasionally asked either by him or by the Ilkhan to write a treatise on various subjects.[161]

There is no definite information on the date of al-Ḥillī's departure from court. Ḥāfiẓ al-Abrū reports that he and his son received permission to return to al-Ḥilla during the lifetime of Uljaytū.[162]

This agrees with the reports of some historians that Uljaytū rejoined Sunnite Islam during his lifetime, mainly as a result of his failure to convert the people of Iran and Iraq to Shiᶜism.[163] Yet the Persian historians who were best acquainted with the situation at court do not confirm this and the numismatic evidence indicates that it was only Uljaytū's son, Abū Saᶜīd, who returned to Sunnite Islam.[164] ᶜAbbās Zaryāb argues that following the execution of Tāj al-Dīn Awjī in 711/1312, Shiᶜite influence at court declined and to some extent Uljaytū turned away from Shiᶜism.[165] This opinion cannot easily be supported by the historical evidence available. As seen above, al-Ḥillī's relations with Rashīd al-Dīn, and apparently also with Uljaytū, were good at least until 712/1312-3 and it is unlikely that al-Ḥillī's departure from the court was due to Uljaytū's declining interest in Shiᶜism following the disappearance of Tāj al-Dīn Awjī's influence at court. Moreover, Mufaḍḍal reports that in 716/1316-7 Uljaytū supported a plan, proposed by Ḥumayḍa b. Abī Numay al-Makkī (d. 720/1320) and favoured by the Shiᶜites, to march to Medina and destroy the tombs of Abū

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161 See van Ess, Wesir, 44, 48 (C 10).
162 Ḥāfiẓ al-Abrū, 103.
163 Ibn Baṭūṭa, 2:58-61.
164 See al-ᶜAzzāwī, 1:409; Ibn Kathīr, 14:77.
165 Zaryāb, 466.

Bakr and ᶜUmar there. The plan failed because the Mongol attackers were defeated by an army of Arabs led by the Amīr Muḥammad b. ᶜĪsā.[166] Uljaytū died only shortly afterwards.[167] The report clearly implies that Uljaytū continued to adhere to Shiᶜite Islam until his death.

There is firm evidence that al-Ḥillī and his son stayed in Sulṭāniyya during the first half of the year 715/1315.[168] At some time between 3 Jumādā I 715/5 August 1315[169] and 14 Muḥarram 716/8 April 1316[170] al-Ḥillī apparently left Sulṭāniyya for al-Ḥilla. It is not clear how long he stayed there but he must have returned for some time to Sulṭāniyya where he is known to have been on 26 Jumādā I 716/16 August 1316,[171] four months before the death of Uljaytū on 27 Ramaḍān 716 /13 December 1316.

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[166] Spuler, 159; Y.Rāġib, "Un épisode obscur d'Histoire Fatimide," Studia Islamica 48 (1978):131; Ibn Kathīr, 14:78; also Maqrīzī, 2/1:147-8.

[167] Ibn Taghrībirdī, 9:238-9; Ibn Kathīr, 14:78.

[168] On 6 Rabīᶜ I or Rabīᶜ II 715/10 June or July 1315, Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn completed his Miᶜrāj al-yaqīn fī sharḥ nahj al-mustarshidīn in Sulṭāniyya; see Āghā Buzurg, Dharīᶜa, 21:237.

[169] On this date, al-Ḥillī completed a section of his Tadhkira in Sulṭāniyya; see Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Mutahhar al-Ḥillī, Tadhkirat al-fuqahā (Tehran: al-Murtaḍawiyya, 1984), 2:289; see also M.Shīrwānī, Fihrist-i nuskhahāy-i khaṭṭī-yi Kitābkhāna-yi Wazīrī (Tehran, 1350sh), 1:52-3; Fihrist-i kutub-i Kitābkhāna-yi mubāraka-yi Āstān-i Quds-i Riḍawī, (Mashhad, 1305sh-) 5:383)

[170] On this date, al-Ḥillī completed another section of the Tadhkira in al-Ḥilla; see his Tadhkira, 1:295. See, however, M.T.Dānishpazhūh, "Nuskhahāy-i khaṭṭī-yi Kitābkhāna-yi Āyat Allāh Riḍawī dar shahr-i Kāshān," Nashriyya-yi Kitābkhāna-yi Markazī-yi Dānishgāh-i Tehran dar barā-yi nuskhahāy-i khaṭṭī 7 (Tehran, 1353sh): 33 and Fihrist-i Riḍawī, 5:382 where no place is mentioned.

[171] On this date, he completed another section of his Tadhkira; see his Tadhkira, 2:451; see also Fihrist-i Riḍawī, 5:383.

## 4. Al-Ḥillī's Last Years

From various notes in the sources it is evident that al-Ḥillī stayed during this period mostly in al-Ḥilla where he was engaged in teaching. There is evidence that in 717/1317-8 Sayyid Muhanna' b. Sinān, who had formerly been qāḍī in Medina[172] and arrived in Iraq in 716/1316-7,[173] studied with al-Ḥillī in the latter's home in al-Ḥilla.[174] At this time al-Ḥillī had already compiled his answers to some questions posed by him. Sayyid Muhanna' records that he formulated his questions in Baghdad and then sent them to al-Ḥillī in al-Ḥilla.[175] In Dhū al-Ḥijja 719/January-February 1320 al-Ḥillī issued an ijāza to Sayyid Muhanna' which, according to his own testimony, was written in al-Ḥilla.[176] The same applies to al-Ḥillī's second ijāza to Sayyid Muhanna' which he wrote in Muḥarram 720/February-March 1320.[177] Further evidence that al-Ḥillī lived in his home town during this period is provided by his Tadhkira, parts of which he finished in al-Ḥilla on 6 Ramaḍān 718/1 November 1318,[178] on 12 Rabī$^c$ I 719/3 May 1319,[179] on 19 Shawwāl 719/ 3

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[172] Al-Baḥrānī, 208 n.28 (on p.209); about him, see al-Afandī, 5:222-3; al-$^c$Āmilī, 49:18ff (no.11077); Āghā Buzurg, Ṭabaqāt, 5:223-5; Ibn Ḥajar, 5:138 (no.4864).
[173] Āghā Buzurg, Ṭabaqāt, 5:224; idem, Dharī$^c$a, 5:238.
[174] Al-Ḥillī, Ajwiba, 13.
[175] Ibid., 13,18.
[176] Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza li-Muhanna' b. Sinān," 146; in the edition of this ijāza in al-Ḥillī's Ajwiba (117), no place is mentioned. Āghā Buzurg (Dharī$^c$a, 1:178 (no.910); Ṭabaqāt, 5:224) reports the date as Dhū al-Ḥijja 709/May 1310 for this ijāza. This must be a mistake.
[177] Al-Ḥillī, Ajwiba, 157; see also idem, "Ijāza ukhrā li-l-Sayyid Muhanna' b. Sinān," in al-Majlisī, Biḥār, 107:149 where no place is mentioned.
[178] See $^c$A.Ḥā'irī et al., Fihrist-i Kitābkhāna-yi Majlis-i Shūrāy-i Millī (Tehran, 1305-57sh), 17:235; Dānishpazhūh, "Kāshān," 33; O.Loth and R.Levy, A Catalogue of the Arabic Manuscripts in the Library of the India Office, (London, 1877), 2:307.
[179] See Loth, 2:308; Āghā Buzurg, Dharī$^c$a, 4:44.

December 1319[180] and on 16 Dhū al-Ḥijja 720/17 January 1321.[181] On 15 Sha^cbān 723/19 August 1323 al-Ḥillī issued the great ijāza to the Banū Zuhra.[182] Unfortunately, he does not mention the place of his writing.[183]

According to Ibn Ḥajar, al-Ḥillī performed a pilgrimage to Mecca in the last years of his life where he is said to have met Ibn Taymiyya[184] but this report is not confirmed by any other source.[185] Moreover, Ibn Taymiyya is not known to have made a pilgrimage during the years in question.[186]

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[180] Fihrist-i Riḍawī, 5:383.
[181] Al-Ḥillī, Tadhkira, 2:661; see also M.Fāḍil, Fihrist-i nuskhahāy-i khaṭṭī-yi Kitābkhāna-yi Dānishkada-yi Ilāhiyyāt (Mashhad, 1976-), 2:244; Āghā Buzurg, Dharī^ca, 4:43.
[182] See also al-Baḥrānī, 201 n.18 (on p.203) according to whom this ijāza was dated 25 Sha^cbān/29 August.
[183] Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza kabīra," 137.
[184] Ibn Ḥajar, 2:159; the report that al-Ḥillī met Ibn Taymīyya was later added to the margin of the Durar al-kāmina (ibid., 159 n.2).
[185] Al-Afandī (1:384-5) quotes the passage from the Durar al-kāmina (without the marginal note) and expresses his doubts about it.
[186] See H.Laoust, "Ibn Taymiyya," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 3:952.

## 5.Al-Ḥillī's Students

With his high reputation as a scholar, al-Ḥillī attracted a large number of students during his life.[187]

The most important of them was his son, Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn (682/1283-771/1369)[188] who accompanied him everywhere until the father's death in 726/1325. According to the biographical reports on him he was an outstanding scholar. He wrote commentaries on a number of his father's works. In regard to al-Ḥillī's legal works, he wrote Īḍāḥ al-fawā'id fī ḥall mushkilāt al-qawāᶜid[189] and Sharḥ khuṭbat al-qawāᶜid which are both commentaries on al-Ḥillī's Qawāᶜid al-aḥkām. Further, he wrote Ghāyat al-su'āl,[190] a commentary on his father's Tahdhīb al-wuṣūl on legal methodology. Of the latter's theological works, he commented on the Nahj al-mustarshidīn.[191] He also wrote a number of independent works on theology such as the Kāfiya fī l-kalām.[192] From Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn's different ijāzas it appears that he started teaching together with his father and eventually took over a number of the latter's students after his father's death.[193] Some of his ijāzas are dated between 701/1301-2 and 706/1306-7. This shows that he was recognized as an outstanding scholar while still relatively young.

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[187] See infra, pp.93-5, for a list of the ijāzat which he had issued to his different students.
[188] About him, see al-Baḥrānī, 190-4 (no.73); al-Khwānsārī, 6:330ff; al-Afandī, 5:77ff; al-Kaḥḥāla, 9:228; al-ᶜĀmilī, 44:32 (no.9806); Brockelmann, GAL, 2:212; GALS, 2:209.
[189] See Brockelmann, GALS, 2:207.
[190] See Āghā Buzurg, Dharīᶜa, 13:169.
[191] Ibid., 14:163.
[192] Ibid., 17:250; see also Modarressi, 76, 103, 119, 152, 163 for his legal works.
[193] See later.

Two further important students of al-Ḥillī were his nephews ᶜAmīd al-Dīn (681/1282-3 - 754/1353)[194] and Ḍiyā' al-Dīn al-Aᶜrajī al-Ḥusaynī (683/1284 - 5-after 740/1339-40). Both also appear sometimes in the ijāzas of various scholars as teachers besides al-Ḥillī and Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn.[195] This suggests that they, too, took over some of al-Ḥillī's students after the latter's death. Since both were born around the same time as Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn, it may be assumed that all three began their studies with al-Ḥillī at about the same time. However, while there is clear evidence that Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn accompanied al-Ḥillī to the court of Uljaytū and on the trips of the madrasa sayyāra, no such evidence is available regarding ᶜAmīd al-Dīn and Ḍiyā' al-Dīn. Yet the possibility that they also attended this school should not be ruled out. Like Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn, the two brothers wrote commentaries on several of al-Ḥillī's works. ᶜAmīd al-Dīn commented on al-Ḥillī's Tahdhīb al-wuṣūl[196] and on the Qawāᶜid al-aḥkām.[197] Of al-Ḥillī's theological works, he wrote commentaries on the Nahj al-mustarshidīn[198] and the Anwār al-malakūt.[199] Ḍiyā' al-Dīn wrote a commentary on the Tahdhīb al-wuṣūl,[200] and another one on the Nahj al-mustarshidīn[201] which he completed in 703/1303-4. Moreover, he commented on the Taslīk al-nafs.[202] The commentaries of the brothers on al-Ḥillī's Tahdhīb al-wuṣūl were especially important. These two works were vital for the development of Shiᶜite legal methodology. In

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[194]About him, see al-Khwānsārī, 4:264-8 (no.394); Ibn Fuwaṭī, Muᶜjam, 2:925-6.
[195]See later.
[196]See Āghā Buzurg, Dharīᶜa, 13:168.
[197]Kitāb fī kanz al-fawā'id fī ḥall mushkilāt al-qawāᶜid, see ibid., 18:162.
[198]Tabṣirat al-ṭālibīn fī sharḥ nahj al-mustarshidīn, see ibid., 3:318.
[199]See ibid., 13:115.
[200]Munyat al-labīb, see ibid., 13:168.
[201]Tadhkirat al-wāṣilīn fī nahj al-mustarshidīn, see ibid., 4:51.
[202]Īḍāh al-labs fī sharḥ taslīk al-nafs, see ibid., 2:498.

his *Jāmi$^{c}$ al-bayn*, the Shahīd al-awwal Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Makkī (d. 786/1384) joined these two commentaries together with some additional useful notes by himself.[203]

Al-Ḥillī's *ijāzas* indicate that the circle of his students in al-Ḥilla was already large by the time he left for the court of Uljaytū.

Among these students was Jamāl al-Dīn Abū al-Futūḥ b. $^{c}$Alī b. Āwī[204] who received an *ijāza* from al-Ḥillī in 705/1305-6.[205] Evidence exists that he studied in 703/1304 with al-Ḥillī[206] and was also a student at the *madrasa sayyāra*.[207] He studied also with Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn who issued to him two *ijāzas* in 705/1305-6.[208] Sharaf al-Dīn Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad b. $^{c}$Alī al-$^{c}$Alawī al-Ḥusaynī al-Ṭūsī[209] received his *ijāza* in Muḥarram 704/August-September 1304 for al-Ḥillī's *Irshād al-adhhān*.[210] $^{c}$Alī b. Ismā$^{c}$īl b. Ibrāhīm b. Futūḥ al-Gharawī[211] was given an *ijāza* by al-Ḥillī on 12 Rajab 701/13 March 1302 for the latter's *Irshād al-adhhān*[212] and by Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn in 705/1305-6.[213] In Rajab 705/January-February 1306 al-Ḥillī issued an *ijāza* to Rashīd al-Dīn $^{c}$Alī b. Muḥammad Rashīd al-Āwī[214] who studied the *Risālat al-Ḥisāb* of Naṣīr al-Dīn

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[203] See ibid., 23:207-8; also Modarressi, 8.

[204] See about him Āghā Buzurg, *Ṭabaqāt*, 5:5.

[205] See Āghā Buzurg, *Dharī$^{c}$a*, 1:176 (no.898); also al-$^{c}$Āmilī, 7:274.

[206] He completed on 21 Ramaḍān 703/29 April 1304 a copy of al-Ḥillī's *Mabādi' al-wuṣūl* and received an *Ijāza* for this work from al-Ḥillī; see Āghā Buzurg, *Ṭabaqāt*, 5:5.

[207] On 20 Rajab 717/29 September 1317 he completed in Sulṭāniyya a copy of Mītham al-Baḥrānī's *Qawā$^{c}$id al-marām*; see Āghā Buzurg, *Ṭabaqāt*, 5:5.

[208] See Āghā Buzurg, *Dharī$^{c}$a*, 1:234-5 (no.1232); idem, *Ṭabaqāt*, 5:5. The two *ijāzas* were issued for al-Ḥillī's *Mabādi' al-wuṣūl ilā $^{c}$ilm al-uṣūl* and his *Nahj al-mustarshidīn*. For the quotations of the two *ijāzāt*, see H.$^{c}$A.Maḥfūẓ, "Nafā'is al-Makhṭūṭāt al-$^{c}$Arabiyya fī Īrān," *Majallat Ma$^{c}$had al-Makhṭūṭāt al-$^{c}$Arabiyya* 3 (1957):19-20.

[209] Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad b. $^{c}$Alī Sharaf al-Dīn al-$^{c}$Alawī al-Ḥusaynī al-Ṭūsī; about him, see Āghā Buzurg, *Ṭabaqāt*, 5:58-9.

[210] See Āghā Buzurg, *Ṭabaqāt*, 5:58 for the quotation of this *ijāza*; see also idem, *Dharī$^{c}$a*, 1:177 (no.903).

[211] Zayn al-Dīn $^{c}$Alī b. Ismā$^{c}$īl b. Ibrāhīm b. Futūḥ; about him, see Āghā Buzurg, *Ṭabaqāt*, 5:134.

[212] See Āghā Buzurg, *Dharī$^{c}$a*, 1:177 (no.904).

[213] See ibid., 1:235 (no.1233).

[214] See al-Afandī, 4:205; Āghā Buzurg, *Dharī$^{c}$a*, 1:177 (no.905).

al-Ṭūsī with al-Ḥillī.[215] Al-Afandī holds that this student is not to be identified with the minister Rashīd al-Dīn.[216] Āghā Buzurg, however, seems to identify him with the vizier.[217] Since it is known that al-Ḥillī had discussions and corresponded frequently with Rashīd al-Dīn it would be possible that he gave the latter an *ijāza*. However, the date seems to preclude this. Al-Ḥillī arrived at the court only in 709/1309, and it is extremely unlikely that Rashīd al-Dīn could have left the court for a while in order to study with al-Ḥillī. Another student of his at this time appears to have been Rukn al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Jurjānī al-Gharawī, author of a commentary on al-Ḥillī's *Mabādi' al-wuṣūl* which he completed on 19 Shawwāl 697/30 July 1298.[218] Ḍiyā' al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad Hārūn al-Ṭabrisī[219] received his *ijāza* for al-Ḥillī's *Qawāʿid al-aḥkām* on 17 Rajab 701/18 March 1302.[220] In 707/1307-8, al-Ḥillī issued an *ijāza* for his *Qawāʿid al-aḥkām* to Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn b. al-Ḥasan b. ʿAlī al-Harqalī.[221] The latter had also studied with the Muḥaqqiq al-awwal.[222] ʿIzz al-Dīn al-Ḥusayn b. Ibrāhīm b. Yaḥyā al-Astarābādī[223] received al-Ḥillī's *ijāza* on 28 Ṣafar 708/17 August 1308.[224]

The students to whom an *ijāza* was issued between the years 709/1309 and 714/1314-5 are probably those who attended al-Ḥillī's lessons at the *madrasa sayyāra*. Among them were

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[215] Al-Afandī, 4:205.
[216] Ibid., 4:205.
[217] Āghā Buzurg, *Ṭabaqāt*, 5:147.
[218] *Ghāyat al-bādī fī sharḥ al-mabādi'*; see Āghā Buzurg, *Dharīʿa*, 16:10. About Rukn al-Dīn, see al-ʿĀmilī, 46:29 (no.2447).
[219] Ḍiyā' al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad Hārūn b. Najm al-Dīn Ḥasan Mīr Shams al-Dīn ʿAlī b. al-Ḥasan al-Ṭabrisī; see about him Āghā Buzurg, *Ṭabaqāt*, 5:42; al-Khwānsārī, 2:264-5.
[220] Āghā Buzurg, *Ṭabaqāt*, 5:42; idem, *Dharīʿa*, 1:178 (no.912); also al-Khwānsārī, 2:264-5.
[221] See Āghā Buzurg, *Dharīʿa*, 1:177 (no.906). See about him, idem, *Ṭabaqāt*, 5:179-80; also al-Ḥurr al-ʿĀmilī, 2:245 (no.721); he reports that al-Harqalī also studied al-Ḥillī's *Mukhtalaf al-shīʿa* with the author.
[222] See Āghā Buzurg, *Ṭabaqāt*, 5:179-80; the Muḥaqqiq al-awwal gave him an *Ijāza* for his *Sharā'iʿ* in 671/1272-3; see ibid.; idem, *Dharīʿa*, 1:164.
[223] See about him Āghā Buzurg, *Ṭabaqāt*, 5:54-5.
[224] See Āghā Buzurg, *Dharīʿa*, 1:177 (no.902).

Taqī al-Dīn Ibrāhīm b. al-Ḥusayn b. $^{c}$Alī al-Āmulī[225] who received his *ijāza* in 709/1309-10.[226] Apparently, he was already studying in 706/1307 in al-Ḥilla, since Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn issued an *ijāza* to him on 12 Ramaḍān 706/17 March 1307.[227] Among these students was also Sirāj al-Dīn Ḥasan b. Bahā' al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī al-Majd al-Sirābshanawī (*ijāza* dated Jumādā I 715/August-September 1315)[228] and Tāj al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. al-Qāḍī $^{c}$Abd al-Waḥīd al-Rāzī[229] (*ijāza* dated Rabī$^{c}$ II 709/September-Oktober 1309).[230] The latter received his *ijāza* in Sulṭāniyya.[231]

One of al-Ḥillī's outstanding students, whom he taught most likely also at the *madrasa sayyāra*, was Quṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad (or: Maḥmūd) b. Muḥammad al-Rāzī al-Būwayhī (d. 766/1365)[232] who received his *ijāza* on 3 Sha$^{c}$bān 713/23 November 1313 in the region of Warāmīn.[233] He is famous especially for his works on logic, such as his commentary on the *Risāla al-shamsīyya* of al-Kātibī, and on philosophy. He evidently was a scholar of some repute even at this time since he was included in Rashīd al-Dīn's list of scholars entitled to receive gifts.[234]

A number of al-Ḥillī's students appear to have joined him after he returned from the court of Uljaytū or may have returned with him from there. Among the former was probably Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. Yār who received his *ijāza* in Jumādā

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[225] Ibrāhīm b. al-Ḥusayn b. $^{c}$Alī al-Shaykh Taqī al-Dīn al-Āmulī; see about him Āghā Buzurg, *Ṭabaqāt*, 5:2.
[226] Āghā Buzurg, *Dharī$^{c}$a*, 1:175-6 (no.897).
[227] Āghā Buzurg, *Ṭabaqāt*, 5:2; idem, *Dharī$^{c}$a*, 1:234 (no.1231).
[228] Āghā Buzurg, *Dharī$^{c}$a*, 1:177 (no.900); about him, see idem, *Ṭabaqāt*, 5:49.
[229] Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad b. $^{c}$Abd al-Waḥīd al-Rāzī; see about him Āghā Buzurg, *Ṭabaqāt*, 5:210-1.
[230] Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza li-Tāj al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-Rāzī," 142; see also Āghā Buzurg, *Dharī$^{c}$a*, 1:178 (no.908).
[231] Al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza li-Tāj al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-Rāzī," 142.
[232] About him, see al-Qummī, 3:61-2; al-Kaḥḥāla, 11:215; al-Baḥrānī, 195-6; Ni$^{c}$ma, 469ff.; Shushtarī, 2:212-3; al-Suyūṭī, *Bughya*, 2:881 (no.1981); al-Khwānsārī, 6:38-48; al-Afandī, 5:168-172; Abū Naṣr $^{c}$Abd al-Wahhāb b. Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfi$^{c}$iya al-kubrā* (Cairo, 1323-4/1905-6), 6:31.
[233] Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, "Ijāza li-Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī," in al-Majlisī, *Biḥār*, 107:140.
[234] Rashīd al-Dīn, *Mukātabāt*, 65 no.28.

II 724/May-June 1324 for al-Ḥillī's Taḥrīr al-aḥkām[235] and Sayyid Muhanna' b. Sinān.[236] Another student of al-Ḥillī was Tāj al-Dīn b. al-Muᶜayya (d. 776/1374)[237] according to the latter's testimony in an ijāza which he issued to one of his students.[238] He reports there having studied also under the guidance of Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn and the brothers ᶜAmīd al-Dīn and Ḍiyā' al-Dīn al-Aᶜrajī.[239] Ibn al-Muᶜayya became a renowned scholar who wrote a large number of works in various fields such as tradition, law and history.[240]

According to the Shahīd al-awwal two more scholars studied with al-Ḥillī.[241] These were Raḍī al-Dīn Abū l-Ḥasan ᶜAlī b. Ṭurād al-Maṭārābādī (d. 762/1360-1),[242] a scholar who taught later in al-Ḥilla,[243] and Jamāl al-Dīn Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā al-Mazyadī (d. 757/1356)[244] whose primary competence was in law.

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[235] See Āghā Buzurg, Dharīᶜa, 1:178 (no.909); idem, Ṭabaqāt, 5:212.

[236] About him, see supra, p.33.

[237] About him, see al-Afandī, 5:152-3; al-Khwānsārī, 6:324-9; al-Ḥurr al-ᶜĀmilī, 2:294-5 (no.887); al-ᶜĀmilī, 46:196 (no.2630).

[238] Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim b. al-Ḥusayn b. al-Muᶜayya, "Ijāza li-l-Sayyid Shams al-Dīn," in al-Majlisī, Biḥār, 107:174.

[239] Ibid., 174-5; see also al-Khwānsārī, 6:326.

[240] See al-Khwānsārī, 6:325 for a list of his works.

[241] See ibid., 7:5.

[242] About him, see al-Baḥrānī, 190 n.1.

[243] See ibid.

[244] About him, see al-Afandī, 3:369; al-Khwānsārī, 4:345 ff (no.409); al-Baḥrānī, 190 n.2.

CHAPTER II

WORKS OF AL-ḤILLĪ

1. General Introduction

The principal sources for our knowledge of al-Ḥillī's works derive from the author himself. In his biographical work Khulāṣat al-aqwāl, he offers an article on himself containing a list of his works up to Rabīᶜ II 693/March 1294.[1] In Muḥarram 720/February-March 1320, he issued a teaching permit to his student Muhanna' b. Sinān authorizing him to teach his works and this ijāza includes a list of some of al-Ḥillī's books up to this date.[2]

Despite this fortunate circumstance there are a number of problems connected with the use of these two lists.

In regard to the KH list, it is evident that its contents cannot be as originally included in 693/1294. It contains a number of works which al-Ḥillī is known to have started to write much later. The most striking examples are

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[1] Rijāl, 45. According to Āghā Buzurg (Dharīᶜa, 23:12), the list was dated 7 Rabīᶜ II 693/7 March 1294. This list will be referred to in the following as KH. The following copies of the Khulāṣa have been consulted: (1) Rijāl al-ᶜAllāma (edited by Muḥammad Bahr al-ᶜUlūm. Najaf: al-Ḥaydariyya, 1961), 45-48 = KH 1; (2) Kitāb al-rijāl (Tehran, 1311-2/1893-5), 23-25 = KH 2; (3) MS Bibliothèque Nationale, 384r-v = KH 3; (4) MS Los Angeles M959, 5-7 = KH 4; (5) MS Ismaᶜili Institute 409, 19v-20v = KH 5; (6) MS Ismaᶜili Institute 104, 14v-15r = KH 6; (7) MS Ismaᶜili Institute 103, 20v-22r = KH 7; (8) MS Princeton University Library New Series 770, 17r-18r = KH 8; (9) MS Princeton University Library New Series 880, 23vff. = KH 9; (10) MS Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin, Orientabteilung 9926, 25v-27r = KH 10; (11) MS Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin, Orientabteilung 9927, 26r-28r = KH 11; (12) quotation in al-Khwānsārī, 2:271-3 = KH 12.

[2] This list will be referred to in the following as IM. The following copies have been used: (1) in al-Majlisī, Biḥār, 107:147-149 = IM 1; (2) in al-Ḥillī, Ajwiba (Qum: al-Khayyām, 1401H.), 155-157 = IM 2; (3) MS India Office 1797 (278v-279r) = IM 3; (4) MS Princeton University Library New Series 960 (32v-33r) = IM 4; (5) quotation in al-Afandī, 1:367ff = IM 5.

the works which he composed at the request of Uljaytū which he certainly did not begin before Rabīc II 709/August-September 1309, the earliest date when there are safe indications for al-Ḥillī's presence at the court.[3] This impression, already current among medieval authors,[4] cannot therefore be explained by his statement at the end of the list that some of the works included have not yet been completed.[5]

Further evidence for frequent later additions to this list appears from its arrangement. At first sight, it lacks any internal order. The titles are often not placed in the appropriate sections but appear at random anywhere in the list. It is, however, possible to establish sections in the list which point to an originally logical arrangement.[6] In addition to the presumably original sections, there are for some subjects, such as law and theology, additional sections which are completely detached from these original sections and which were most likely added later.[7] Other titles are placed between or in the middle of inappropriate sections.[8]

It is likely that most of the additions were made during the author's lifetime and presumably even by al-Ḥillī himself. As a biographic work, the Khulāṣa belonged to the curriculum which al-Ḥillī used to teach. Evidence for this is found in teaching permits issued by him to numerous students of this work.[9] In the course of this teaching he presumably regularly added the titles of those works which he wrote later. Later writers added even more titles to it but many of these later additions did not become standard.[10] It is

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[3]See supra, p.27.
[4]E.g. al-Afandī, 1:377.
[5]Rijāl, 48.
[6]For the following examples, the numbers of the titles correspond to KH 1. Titles 1 - 6 are legal works, titles 7 - 9 are works on traditions, titles 11 - 14 are exegetical works, titles 17 -25 are works on theology, titles 28 - 35, except title 32, are works on philosophy, titles 36 - 40 are works on grammar.
[7]Titles 45 - 49 are legal works, titles 51 - 53 are works on theology.
[8]E.g. titles 10, 50, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58.
[9]See Āghā Buzurg, Dharīca, 7:214-5.
[10]See e.g. al-Afandī, 1:372 ff.

therefore impossible to consider the list as an indication of the date of composition of the works included; it only indicates the authenticity of the titles as works by al-Ḥillī.

The problems of the IM list are of a different nature. Since it appears in a teaching permit and since it was written only six years before al-Ḥillī's death, its content seems to have remained largely unchanged. This is supported by the fact that the list is clearly subdivided into sections whereby each title appears in its appropriate section and no section is duplicated. It can, therefore, safely be assumed that the titles included were either partly or completely written before 720/1320.

Yet the IM obviously does not include all of al-Ḥillī's works. Owing to its nature as a teaching permit, al-Ḥillī appears to have included only those works which were suitable as books for the purpose of teaching. He therefore excluded, for example, his polemic writings which he composed at the request of Uljaytū and, apparently, also works which he did not consider as important enough to be included. Thus, neither of the lists are reliable, exhaustive catalogues of al-Ḥillī's entire works.

This defect led later authors to add the missing titles to their own lists of al-Ḥillī's works[11] and this resulted at times in erroneous attributions.[12]

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[11] See e.g. al-Afandī, 1:375ff; al-Khwānsārī, 2:273ff.

[12] The following works were erroneously attributed to al-Ḥillī by some of his biographers: *Rasā'il al-dalā'il al-burhāniyya*, *Kitāb al-asrār fī l-imāma*, and *al-Kashkūl*. For these see al-ʿĀmilī, 24:255-6. Other works falsely attributed to him were the *Muʿtamad* (Āghā Buzurg, *Dharīʿa*, 21:213-4) and the *Majāmiʿ al-akhbār* (ibid., 5:37, 19:374). Al-Khwānsārī further attributed to him a work entitled *Ḥāshiyat talkhīṣ al-marām*. Al-Afandī (1:379-80) rejected the existence of such a work, suggesting that this *Ḥāshiya* consisted simply of a small number of marginal notes by al-Ḥillī on his *Talkhīṣ* See also Āghā Buzurg, *Dharīʿa*, 6:47. Another work usually attributed to al-Ḥillī is entitled *al-Ḥujaj al-qawiyya fī ithbāt al-waṣiyya* (edited by Muḥammad Hādī al-Amīnī. Najaf: Dār al-kutub al-tijāriyya, n.d.). Āghā Buzurg has shown (*Dharīʿa*, 6:265, no.1449) that this work cannot possibly have been written by al-Ḥillī.

Another more reliable source for establishing a complete list of his works is internal evidence which points to their authenticity.

The following discussion of al-Ḥillī's works is divided into two parts. First, each subject on which he composed works will be discussed separately; here, the main aim is to establish the chronological order of the works which belong to it and to determine the relative importance and the specific characteristic of each work.

In the appendix, a systematic alphabetical list of his writings will be given. The titles are arranged according to the Arabic alphabet. An attempt has been made to give the exact titles as used by al-Ḥillī himself. If different titles occur preference has been given to the one given in the works themselves. In regard to lost works whose titles differ in various copies of the KH list and the IM list, no reasonable preference could be exercised. Variants of titles will be mentioned. The information in this list consists first of the title of the work together with an indication of where the work has first been mentioned. IM, KH, or KH/IM shows that the work is included always in the indicated list. KH* indicates that only some copies include the title and that it is definitely known that the title has been added to the list at a very late stage. KH** indicates that none of the consulted copies of the KH include this title, but that Āghā Buzurg reports that there are some copies of the KH list which do include this title. These additions are usually very late and must almost certainly be considered erroneous. IM* indicates that not all copies of the IM list include this title. This is usually because of a fault of the copyist and as such without serious implications for its authenticity. IE signifies that the work in question is authentic on the basis of internal evidence, even though it is not to be found in either of the lists. DH signifies that Āghā Buzurg attributes this title in his <u>Dharīᶜa</u> to al-Ḥillī without any further information why he does so. DH* signifies that the work in question was attributed to al-Ḥillī by later authors.

References are given in the appropriate section in the Dharīᶜa. RU signifies that al-Afandī attributes this work in his Riyāḍ al-ᶜulamā to al-Ḥillī while it is not listed in the Dharīᶜa.

The list furthermore includes a reference to Āghā Buzurg's Dharīᶜa which contains additional valuable information about the work and especially locations of manuscripts mostly in private libraries in Iran and Iraq. Since the Dharīᶜa is accessible, the information given there will not be included in the present list. As far as it could be established in the first part, the dates of composition will also be indicated.

The most important editions of published works will be listed[13] and the locations of manuscripts of extant works will also be given. Since most of the consulted manuscript catalogues are available in print, neither the date of the

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[13]For further editions, it is advisable to consult Khān Bābā Mushār, Mu'allifīn-i kutub-i chāpī, fārsī wa-ᶜarabī (Tehran, 1340-4/1961-5), 2:669-677 and ᶜAbd al-Jabbār ᶜAbd al-Rahman, Dhakhā'ir al-turāth al-ᶜarabī al-islāmī (Basra, 1401-3/1981-3), 1:241-243.

copies nor whether they are complete will be indicated.[14] Although an attempt was made to consult the catalogues of all the relevant manuscript collections, the information given cannot be considered exhaustive. For the theological works, a list of the important commentaries in Arabic will be offered. Translations into European languages will likewise be noted.

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[14]The abbreviations which are used in this section are identical with those employed by Modarressi (218-237). The following abbreviations of catalogues are not listed there: Āghā Ḥakīm = "Kitābkhāna-yi Āghā-yi Ḥakīm dar Najaf," Nashriyya-yi Kitābkhāna-yi Markazī-yi Dānishgāh-i Tehrān dar barā-yi nuskhahāy-i khaṭṭī, 5 (1346sh):420-28; Bibliothèque Nationale = G.Vajda and Y.Sauvan, Catalogue des Manuscrits Arabes, (Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale, 1978-85); Chester Beatty = A.J.Arberry, The Chester Beatty Library: A Handlist of the Arabic Manuscripts (Dublin: Walker, 1955-66); Fayid Mahdawī = Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī, "Maktabat al-Fayid al-Mahdawī," Turāthunā 9 (1407H.):23-69; Isma<sup>c</sup>ili Institute = A.Gacek, Catalogue of Arabic Manuscripts in the Library of the Institute of Isma<sup>c</sup>ili Studies (London, 1984-5); Oppenheim = Oppenheim Stiftung/Cologne, no published catalogue available; Princeton = R.Mach and E.L.Ormsby, Handlist of Arabic Manuscripts (New Series) in the Princeton University Library (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Riḍawī = the first volume of the catalogue referred to by Modarressi (233) is now available in a new edition: <sup>c</sup>Alī Ardalān Jawān, Fihrist-i kutub-i khaṭṭī-yi Kitābkhāna-yi Markazī-yi Āstān-i Quds-i Riḍawī (Intishārāt-i kitābkhāna-yi markazī-yi Āstān-i Qudsi-i Riḍawī, no.12. Mashhad, 1365/1987); Rampur = Imtiyāz <sup>c</sup>Alī <sup>c</sup>Arshī, Catalogue of the Arabic Manuscripts in the Raza Library, Rampur (Rampur: Raza Library publications series no.12, Rampur: Raza Library Trust, 1963-77).

## 2.Theological Works

Al-Ḥillī's first work on theology was his *Manāhij al-yaqīn fī uṣūl al-dīn*. This is known from the introduction to his *Kitāb ghāyat al-wuṣūl*, where he states that *Manāhij al-yaqīn* and *Asrār al-khafiyya* were his first works on theology and philosophy.[15] The *Manāhij* were completed on 6 Rabī$^{c}$ II 680/25 July 1281.[16] The work was highly regarded by al-Ḥillī himself and it must be considered as second in importance, just after his most extensive work on theology, the *Nihāyat al-marām fī $^{c}$ilm al-kalām*. Evidence for this is that he not only refers to the *Manāhij* in his other theological and philosophical writings before he started writing the *Nihāyat al-marām*,[17] but even in his later works he often refers both to the *Nihāya* and the *Manāhij*.[18] Moreover, al-Fāḍil al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī (d. 826/1423) who wrote commentaries on a number of al-Ḥillī's theological works used the *Manāhij* as one of his principal sources.[19]

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[15] Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, *Ghāyat al-wuṣūl wa-īḍāḥ al-subul fī sharḥ mukhtaṣar muntahā al-su'āl wa-l-amal* (MS British Museum OR 3970), 2r.

[16] Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, *Manāhij al-yaqīn fī uṣūl al-dīn* (MS India Office Loth 471/6), 105v. See also M.$^{c}$A.Rawḍātī, *Fihrist-i kutub-i khaṭṭī-yi kitābkhānahāy-i Iṣfahān* (Isfahan, 1377H.), 97-8.

[17] Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, *Ma$^{c}$ārij al-fahm fī sharḥ al-nuẓum* (MS India Office Loth 471/6), 110v, 115v, 118r; idem, *Anwār al-malakūt fī sharḥ al-yāqūt* (edited by Muḥammad Zanjānī. Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tehrān, no.543. Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1338H.), 149, 193, 203; idem, *Kashf al-murād fī sharḥ tajrīd al-i$^{c}$tiqād* (Qum: Maktabat al-mustawafī, n.d.), 126; idem, *Īḍāḥ al-maqāṣid min ḥikmat $^{c}$ayn al-qawā'id* (edited by $^{c}$A.Munzawī. Tehran, 1378/1959), 229.

[18] Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, *Nahj al-mustarshidīn* (together with al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī's *Irshād al-ṭālibīn ilā nahj al-mustarshidīn*. Edited by Mahdī al-Rajānī. Min makhṭūṭāt Āyat Allāh al-Mar$^{c}$ashī al-$^{c}$āmma, no.10. Qum: Maṭba$^{c}$at Sayyid al-shuhadā', 1405H.), 216, 386; idem, "Kashf al-fawā'id," in *Majmū$^{c}$at rasā'il* (Tehran: Maktabat Āyat Allāh al-$^{c}$uẓmā al-Mar$^{c}$ashī al-Najafī, 1404H.), 86.

[19] E.g. Jamāl al-Dīn al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī, *Irshād al-ṭālibīn ilā nahj al-mustarshidīn* (edited by Mahdī al-Rajānī. Min makhṭūṭāt maktabat Āyat Allāh al-Mar$^{c}$ashī al-$^{c}$āmma, no.10.

Another early work is his very brief treatise Nuẓum al-barāhīn and the commentary on it, entitled Maᶜārij al-fahm fī sharḥ al-nuẓum. According to one manuscript copy, this commentary was completed on 6 Ramaḍān 678/10 January 1280.[20] Since it has safely been established that the Manāhij was his first work on theology, it is likely that he started writing the Nuẓum and the Maᶜārij and completed them before he had finished the Manāhij. That the Manāhij and the Maᶜārij were written more or less simultaneously is further indicated by cross references in both works.[21] In his introduction, he states that he wrote the Maᶜārij in order to elucidate the meanings of the Nuẓum which is, owing to its concise style, difficult to understand.[22] His method of expressing his ideas in the Maᶜārij is therefore often more original than in his Manāhij where he frequently bases his discussions directly on earlier works, such as Ibn al-Malāḥimī's Fā'iq. Yet except for very few exceptions his views do not differ in the Maᶜārij from those in the Manāhij.

In Jumādā II 684/August-September 1285 he completed the Anwār al-malakūt fī sharḥ al-yāqūt.[23] This is a commentary on the Kitāb al-yāqūt which was written by the otherwise unidentified Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm b. al-Nawbakhtī.[24] Since al-Ḥillī states in the introduction that he started to

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Qum: Maṭbaᶜat Sayyid al-shuhadā', 1405H.), 52. He wrote commentaries on al-Ḥillī's Bāb al-hādī ᶜashar and his Nahj al-mustarshidīn both of which have been edited repeatedly.

[20] Rawḍātī, 194-5.

[21] Manāhij, 87r; Maᶜārij, 110v, 115v, 118r.

[22] Maᶜārij, 106r.

[23] Anwār, 230.

[24] Iqbāl (168ff) argued that this work was composed by a descendant of the Banū Nawbakht and that is was written in the first half of the 4th century. Muḥammad Khān Qazwīnī suggested orally to P.Kraus that it may have been compiled "not long before the commentary of al-Ḥillī" (P.Kraus, "Raziana I," Orientalia 4 (1935):306 n.6). W.Madelung finally showed that the Kitāb al-yāqūt does not correspond to the theological doctrine of the Banū Nawbakht ("Imāmism," 15 n.1). He suggests that the work was written at the earliest in the 5th century or even later (ibid., 15). As a possible author he suggests (ibid., 15 n.1) a certain Ibrāhīm Nawbakhtī whom ᶜAbd al-Jalīl al-Rāzī mentions in his Kitāb al-naqḍ (written about 565/1170).

compose this commentary after having already written a number of works on theology,[25] it is likely that he started it after 680/1281.

On 16 Jumādā I 687/18 June 1288, he completed the first section of his Muntahā al-wuṣūl fī ᶜilmay al-kalām wa-l-uṣūl which deals with theology.[26] The next section deals with legal methodology. This work, which is comparable in length with the Manāhij,[27] is written in a much more concise style than the latter. Al-Ḥillī does not seem to have considered it as important as the Manāhij since he refers to it only rarely in later works.[28] Moreover, in contrast to the Manāhij, no commentary has been written upon it by later scholars.

Probably after having written at least some of the works mentioned above, al-Ḥillī started to write his famous commentary on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's Tajrīd al-iᶜtiqād, the Kashf al-murād fī sharḥ tajrīd al-iᶜtiqād; in the introduction he states that he began composing this commentary after having already written a number of theological works.[29] Since, however, he does not mention there his largest work, the Nihāyat al-marām fī ᶜilm al-kalām, it seems most likely that he started to compose the Kashf al-murād before beginning the latter work. This is supported by the fact that he does not refer to the Nihāya throughout the first half of the Kashf al-murād but only to the Manāhij[30] and the Asrār.[31] Since he refers to it, however, in the second half of the Kashf al-murād,[32] he apparently started to work on the Nihāya before having finished with the Kashf al-murād. He completed the Kashf on either 15 or 16 Rabīᶜ I 696/11 or 12

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[25] Anwār, 1.
[26] Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, Muntahā al-wuṣūl fī ᶜilmay al-kalām wa-l-uṣūl (MS British Museum OR 8326), 134v.
[27] See e.g. Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 438 where al-Ḥillī recommends both as medium-sized works on theology.
[28] E.g. Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 438.
[29] Kashf al-murād, 4.
[30] Ibid., 126.
[31] Ibid., 36, 151, 209.
[32] Ibid., 259, 281, 284.

January 1297.[33] The treatise belongs to the most widely read of al-Ḥillī's works. Its special importance lies in its being the first commentary written on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's Tajrīd al-iᶜtiqād[34] thus serving as a basis for the understanding of that work for numerous later commentators.[35]

In the light of the evidence of the Kashf al-murād, al-Ḥillī evidently started to write his major theological work, the Nihāyat al-marām fī ᶜilm al-kalām, before having completed the Kashf al-murād. When he composed his Nahj al-mustarshidīn, which was completed in 699/1299, large parts of the Nihāya must have already been written since he frequently refers to the work.[36] From this work onwards, references to the Nihāya are usually given.[37]

Al-Ḥillī presumably completed the Nihāya at a very late stage. In his IM list written in 720/1320 he states that at that time four volumes of the work had been completed. It is unknown how much these four volumes covered of the whole Nihāya as it was planned originally, and how much more he completed during the rest of his life. None of the extant manuscript portions of the work seem to be a complete copy.[38]

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[33] According to Āghā Buzurg (Dharīᶜa, 18:60) it was completed on 15 Rabīᶜ I 696/11 January 1297; see also A.Husaynī, Fihrist-i nuskhahāy-i khaṭṭī-yi kitābkhāna-yi ᶜumūmī-yi...Marᶜashī (Qum, 1395H.-), 2:324. According to MS India Office Loth 471/14, the Kashf was completed on 16 Rabīᶜ I/12 January (1297) (Loth, 1:128). MS Chester Beatty 4279 is dated 16 Rabīᶜ I 690/12 January 1297. (Arberry, 5:87). Since the evidence that the work was completed in 696 is quite strong, this date is most likely an error of the copyist.

[34] Āghā Buzurg, Dharīᶜa, 18:60.

[35] The commentator Shams al-Dīn Abū l-Thanā al-Iṣfahānī (d. 749/1348), for instance, pointed out that if it were not for al-Ḥillī's commentary, it would be impossible to understand the Tajrīd (see Āghā Buzurg, Dharīᶜa, 18:60; for a list of the various commentaries on the Tajrīd, see ibid., 3:352ff).

[36] Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 123, 190, 202, 203, 216, 244, 371, 386, 393, and 438 where he recommends his Nihāyat al-marām to the reader as his most extensive work on theology.

[37] Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, Taslīk al-nafs ilā ḥaẓīrat al-quds (MS British Museum OR 10971), 12r, 44v, 75r; "Kashf al-fawā'id," 2, 5, 21, 37, 43, 82; Ajwiba, 22.

[38] Āghā Buzurg, Dharīᶜa, 24:407 (no.2153); see also Rawḍātī, 37, for MS Ḥaydariyya 628. Not having seen the appropriate catalogue, I am indebted to Professor Modarressi for his information that the MS Majlis 10192 contains only the first

Moreover, some of the references to the Nihāya are suspect. This applies to those in the Kashf al-murād where it is highly unlikely that he had already reached the corresponding sections in the Nihāya. He similarly refers to the Nihāya in the works which were completed after the Kashf to the Nihāya in regard to subjects which were usually discussed by him at the end of the theological works.[39] In most of these instances it is unlikely that at that stage he had advanced so far in the writing of the Nihāya. It may therefore be assumed that most of these references were inserted with the intention of dealing with these points in greater detail in his Nihāya. On the basis of this evidence, the possibility that the Nihāya was never completed cannot be ruled out.

The Nihāya had only a very limited circulation. Only four incomplete manuscripts apparently exist today. Even al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī who wrote commentaries upon some of al-Ḥillī's theological works mentions that he did not have a chance to consult the Nihāya.[40]

At the request of his son,[41] al-Ḥillī wrote the Nahj al-mustarshidīn which he completed on 22 Rabī$^c$ I 699/17 December 1299.[42] This work is written in a very concise style. Among later scholars, it became highly popular as is evident from the numerous commentaries which were written upon it. On 3 Dhū al-Ḥijja 703/7 July 1304,[43] he completed the Kitāb kashf al-fawā'id fī sharḥ qawā$^c$id al-$^c$aqā'id, a commentary on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's Qawā$^c$id al-$^c$aqā'id and on 12 Muḥarram 704/15 August 1304[44] he finished the medium-sized work Taslīk al-nafs ilā ḥaẓīrat al-quds. Again, both works were compiled at the request of his son.[45] All the works mentioned are included in the KH and the IM.

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part of the work. MS Mar$^c$ashī 254 also breaks in the middle of the discussion on accidents.

39 E.g. Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 386 (referring to the question of what is man); Ajwiba, 22 (referring to the issue of belief and muwāfāt).

40 Al-Miqdād, 395.

41 Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 9.

42 Āghā Buzurg, Dharī$^c$a, 24:424 (no.2222).

43 Ibid., 18:51-2 (no.635).

44 Taslīk, 82r.

45 "Kashf al-fawā'id," 2; Taslīk, 3v.

As was characteristic of the theological works of this period which were heavily influenced by the philosophical tradition, al-Ḥillī started off most of his systematic theological works with a chapter on metaphysics.[46] An exception is his Maᶜārij which begins with a chapter on man's obligation to reason towards the knowledge of God. This agrees with the traditional pattern of theological works.

None of the works which al-Ḥillī composed after Rabīᶜ II 709/August-September 1309 on the request of Uljaytū are included in either of the two original lists. Although some copies of the KH contain the titles of the most important works of this period,[47] they were obviously added by later writers and they regularly appear at the end of the list in these copies. The reason for not including them in the IM was apparently that most of these works were concerned mainly with polemics and as such, they were not suitable for teaching. Thus it would have been inappropriate to include them in a teaching permit.

Owing to their polemic character, the works of this period are of little significance for the investigation of al-Ḥillī's theological views. To this group of works belong the Minhāj al-karāma fī l-imāma which defends the Shiᶜite positions on the Imamate[48] and the Istiqṣā' al-naẓar fī l-qaḍā' wa-l-qadar in which al-Ḥillī defends the

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[46] According to Ibn Khaldūn (3:1112), this new pattern was first introduced by al-Rāzī in his Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya. For this pattern of theological works among later theologians, see also see L.Gardet and M.M.Anawati, Introduction à la théologie musulmane (Etudes de philosophie médiévale, no.37. Paris: Vrin, 1948), 160ff.

[47] The titles Nahj al-ḥaqq wa-kashf al-ṣidq, Minhāj al-karāma fī l-imāma, and Istiqṣā' al-naẓar fī l-qaḍā' wa-l-qadar are listed in KH 1, KH 2, KH 4, KH 8, KH 9, KH 11, and KH 12. They do not appear in KH 5, KH 6, KH 7 and KH 10.

[48] This work has been investigated by H.Laoust in the articles "La Critique du Sunnisme dans la doctrine d'al-Ḥillī," Revue des études islamiques 34 (1966):35-60, and "Les Fondaments de l'Imamat dans le Minhāǧ d'al-Ḥillī," Revue des études islamiques 46 (1978):3-55.

Mu^c^tazilite view of man's free choice in his acts against the determinists. In the Kitāb nahj al-ḥaqq wa-kashf al-ṣidq, al-Ḥillī polemically deals with the views of the Ash^c^arites.

The polemic character of these works provoked Sunnite authors to compose refutations of them. The refutations of the Nahj al-ḥaqq wa-kashf al-ṣidq and the Istiqṣā' al-naẓar fī l-qaḍā' wa-l-qadar in turn provoked later Shi^c^ite authors to write counter-refutations.[49]

Al-Ḥillī, moreover, wrote a number of smaller treatises on specific theological questions at the request of the Uljaytū. To these belongs a treatise which deals with the problem of abrogation of the divine laws.[50] According to Rashīd al-Dīn, al-Ḥillī formulated an answer at the request of the Ilkhan concerning the purpose of visiting the tombs of saints.[51] It is not known whether he did so in writing or orally. Since the earliest definitely known date of his presence at court is Rabī^c^ II 709/August-September 1309,[52] it is certain that he did not start or plan to start writing any of these works before then.[53]

Another work which is listed in only some copies of the KH and which does not appear in the IM list is the Risāla al-sa^c^diyya dedicated to the minister Sa^c^d al-Dīn. This treatise was written between Rabī^c^ II 709/August-September 1309 and 10 Shawwāl 711/19 February 1312.[54] The very concise Risāla fī wājib al-i^c^tiqād is also one of al-Ḥillī's later treatises. This title is not included in the IM and was added later to some copies of the KH.[55] Its authenticity as a work by al-Ḥillī is known since he mentions it in his Ajwibat al-masā'il al-muhanna'iyya.[56]

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49 See appendix no.120 & 26.
50 Jawāb su'āl ^c^an hikmat al-naskh fī l-aḥkām al-ilāhiyya.
51 See van Ess, Wesīr, 42.
52 See supra, p.27.
53 H.^c^A.Maḥfūẓ records ("Nafā'is al-makhtūṭāt al-^c^arabiyya fī Īrān," Majallat Ma^c^had al-Makhtūṭāt al-^c^Arabiyya 3 (1957):52) a MS copy of the Nahj al-ḥaqq which is dated 704/1304-5. This clearly must be an error.
54 On this date, Sa^c^d al-Dīn was executed; see Qāshānī, 114.
55 The title is included in KH 1, KH 2, KH 4, KH 8, KH 9; KH 12.
56 See Āghā Buzurg, Dharī^c^a, 25:4.

Some copies of the KH list include another title of al-Ḥillī, the Kitāb al-alfayn al-fāriq bayn al-ṣidq wa-l-mayn.[57] The aim of this work is to prove the Shiᶜite doctrine of the Imamate. In the introduction, al-Ḥillī states that he started to compose it at the request of his son.[58] He completed the draft (taswīd) of the first section on 20 Rabīᶜ I 709/28 August 1309[59] and the draft of the whole work in Ramaḍān 712/December 1312-January 1313.[60] Yet there are clear indications that al-Ḥillī's contribution to this book must have been very limited. His son Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn appears to have written most of it although he claims at the end of the first and the second section merely to have made a fair copy (tabyīḍ) of his father's draft. In the first section of the book,[61] Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn says that on 11 Jumādā II 726/15 May 1326 (several months after the death of his father) while editing the book he encountered a problem which perplexed him. Subsequently, his father appeared to him in a dream and clarified the point in question. This instance clearly indicates that Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn did not work on a final version which he had received from his father. It is therefore questionable whether al-Ḥillī made any major contribution to the work at all. Another indication that his son wrote most of the work is the considerable distance in time between the date on which al-Ḥillī is said to have completed the draft and the date on which Fakhr al-Muḥqqiqīn completed the fair copy of it; this amounts in the first section to 17 years[62] and in the second section to 42 years.[63]

Both lists include the titles of works which are lost and it is therefore impossible to establish the date of their composition. To these belong the Kitāb muᶜtaqad al-wāṣilīn or

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[57]The title is included in KH 1, KH 2, KH 4, KH 8, KH 9, KH 11; KH 12.
[58]Alfayn, 11.
[59]Ibid., 138.
[60]Ibid., 445.
[61]Ibid., 125ff.
[62]Ibid., 138.
[63]Ibid., 445.

Maqṣid al-wāṣilīn, Kitāb al-tanāsub bayn al-firaq al-ashᶜariyya wa-l-sufisṭā'iyya, Arbaᶜīn mas'ala fī uṣūl al-dīn, and Kitāb manāhij al-hidāya wa-maᶜārij al-dirāya.

Among al-Ḥillī's last works on theology is the short treatise al-Bāb al-ḥādī ᶜashar fīmā yajibu ᶜalā ᶜāmmat al-mukallafīn min maᶜrifat uṣūl al-dīn which he added as the eleventh chapter to his Minhāj al-ṣalāḥ fī ikhtiṣār al-miṣbāḥ. This work was completed on 11 Dhū al-Ḥijja 723/11 December 1323.[64] The Bāb al-ḥādī ᶜashar which was written, as the title indicates, for the general reader rather than for students of theology, is clearly the most popular among his theological works to this day. The large number of extant manuscripts as well as the numerous commentaries written upon it bear witness to this.[65] Together with its most famous commentary by al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī (d. 826/1423), it has been edited frequently and translations of the two works in Persian and English are currently available.[66]

A number of titles were attributed to al-Ḥillī by later writers but these works are apparently lost. The authenticity of the attribution of these works to him can therefore neither be affirmed nor denied. Those works are Risāla fī buṭlān al-jabr,[67] Risāla fī taḥqīq maᶜnā al-īmān,[68] and Risāla fī khalq al-aᶜmāl.[69]

Furthermore, Āghā Buzurg attributes al-Khulāṣa fī uṣūl al-dīn and al-Muqaddima fī l-kalām to al-Ḥillī.[70] While he does not indicate his reference in regard to the Muqaddima, he attributes the Khulāṣa to him on the basis of a manuscript copy in the Maktabat al-Khwānsārī.[71]

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64 See Rawḍātī, 103.
65 See appendix no.36.
66 Hasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, al-Bāb al-ḥādī ᶜashar (edited by Mahdī Muḥaqqiq. Wisdom of Persia, no.38. Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1365/1986), introduction, 16-7; see also appendix no.36.
67 Al-Afandī, 1:375.
68 Ibid., 1:379; also Khwānsārī, 2:275.
69 Al-Afandī, 1:375.
70 Āghā Buzurg, Dharīᶜa, 22:89 (no.6205)
71 Ibid., 7:208-9 (no.1024). There exist numerous copies of an anonymous text which may possibly be the Khulāṣa by

3.Philosophical Works

Al-Ḥillī's first philosophical work was his Kitāb al-asrār al-khafiyya,[72] which he dedicated to the minister Hārūn b. Shams al-Dīn al-Juwaynī[73] who died in 685/1286. Thus he must have written it before that date and there are safe indications that he began to write it, or even completed it, long before. In his Manāhij, he frequently refers to the Asrār;[74] it is therefore likely that at least considerable parts of the Asrār were written before 6 Rabīᶜ II 680/25 July 1281, when he completed the Manāhij. This is confirmed by his concluding remarks in the Qawāᶜid al-jaliyya,[75] a work on logic completed in Rabīᶜ II 679/July-August 1280,[76] where he refers to the Asrār.

The Asrār is arranged in a manner typical of philosophical works; it is divided into the three sections logic (manṭiq), physics (ṭabīᶜiyyāt) and theology (ilāhiyyāt).

This work is one of al-Ḥillī's most important philosophical treatises and for a long time he himself considered it as his most authoritative work in this field. He refers to it frequently not only in his commentary on al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī's (d. 675/1277) Ḥikmat al-ᶜayn, the

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al-Ḥillī if the attribution of the manuscript mentioned by Āghā Buzurg is correct. One of these is MS Princeton University Library New Series 1886 (39r-48r) contained in a collection of works which were all written either by al-Ḥillī or by his son Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn (see Mach, 128-9). Mach and Ormsby mention further copies of the same work in two Iranian libraries, one of which is anonymous whereas the other is attributed to al-Shahīd al-thānī (ibid.). Another copy of the same treatise is extant in MS British Museum OR 10968/2. The theological positions in this treatise agree with al-Ḥillī's views.

[72] This is known from his introduction to his Ghāyat al-wuṣūl (2r) where he states that the Manāhij and the Asrār were the first works he compiled on theology and philosophy.

[73] Āghā Buzurg, Dharīᶜa, 2:45.

[74] E.g. Manāhij, 89r, 90r, 91r.

[75] Quoted in Jawān, 1:348.

[76] See later.

*Īḍāḥ al-maqāṣid fī sharḥ ḥikmat al-$^{c}$ayn*[77] (completed on 8 Shawwāl 694/21 August 1295)[78] but also in most of his theological works.[79] Even al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī sometimes refers to the *Asrār* in his commentaries on al-Ḥillī's *Nahj al-mustarshidīn*.[80] In his later theological works, however, al-Ḥillī rarely refers to the *Asrār*. Instead, he advises his readers to consult his extensive theological work *Nihāyat al-marām* which similarly contained detailed discussions on philosophical questions. This indicates that he did not compose another work on philosophical issues after the *Asrār* which he considered its equal in authority.

In this work, al-Ḥillī is highly critical of the philosophical propositions whenever they disagreed with vital theological views.

In the *Īḍāḥ al-maqāṣid*, the author refers to two other works on philosophy. These therefore must have been written before 8 Shawwāl 694/21 August 1295, the date when the *Īḍāḥ* was completed. They are his *Muqāwamāt al-ḥikmiyya*[81] and his *Tanqīḥ al-abḥāth fī l-$^{c}$ulūm al-thalātha*,[82] neither of which is extant. Both works are mentioned in at least some copies of the KH[83] but not in the IM. Al-Ḥillī possibly did not consider them as important enough to be included in the IM list. The *Muqāwamāt al-ḥikmiyya* were apparently completed even before Rabī$^{c}$ II 693/March 1294 since he mentions in the KH that this work had already been completed.[84] In his *Īḍāḥ al-maqāṣid*, he further refers to his "*Asrār* together with its summary" (*al-Asrār wa-khulāṣatuhu*).[85] It is not evident which work is meant to be this summary.

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[77] *Īḍāḥ al-maqāṣid*, 114; 132; 220, 222, 224.
[78] *Ibid.*, 385.
[79] E.g. *Manāhij*, 89r, 90r, 91r; *Kashf al-murād*, 36, 151, 209; *Nahj al-mustarshidīn*, 48; *Ma$^{c}$ārij*, 111r.
[80] Al-Miqdād, 54.
[81] *Īḍāḥ al-maqāṣid*, 307.
[82] *Ibid.*, 246, 268.
[83] Although none of the copies of the KH consulted contain the *Tanqīḥ al-abḥāth*, Āghā Buzurg mentions (*Dharī$^{c}$a*, 4:460) that some of the KH copies do include this title.
[84] *Rijāl*, 47.
[85] *Īḍāḥ al-maqāṣid*, 10.

Of his Kitāb kashf al-khafā' min kitāb al-shifā', only the second portion is extant; this starts off with a discussion about the ten categories and deals subsequently with substance (jawhar) and the accidents of quantity (kam) and of relation (muḍāf). This portion was completed on 9 Rabīᶜ II 717/21 June 1317.[86] At its end, a third section on the accident of quality (kayf) is announced.[87] Al-Ḥillī mentions in the IM list that only two volumes (mujalladān) of this work had been written up to then.[88] The possibility that this work was never completed cannot therefore be ruled out.

Of his Marāṣid al-tadqīq wa-maqāṣid al-taḥqīq, which originally contained sections on logic, physics and theology, only the section on logic is extant.[89]

All his remaining philosophical works are lost. In so far as the titles indicate, a large number of his works are concerned with the works of Ibn Sīnā and especially with the latter's al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt or with commentaries on this work. This applies to al-Ḥillī's Muḥākamāt bayn shurrāḥ al-ishārāt, the Ishārāt ilā maᶜānī al-ishārāt, Īḍāḥ al-muᶜḍilāt min sharḥ al-ishārāt, and the Basṭ al-ishārāt. His works Kashf al-talbīs wa-bayān sayr al-ra'īs[90] and Īḍāḥ al-talbīs min kalām al-ra'īs[91] appear to be similarly

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[86] Hasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, Kashf al-khafā' min kitāb al-shifā' (MS Chester Beatty 5151), 102r.
[87] Ibid., 102r.
[88] See IM 2. According to IM 4, only one volume had been written until then. This is unlikely since the second portion was completed before the IM was written. IM 1 and IM 4 do not specify how many volumes had been written to that date. According to IM 5 "a number of volumes" (mujalladāt) had been written.
[89] M.T.Dānishpazhūh and ᶜA.N.Munzawī, Fihrist-i nuskhahāy-i khaṭṭī-yi Kitābkhāna-yi Markazī-yi Dānishgāh-i Tehrān (Tehran, 1330-57sh), 9:934-5.
[90] The IM copies differ regarding the exact title of this work. According to IM 1 the title is Kashf al-talbīs wa-bayān sayr al-ra'īs; according to IM 2 it is Kashf al-talbīs fī bayān sayr al-ra'īs. IM 3 reads Kashf al-talbīs min sahar al-ra'īs. Al-ᶜĀmilī (24:252) suggests the reading sahw. Another possibility which would make sense would be to read it as shubah.
[91] Āghā Buzurg suggests (Dharīᶜa, 18:24) that these two titles refer to the same work. This possibility should not be ruled

concerned with the views of Ibn Sīnā. Al-Ḥillī wrote two further works entitled Ḥall al-mushkilāt min kitāb al-talwīḥāt and Kashf al-mushkilāt min kitāb al-talwīḥāt which seem to be commentaries on the Kitāb al-talwīḥāt by al-Suhrawardī (d. 586/1190).[92] His Taḥṣīl al-mulakhkhaṣ may possibly be a commentary on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's Mulakhkhaṣ.[93]

For those titles which appear both in the KH list and in the IM list, there is no indication of their date of compilation. To these belong the titles Kashf al-talbīs min kalām al-ra'īs, and the Muḥākamāt bayn shurrāḥ al-ishārāt. Those titles which appear only in the IM list, were presumably written just before 720/1320. These are the Kashf al-mushkilāt min kitāb al-talwīḥāt, Kashf al-talbīs wa-bayān sayr al-ra'īs, Ishārāt ilā ma<sup>c</sup>ānī al-ishārāt, Īḍāḥ al-mu<sup>c</sup>dilāt min sharḥ al-ishārāt, Basṭ al-ishārāt, Taḥrīr al-abḥāth, Taḥṣīl al-mulakhkhaṣ,[94] and Lubb al-ḥikma.[95]

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out since the different copies of the two lists are consistent in the wording of the two titles. The KH lists all agree in the title Īḍāḥ al-talbīs..., while all IM copies list the work under the title Kashf al-talbīs....

[92] It is possible that these two titles refer to the same work. Indication for this is that all KH copies list the work as Ḥall al-mushkilāt whereas all IM copies list it under the title Kashf al-mushkilāt.

[93] See also al-<sup>c</sup>Āmilī, 24:252.

[94] Taḥṣīl al-mulakhkhaṣ is mentioned in IM 3 and IM 5 only; in IM 5 it is moreover mentioned that only one volume had until then been written.

[95] The title Lubb al-ḥikma occurs only in IM 2 and IM 5. In IM 3 Kutub al-ḥikma appears instead as a heading for the following four titles. IM 4 offers at this position Kitāb al-ḥikma. IM 1 does not mention either of the titles. Since there does not appear to be any substantial difference between the four titles which are listed after the title in question (Kitāb al-ta<sup>c</sup>līm al-thānī, Kitāb kashf al-talbīs wa-bayān al-ra'īs, Kitāb īḍāḥ al-mu<sup>c</sup>dilāt min kitāb al-ishārāt and Kitāb kashf al-mushkilāt min kitāb al-talwīḥāt) and the titles of the previous section which is headed kutub al-<sup>c</sup>uqūl and in which al-Ḥillī's remaining works on philosophy as well as on logic are listed, there does not seem to be any justification for the reading kutub al-ḥikma or kitāb al-ḥikma. The reading of Lubb al-ḥikma as a separate title seems therefore preferable.

Al-Ḥillī's Ta^c^līm al-thānī belongs to the more extensive works of this later period; according to the IM list this consists of a number of volumes. Since it is mentioned there that to that point only some of the sections had been written, it is likely that this work was never completed.

The reason why most of al-Ḥillī's philosophical works are lost was presumably that they were of little originality. Since he was a theologian rather than a philosopher, it is most likely that he composed most of his philosophical works as books of instruction for his students. This impression is confirmed by the titles of some of the lost works.

4.Works on logic

Besides those philosophical treatises which include a separate section on logic,[96] al-Ḥillī composed a number of works exclusively concerned with logic.

The Qawā<sup>c</sup>id al-jaliyya fī sharḥ al-risāla al-shamsiyya which he completed in Rabī<sup>c</sup> II 679/July-August 1280[97] was apparently the earliest. This work is a commentary on the Risāla al-shamsiyya by al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī (d. 675/1277).

Presumably after 680/1281, he composed his commentary on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's Tajrīd on logic, entitled al-Jawhar al-naḍīd fī sharḥ kitāb al-tajrīd. The time of composition suggested can be justified in so far as al-Ḥillī mentions in this work, from among his other writings, only his Asrār[98] and his Manāhij.[99] Since the Manāhij was completed in 680/1281 and the Asrār presumably even earlier, it is likely that the Jawhar was written shortly after these two works. The Qawā<sup>c</sup>id and the Jawhar are the only works on logic which are extant.

In his KH and his IM list al-Ḥillī furthermore lists the Nahj al-<sup>c</sup>irfān fī <sup>c</sup>ilm al-mīzān. His Kāshif al-astār fī sharḥ kashf al-asrār, which is equally included in both lists, is presumably a commentary on the Kashf al-asrār <sup>c</sup>an ghawāmiḍ al-afkār by Muḥammad b. Nāmawār b. <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Malik al-Khūnjī (d. 646/1248). Another work on logic, the Kitāb nūr al-mushriq, is to be found only in the IM list. It was possibly written only just before 720/1320. His Kitāb al-durr al-maknūn fī <sup>c</sup>ilm al-qānūn appears only in the KH list.

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[96] Such as the Asrār or the Marāṣid al-tadqīq.
[97] See Jawān, 1:348.
[98] Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, al-Jawhar al-naḍīd fī sharḥ manṭiq al-tajrīd (edited by Muḥsin Baydārfar. Ṭehran: Intishārāt-i Baydār, 1363sh.), 13, 23, 35.
[99] Ibid., 35.

5.Legal works

Al-Ḥillī's contribution to the development of Shiʿite law was formative.[100] He composed numerous and extensive legal works.

His first work in this field was the *Muntahā al-maṭlab* which was also his most extensiveone although the extant portions cover only the field of acts of devotion (*ʿibādāt*).[101] The first part was completed in 684/1285-6[102] and the second part on 11 Jumādā II 688/2 July 1289.[103] The *Mukhtalaf al-shīʿa* which is also one of his more extensive works, was completed between 4 Jumādā II 699/26 February 1300[104] and 15 Dhū al-Qaʿda 708/26 April 1309.[105] This work, which in contrast to the *Muntahā* covers all fields of law, also differs from the latter in its purpose; while the *Muntahā* deals systematically with the relevant legal questions, the *Mukhtalaf* is confined to those questions about which there was disagreement among the Shiʿite lawyers.[106]

His *Qawāʿid al-aḥkām* which al-Ḥillī compiled at the request of his son[107] is of a more concise style. The work, which covers all areas of the law, enjoyed high popularity among later scholars which is indicated by the large number

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[100] Modarressi, 47-8.
[101] In the KH (*Rijāl*, 45), al-Ḥillī states that by Rabīʿ II 693/March 1294 he had completed the seventh portion of this work. Since the extant portion includes only the sixth part, it is likely that he wrote at least one more portion of this work. Yet this portion is apparently not extant; see also Āghā Buzurg, *Dharīʿa*, 23:12.
[102] Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, *Muntahā al-maṭlab fī taḥqīq al-madhhab* (Tehran, 1333/1915), 1:192; the date given there is 784 which is clearly an error. Most likely, 684 is meant.
[103] Āghā Buzurg, *Dharīʿa*, 23:12.
[104] Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, *Mukhtalaf al-shīʿa fī aḥkām al-sharīʿa* (Tehran, 1323-4/1905-6), 1:171.
[105] Ibid., 5:274.
[106] Ibid., 1:2.
[107] Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, *Qawāʿid al-aḥkām fī maʿrifat al-ḥalāl wa-l-ḥarām* (Qum, 1984 (Repr. of the 1315/1898 edn), 2.

of commentaries on it.[108] Al-Ḥillī concluded the work with a *waṣiyya* for his son in which he states that he completed the work when he (al-Ḥillī) was at the end of his fifties and the beginning of his sixties.[109] This suggests that he completed the work around the year 700/1300-1. This is confirmed by one manuscript copy which is dated 24 Dhū l-Ḥijja 699/10 September 1300.[110] In regard to one question on a legal issue connected with the *Qawā$^{c}$id*, al-Ḥillī is reported to have had a correspondance with $^{c}$Abd Allāh al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685/1286).[111]

Āghā Buzurg suggests[112] that the *Taḥrīr al-aḥkām* and the *Talkhīṣ al-marām fī ma$^{c}$rifat al-aḥkām* were both written before the *Mukhtalaf al-shī$^{c}$a*, which al-Ḥillī started shortly before 699/1299-1300. The *Taḥrīr* which covers the field of acts of devotion ($^{c}$*ibādāt*) and mutual relations (*mu$^{c}$āmalāt*) is described by the author as a summary of the *Muntahā al-maṭlab*.[113]

The KH further includes the title *Ghāyat al-iḥkām fī taṣḥīḥ talkhīṣ al-marām* which apparently is lost. The title suggests that this work was a commentary on al-Ḥillī's *Talkhīṣ al-marām*. It is, however, worth noting that the title appears only in some KH copies[114] while it is not included in the IM. Its attribution to al-Ḥillī is therefore doubtful. Since the work is not extant, however, it is difficult to decide this matter. Al-Ḥillī's *Irshād al-adhhān*, comparable in length to the *Qawā$^{c}$id*, enjoyed great popularity among later scholars. This is indicated by the vast number of commentaries on this work.[115] According to Āghā Buzurg, the *Irshād* was completed either in 676/1277-8

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[108] See Modarressi, 73-4; Āghā Buzurg, *Dharī$^{c}$a*, 14:17-26.
[109] *Qawā$^{c}$id*, 2:346.
[110] See M.T.Dānishpazhūh, "Fihrist-i nuskhahāy-i khaṭṭī-yi Kitābkhāna-yi Dr.Husayn Miftāḥ," *Nashriyya-yi Kitābkhāna-yi Markazī-yi Dānishgāh-i Tehrān dar barā-yi nuskhahāy-i khaṭṭī* 7 (Tehran, 1353sh): 203.
[111] Al-$^{c}$Āmilī, 24:237.
[112] *Dharī$^{c}$a*, 20:220.
[113] Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, *Taḥrīr al-aḥkām al-shar$^{c}$iyya $^{c}$alā madhhab al-imāmiyya* (Tehran, 1314/1896), 2.
[114] KH 1, KH 2, KH 5, KH 6, KH 10.
[115] See Āghā Buzurg, *Dharī$^{c}$a*, 1:511-2.

or in 696/1296-7.[116] The year 676/1277-8 seems unlikely since al-Ḥillī's first legal work, the Muntahā al-maṭlab, was completed only in 688/1289. Moreover, at the end of the Irshād, the author refers to the Muntahā al-maṭlab, the Taḥrīr al-aḥkām, the Qawāᶜid al-aḥkām and the Tadhkirat al-fuqahā'[117] most of which al-Ḥillī had not even begun writing in 676/1277-8. The Tabṣirat al-mutaᶜallimīn, his shortest systematic exposition on law, was written for non-specialists and novice students.[118]

The Tadhkirat al-fuqahā' which al-Ḥillī wrote at the request of his son[119] is one of his most extensive legal works. The first section was completed on 24 Ṣafar 703/7 October 1303[120] and the last section was finished on 16 Dhū al-Ḥijja 720/17 January 1321.[121] Because of a reference in one of Fakhr al-Muḥaqqiqīn's legal writings, it has been suggested that he continued the Tadhkira after his father's death.[122] Yet the printed edition of the work and apparently also the manuscripts available contain only the portions of the book which al-Ḥillī himself had written. These end with the section on marriage (nikāḥ).[123] The Nihāyat al-iḥkām which al-Ḥillī wrote also at his son's request was another late work.[124] In 720/1320, al-Ḥillī states in his IM that so far only the first two sections on ritual purity (ṭahāra) and prayer (ṣalāt) had been written. The work was apparently not continued.[125]

Al-Ḥillī further composed some shorter treatises on specific legal points, such as his Risāla fī manāsik al-ḥajj which is included in the KH. In addition later writers ascribed to him a treatise entitled Wājib al-wuḍū'

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116 Ibid., 1:510.
117 See Shīrwānī, 1:13.
118 Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, Tabṣirat al-mutaᶜallimīn fī aḥkām al-dīn (Tehran: al-Maktaba al-islāmiyya, 1372H.), 2.
119 Tadhkira, 1:2.
120 Ibid., 1:70.
121 Ibid., 2:661.
122 Āghā Buzurg, Dharīᶜa, 4:43.
123 Tadhkira, 2:661; also Fāḍil, 2:244.
124 See quotation in Fāḍil, 2:318.
125 Al-Khwānsārī, 2:275.

wa-l-salāt[126] and the Risāla fī wājibāt al-hajj wa-arkānihi min dūn dhikr al-adciya wa-l-mustahabbāt.[127] Modarressi also records a manuscript entitled Risāla fī l-mawārīth which contains evidence that it was written by al-Hillī,[128] as well as two other treatises entitled Ajwibat al-masā'il al-fiqhiyya and Ajwibat masā'il Ibn Zuhra.[129]

His Taslīk al-adhhān and Tahdhīb al-nafs appear to be lost. Both titles are listed only in the IM which suggests that they were written shortly before 720/1320 and both were apparently shorter works.[130] His Taslīk al-afhām which is also lost is listed only in the KH. This may indicate that the author considered it less important. His Madārik al-ahkām, which is lost as well, is included in both lists. Since al-Hillī states in the IM that until then he had written only the first section on ritual purity (tahāra), he must have started it just before 720/1320. It is doubtful whether he completed any more sections during the rest of his life.[131]

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[126] Al-Afandī, 1:378.
[127] Ibid., 1:378.
[128] Modarressi, 204.
[129] Ibid., 103.
[130] In the IM list, both are characterised as consisting of one volume (mujallad).
[131] See also al-Khwānsārī, 2:275.

6.Works on Legal Methodology (*Uṣūl al-Fiqh*)

The *Ghāyat al-wuṣūl wa-īḍāḥ al-subul fī sharḥ mukhtaṣar muntahā al-su'āl wa-l-amal*, which is a commentary on the *Mukhtaṣar muntahā al-su'āl wa-l-amal* of Ibn al-Ḥājib (d. 646/1249), was al-Ḥillī's first work in this discipline. This is indicated by his statement in the introduction to this work that after having written the *Manāhij* on theology and the *Asrār* in philosophy, he now turns to legal methodology.[132] It is likely, therefore, that he began to write this work after 680/1281. According to Āghā Buzurg, the *Ghāyat al-wuṣūl* was completed on 12 Rajab 697/25 April 1298.[133] The second portion of the middle-sized work *Muntahā al-wuṣūl ilā $^{c}$ilmay al-kalām wa-l-uṣūl* was presumably written after 16 Jumādā I 687/18 June 1288, the date when al-Ḥillī completed the first portion on theology.[134] The *Mabādi' al-wuṣūl ila $^{c}$ilm al-uṣūl* is a summary of the *Minhāj al-wuṣūl fī ma$^{c}$rifat $^{c}$ilm al-uṣūl* of $^{c}$Abd Allāh al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685/1286)[135] which he composed at the request of Taqī al-Dīn Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad al-Baṣrī.[136] It was written at least before 705/1305-6.[137]

At the request of his son,[138] al-Ḥillī started his most extensive work in this discipline, the *Nihāyat al-wuṣūl ilā $^{c}$ilm al-uṣūl*, which he completed on 8 Ramaḍān 704/4 April 1305.[139] Since he states in the introduction to this work

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[132] *Ghāya*, 2r.
[133] *Dharī$^{c}$a*, 16:24-5.
[134] *Muntahā al-wuṣūl*, 134v. The MS copy is incomplete at the end of the work.
[135] Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, *Mabādi' al-wuṣūl ilā $^{c}$ilm al-uṣūl* (edited by $^{c}$Abd al-Ḥusayn Muḥammad $^{c}$Alī al-Baqqāl. Najaf: al-Ādāb, 1390/1970), introd., 35.
[136] Āghā Buzurg, *Dharī$^{c}$a*, 19:44.
[137] In this year, the work was already studied by his students; see *Mabādi'*, introd., 41.
[138] Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, *Nihāyat al-wuṣūl ilā $^{c}$ilm al-uṣūl* (MS Bankipore 1567), 2v.
[139] Ibid., 316v.

that he had already written a number of shorter and more extensive works in this field, he began to compose it at a later stage of his career.[140]

During or after the composition of the Nihāya, he wrote the more concise Tahdhīb al-wuṣūl ilā $^{c}$ilm al-uṣūl which was very popular among later scholars. Since al-Ḥillī refers in it to his Nihāya[141] it must be one of his later works. The afore-mentioned works are extant and included in both lists.

Al-Ḥillī wrote two further works both of which are lost. The al-Nukat al-badī$^{c}$a fī taḥrīr al-dharī$^{c}$a may possibly have been a commentary on al-Murtaḍā's Dharī$^{c}$a ilā uṣūl al-sharī$^{c}$a. Since it is listed in the KH only, al-Ḥillī may not have considered it as very important. The Nahj al-wuṣūl ilā $^{c}$ilm al-uṣūl is listed in both the KH and the IM.

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[140] Ibid., 2v.
[141] See Ḥā'irī, 13:21.

7.Biographic Works

Around Rabī$^c$ II 693/March 1294[142] al-Ḥillī wrote his Khulāṣat al-aqwāl fī ma$^c$rifat al-rijāl which lists in the first part reliable transmitters, and unreliable transmitters in the second.[143] Since the work is designed as a short work (mukhtaṣar)[144] the author does not offer complete biographical and bibliographical dates for every transmitter. An exception is the article on himself in which he offers a list of his own works.[145]

His Īḍāḥ al-ishtibāh fī aḥwāl al-ruwāt was completed on 19 Dhū al-Qa$^c$da 707/11 May 1308.[146] This work is much more concise than the Khulāṣa.[147] Although it is not included in the IM list, its authenticity as a work by al-Ḥillī is established by internal evidence.[148]

The Kashf al-maqāl fī ma$^c$rifat aḥwāl al-rijāl is described by the author as his most extensive biographic work. He refers to it both in his Īḍāh al-ishtibāh[149] and in his Khulāṣa.[150] This work is apparently lost.[151] Moreover, although al-Ḥillī refers to it frequently he does not include it in either of the lists of his works.[152] Since the work must

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[142] Rijāl, 45.
[143] Ibid., 3.
[144] Ibid., 2.
[145] Ibid., 45-8.
[146] Āghā Buzurg, Dharī$^c$a, 2:493.
[147] See Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, Īḍāh al-ishtibāh fī asmā' al-ruwāt (MS Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin, Orientabteilung 10164), 1v.
[148] Ibid., 1v, where al-Ḥillī states that he is the author of the work.
[149] Ibid., 60v: "Whoever seeks the coverage and thorough examination of the knowledge of all transmitters and their states,...he should refer to our book entitled Kashf al-maqāl fī ma$^c$rifat al-rijāl."
[150] Rijāl, 2-3.
[151] Āghā Buzurg mentions in fact (Dharī$^c$a, 18:63-4) that there is a MS copy listed in the catalogue of the Khizāna al-Riḍawiyya in Mashhad. However, he expresses doubt about this.
[152] Āghā Buzurg mentions that al-Ḥillī included the title in his KH according to some manuscripts (Dharī$^c$a, 18:64). But none of the consulted copies includes this work.

have been considered very important by al-Ḥillī, this is striking and the possibility that he never wrote this work but rather intended to do so should therefore not be ruled out.

8.Works on Grammar

Of al-Ḥillī's works on grammar, none appears to be extant. His Basṭ al-kāfiya was a summary of the Sharḥ al-kāfiya by Raḍī al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Ḥasan al-Astarābādī (d. 686/1287)[153] which in turn was a commentary on the Kāfiya by Ibn al-Ḥājib (d. 646/1249). Al-Ḥillī's Kashf al-maknūn min kitāb al-maknūn was a summary of the Sharḥ al-muqaddima al-jazūliyya which is a commentary by Ibn al-Ḥājib on the Muqaddima al-jazūliyya by ᶜĪsā b. ᶜAbd al-Azīz b. Yūmarīlī al-Jazūlī (d. 610/1213). His Kitāb al-maqāṣid al-wāfiya li-fawā'id al-qānūn wa-l-kāfiya was based on the above-mentioned Muqaddima al-jazūliyya and the Kāfiya of Ibn al-Ḥājib. Except for the Kashf al-maknūn and the Durr al-maknūn fī sharḥ al-qānūn which are mentioned only in the KH, all works are listed in the KH and the IM. His Kitab al-maṭālib al-ᶜaliyya fī ᶜilm al-ᶜarabiyya is similarly mentioned in both lists.

Since most of al-Ḥillī's works on grammar were largely based on works of earlier grammarians, they were presumably of little originality. It is likely that he composed most of them as textbooks for his own students. This is presumably also the reason why none of the works have survived.

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[153] Rijāl, 47.

## 9.Mystical Works

Although al-Ḥillī had contacts with Sufis and was almost certainly acquainted with the mysticism of Ibn al-ᶜArabī (d. 638/1240) and the philosophy of illumination (ishrāq) of al-Suhrawardī (d. 586/1190),[154] their views did not make any impact on his thought. Later authors attributed to him a work entitled Sharḥ ḥikmat al-ishrāq which is said to be a commentary on al-Suhrawardī's Ḥikmat al-ishrāq.[155] This attribution seems doubtful; the title is not listed in any of al-Ḥillī's works. Moreover, given his limited interest in mystical ideas, it seems unlikely that he wrote such a work.

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[154] See supra, p.20-1.

[155] Āghā Buzurg, Dharīᶜa, 13:211 (no.750).

10.Exegetical Works

Al-Ḥillī wrote two exegetical works, the Kitāb al-qawl al-wajīz fī tafsīr al-Qur'ān and the Kitāb nahj al-īmān fī tafsīr al-Qur'ān, neither of which is extant. The Nahj al-īmān is described in the KH as a work in which he abridged the Kashshāf ᶜan ḥaqā'iq al-tanzīl of Jār Allāh Maḥmūd b. ᶜUmar al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144), the Tafsīr al-tibyān of al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067) and other exegetical works.[156]

Since both titles are listed only in the KH but not in the IM, it may be assumed that al-Ḥillī did not consider them very important. Moreover, the fact that both are lost seems to indicate that they were of little originality and significance.

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[156] Rijāl, 46.

11.Works on Traditions

Al-Ḥillī wrote a number of works on traditions, of which all but one are lost. The extant work is entitled *Īḍāḥ mukhālafat al-sunna* which was completed in 723/1323.[157] Because of the extremely late date of its compilation, the work is not included in either of the lists. Later authors ascribed it to al-Ḥillī.[158]

Of his remaining works on tradition which are all lost, the *Kitāb maṣābīḥ al-anwār* and the *Kitāb nahj al-waḍḍāḥ fī l-aḥādīth al-ṣiḥāḥ* are listed only in the KH. The *Istiqṣā' al-i$^{c}$tibār li-taḥrīr ma$^{c}$ānī al-akhbār* and the *Kitāb al-durr wa-l-marjān fī l-aḥādīth al-ṣiḥāḥ wa-l-ḥisān* are listed in the KH and the IM. His *Tanqīḥ qawā$^{c}$id al-dīn al-ma'khūdha $^{c}$an Āl Yāsīn* is included only in the IM list. This latter work may have been based on al-Ḥillī's *al-Durr wa-l-marjān fī l-aḥādīth al-ṣiḥāḥ wa-l-ḥisān*; IM 1 reports the title of the work as *Tanqīḥ qawā$^{c}$id al-dīn al-ma'khūdha $^{c}$an kitāb al-durr wa-l-marjān fī l-aḥādīth al-ṣiḥāḥ wa-l-ḥisān*. Yet no other copy agrees with this version. According to IM 4 its title is *Tanqīḥ al-qawā$^{c}$id al-ma'khūdha $^{c}$an al-ra'īsayn*.

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[157] Āghā Buzurg, *Dharī$^{c}$a*, 2:499.

[158] Ibid., 2:498-9. Not having seen a copy of the work, I cannot say whether it contains internal evidence for its authenticity as one of al-Ḥillī's works.

(1) al-Abḥāth al-mufīda fī taḥṣīl al-$^{c}$aqīda (KH/IM).
(theology)
Dharī$^{c}$a, 1:63 (no.310).
MSS: Ḥakīm M599 (cat.16); see also the locations of the following commentaries.
Commentaries: (1) Sharḥ al-abḥāth al-mufīda by Naṣīr b. Ibrāhīm al-Aḥsā'ī (d. 853/1449) (Dharī$^{c}$a, 13:57, no.182), MSS: Bīnish 13 (cat.852) - Riḍawī Ḥikma 13 (cat.1:14 = 132 new edition); (2) Sharḥ al-abḥāth al-mufīda by Hādī b. al-Mahdī al-Sabzawārī (d. 1289/1872) (Dharī$^{c}$a, 13:57, no.183), MSS: Riḍawī Ḥikma 2 (cat.1:17 = 133 new edition) -Bīnish 27 (cat.852).

(2) Ithbāt al-raj$^{c}$a (DH).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 1:92 (no.442).
MSS: Madrasat Fāḍil Khān (see Dharī$^{c}$a).

(3) al-Ijāza li-$^{c}$Alī b. Ismā$^{c}$īl b. Ibrāhīm b. Futūḥ al-Gharawī.
Dharī$^{c}$a, 1:177 (no.904).
(issued on 12 Rajab 701/13 March 1302)
MSS: no MS known.

(4) al-Ijāza li-Taqī al-Dīn Ibrāhīm b. al-Ḥusayn b. $^{c}$Alī al-Āmulī.
Dharī$^{c}$a, 1:175-6 (no.897).
(issued in 709/1309-10)
MSS: no MS known.

(5) al-Ijāza li-Tāj al-Dīn Ḥasan b. al-Ḥusayn b. al-Ḥasan al-Sirābshanawī al-Kāshānī.
Dharī$^{c}$a, 1:177 (no.901).
MSS: no MS known.

(6) al-Ijāza li-Tāj al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. al-Mawlā Zayn al-Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Qāḍī $^{c}$Abd al-Wāḥid al-Rāzī.
Dharī$^{c}$a, 1:178 (no.908).
(issued in Rabī$^{c}$ II 709/September-October 1309)
Editions: al-Majlisī, Biḥār, 107:142.

(7) Ijāza thāniya li-Najm al-Dīn Muhanna' b. Sinān b. $^{c}$Abd al-Wahhāb al-Ḥusaynī al-Madanī.
Dharī$^{c}$a, 1:178 (no.911).
(issued in Muḥarram 720/February-March 1320 in al-Ḥilla)
Editions: in al-Majlisī, Biḥār, 107:147-149; in al-Ḥillī, Ajwibat al-masā'il al-muhanna'iyya, Qum: al-Khayyam, 1401H. 155-157.
MSS: Majlis 5192 (4) (cat.16:20); Riḍawī fiqh 120 - 121 (cat.2:36); Princeton New Series 960 (cat.77).

(8) al-Ijāza li-Jamāl al-Dīn Abī al-Futūḥ Aḥmad b. al-Shaykh Abī $^{c}$Abd Allah Balkū b. Abī Ṭālib b. $^{c}$Alī al-Āwī.
Dharī$^{c}$a, 1:176 (no.898).

(issued in 705/1305-6)
Editions: quoted in H.$^{c}$A Maḥfūẓ, "Nafā'is al-makhṭūṭāt fī Īrān," 19-20.

(9) al-Ijāza li-Rashīd al-Dīn $^{c}$Alī b. Muḥammad al-Rashīd al-Āwī.
Dharī$^{c}$a, 1:177 (no.905).
(issued in Rajab 705/January-February 1306)
MSS: no MS known.

(10) al-Ijāza li-Sirāj al-Dīn Ḥasan b. Bahā' al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Abī al-Majd al-Sirābshanawī.
Dharī$^{c}$a, 1:177 (no.900).
(issued in Jumādā I 715/August-September 1315)
MSS: no MS known.

(11) al-Ijāza li-Sharaf al-Dīn Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad b. $^{c}$Alī al-$^{c}$Alawī al-Ḥusaynī al-Ṭūsī.
Dharī$^{c}$a, 1:177 (no.903).
(issued in Muharram 704/August-September 1304)
Editions: quoted in Āghā Buzurg, Ṭabaqāt, 5:58-9.
MSS: Majlis 4941 (1) (cat.14:170).

(12) al-Ijāza li-Ḍiyā' al-Dīn Abī Muḥammad Hārūn b. Najm al-Dīn al-Ḥasan b. al-Amīr Shams al-Dīn $^{c}$Alī b. al-Ḥasan al-Ṭabarī.
Dharī$^{c}$a, 1:178 (no.912).
(issued on 17 Rajab 701/18 March 1302)
MSS: no MS known.

(13) al-Ijāza li-$^{c}$Izz al-Dīn al-Ḥusayn b. Ibrāhīm b. Yaḥyā al-Astarābādī.
Dharī$^{c}$a, 1:177 (no.902).
(issued on 28 Safar 708/17 August 1308)
MSS: no MS known.

(14) al-Ijāza al-kabīra li-Banī Zuhra.
Dharī$^{c}$a, 1:176 (no.899).
(issued on 15 Sha$^{c}$bān 723/19 August 1323)
Editions: in al-Majlisī, Biḥār, 107:60-137.
MSS: Berlin 152 (cat.1:56); Dānishgāh 3108(3) (cat.11:2063) -5396(5) (cat.15:4238) - 6955(4) (cat.16:410); Majlis 4873(14) (cat.14:13) - 5138(104) (cat.15:181).

(15) al-Ijāza al-kabīra li-Najm al-Dīn Muhanna' b. Sinān b. $^{c}$Abd al-Wahhāb al-Ḥusaynī al-Madanī.
Dharī$^{c}$a, 1:178.
(issued in Dhū al-Ḥijja 719/January-February 1320 in al-Ḥilla)
Editions: in al-Majlisī, Biḥār, 107:143-146; al-Ḥillī, Ajwiba, 114-117.
MSS: Ḥakīm M534 (cat.22); Majlis 4566(4) (cat.12:259) -5192(2) (cat.16:19); Princeton New Series 960 (cat.77).

(16) al-Ijāza li-Muḥammad b. Ismā$^{c}$īl b. al-Ḥusayn b. al-Ḥasan b. $^{c}$Alī al-Harqalī.
Dharī$^{c}$a, 1:177 (no.906).

(issued in 707/1307-8)
MSS: no MS known.

(17) al-Ijāza li-Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad b. Yār.
Dharīᶜa, 1:178 (no.909).
(issued in Jumādā II 724/May-June 1324)
MSS: no MS known.

(18) al-Ijāza li-Quṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Rāzī al-Buwayhī.
Dharīᶜa, 1:177-8 (no.907).
(issued on 3 Shaᶜbān 713/23 November 1313)
Editions: al-Majlisī, Biḥār, 107:138-141.

(19) Ajwibat masā'il Ibn Zuhra.
(see Modarressi, 103)
MSS: Dānishgāh 1474(3) (cat.8:125) - 3514(17) (cat.12:2526); Ḥakīm M548 (cat.28); Ḥuqūq J178(1) (cat.460).

(20) Ajwibat al-masā'il al-fiqhiyya.
(see Modarressi, 103)
MSS: Dānishgāh 2621(5) (cat.9:1497); Majlis 5642(2) (cat.17:97).

(21) Ajwibat al-masā'il al-muhanna'iyya (IE).
Dharīᶜa, 5:236-8 (no.1136) & 5:238 (no.1137).
(a collection of answers on a variety of topics; these answers on questions posed by Najm al-Dīn Muhanna' b. Sinān b. ᶜAbd al-Wahhāb al-Ḥusaynī al-Madanī were given orally in 717/1317-8 in al-Ḥilla and subsequently written down by al-Ḥillī. The first portion was completed in Dhū al-Ḥijja 719/January-February 1320, the remaining portion in Muḥarram 720/February-March 1320.)
Editions: Qum: al-Khayyām, 1401H.
MSS: Bīnish 2330 - 2331 - 2332 - 2822 - 2727 (cat.689); Dānishgāh 741 -1474(4) - 2144(3) - 2477(6) - 5396(1) -6710(59) - MF2068 (cat.1:380); Dār al-Kutub B 19178 (cat.3:58); Ḥuqūq D10 (cat.459); Ilāhiyyāt D246(4) (cat.1:266); India Office 1797 (cat.2:309); Iṣfahān Dānishgāh 291(1) (cat.937); Majlis 4566(3) (cat.12:259) -4566(5) (cat.12:260) -5192(1) (cat.16:19) - 5192(3) (cat.16:20); Malik 5210 (cat.1:666-7); Marᶜashī 1409(8) (cat.4:187) - 1409(9) -1409(10) (cat.4:188); Mashhad Ilāhīyat 1744(3) (cat.3:832); Nawwāb cat.475; Princeton New Series 524 (fol.15v -21r) - 960 (fol.1v-32v) (cat.6); Riḍawī Fiqh 582 -583 -584 (cat.5:396-8) - Fiqh 120 - 121 -122 - 123 - 124 -125 -126 (cat.2:36); Rampur 930 MK (cat.3:470).

(22) al-Adᶜiya al-fākhira al-manqūla ᶜan al-A'imma al-ṭāhira (KH).
Dharīᶜa, 1:398 (no.2066).
MSS: no MS known.

(23) Arba'īn mas'ala fī uṣūl al-dīn (DH).
Dharīᶜa, 1:435-6 (no.2205).
(theology)

MSS: Maktabat al-Sayyid Rājah Muḥammad Mahdī Ṣāḥib (see Dharī$^{c}$a, 1:435-6).

(24) Irshād al-adhhān fī aḥkām al-īmān (KH/IM). Dharī$^{c}$a, 1:510-512 (no.2509).
(law; completed in 696/1296-7)
Editions: together with al-Ardabīlī's Majmū$^{c}$at al-fā'ida wa-l-burhān. Qum, 1403/4H.; edited by Shaykh Fāris al-Hassūn. Qum: Manshūrāt mu'assasat al-nashr al-islāmī, forthcoming (see Turāthunā, 16 (1409):234).
MSS: $^{c}$Abd al-$^{c}$Aẓīm 130(1) (cat.439); Adabiyyāt (1960) J28 -D132 (cat.23ff); Āghā Ḥakīm 77 (cat.424); Ambrosiana C 134 (cat.2:187); Adabiyyāt (1965) 382 (cat.69); Berlin 4590 -4591 (cat.4:133-4); Bīnish cat.586-7 (29 copies); Dānishgāh 1548 (cat.8:173-4) - 1706 (cat.8:254) - 1983 (cat.8:592) -3560 (cat.12:2580) - 3665 (cat.12:2675) - 4145 (cat.13:3115) -6273 (cat.16:221) - 6340(3) (cat.16:246) - 6369(2) (cat.16:253) -6775 (cat.16:358) - 6853 (cat.16:382-3) - 7123 (cat.16:460) -7316 (cat.16:511) - 7720 (cat.16:683) -8629(1) (cat.17:182) -9503 (cat.17:385) - MF2544 (cat.1:281); Dār al-Kutub B23235 -B21262 (cat.1:34); Farhād 62 (cat.148); Gawharshād cat.210-1; Gulpāyigānī 39 (cat.46) -50 (cat.63); Ḥakīm 1671 (cat.44) -1424 -1730 - 1018 - 611 -477 - 121 -537 - 695 - 1562 - 1619 -1803 - 1899 (cat.45-6); Ḥuqūq J34 - J41 - J287 -J345 (241); Ilāhiyyāt J10 -B83 - J243 - D75 - D273 -D505 (cat.1:450ff); India Office 1794 - 1795 -1796 (cat.2:308-9); Iṣfahān Dānishgāh 75 (cat.882) - 113(3) (cat.925); Iṣfahān $^{c}$Umūmī 2882 (cat.176) -2966 -2972 - 2995 -3051 (cat.177) -3067 -3093 - 5350 (cat.178); Isma$^{c}$ili Institute A(399) -B(504) (cat.2:62); Kāshān 2 (cat.32); Kāshānī 8 (cat.59); Los Angeles M161 -M818 -M855 - M1118 -M1148 (cat.147-8); Ma$^{c}$ārif 53 (cat.1:74); Maḥfūẓ 1 (cat.3:17) - 95 (cat.3:24) -39 (cat.3:22) - 15 (cat.4:196) -354 (cat.4:232) - 30 (cat.4:255) - 25 (cat.4:257); Majlis 1287 (cat.4:62) -2869(1) (cat.10/1:218) -3086 (cat.10/2:641) - 3445 (cat.10/3:1304) -3462 (cat.10/3:1426) - 3770 (cat.10/4:1755) - 4404 (cat.12:104) - 4645(1) (cat.13:33) -4673(2) (cat.13:56) -4941(2) (cat.14:171) - 5819 (cat.17:239) - 5848 (cat.17:256) - 5863 (cat.17:268); Malik 1961 -2127 -2320 -2612 -5872 (cat.1:29-30); Mar$^{c}$ashī 961 (cat.3:153) -1248 (cat.4:47) -1285 (cat.4:83) - 1487 (cat.4:284) - 1588 (cat.4:393) - 1728 (cat.5:116) - 2805 (cat.8:7) - 3363 (cat.9:138) -3400 (cat.9:184) - 3981 (cat.10:360) - 4136 (cat.11:155) - 4357 (cat.11:355) - 4408 (cat.12:10) - 4827 (cat.13:26); Mashhad Adabiyyāt 9 (cat.8); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 1621 (cat.3:745) -1751 (cat.3:836) -19 (cat.1:10) - 548(1) (cat.1:296); Masjid-i Jāmi$^{c}$ 43 (cat.311) - 44 (cat.312); Miftāḥ 108 (cat.100) -157(1) (cat.224); Millī Arabic 1157 (cat.9:146) -Arabic 1446 (cat.9:478) -Arabic 996 (cat.8:483) - Arabic 845 (cat.8:348) - Arabic 402 (cat.7:343); Mīrzā Ja$^{c}$far cat.34,43; Nawwāb cat.449, 469; Oppenheim (n.n.); Princeton New Series 87 -111 - 122 - 318 -602 - 826 - 836 -1170 - 1329 - 1444 -1840 (cat.81); Riḍawī Fiqh 487 - 488 - 489 - 490 - 491 -492 -483 (cat.5:357-9) - cat.2:3-6 (16 copies); Rampur 10275 D -10239 D - 1009 D - 657 D - 987 MK (cat.3:464-6); Sipahsālār 447 -448 - 449 - 450 - 451 (cat.1:355,359); Sulaymān Khān cat.4-5; Tabrīz Millī 3377 (cat.1:46); Topkapi Serayi A 1082

(cat.2:746); Tustariyya 696 - 720 -730 - 901 -915 (cat.789) - 618(2) (p.869) - 841(2) (cat.876); ; Ustādī cat.5; Wazīrī 12 (cat.1:13) - 13 (cat.1:17) - 387 (cat.1:351-2) - 277 (cat.1:284-5) - 502 (cat.2:437) - 660 (cat.2:568) - 831 (cat.2:702) - 871 (cat.2:725) -1023 (cat.3:1023) -1153 (cat.3:874) -1254 (cat.3:907) - 1605 (cat.3:1000) -1139 (cat.3:870); Zanjānī cat.198,206.

(25) Istiqsā' al-i$^{c}$tibār fī taḥqīq ma$^{c}$ānī al-akhbār (KH/IM).
(also: Istiqsā' al-i$^{c}$tibār fī taḥrīr ma$^{c}$ānī al-akhbār)
Dharī$^{c}$a, 2:30 (no.120).
(traditions)
MSS: no MS known.

(26) Istiqsā' al-naẓar fī l-baḥth $^{c}$an al-qadā' wa-l-qadar (KH$^{*}$).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 2:31-2 (no.122).
(theology; written after Rabī$^{c}$ II 709/September-October 1309)
Editions: edited by $^{c}$Alī al-Khākānī al-Najafī. Najaf, 1354/1935.
MSS: Adabiyyāt (1960) D136 (cat.27); Bīnish 314 (cat.590); Dānishgāh 2091(2) (cat.8:714) - 5896(1) (cat.16:137) -7243(6) (cat.16:498) - MF2314(2) (1:671) -MF2992(1) (cat.1:776); Ḥakīm M1087 - M294 (cat.51); Ḥuqūq J227 (cat.244); Isma$^{c}$ili Institute 631 (fol.1v-16v) (cat.2:64); Majlis 4232(2) (cat.11:250) - 4322(2) (cat.12:16) - 4763(3) (cat.13:149) -4953(1) (cat.14:225) - 4954(13) (cat.14:237) - 5168(5) (cat.15:306); Mar$^{c}$ashī 2796(2) (cat.7:362); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 936(1) (cat.2:86); Princeton New Series 461 (fol.25r-31r) -1084 (fol.154r-162r) - 1886 (fol.57v-65v) (cat.87); Riḍawī Ḥikma 328 (cat.4:15) - Ḥikma 45 (cat.1:21 = 206 new edition); Tustariyya 562(4) (cat.866).
Commentaries: Nūr Allāh al-Shushtarī (d. 1019/1610), al-Nūr al-anwar wa-l-nūr al-azhar fī tanwīr khafāyā al-qadā' wa-l-qadar (Dharī$^{c}$a, 24:362, no.1952), written against objections by some Indian scholars against al-Ḥillī's Istiqsā' al-naẓar.

(27) al-Asrār al-khafiyya fī l-$^{c}$ulūm al-$^{c}$aqliyya (KH/IM).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 2:45 (no.175).
(philosophy; written before 680/1281)
MSS: Āghā Ḥakīm 179 (cat.420); Bankipore XXI, 2384; Ḥakīm 380 -1295 (cat.51); Maḥfūẓ 49 (cat.4:217).

(28) al-Ishārat ilā ma$^{c}$ānī al-ishārāt (IM).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 2:98.
(philosophy; written after Rabī$^{c}$ II 693/March 1294)
MSS: no MS known.

(29) al-Alfayn al-fāriq bayn al-ṣidq wa-l-mayn (KH$^{*}$).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 2:298-9 (no.1199).
(theology)
Editions: edited by Ḥusayn al-A$^{c}$lamī. Beirut: Mu'assasat al-A$^{c}$lamī, 1402/1982.
MSS: Adabiyyāt (1965) 94 (cat.71); Adabiyyāt (1341) 197 (cat.74); Bīnish 29 - 28 - 30 - 340 (cat.603-4); Dānishgāh 4551 (cat.13:3493); Gawharshād cat.218; Ḥakīm 669 (cat.67);

Hujjatiyya 171(1) (cat.100); Isma$^{c}$ili Institute 283 (cat.2:2); Los Angeles M1028 -M1129 (cat.154); Majlis 1686 (cat.5:4) - 1687 (cat.5:8) - 1688 (cat.5:9); Malik 2132 (cat.1:57); Miftāh 1040 -1047 (cat.103); Millī Arabic 268 (cat.7:241); Nūrbakhsh 189 (cat.1:190); Princeton New Series 1028 (cat.115); Ridawī Hikma 363 (cat.4:31) - Hikma 28 -29 -30 (cat.1:18 = 45-47 new edition); Wazīrī 1556 (cat.3:988).

(30) Anwār al-malakūt fī sharh al-yāqūt (KH/IM).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 2:444-5 (no.1725).
(theology; completed in Jumādā II 684/August-September 1285)
Editions: edited by Muhammad Zanjānī. Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tehrān, no.543. Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1338H.
MSS: Bīnish 31 - 32 (cat.609); Būhār 95 (cat.2:106); Dānishgāh 1046 - 4273 (cat.13:3240-1) - MF3081 (cat.2:62); Hakīm 1096 (cat.76); Huqūq J146 (cat.257); Ja$^{c}$fariyya 29 (cat.437); Mahfūz 60 (cat.4:218) - 82 (cat.3:34) - 34 (cat.3:59); Majlis 81 (cat.2:41) -1689 (cat.5:10); Malik 479 - 1292 (cat.71); Mar$^{c}$ashī 1241 (cat.4:40); Princeton New Series 1128 (cat.9-10); Ridawī Hikma 31 - 32 (cat.1:18 = 49-50 new edition); Tabrīz Millī 3511 (cat.1:111)
Commentaries: Nahj al-$^{c}$Amīdī $^{c}$alā anwār al-malakūt, by $^{c}$Amīd al-Dīn $^{c}$Abd al-Muttalib al-A$^{c}$rajī al-Husaynī al-Hillī (d. 754/1353) (Dharī$^{c}$a, 13:115, no.366).

(31) Īdāh al-ishtibāh fī asmā al-ruwāt (IE).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 2:493 (no.1934).
(biographic work; completed on 19 Dhū al-Qa$^{c}$da 707/11 May 1308).
Editions: Tehran, 1318H.
MSS: Adabiyyāt (1341) 138 (cat.74); Adabiyyāt (1960) B107 -J127 - D22 - D133 (cat.38 ff); Berlin 10164 (cat.9:517-8); Bīnish 8266 (cat.612); Adabiyyāt (1965) 151(2)- 309 - 452(3) (cat.77); Dānishgāh 2359(3) (cat.9:964) - 2945(4) (cat.10:1829) -6290(2) (cat.16:235) - MF1441(1) (cat.1:601); Majlis 25/12 (cat.7:23) -1599 (cat.4:300) - 3153(3) (cat.10/2:738) -5903 (cat.17:296); Fu'ād Sayyid 589 (cat.2/2:18); Mahfūz 51 (cat.4:203) - 21(2) (cat.4:209); Mar$^{c}$ashī 108(2) (cat.1:129) -443(1) (cat.2:45) - 1176(4) (cat.3:348); 2548(2) (cat.7:130) - 3029(2) (cat.8:217) -4772(2) (cat.12:336) -4910(2) (cat.13:90) - 4952(2) (cat.13:151); Mashhad Ilahiyyāt 1429(3) (cat.2:578) -1862(2) (cat.3:931) - 30 (cat.1:16); Millī Arabic 1433(3) (cat.9:455); Ridawī Rijāl 39 - 40 (cat.6:641-2) - Rijāl 3 (cat.2:353); Sulaymān Khān 108(3) (cat.18); Saryazdī 66(2) (cat.427).

(32) Īdāh al-talbīs fī kalām al-ra'īs (KH).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 2:493 (no.1938).
(philosophy)
MSS: no MS known.

(33) Īdāh mukhālafat al-sunna (DH*).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 2:498-9 (no.1954).
(traditions; completed in 723/1323).

MSS: Bīnish 6096 (cat.613); Dānishgāh MF1751 - MF2970 (cat.1:288); Majlis 5070 (cat.15:30); Sinā 29 (cat.1:14).

(34) Īḍāh al-muᶜdilāt min sharḥ al-ishārāt (IM).
Dharīᶜa, 2:500-1 (no.1960).
(philosophy; written after Rabīᶜ II 693/March 1294)
MSS: no MS known.

(35) Īḍāh al-maqāṣid fī sharḥ ḥikmat ᶜayn al-qawāᶜid (KH).
Dharīᶜa, 2:501 (no.1962).
(philosophy; completed on 8 Shawwāl 694/21 August 1295)
Editions: edited by ᶜA.Munzawī. Tehran, 1378/1959.
MSS: Dānishgāh 4792 (cat.14:3831) - MF71 (cat.1:289); Riḍawī Ḥikma 47 (cat.1:22 = 53 new edition); see also above mentioned edition, introduction, 25-33.

(36) al-Bāb al-ḥādī ᶜashar fīmā yajibu ᶜalā ᶜāmmat al-mukallafīn min maᶜrifat uṣūl al-dīn (IE).
(being the 11th chapter of no.110)
Dharīᶜa, 3:5-7 (no.4).
(theology; completed on 11 Dhū al-Ḥijja 723/11 December 1323).
Editions: together with the commentaries al-Nāfiᶜ yawm al-ḥashr by al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī and Miftāḥ al-Bāb by Abū l-Fatḥ b. Makhdūm al-Ḥusaynī. Edited by Mahdī Muḥaqqiq. Wisdom of Persia, no.38. Tehran 1365/1986.
Translations: English: al-Bābu 'l-Ḥādī ᶜAshar. A Treatise on the Principles of Shiᶜite Theology. Translated by W.M.Miller. London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1928.
MSS: ᶜAbd al-ᶜAẓīm 212(2) (cat.444) - 287(3) (cat.447); Bīnish 48 - 356 - 357 - 355 - 352 - 353 (cat.614); Bodleian MS arab f.64 (ff.109-112); Dānishgāh 328 - 4176(3) (cat.13:3143) - 7274(2) (cat.16:503) - 8596(7) (cat.17:169); Gawharshād cat.224; Gulpāyigānī 387(4) (cat.320); Ḥakīm M1757 - M1927 - M725 - M1177 - M1705 (cat.85); Iṣfahān Dānishgāh 122(2) (cat.926); Kāshānī 22 (cat.83); Los Angeles M97(2) (cat.663) -M1051(1) (cat.707); Majlis 109(12) (cat.7:325) -2767(3) (cat.9/1:178) - 3149(1) (cat.10/2:729) -4339(1) (cat.12:38) - 4954(26) (cat.14:243) - 5344(4) (cat.16:256) -5384(2) (cat.16:290) -5417(10) (cat.16:327); Marᶜashī 69(2) (cat.1:82) - 1003(2) (cat.3:194) -2247(4) (cat.6:232) - 5148(1) (cat.13:353); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 1577(3) (cat.2:712) - 668(2) (cat.1:467); Millī 1190(6) (cat.9:178); Nawwāb Ḥikma 79 (1) (cat.518); Oppenheim (n.n.); Princeton New Series 1550 (fol.150v- 156r) - 1886 (fol.48v- 51r) (cat.24); Riḍawī Ḥikma 371- 372 -373 -374 - 375 - 376 (cat.4:33-4) - Ḥikma 48 (cat.1:22 = 53-4 new edition); Wazīrī 2085(4) (cat.4:1159) - 2284(4) (cat.4:1232) - 2520(1) (cat.4:1326).
Commentaries: (1) Al-Fāḍil Miqdād al-Suyūrī (d. 826/1423), al-Nāfiᶜ yawm al-ḥashr fī sharḥ al-bāb al-ḥādī ᶜashar (2) Miftāḥ li-l-bāb al-mulḥaq bi-mukhtaṣar al-miṣbāḥ by Abū l-Fatḥ b. Makhdūm al-Khādim al-Ḥusaynī al-ᶜArabshāhī (d. 976/1568-9); (3) Irshād al-bashar fī sharḥ al-bāb al-ḥādī ᶜashar by Sulaymān b. Aḥmad b. al-Ḥusayn Āl ᶜAbd al-Jabbār al-Qaṭīfī (d. 1266/1850) (Brockelmann, GALS 2:794; Dharīᶜa, 2:794); (4) Sharḥ al-bāb

al-hādī $^{c}$ashar by Mīrzā Ibrāhīm b. Kāshif al-Dīn Muhammad b. al-Yazdī (d. after 1063/1653) (Dharī$^{c}$a, 13:118, no.378); (5) Matāli$^{c}$ al-nazar by Safī al-Dīn b. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Tarīhī; (Dharī$^{c}$a, 13:121); (6) Sharh al-bāb al-hādī $^{c}$ashar by Dildār b. $^{c}$Alī b. Muhammad Mu$^{c}$īn al-Dīn al-Hindī al-Nasīrābādī (d. 1235/1820) (Dharī$^{c}$a, 13:120, no.382); (7) Ma$^{c}$īn al-fikar fī sharh al-bāb al-hādī $^{c}$ashar by Ibn Abī Jumhūr al-Ahsā'ī (d. after 904/1499) (Dharī$^{c}$a, 21:286, no.5097); (8) Sharh ma$^{c}$īn al-fikar fī sharh al-bāb al-hādī $^{c}$ashar, a supercommentary by Ibn Abī Jumhūr al-Ahsā'ī on (7) (Dharī$^{c}$a, 14:73, no.1803); (9) Miftāh al-fikar li-fath sharh al-bāb al-hādī $^{c}$ashar by Ibn Abī Jumhūr al-Ahsā'ī (Dharī$^{c}$a, 21:339, no.5371); (10) Sharh al-bāb al-hādī $^{c}$ashar by Ibn Abī Jumhūr al-Ahsā'ī; (11) al-Zād al-muddakhar fī sharh al-bāb al-hādī $^{c}$ashar by Muhammad Ridā b. Qāsim al-Gharawī al-Najafī (written in 1349/1930-1) (Dharī$^{c}$a, 12:7, no.38); (12) Natā'ij al-fikar fī sharh al-bāb al-hādī $^{c}$ashar by Muhammad b. Muhammad Tāhā al-Karamī (written around 1376/1956-7) (Dharī$^{c}$a, 24:46, no.228); (13) Fath al-bāb fī sharh al-bāb al-hādī $^{c}$ashar by $^{c}$Abd al-Wahīd b. Ni$^{c}$mat Allāh al-Jīlānī or al-Astarābādī (Dharī$^{c}$a, 16:105, no.134); (14) Hādī al-bashar fī sharh al-bāb al-hādī $^{c}$ashar by Muhsin b. Muhammad al-Gīlānī (written in 1207/1792-3) (Dharī$^{c}$a, 25:151, no.11); (15) Sharh al-bāb al-hādī $^{c}$ashar by Mīrzā $^{c}$Alī Āghā al-Tabrīzī (d. around 1340/1921-2) (Dharī$^{c}$a, 13:122 no.390); (16) Sharh al-bāb al-hādī $^{c}$ashar by Sulaymān b. $^{c}$Abd Allāh b. $^{c}$Alī b. al-Husayn b. Ahmad b. Yūsuf b. $^{c}$Ammār al-Huwayzī al-Bahrānī (d. 1121/1709-10) (Dharī$^{c}$a, 13:120, no.383); (17) Sharh al-bāb al-hādī $^{c}$ashar by Muhammad b. Ahmad al-ma$^{c}$rūf bi-Khawājakī (completed on 5 Sha$^{c}$bān 952/24 November 1545) (Dharī$^{c}$a, 13:122, no.391); (18) Jāmi$^{c}$ al-durar fī sharh al-bāb al-hādī $^{c}$ashar by Khidr b. Muhammad b. $^{c}$Alī al-Rāzī al-Habalrūdī (d. around 850/1446) (Dharī$^{c}$a, 5:51, no.202); (19) Miftāh al-ghurar li-fath al-bāb al-hādī $^{c}$ashar by Khidr b. Muhammad b. $^{c}$Alī al-Rāzī al-Habalrūdī (d. around 850/1446) (Dharī$^{c}$a, 21:226, no.5358); (20) Sharh al-bāb al-hādī $^{c}$ashar by Amīr Abī l-Fath al-Sharīfī al-Shī$^{c}$ī b. al-Nāsib al-Mīrzā Makhdūm (d. around 976/1568-9) (Dharī$^{c}$a, 13:119).

(37) Bast al-ishārāt (IM/KH**).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 3:108 (no.358).
(philosophy; written after Rabī$^{c}$ II 693/March 1294)
MSS: no MS known.

(38) Bast al-kāfiya (KH/IM).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 3:109 (no.360).
(grammar)
MSS: no MS known.

(39) Tabsirat al-muta$^{c}$allimīn fī ahkam al-dīn (KH/IM).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 3:321 - 323 (no.1180).
(law)
Editions: Tehran: al-Maktaba al-islāmiyya, 1372H.

MSS: Amīr al-Mu'minīn 25 (cat.412) - 26(2) (cat.412); Bīnish 2281 - 2280 - 6432 - 2279 - 3515 (cat.627); Chester Beatty 4359 (cat.5:113); Dānishgāh 7192 (cat.16:480) -MF2594 (cat.1:295 & 2:11) - MF2992(5) (cat.1:777); Fayd Mahdawī (cat.27); Hakīm M1669 - 1852 (cat.100); Huqūq D27 (cat.281); India Office 1793 (cat.2:308); Los Angeles M652 (cat.164); Majlis 2767(2) (cat.9/1:177) - 4254 (cat.11:269) -4953(9) (cat.14:229) - 5396 (cat.16:302); Malik n.n. (cat.1:106); Mar$^{c}$ashī 2074(2) (cat.6:87); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 1123(4) (cat.2:258) - 994(2) (cat.2:145); Nawwāb cat.451; Princeton New Series 1372 (cat.314); Ridawī Fiqh 530 (cat.5:374) - Fiqh 69 -70 - 71 (cat.2:21); Rampur 984 MK (cat.3:462); Sipahsālār 457 (cat.1:369); Wazīrī 1350 (cat.3:936) - 2013 (cat.4:1128) - 2656 (cat.4:1379).

(40) Tahrīr al-abhāth fī ma$^{c}$rifat al-$^{c}$ulūm al-thalātha (IM*). Dharī$^{c}$a, 3:351 (no.1272).
(philosophy; written after Rabī$^{c}$ II 693/March 1294)
MSS: no MS known.

(41) Tahrīr al-ahkām al-shar$^{c}$iyya $^{c}$alā madhhab al-imāmiyya (KH/IM).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 3:378-9 (no.1375).
(law; completed on 10 Rabī$^{c}$ I 690/13 March 1291)
Editions: Tehran, 1314/1896.
MSS: $^{c}$Abd al-$^{c}$Azīm 45 (cat.73); Adabiyyāt (1965) 322(2) -497 (cat.78); Bīnish 2276 - 2277 - 2703 - 2705 - 2704 -2708 -2707 - 5705 - 2706 (cat.630); British Library OR 8405 - OR 8329; Dānishgāh 872 - 1516 (cat.8:151) -2730 (cat.10:1603) - 2923 (cat.10:1782-3) -6670 (cat.16:330) - 6790 (cat.16:360) -7632 (cat.16:660) - 8168(1) (cat.17:46) - MF2756 (cat.1:297); Farhād 34 (cat.158); Fayd Mahdawī (cat.27); Gawharshād cat.233; Gulpāyigānī 130 (cat.123) - 261 (cat.227) -262 (cat.228); Hakīm 858 - 859 -1771 - 1779 - 1579 (cat.102); Haydariyya 671 (cat.48); Kāshān 9 (cat.33); Los Angeles M162 (cat.166); Ma$^{c}$ārif 55 (cat.1:78); Mahfūz 49 (cat.3:22); Majlis 2841 (cat.10/1:168) - 3396(1) (cat.10/3:1261) -4007 (cat.11:10) - 4710 (cat.13:91) -5010 (cat.14:317) - 5171 -5172 (cat.15:311) -5218(2) (cat.16:50); Malik 975 - 1249 -1373 - 1429 - 9122 -3053 (cat.1:109); Mar$^{c}$ashī 272 (cat.1:301) - 385 (cat.1:402) -543 (cat.2:146) - 915 (cat.3:104) - 1008 (cat.3:202) - 1084 (cat.3:263) -1279 (cat.4:80) - 1556 (cat.4:359) - 1598 (cat.4:400) - 1639 (cat.5:41) - 2631 (cat.7:205) -3535 (cat.9:330) - 3572 (cat.9:359) - 3751 (cat.10:144) - 3822 (cat.10:200) - 4831 (cat.13:29); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 1165 (cat.2:296) -1701 (cat.3:804) - 58 (cat.1:28); Millī Arabic 925 (cat.8:425); Nawwāb cat.451; Nūrbakhsh 159 (cat.1:173-4) - 436 (cat.2:132); Princeton New Series 528 - 552 -1231 -1518 (cat.323-4); Ridawī Fiqh 531 - 532 - 533 - 534 - 535 -536 -537 - 538 (cat.5:374-6) - Fiqh 66 (cat.2:20); Rampur 1278 D (cat.3:464); Sipahsālār 458 (cat.1:370); Sulaymān Khān cat.6; Tabrīz Millī 3352 (cat.1:192); Topkapi Serayi A 1143/1 - A 1143/2 - A 1143/3 -A 1143/5 - A 1143/6 - A 1143/7 (cat.2:747-8); Tustariyya 807 (cat.791) - 808 (cat.792); Wazīrī 386 (cat.1:351) -368 (cat.1:336) - 2589 (cat.4:1355); Zanjānī cat.206.

(42) Taḥṣīl al-mulakhkhaṣ (IM*).
Dharīᶜa, 3:397-8 (no.1427).
(philosophy; written after Rabīᶜ II 693/March 1294)
MSS: no MS known.

(43) Tadhkirat al-fuqahā' ᶜalā talkhīṣ fatāwī al-ᶜulamā' (KH/IM).
Dharīᶜa, 4:43-4 (no.169).
(law; completed between 24 Ṣafar 703/7 October 1303 and 16 Dhū al-Ḥijja 720/17 January 1321)
Editions: Tehran: al-Maktaba al-Murtaḍawiyya, Tehran 1984 (repr. of the 1388/1968 edn.).
MSS: Bīnish 2713 - 6672 - 2267 - 5776 - 2298 - 7495 -7496 -2266 - 2264 - 2265 - 2263 (cat.641); Būhār 180 (cat.2:204); Dānishgāh 6245 (cat.16:225) - 6617 (cat.16:313) -6666 (cat.16:329); Dār al-Kutub B20018 (1:149); Gawharshād cat.236; Ḥakīm 318- 844 - 882 - 884 -1433 - 1961 - 1991 -1617 (cat.110-113); Ḥuqūq J4 -J24 (cat.287); India Office 1791 -1792 (cat.2:307); Iṣfahān ᶜUmūmī 2913 (cat.201) -2974 -5416 (cat.202); Kāshān 10 (cat.33); Los Angeles M801 (cat.168); Maḥfūẓ 6 (cat.4:251); Majlis 3227 (cat.10/2:810) -3228 (cat.10/2:811) -3229 (cat.10/2:811) - 4466 (cat.12:140) -4517 (cat.12:185) - 5810 (cat.17:234) - 5811 (cat.17:235); Malik 1916 - 2460 -2461 - 2463 - 2464 - 2465 -2466 - 2490 (cat.1:130 ff); Marᶜashī 1071 (cat.3:254) - 2309 (cat.6:291-2) - 3745 (cat.10:141) - 4832(1) (cat.13:30) -1611 (cat.5:14); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 1070(1) (cat.2:225) - 1108 (cat.2:244) - 78 - 79 (cat.1:39); Masjid-i Jāmiᶜ 55 - 56 (cat.314); Miftāḥ 1033 (cat.118); Princeton New Series 44 -599 -1829 (cat.315); Riḍawī 546 - 547 - 548 - 549 (cat.5:382-3) - 53 - 54 - 55 - 56 - 57 - 58 (cat.2:16); Sinā 1117 (cat.2:123); Sipahsālār cat.1:371-5; Topkapi Serayi A1143/1 -A1143/2 - A1143/3 - A1143/5 - A1143/6 - A1143/7 (cat.2:747-8); Wazīrī 41 (cat.1:48).

(44) Taslīk al-adhhān ilā aḥkām al-īmān (IM).
Dharīᶜa, 4:174 (no.865).
(law)
MSS: no MS known.

(45) Taslīk al-afhām fī maᶜrifat al-aḥkām (KH).
Dharīᶜa, 4:179 (no.887).
(law)
MSS: no MS known.

(46) Taslīk al-nafs ilā ḥaẓīrat al-quds (KH/IM).
Dharīᶜa, 4:180 (no.889) & 26:209 (no.1056).
(theology; completed on 12 Muḥarram 704/15 August 1304)
MSS: Āghā Ḥakīm 166(1) (cat.428); British Library Or 10.971; Dānishgāh MF1523 (cat.1:299) - MF2913(1) (cat.1:740); Ḥakīm M929 (cat.120); Ḥaydariyya 724 (cat.67); Maḥfūẓ 50(1) (cat.4:217); Majlis 5384(1) (cat.16:289).
Commentaries: (1) Īḍāḥ al-labs fī sharḥ taslīk al-nafs ilā ḥaẓīrat al-quds by Niẓām al-Dīn ᶜAbd al-Ḥamīd b. Abī l-Fawāris Muḥammad b. ᶜAlī al-Aᶜrajī (Dharīᶜa, 2:498, no.1952).

(47) al-Ta^c^līm al-thānī (IM*).
(also al-Ta^c^līm al-tāmm)
Dharī^c^a, 4:226-7 (no.1137).
(philosophy; written after Rabī^c^ II 693/March 1294)
MSS: no MS known.

(48) Talkhīs al-marām fī ma^c^rifat al-aḥkām (KH/IM).
Dharī^c^a, 4:427 (no.1893).
(law)
MSS: Bīnish 2274 - 2275 (cat.667); Majlis 4253 (cat.11:268) - 4818 (cat.13:229) - 5314 (cat.16:228-9); Mar^c^ashī 472 (cat.2:77); Riḍawī Fiqh 64 - 65 (cat.2:20).

(49) al-Tanāsub bayn al-Ash^c^ariyya wa-l-firaq al-sūfistā'iyya (KH).
Dharī^c^a, 4:435 (no.1934).
(theology)
MSS: no MS known.

(50) Tanqīh al-abḥāth fī l-^c^ulūm al-thalātha (KH*).
Dharī^c^a, 4:460 (no.2053).
(philosophy; written before 8 Shawwāl 694/21 August 1295)
MSS: no MS known.

(51) Tanqīh qawā^c^id al-dīn al-ma'khūdha ^c^an al-A'imma al-ṭāhirīn (IM).
(also: Tanqīh qawā^c^id al-dīn al-ma'khūdha ^c^an Āl Yāsīn and Tanqīh al-qawā^c^id al-ma'khūdha ^c^an kitāb al-durr wa-l-marjān fī l-aḥādīth al-ṣiḥāh wa-l-ḥisān).
Dharī^c^a, 4:464 (no.2061).
(traditions; written after Rabī^c^ II 693/March 1294)
MSS: no MS known.

(52) Tahdhīb al-nafs fī ma^c^rifat al-madhāhib al-khamsa (IM).
Dharī^c^a, 4:515 (no.2285).
(law; written after Rabī^c^ II 693/March 1294)
MSS: no MS known.

(53) Tahdhīb al-wuṣūl ilā ^c^ilm al-uṣūl (KH/IM)
Dharī^c^a, 4:511-514 (no.2280).
(legal methodology)
Editions: edited by ^c^Abd al-Ḥusayn al-Baqqāl. Najaf: al-Ādāb, 1970.
MSS: Adabiyyāt (1965) 303 (cat.81); Dānishgāh 872 -1637 (cat.8:216-7) - 1670(2) (cat.8:236) - 1702(3) (cat.8:252) -1876 (cat.8:481) - 3534 (cat.12:2554) - 7691 (cat.16:672) -8307 (cat.17:103) - 9254(1) (cat.17:332); Farhād 3(2) (cat.169); Gawharshād cat.247; Ḥakīm 1949 - 554 -M1310 - 1286 - 1578 - 1158 -1226 (cat.146-7); Ḥuqūq J330 (cat.311); Iṣfahān ^c^Umūmī 3076 (cat.213-4); Isma^c^ili Institute A(493) -B(648) (cat.2:187); Kāshānī 41 (cat.112); Los Angeles M69 -M894 - M1340 (cat.182); Majlis 3427(1) (cat.10/3:1288) -4629 (cat.13:21) - 5756 (cat.17:195); Mūza 4321(2) (cat.202); Malik 2014 (cat.1:185); Mar^c^ashī 119(3) (cat.1:143) -126 (cat.1:148) - 4170(1) (cat.11:181); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 1536(2) (cat.2:676) - 1538 (cat.2:680) -1540(1) (cat.2:680-1); Nawwāb

cat.453; Ridawī Uṣūl al-Fiqh 114-5 (cat.6:110) -Uṣūl al-Fiqh 150 - 151 - 152 (cat.6:20) -Uṣūl 5 - 6 (cat.2:186-7); Sipahsālār 674 -675 (cat.1:562); Tabrīz Millī 3363 (cat.1:310); Tustariyya 867(2) (cat.877); Wazīrī 650 (cat.2:561) - 1846 (cat.3:1073) - 2040 (cat.4:1138) -2240 (cat.4:1215); Zanjānī cat.211.

(54) Jawāb al-su'āl ᶜan ḥikmat al-naskh fī l-aḥkām al-ilāhiyya (DH*).
Dharīᶜa, 5:183 (no.805).
(theology; written after Rabīᶜ II 709/September-October 1309)
MSS: no MS known.

(55) Jawāhir al-maṭālib fī faḍā'il Amīr al-mu'minīn ᶜAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (DH).
Dharīᶜa, 5:280-1 (no.1313).
(on the virtues of the Imam ᶜAlī)
MSS: no MS known.

(56) al-Jawhar al-naḍīd fī sharḥ kitāb al-tajrīd (KH).
Dharīᶜa, 5:290 (no.1356).
(logic)
Editions: edited by Muḥsin Baydārfar. Tehran: Intishārāt-i Baydār, 1363sh.
MSS: ᶜAbd al-ᶜAẓīm 255 (cat.461); Adabiyyāt (1965) 265 (cat.83); Bīnish 1140 - 1141 (cat.695); Dānishgāh MF5217(2) (cat.3:143); Ḥakīm 448 - 1668 (cat.176); Iṣfahān ᶜUmūmī 2814 - 5400 (cat.218); Los Angeles M1263 (cat.191); Maḥfūẓ 54 (cat.4:217); Majlis 3909 (cat.10/4:1939) - 4319 (cat.12:14); Marᶜashī 4680 (cat.12:268); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 152 - 153 (cat.1:81); Princeton New Series 591 - 715 (fol.2v-51v) -1127 (cat.103); Ridawī Manṭiq 182 - 183 (cat.4:370); Rampur 1442 D (cat.4:258); Tustariyya 165 (cat.796); Wazīrī 1284 (cat.3:916) - 1593 (cat.3:997) - 1981 (cat.3:1116).

(57) Ḥāshiyat talkhīs al-aḥkām (DH*).
Dharīᶜa, 6:47 (no.233).
(law)
MSS: no MS known.

(58) Ḥall al-mushkilāt min kitāb al-talwīḥāt (KH).
Dharīᶜa, 7:74-5 (no.399).
(philosophy)
MSS: no MS known.

(59) Khulāṣat al-aqwāl fī maᶜrifat al-rijāl (IM/IE).
Dharīᶜa, 7:214/5 (no.1040).
(biographic work; written around Rabīᶜ II 693/March 1294)
Editions: edited by Muḥammad Ṣādiq Baḥr al-ᶜUlūm. Najaf: al-Ḥaydariyya, 1972.
MSS: Adabiyyāt (1341) 205 (cat.78); Adabiyyāt (1965) 151(1) -178 (cat.87); Berlin 9926 - 9927 (cat.9:385-6); Bibliotheque Nationale 1108 (2) (cat.2:323); Bīnish 6890 -3606 - 8181 -3605 -3607 - 3629 - 3630 - 3631 - 5736 - 6589 -7323 - 6614 (cat.743-4); Būhār 277 (cat.2:307) -466 (cat.2:527); Dānishgāh 194 - 1772 (cat.8:312) - 4198 (cat.13:3167) -5385(1) (cat.15:4232) -6714(1) (cat.16:343) -7170

(cat.16:472) - 7682 (cat.16:670) - 8308 (cat.17:103) -MF3027 (cat.2:31) - MF3573 (cat.3:226); Dār al-Kutub B26297 (cat.1:297); Fu'ād Sayyid 1593 - 1594 (cat.2/4:166); Gawharshād cat.293; Isfahān $^c$Umūmī 3266 (cat.243); Isma$^c$ili Institute A (409) - B (103) - C (104) (cat.2:74); Los Angeles M959 (cat.218); Ma$^c$had 280(2) (cat.29); Mahfūz 4 (cat.3:9) -19 (cat.3:38) - 52 (cat.4:203) -35 (cat.4:241) - 21 (cat.4:257) - 184 (cat.4:224); Majlis 2936(2) (cat.10/1:347) - 3153(1) (cat.10/2:737) -4406 (cat.12:105) - 5432 (cat.16:333) -5761(3) (cat.17:201); Malik 3543 (cat.1:280); Mar$^c$ashī 108(1) (cat.1:129) - 137 (cat.1:156) - 221 (cat.1:249) - 773 (cat.2:381) - 418 (cat.2:23) - 1452(2) (cat.4:241) -2282 (cat.6:267) -2548(3) (cat.7:131) -3436 (cat.9:221) - 4135 (cat.11:154) -4147(1) (cat.11:163) -4952(1) (cat.13:151); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 200 - 201 -202 (cat.1:104-5) - 518(1) (cat.1:270) - 881 (cat.2:53) -886 (cat.2:55) - 1381 (cat.2:529); Miftāh 242(1) (cat.230) - 110 - 538 (cat.149) - 1002(2) (cat.265); Millī Arabic 862(1) (cat.8:365) - Arabic 1272 (cat.9:262) -Arabic 1878 (cat.10:511); Mīrzā Ja$^c$far cat.39; Nawwāb cat.547; Nūrbakhsh 580 (cat.2:231); Princeton New Series 770 - 880 (cat.130); Ridawī Rijāl 57 - 58 - 59 - 60 - 61 -62 - 63 -64 - 65 - 66 (cat.6:599-602) -Rijāl 15 - 16 -17 -18 (cat.2:357-8); Sulaymān Khān cat.11; Tabrīz Millī 3139 (cat.1:461); Tustariyya 175 (cat.798); Ustādī cat.17; Zanjānī cat.199,236.

(60) *al-Khulāsa fī usūl al-dīn* (DH).
*Dharī$^c$a*, 7:208-9 (no.1024).
(theology)
MSS: no MS known.

(61) *al-Durr al-maknūn fī sharh al-qānūn* (IM).
(grammar; written after Rabī$^c$ II 693/March 1294)
MSS: no MS known.

(62) *al-Durr al-maknūn fī $^c$ilm al-qanūn* (KH).
*Dharī$^c$a*, 8:73 (no.253).
(logic)
MSS: no MS known.

(63) *al-Durr wa-l-marjān fī l-ahādith al-sihāh wa-l-hisān* (KH/IM*).
*Dharī$^c$a*, 8:87 (no.312).
(traditions)
MSS: no MS known.

(64) *al-Risāla al-sa$^c$diyya* (KH*).
Dharī$^c$a, 12:183 (no.1211).
(theology; written between Rabī$^c$ II 709/September-October 1309 and 10 Shawwāl 711/19 February 1312)
Editions: in *Kalimāt al-muhaqqiqīn* (Tehran, 1315/1898), 338-379.
MSS: Adabiyyāt (1960) D136 (cat.313); Bīnish 600 - 602 (cat.818) - 5655 (cat.819); Būhār 451(1) (cat.2:495); Dānishgāh 415 - 3819(1) (cat.12:2798); Ilāhiyyāt 245D (cat.1:561); Isfahān Dānishgāh 87(3) (cat.924); Majlis 4322(3) (cat.12:16); Mar$^c$ashī 4099 (cat.11:116) - 1530

(cat.4:332) - 454(2) (cat.2:56) - 514(2) (cat.2:119); Miftāh 198(2) (cat.228); Ridawī Hikma 656 - 657 - 658 -659 (cat.4:129-30).

(65) Risāla fī adab al-bahth al-mukhtasar (DH).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 1:13 (no.60).
MSS: see Dharī$^{c}$a, 1:13.

(66) Risāla fī butlan al-jabr (RU).
(theology)
MSS: no MS known.

(67) Risāla fī tahqīq ma$^{c}$nā al-īmān (RU).
(theology)
MSS: no MS known.

(68) Risāla fī khalq al-a$^{c}$māl (DH*).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 7:243 (no.1177).
(theology)
MSS: no MS known.

(69) Risāla fī su'ālayn sa'ala $^{c}$anhumā al-Khwāja Rashīd al-Dīn (IE).
(theology; written after Rabī$^{c}$ II 709/September-October 1309; for this treatise, see J.v.Ess, Wesir, 47-8).
Editions: in Farhang-ī Īrānzamīn 19 (1952):106-117.
MSS: Dānishgāh 1795(3) (cat.8:368); Gawharshād cat.250; Lucknow Nāsiriya 714; privat library of Mahmūd Shihābī (for the latter two references, see van Ess, Wezir, 48).

(70) Risāla fī l-mawārīth.
(see Modarressi, 204)
(legal treatise)
MSS: Masjid-i A$^{c}$zam 3085 (7).

(71) Risāla fī wājib al-i$^{c}$tiqād $^{c}$alā jamī$^{c}$ al-$^{c}$ibād. (KH*)
Dharī$^{c}$a, 25:4 (no.19).
(theology)
Editions: together with al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī's I$^{c}$timād fī sharh wājib al-i$^{c}$tiqād, in Kalimāt al-muhaqqiqīn (Tehran, 1315/1897), 380-422.
MSS: Dānishgāh 7693(7) (cat.16:673); Gawharshād cat.428; Isfahān Dānishgāh 83(3) (cat.924) -126(4) (cat.928) -182(7) (cat.930); Isma$^{c}$ili Institute 361 (cat.2:206); Majlis 4953(11) (cat.14:230); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 658(6) (cat.1:449); Princeton New Series 1886 (fol.128v-137r) (cat.357); Ustādī cat.65.
Commentaries: (1) Nahj al-sadād fī sharh wājib al-i$^{c}$tiqād by $^{c}$Abd al-Wāhid b. al-Safī al-Nu$^{c}$mānī (d. after 1130/1718) (Dharī$^{c}$a, 14:163); (2) Tahsīl al-sadād fī sharh wājib al-i$^{c}$tiqād by Ibrāhīm b. $^{c}$Alī b. $^{c}$Abd al-$^{c}$Ālī al-$^{c}$Āmilī al-Maysī (d. after 1020/1611) (Dharī$^{c}$a, 3:396-7, no.1424); (3) al-I$^{c}$timād fī sharh wājib al-i$^{c}$tiqād by al-Fādil al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī (d. 826/1423) (Dharī$^{c}$a, 2:230, no.908).

(72) Risāla fī wājibāt al-hajj wa-arkānihi min dūn dhikr al-ad$^{c}$iya wa-l-mustahabbāt (RŪ).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 25:1 (no.4) & 22:260 (no.6962).
(law)
MSS: no MS known.

(73) Sharh hikmat al-ishrāq (DH*).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 13:211 (no.750).
(mysticism)
MSS: see Dharī$^{c}$a, 13:211.

(74) al-Risāla al-$^{c}$izziyya (KH**/IM**).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 15:262 (no.1701).
MSS: no MS known.

(75) Ghāyat al-ihkām fī tashīh talkhīs al-marām (KH*).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 16:6 (no.24).
(law)
MSS: no MS known.

(76) Ghāyat al-wusūl wa-īdāh al-subul fī sharh mukhtasar muntahā al-su'āl wa-l-amal (KH/IM).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 16:24-5.
(legal methodology; completed on 12 Rajab 697/25 April 1298)
MSS: Āghā Hakīm 180 (cat.428); British Library OR 3970; Dānishgāh 2771 (cat.10:1628); Los Angeles A446 (cat.297); Mahfūz 133 (cat.4:221); Nawwāb cat.462; Ridawī Usūl 63 -64 (cat.2:203-4); Topkapi Serayi A 1244 - A 1299 - A 1300 (cat. 2:318-9); Wazīrī 1955 (cat.3:1105-6).

(77) Qawā$^{c}$id al-ahkām fī ma$^{c}$rifat al-halāl wa-l-harām (KH/IM).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 17:176-7 (no.930).
(law; completed on 24 Dhū l-Hijja 699/10 September 1300)
Editions: Qum, 1984 (Repr. of the 1315/1898 edn.).
MSS: Adabiyyāt (1965) 34 - 49 (cat.101); $^{c}$Abd al-$^{c}$Azīm 6 - 18 - 47 (cat.78) - 402 (cat.473); Amīr al-Mu'minīn 61 (cat.415); Bīnish cat.942-3 (27 copies); British Library OR 8341 - OR 8403; Dānishgāh 918 - 1382 (cat.8:69) -1408 (cat.8:84) - 1503 -1504 - 1505 (cat.8:145-6) -1850 (cat.8:446) -1857 (cat.8:450) - 2112 (cat.8:748) - 6350 (cat.16:247) - 6362 (cat.16:252) - 6698 (cat.16:335) - 6743 (cat.16:349-50) - 6880 (cat.16:388) - 7314 (cat.16:510) -8955 (cat.17:261) -MF2537 (cat.1:363); Fayd Mahdawī (cat.37); Gawharshād cat.370-1; Gulpāyigānī 136 (cat.129); Huqūq J8 -J9 - J64 - J346 (cat.414 ff); Ilāhiyyāt 38B - 57J - 164J - 175J -(cat.1:630); India Office 1798 (cat.2:309) - 1799 (cat.2:310); Isfahān $^{c}$Umūmī 2910 (cat.278) - 2925 (cat.279) - 2941 (cat.279); Isma$^{c}$ili Institute A(448) - B(449) (cat.2:126); Kāshān 62 (cat.38); Los Angeles M655 - M1065 -M1316 (cat.321); Ma$^{c}$ārif 67 (cat.1:93); Mahdawī 798 (cat.165); Mahfūz 59 (cat.3:23) - 70 (cat.3:23) - 373 (cat.4:233); Majlis 144(1) (cat.7:330) - 170 (cat.7:218-9) -2748(2) (cat.9/1:118) -2748(3) (cat.9/1:119) - 2839 (cat.10/1:166) - 3275 (cat.10/2:884) - 3276 (cat.10/2:884-5) - 4196 (cat.11:211) - 4471(4) (cat.12:145) - 4545 (cat.12:217) - 4809 (cat.13:218) - 5219(2) (cat.16:51)

-5642(1) (cat.17:97); Malik 1096 - 1883 - 1919 - 1948 (cat.1:572-3); Mar^c^ashī 1077 (cat.3:258) - 1112 (cat.3:283) -1163 (cat.3:337) - 1206 (cat.4:6) - 1292 (cat.4:88) -1310 (cat.4:98) - 1413 (cat.4:195) - 1622 (cat.5:26) -1706 (cat.5:99) -1711 (cat.5:102) -1729 (cat.5:116) -1881 (cat.5:258) - 1937 (cat.5:303) - 2145 (cat.6:153) -2528 (cat.7:115) - 2616 (cat.7:195) - 2886 (cat.8:90) -4094 (cat.11:111) - 4273 (cat.11:275); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 1111 (cat.2:245) - 1730 (cat.3:821) - 1896 (cat.3:950) - 441 (cat.1:222); Miftāh 138 (cat.203); Millī Arabic 173 (cat.7:152) - Arabic 373 (cat.7:325) -Arabic 474 (cat.7:396) - Arabic 475 (cat.7:397) -Arabic 538 (cat.8:34) - Arabic 537 (cat.8:33) -Arabic 721 (cat.8:179) - Arabic 977 (cat.8:468) -Arabic 1490 (cat.9:509) -Arabic 1832 (cat.10:414); Mīrzā Ja^c^far cat.38; Nawwāb cat.463 - Fiqh 51(1) (cat.466); Nūrbakhsh 195 (cat.1:193) -213 (cat.1:203) -580 (cat.2:231); Oppenheim (n.n.); Princeton New Series 43 -107 - 529 -649 -693 (cat.206-7); Ridawī fiqh 302 - 303 -304 - 305 -306 - 307 - 308 309 - 310 - 311 - 312 -313 -314 (cat.2:94) - fiqh 770 - 771 - 772 - 773 - 774 - 775 -776 -777 (cat.5:476-9); Rampur 985 MK (cat.3:468); Saryazdī 69 (cat.424); Sinā 1389 (cat.2:242); Sipahsālār 608 -609 -610 - 611 - 612 - 613 - 614 (cat.1:496-9); Sulaymān Khān cat.16; Topkapi Serayi A 1090 (cat.2:746); Tustariyya 711 (cat.808); Wazīrī 275 (cat.1:283) - 322 (cat.1:313) - 349 (cat.1:328) - 443 (cat.1:393) - 464 (cat.1:409) - 466 (cat.1:410) - 1609 (cat.1:1001) - 2350 (cat.4:1260); Zanjānī cat.191.

(78) <u>al-Qawā^c^id al-jaliyya fī sharh al-risāla al-shamsiyya</u> (KH/IM).
<u>Dharī^c^a</u>, 17:182 (no.955).
(logic; completed in Rabī^c^ II 679/July-August 1280)
Editions: Edited by Fāris al-Hassūn (forthcoming) (see <u>Turāthunā</u>, 17 (1409):243-4).
MSS: Bīnish 1144 (cat.943); Ridawī Mantiq 1114 (cat.1:43 = 348 new edition); see also <u>Turāthunā</u>, 17 (1409):243-4 for further MSS.

(79) <u>Qawā^c^id wa-maqāsid fī l-mantiq wa-l-tabī^c^ī wa-l-ilāhī</u> (KH/IM).
<u>Dharī^c^a</u>, 17:195 (no.1031).
(philosophy)
MSS: no MS known.

(80) <u>al-Qawl al-wajīz fī tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-^c^azīz</u> (KH).
(also: <u>al-Sirr al-wajīz fī tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-^c^azīz</u>).
<u>Dharī^c^a</u>, 17:216 (no.1173), 12:170-1 (no.1138).
(exegesis)
MSS: no MS known.

(81) <u>Kāshif al-astār fī sharh kashf al-asrār</u> (KH/IM).
(also: <u>Kashf al-astār fī sharh kashf al-asrār</u>)
<u>Dharī^c^a</u>, 17:233-4 (no.37).
(logic)
MSS: no MS known.

(82) Kashf al-talbīs wa-bayān sayr al-ra'īs (IM).
(also: Kashf al-talbīs fī bayān sayr al-ra'īs).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 18:24.
(philosophy; written after Rabī$^{c}$ II 693/March 1294)
MSS: no MS known.

(83) Kashf al-khafā' min kitāb al-shifā' (KH/IM).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 18:34 (no.549).
(philosophy; completed on 9 Rabī$^{c}$ II 717/21 June 1317)
MSS: Chester Beatty 5151 (cat.7:51).

(84) Kashf al-fawā'id $^{c}$alā Īdāh mā ishtamalat $^{c}$alayhi al-risāla al-mawsūma bi-qawā$^{c}$id al-$^{c}$aqā'id (KH/IM).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 18:52-3 (no.635).
(theology; completed on 3 Dhū al-Hijja 703/5 July 1304)
Editions: in Majmū$^{c}$at rasā'il (Tehran: Maktabat Āyat Allāh al-$^{c}$uzmā al-Mar$^{c}$ashī al-Najafī, 1404H.), 2-97.
MSS: Dānishgāh 128; Gawharshād cat.377; Isma$^{c}$ili Institute 450 (fol.24v-105r) (cat.2:73); Majlis 81(2) (cat.7:234) -179 (cat.7:232); Ridawī Hikma 482 - 483 - 484 - 485 (cat.4:340); Tustariyya 860 (cat.808).
Commentaries: (1) by Muhammad al-$^{c}$Assār al-Tihrānī (Dharī$^{c}$a, 18:52).

(85) Kashf al-murād fī sharh tajrīd al-i$^{c}$tiqād (KH/IM).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 18:60 (no.668) & 3:353.
(theology; completed on 15 or 16 Rabī$^{c}$ I 696/11 or 12 January 1297)
Editions: Saida: Matba$^{c}$at al-$^{c}$irfān 1353/1934; Qum: al-Maktaba al-Mustawfiyya, n.d.
MSS: Adabiyyāt (1341) 17 (cat.83); Adabiyyāt (1960) J60 (cat.394); $^{c}$Abd al-$^{c}$Azīm 337 (cat.475); Būhār 87 (cat.2:99); Chester Beatty 4279 (cat.5:87); Dānishgāh 1104 - 1869 (cat.8:475) - 1865 (cat.8:472) - 6738 (cat.16:348) - 6997 (cat.16:423) -9336 (cat.17:350); Gawharshād cat.378; India Office 471(14) (cat.1:127); Los Angeles M661 (cat.330); Mahfūz 20(4) (cat.3:29) - 74 (cat.3:44); Majlis 630(12) (cat.1:390) - 4741 (cat.10/4:1726); Malik 806 - 2543 (cat.1:597-8); Mar$^{c}$ashī 727 (cat.2:324); Mashhad Adabiyyāt 200 (cat.110); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 819 (cat.2:11) - 457 (cat.1:231); Miftāh 1002(1) (cat.265); Nawwāb cat.511; Qādiriyya 559 (cat.2:398) - 560 (cat.2:399); Ridawī Hikma 220 (cat.1:67 = 118 new edition) -Hikma 221 (cat.1:68 = 189 new edition) - Hikma 486 -487 - 488 (cat.4:340-1); Sinā 525 (cat.1:324); Wazīrī 2622 (cat.4:1366-7).
Commentaries: (see also Dharī$^{c}$a, 6:118) (1) by Abū Qāsim al-Husayn al-Radawī al-Qummī al-Hā'irī (d. 1324/1906); (2) by Mirza $^{c}$Abd al-Razzaq b. $^{c}$Alī al-Muhaddith al-Wā$^{c}$iz.

(86) Kashf al-mushkilāt min kitāb al-talwīhāt (IM).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 18:62 (no.679).
(philosophy; written after Rabī$^{c}$ II 693/March 1294).
MSS: no MS known.

(87) Kashf al-maqāl fī ma$^{c}$rifat al-rijāl (KH**).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 18:63-4 (no.689).
(biographic work)
MSS: no MS known.

(88) Kashf al-maknūn min kitāb al-qānūn (KH).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 18:64 (no.692).
(grammar)
MSS: no MS known.

(89) Kashf al-yaqīn fī faḍā'il Amīr al-mu'minīn (IE).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 18:69-70 (no.721).
(on the virtues of the Imam $^{c}$Alī)
Editions: Najaf n.d.
MSS: Dānishgāh 128 - 1627(2) (cat.8:210) - 1796 (cat.8:368) - MF3856(1) (cat.2:270); India Office 471(4) (cat.1:123); Mar$^{c}$ashī 980(2) (cat.3:172); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 1804 (cat.3:874); Maḥfūẓ 31 (cat.3:41); Millī Arabic 1379(1) (cat.9:378); Princeton New Series 61 (cat.113); Riḍawī akhbār 245 (cat.1:80); Wazīrī 1700 (1) (cat.3:1025).

(90) Lubb al-ḥikma (IM*).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 18:286 (no.131).
(philosophy)
MSS: no MS known.

(91) al-Mabāḥith: arba$^{c}$ūn mas'ala fī $^{c}$uṣūl al-dīn (DH).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 19:37 (no.198).
(theology)
MSS: Maktabat al-Samāwī (see Dharī$^{c}$a, 19:37).

(92) al-Mabāḥith al-saniyya wa-l-mu$^{c}$āraḍāt al-naṣīriyya (KH).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 19:39-40 (no.207).
(theology)
MSS: no MS known.

(93) Mabādi' al-wuṣūl ilā $^{c}$ilm al-uṣūl (KH/IM).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 19:43-4 (no.229).
(legal methodology)
Editions: edited by $^{c}$Abd al-Ḥusayn Muḥammad b. $^{c}$Alī al-Baqqāl, Najaf: al-Ādāb, 1390/1970.
MSS: $^{c}$Abd al-$^{c}$Aẓīm 382 (cat.475); Berlin 4427 (cat.4:39); British Library OR 10963; Chester Beatty 3788(2) (cat.4:12); Dānishgāh 1395 (cat.8:75) -1690(3) (cat.8:247) - 4798 (cat.14:383) - 7312(3) (cat.16:510) - 9262(1) (cat.17:334) -MF3043(2) (cat.2:41); Fayḍ Mahdawī (cat.38); Gawharshād cat.384; Ḥujjatiyya 252(2) (cat.102) -441(1) (cat.107) -569(2) (cat.114); Ḥuqūq J217 -D56 (cat.452); Iṣfahān Dānishgāh 148(2) (cat.929); Isma$^{c}$ili Institute 417 (cat.2:92); Kāshān 82(2) (cat.41); Maḥfūẓ 30 (cat.3:19) -2 (cat.4:253); Majlis 3850 (cat.10/4:1884) - 5406(1) (cat.16:311); Malik 2813 (cat.1:630); Mar$^{c}$ashī 4(2) (cat.1:19) - 28(3) (cat.1:40) - 49(3) (cat.1:61) - 119(2) (cat.1:143) - 482(2) (cat.2:87); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 1191 (cat.2:320) - 1206(1) (cat.2:341) -1209(2) (cat.2:345);

Millī Arabic 800(4) (cat.8:304) -Arabic 1678 (cat.10:261); Mūza 4321(1) (cat.212); Princeton New Series 150 - 874 (cat.139-40); Riḍawī Uṣūl al-Fiqh 323(2) (cat.6:140) -Uṣūl 92 (cat.2:212); Rampur 963 MK (cat.3:68); Tustariyya 867(1) (cat.877); Ustādī cat.34.

(94) Muḥākamāt bayn shurrāḥ al-ishārāt (KH/IM*).
Dharīᶜa, 20:132 (no.2256).
(philosophy)
MSS: no MS known.

(95) Mukhtaṣar sharḥ nahj al-balāgha (KH).
(also: Mukhtaṣar nahj al-balāgha)
Dharīᶜa, 10:198 (no.2559) & 14:124 (no.1959).
MSS: Mahdawī 795 (158).

(96) Mukhtalaf al-shīᶜa fī aḥkām al-sharīᶜa (KH/IM).
Dharīᶜa, 20:218 - 221 (no.2666).
(law; written between 4 Jumādā II 699/26 February 1300 and 15 Dhū l-Qaᶜda 708/26 April 1309)
Editions: Tehran, 1322-24/1905-6.
MSS: Adabiyyāt (1965) 121 (cat.105); ᶜAbd al-ᶜAẓīm 20 - 29 -39 (cat.79-80); Bīnish cat.996-7 (17 copies); Bodleian MS arab D.108; British Library OR 7811; Dānishgāh 778 - 1472 (cat.8:122) - 1594 (cat.8:195) -1855 (cat.8:449) - 6653 (cat.16:326) - 6690 (cat.16:334) -6735 (cat.16:347) - 6769 (cat.16:357) - 6888 (cat.16:689-90) - 7717 (cat.16:638); Gawharshād cat.389; Gulpāyigānī 151 (cat.140); India Office 1790 (cat.2:306); Iṣfahān Dānishgāh 70 (cat.915); Iṣfahān ᶜUmūmī 2831 (cat.298); Ismaᶜīli Institut 743 (cat.2:109); Jaᶜfariyya 14 (cat.435); Kāshān 88 (cat.43); Los Angeles M1281 (cat.349); Maᶜārif 69 (cat.1:97); Maḥfūẓ 1 (cat.4:250); Majlis 157 (cat.7:335) -1316 - 1317 (cat.4:90-1) - 3504 (cat.10/3:1458) -4003 (cat.11:7) - 4225 (cat.11:244) -4235 (cat.11:253) - 4511 (cat.12:183) - 4733(1) (cat.13:113); Malik 2082 - 2198 (cat.1:657); Marᶜashī 963 (cat.3:154) - 964 (cat.3:155) - 1052 (cat.3:241) - 1195 (cat.3:363) - 1196 (cat.3:363) - 1229 (cat.4:30) -1545 (cat.4:347) - 1715 (cat.5:105) - 2609 (cat.7:190) - 3252 (cat.9:43); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 1379 (cat.2:526) -1479 (cat.2:623); Masjid-i Jāmiᶜ 171 (cat.337); Millī Arabic 442 (cat.7:375) -Arabic 530 (cat.8:28); Arabic 911 (cat.8:415); Arabic 928 (cat.8:427) -Arabic 952 (cat.8:445); Mīrzā Jaᶜfar cat.41; Nawwāb cat.475; Riḍawī fiqh 347 - 348 - 349 - 350 - 351 - 352 -353 - 354 -355 (cat.2:108) - 803 - 804 - 805 - 806 - 807 -808 - 809 -810 -811 (cat.5:492-5); Rampur 10247 D - 986 M (cat.3:470); Sipahsālār 632 - 633 - 634 - 635 -636 - 637 (cat.1:515-8); Sulaymān Khān cat.20; Tustariyya 816 (cat.810); Ustādī cat.34; Wazīrī 346 (cat.1:323) - 684 (cat.2:584) -686 (cat.2:588) - 687 (cat.2:588) - 1596 (cat.3:997) - 2930 (cat.4:1476).

(97) Madārik al-aḥkām (KH/IM).
Dharīᶜa, 20:239 (no.2764).
(law)

MSS: no MS known.

(98) Marāsid al-tadqīq wa-maqāsid al-taḥqīq (KH).
Dharī^c^a, 20:300 (no.3073).
(philosophy)
MSS: Dānishgāh 2301 (cat.9:934-5).

(99) Maṣābīḥ al-anwār (KH).
Dharī^c^a, 21:85 (no.4056).
(traditions)
MSS: no MS known.

(100) al-Maṭālib al-^c^aliyya fī ma^c^rifat al-^c^arabiyya (KH/IM).
(also: al-Maṭālib al-^c^aliyya fī ^c^ilm al-^c^arabiyya)
Dharī^c^a, 21:140 (no.4324).
(grammar)
MSS: no MS known.

(101) Ma^c^ārij al-fahm fī sharḥ al-nuẓum (KH/IM).
Dharī^c^a, 21:183 (no.4517).
(theology; completed on 6 Ramaḍān 678/10 January 1280)
MSS: Berlin 1796 -1797 (cat.2:348-9); India Office 471(6) (cat.1:124); Bankipore, cat.10, no.618; British Library OR 8478(1) (fol.1r-93v) (fragment); Dār al-Kutub (general catalogue) 1:208; Chester Beatty, 3788 (1) (cat.4:12); ^c^Abd al-^c^Aẓīm 362(1) (cat.450); Āghā Ḥakīm 166(1) (cat.428); Dānishgāh MF2448 (cat.1:283); Maḥfūẓ 50(2) (cat.4:217); Rawḍātī 46 (cat.194); Wazīrī 956 (cat.2:786).

(102) al-Maqāṣid al-wāfiya bi-fawā'id al-qānūn wa-l-kāfiya (KH/IM)
Dharī^c^a, 21:386 (no.5579).
(grammar)
MSS: no MS known.

(103) al-Muqaddima fī l-kalām (DH*)
Dharī^c^a, 22:89 (no.6205).
(theology)
MSS: see Dharī^c^a, 22:89.

(104) Maqṣad al-wāṣilīn fī uṣūl al-dīn (KH/IM).
(also Mu^c^taqad al-wāṣilīn)
Dharī^c^a, 22:112 (no.6312).
(theology)
MSS: no MS known.

(105) al-Muqāwamāt al-ḥikmiyya (KH).
Dharī^c^a, 22:9 (no.5759).
(philosophy; written before Rabī^c^ II 693/March 1294)
MSS: no MS known.

(106) Mukātaba bayn al-^c^Allāma al-Ḥillī wa-l-Qāḍī al-Bayḍāwī
(see al-^c^Āmilī, 24:237-9).
(law)

Editions: quoted in al-$^c$Āmilī, 24:237-9.

(107) Manāhij al-yaqīn fī uṣūl al-dīn (KH/IM).
Dharī$^c$a, 22:352 (no.7402).
(theology; completed on 6 Rabī$^c$ II 680/25 July 1281)
Editions: Bombay, 1298H. (see Brockelmann, GALS, 2:207); edited by Muhammad Riḍā al-Anṣārī (forthcoming) (see Turāthunā, 17 (1409):243).
MSS: Amīr al-Mu'minīn 3 (cat.410); Bīnish 251 (cat.1037) -252 (cat.1038); Ḥuqūq J146 (cat.480); India Office 471(5) (cat.1:124); Kitābkhāna-yi Masjid-i A$^c$zam/Qum 656 (see Turāthunā, 16 (1409):87); Maḥfūẓ 424 (cat.4:235); Maktabat Shāh Jirāgh/Shīrāz 548 (see Turāthunā, 16 (1409H.):88); Malik 736 (1:740); Riḍawī Ḥikma 251 (cat.1:80 = 238-9 new edition) -Ḥikma 252 (cat.1:81 = 240 new edition)[1]; Rawḍātī 29 (cat.95)
Commentaries: (1) al-Īḍāḥ wa-l-tabyīn fī sharḥ minhāj al-yaqīn, by Kamāl al-Dīn $^c$Abd al-Raḥman b. $^c$Atā'iqī al-Ḥillī (d. after 788/1386) (completed on 12 Dhū al-Qa$^c$da 789/24 November 1387) (Dharī$^c$a, 2:502, no.1965); (2) Ta$^c$līqāt by Sayyid $^c$Abd al-Ḥasan al-Kashmīrī (d. 1313/1895) (Dharī$^c$a, 20:352)

(108) Muntahā al-maṭlab fī taḥqīq al-madhhab (KH/IM).
Dharī$^c$a, 23:11-2 (no.7841).
(law; completed on 11 Jumādā II 688/2 July 1289)
Editions: Tehran, 1333/1915.
MSS: $^c$Abd al-$^c$Aẓīm 16 (cat.82); Āghā Ḥakīm n.n. (cat.420); Bīnish 2850 (cat.1041); British Library OR 9854; Gawharshād cat.416; Dānishgāh 1929(1) (cat.8:544); Iṣfahān Dānishgāh 41 (cat.918); Majlis 2840 (cat.10/1:166) - 3309 (cat.10/2:961) - 4755 (cat.13:141); Malik 1012 - 1228 - 1370 - 1371 (cat.1:745-6); Mar$^c$ashī 4461 (cat.12:48); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 878 (cat.2:52); Millī Arabic 370 (cat.7:323); Princeton New Series 798 (cat.184); Riḍawī Fiqh 872 (cat.5:520); Wazīrī 39 (cat.1:47-8) - 523 (cat.2:455) - 1592 (cat.3:996) -1798 (cat.3:1057); Tustariyya 772 (cat.813).

(109) Muntahā al-wuṣūl ilā $^c$ilmay al-kalām wa-l-uṣūl (KH/IM).
Dharī$^c$a, 23:15 (no.7848).
(theology/ legal methodology; the first portion on theology was completed on 16 Jumādā I 687/18 June 1288)
MSS: British Library OR 8326; Dānishgāh 1807 (cat.8:394); Maḥfūẓ 128 (cat.3:48).

(110) Minhāj al-ṣalāh fī ikhtiṣār al-miṣbāḥ (IE).
Dharī$^c$a, 23:164-5 (no.8510).

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[1] See also Riḍawī Uṣūl 6 (cat.2:210) where a work entitled Ma$^c$ārij al-dīn wa-manāhij al-yaqīn is listed. It is suggested there that this work is identical with al-Ḥillī's Manāhij al-yaqīn. The manuscript is, however, described as a legal work. It is therefore impossible that it is identical with the Manāhij. It is moreover likely that it is not a work of al-Ḥillī at all. See also Āghā Buzurg, Dharī$^c$a, 21:181 (no.4508).

(law; completed on 11 Dhū al-Hijja 723/11 December 1323).
MSS: Bīnish 8019 - 3288 (cat.1047); Dānishgāh 9603 (cat.17:433); India Office 342 (cat.1:87) - 371(10) (cat.1:96); Mahfūz 20 (cat.3:18); Majlis 4405 (cat.12:105); Mar$^{c}$ashī 1157 (cat.3:328); Miftāh 1044 (cat.302); Princeton New Series 53 (cat.167); Ridawī Ad$^{c}$iya 493 (cat.6:298) -Ad$^{c}$iya 201 (cat.2:296); Rawdātī 30 (cat.100) - 31 (cat.106).

(111) Minhāj fī manāsik al-hajj (KH).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 23:171 (no.8531).
(legal work).
MSS: Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 1017(2) (cat.2:174).

(112) Minhāj al-karāma fī ma$^{c}$rifat al-imāma (KH*).
Dharī$^{c}$a, 23:172-3 (no.8534).
(theology; written after Rabī$^{c}$ II 709/September-October 1309)
Editions: in Minhāj al-sunna al-nabawiyya, by Ibn Taymiyya (edited by Rashīd Salīm, (Cairo: 1962/64), introduction, 77-202.
MSS: Adabiyyāt (1960) D136 (cat.503); Bīnish 263 - 264 -938 -939 -5668 (cat.1047); Dānishgāh 889 - 1627(1) (cat.8:210) -1990(3) (cat.8:599) - 2603(6) (cat.9:1458) -4543(4) (cat.13:3488) - 5396(9) - 5398(2) (cat.15:4241) -6837(2) (cat.17:377) - 7033(1) (cat.16:434) - 8971(16) (cat.17:267) - MF2120(2) (cat.1:645); Farhād 153(2) (cat.230); Gawharshād cat.417; Huqūq J227 -D15 (cat.485 ff); India Office 471(3) (cat.1:123) - 2089 (cat.2:396); Los Angeles M1050(8) (cat.707); Mahdawī 543(2) (cat.122); Mahfūz 20 (cat.3:18); Majlis 1932(3) (cat.9:637) -4322(1) (cat.12:16); Malik 500 -2235 (cat.1:753-4); Mar$^{c}$ashī 49(2) (cat.1:60) - 620(3) (cat.2:220) - 593(2) (cat.2:186) - 895 (cat.3:90) - 2523(1) (cat.7:109) -2843(2) (cat.8:46) - 3160(1) (cat.8:391); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 1154 (cat.2:282) - 756 (cat.1:583); Nawwāb 166 Akhbār (2) (cat.496) - cat.521; Millī Arabic 159(3) (cat.7:142); Princeton New Series 456 (cat.166-7); Ridawī Hikma 1043 - 1044 - 1045 (cat.4:261) -Hikma 263 (cat.1:84 = 240 new edition) -Hikma 264 (cat.1:85 = 241 new edition); Sinā 164(3) (cat.1:82); Tustariyya 855(2) (cat.876); Ustādī cat.39; Wazīrī 1222 (cat.3:899) -1562(2) (cat.3:989-90) - 2262(2) (cat.4:1222-3) -2738(2) (cat.4:1409-10).
Refutations: (1) Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), Minhāj al-sunna al-nabawiyya fī naqd kalām al-shī$^{c}$a wa-l-qadariyya; (2) Sarīja b. Muhammad al-Malatī al-Māridīnī (d. 788/1386), Sadd al-fatīq al-muzahhar wa-sadd al-fasīq Ibn al-Mutahhar (see Kātip Çelebi, 2:1872)

(113) Minhāj al-hidāya wa-mi$^{c}$rāj al-dirāya fī $^{c}$ilm al-kalām (KH/IM).
(also: Minhāj al-hidāya wa-ma$^{c}$ārij al-hidāya)
Dharī$^{c}$a, 22:351 (no.7398).
(theology)
MSS: no MS known.

(114) Nuzum al-barāhīn fī uṣūl al-dīn (KH/IM).
Dharīᶜa, 24:200 (no.1048).
(theology)
MSS: Maḥfūẓ 104(2) (cat.4:220); together with Maᶜārij al-fahm, see there.
Commentaries: Maᶜārij al-fahm fī sharḥ al-nuẓum by the author himself.

(115) al-Nukat al-badīᶜa fī taḥrīr al-dharīᶜa (KH).
Dharīᶜa, 24:303 (no.1586).
(legal methodology)
MSS: no MS known.

(116) Nihāyat al-iḥkām fī maᶜrifat al-aḥkām (KH/IM*).
Dharīᶜa, 24:394 (no.2108).
(law)
MSS: Āghā Ḥakīm 40 (cat.423); Bīnish 2659 - 2661 (cat.1063); Dānishgāh 6662 (cat.16:328) - MF2438 (cat.1:395); Isfahān ᶜUmūmī 2989 (cat.320); Majlis 5487 (cat.16:385); Malik 1928 - 2967 (cat.1:779); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 1188 (cat.2:318); Nawwāb cat.480; Nūrbakhsh 374 (cat.2:95); Princeton New Series 1256 (cat.194-5); Riḍawī 449 - 450 -451 (cat.2:138-9); Wazīrī 531 (cat.2:461).

(117) Nihāyat al-marām fī ᶜilm al-kalām (KH/IM).
Dharīᶜa, 24:407 (no.2153).
(theology)
MSS: Ḥaydariyya 628 (cat.37); Majlis 10192; Marᶜashī 254 (cat.1:280); Riḍawī 11606 (cat.11:419).

(118) Nihāyat al-wuṣūl ilā ᶜilm al-uṣūl (KH/IM).
Dharīᶜa, 24:408-9 (no.2160).
(legal methodology; completed on 8 Ramaḍān 704/4 April 1305).
MSS: Dār al-Kutub (general catalogue) 1:568; Bankipore XIX, I, 1567; ᶜAbd al-ᶜAẓīm 12 (cat.82); Bīnish 2952 - 6975 -8170 - 2951 - 2662 (cat.1064); Chester Beatty 3054 (cat.1:22); Dānishgāh 801 -1176 - MF4215 (cat.3:32); Gulpāyigānī 200 (cat.179) - 229 (cat.198); Maḥfūẓ 121 (cat.4:221); Majlis 3418 (cat.10/3:1281) - 3842 (cat.10/4:1879) -4052 (cat.11:52); Malik 1879 (cat.1:785); Marᶜashī 277 (cat.1:305) - 384 (cat.1:401) - 1356 (cat.4:132) - 1642 (cat.5:43) -1908 (cat.5:278) - 1927 - 1926 (cat.5:296) - 2217 (cat.6:207) -4566 (cat.12:142) - 4876 (cat.13:59); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 1243 (cat.2:377) - 1873 (cat.3:937); Miftāḥ 1262 (cat.308); Oppenheim 292(4) (Opp.1116.1988); Princeton New Series 376 (cat.195); Riḍawī Uṣūl al-Fiqh 353 - 354 - 355 (cat.6:92-3) -Fiqh 452 (cat.2:139) - Uṣūl 96 - 97 (cat.2:213); Sinā 1385 (cat.2:241-2); Sulaymān Khān cat.23; Topkapi Serayi A 1271 (cat.2:346); Tustariyya 492 (cat.814); Ustādī cat.41; Wazīrī 48(1) (cat.1:63) - 550 (cat.2:470).

(119) Nahj al-īmān fī tafsīr al-Qur'ān (KH).
Dharīᶜa, 24:412 (no.2170).
(exegesis)
MSS: no MS known.

(120) Nahj al-haqq wa-kashf al-sidq (KH*).
Dharī^c^a, 24:416 (no.2183).
(theology; written after Rabī^c II 709/August-September 1309)
Editions: edited by Faraj Allāh al-Ḥusaynī and Riḍā al-Ṣadr (Beirut, 1982).
MSS: ^c^Abd al-^c^Aẓīm 162 (cat.474); Āghā Ḥakīm 83 (cat.424); Bīnish 8062 - 952 - 274 - 275 - 951 - 950 - 8061 - 8063 (cat.1065-6); British Library OR 8057; Dānishgāh 1088 - 1896 (cat.8:505) - 7212 (cat.16:490) - 8947 (cat.17:260) -8971(14) (cat.17:266) - MF3856(2) (cat.2:271); Ḥaydariyya 618 (cat.35); Ilāhiyyāt D847 (cat.2:88); India Office 437 (cat.1:113) - 471 (II) (cat.1:123); Isfahān Dānishgāh 154(1) (cat.930); Isfahān ^c^Umūmī 3252 (cat.288); Ma^c^ārif 86 (cat.1:115); Maḥfūẓ 17 (cat.3:18) - 31 (cat.3:41) - 175 (cat.3:52) - 48 (cat.4:217); Majlis 1866(18) (cat.9:548); 2970 (cat.10/1:418) - 3277 (cat.10/2:885) - 4349 (cat.12:63); Mar^c^ashī 980(1) (cat.3:172) -4905 (cat.13:85); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 991 (cat.2:143); Miftāḥ 183 (cat.208); Millī Arabic 277 (cat.7:247) -Arabic 990 (cat.8:477); Nawwāb cat.522; Princeton New Series 29 - 95 (cat.191); Riḍawī Ḥikma 1062 -1063 - 1064 (cat.4:267-8) - Ḥikma 273 (cat.1:88 = 251 new edition) -Ḥikma 274 -275 (cat.1:89 = 252-3 new edition); Wazīrī 1238 (cat.3:903) - 2978 (cat.4:1492-3).
Refutations: (1) by Faḍl b. Rūzbahān, Nahj al-ta^c^ṭīl (Brockelmann, GALS 2:207) or Ibṭāl al-bāṭil (Dharī^c^a, 8:251) or Ibṭāl nahj al-bāṭil (Dharī^c^a, 1:290) (written in 909/1503-4); (2) this latter work was later refuted by Nūr Allāh al-Shushtarī (d. 1019/1610) in his Iḥqāq al-ḥaqq (written in 1014/1605-6) (Brockelmann, GALS, 2:207; Dharī^c^a, 1:290, no.1521) (3) and also by Muḥammad b. ^c^Abd Allāh b. Muẓaffar al-Najafī (d. 1357/1938) in his Dalā'il al-ṣidq fī nahj al-ḥaqq (Dharī^c^a, 8:251, no.1033); (4) an anonymous commentary entitled Sharḥ nahj al-ḥaqq (Dharī^c^a, 14:161, no.2020)

(121) Nahj al-^c^irfān fī ^c^ilm al-mīzān (KH/IM).
Dharī^c^a, 24:422 (no.2210).
(logic)
MSS: no MS known.

(122) Nahj al-mustarshidīn fī uṣūl al-dīn (KH/IM).
Dharī^c^a, 24:424 (no.2222).
(theology; completed on 22 Rabī^c^ I 699/17 December 1299)
Editions: together with Irshād al-ṭālibīn ilā nahj al-mustarshidīn by al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī (edited by Mahdī al-Rajā'ī. Min makhṭūṭāt maktabat Āyat Allāh al-Mar^c^ashī al-^c^āmma, no.10. Qum: Maktabat Sayyid al-shuhadā', 1405H.).
MSS: Adabiyyāt (1965) 154 (cat.69) (Irshād al-ṭālibīn); Bīnish 955 - 956 - 940 - 953 - 954 (cat.1066); British Library OR 10964; Būhār 94 (cat.2:105); Dānishgāh 503 -1645(1) (cat.8:222) -8596(3) (cat.17:169) - MF3043(3) (cat.2:41); Gawharshād cat.428; Gulpāyigānī 293(2) (cat.254); Ilāhiyyāt D272 (cat.1:453) (Irshād al-ṭālibīn); Isfahān

Dānishgāh 126(2) (cat.928) - 153(1) (cat.929); India Office 471(7) (cat.1:124) - 2094 (cat.2:398); Ismaʿili Institute 342 (cat.2:114); Kāshān 82(1) (cat.41); Los Angeles M930(2) (cat.700) - M1050(9) (cat.707) - M1306(3) (cat.723); Mahfūz 23 (cat.3:18) -70 (cat.3:65) - 31 (cat.3:19) - 30 (cat.4:202) - 80 (cat.4:218); Majlis 3256(2) (cat.10/2:848) (Irshād al-ṭālibīn) - 3427(2) (cat.10/3:1289) (Irshād al-ṭālibīn) -4954(12) (cat.14:237) - 5466 (cat.16:367); Marʿashī 4(3) (cat.1:19) - 750(7) (cat.2:355) -1467(6) (cat.4:259) -2494(3) (cat.7:84) - 4081(3) (cat.11:94) - 3427 (cat.9:214) (Irshād al-ṭālibīn); Mashhad Ilāhiyyāt 1219(1) (cat.2:356) -1834(1) (cat.3:903-4); Millī Arabic 856 (cat.8:358) -Arabic 1691(3) (cat.10:274); Princeton New Series 1308 -1886 (cat.191) -367 (Irshād al-ṭālibīn); Riḍawī Hikma 1065 -1066 - 1067 - 1068 -1069 (cat.4:268-9); Tustariyya 247(7) (cat.845); Wazīrī 1304 (cat.3:923) - 1069(2) (cat.3:843).
Commentaries: (1) Sharh nahj al-mustarshidīn by Muhammad Hasan al-Khawa'īnī al-Zanjānī (Dharīʿa, 14:162, no.2023); (2) al-Tahqīq al-mubīn fī sharh nahj al-mustarshidīn by Khidr b. Muhammad b. ʿAlī al-Rāzī al-Habalrūdī (d. around 850/1446) (Dharīʿa, 3:484, no.1799) (3) Tadhkirat al-wāsilīn fī sharh nahj al-mustarshidīn by Nizām al-Dīn al-Aʿrajī al-Husaynī (Dharīʿa, 4:51, no.206) (4) Tabsirat al-tālibīn fī sharh nahj al-mustarshidīn by ʿAmīd al-Dīn al-Aʿrajī al-Husaynī (d. 754/1353) (Dharīʿa, 3:318, no.1174); (5) Sharh nahj al-mustarshidīn by Fakhr al-Dīn b. Muhammad ʿAlī al-Turayhī (d. 1085/1674) (Dharīʿa, 14:63) (6) Miʿrāj al-yaqīn fī sharh nahj al-mustarshidīn by Fakhr al-Muhaqqiqīn Muhammad b. al-ʿAllāma (d. 771/1369) (Dharīʿa, 14:163); (7) Irshād al-tālibīn by al-Fādil Miqdād al-Suyūrī (d. 826/1423) (Dharīʿa, 1:515, no.1520); (8) Kashf ahwāl al-dīn fī sharh nahj al-mustarshidīn, by Jawād b. Saʿīd b. Jawād al-Kāzimī (written in 1029/1619).

(123) Nahj al-wusūl ilā ʿilm al-usūl (KH/IM).
Dharīʿa, 24:426 (no.2227).
(legal methodology)
MSS: no MS known.

(124) Nahj al-waddāh fī l-ahādīth al-sihāh (KH).
Dharīʿa, 24:427 (no.2229).
(traditions)
MSS: no MS known.

(125) al-Nūr al-mushriq fī ʿilm al-mantiq (IM).
Dharīʿa, 13:376 (no.2025).
(logic, written after Rabīʿ II 693/March 1294)
MSS: no MS known.

(126) Wājib wudū' wa-l-salāt (DH*).
(also: Wājibat al-wudū')
Dharīʿa, 25:5 (no.23).
(law)
MSS: no MS known.

## CHAPTER III

## JUSTICE

### 1.Ethical Objectivism Versus Divine Subjectivism

Al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī disagreed about the origin and character of the ethical standards for good and evil.

Al-Ḥillī supported the Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilite position of ethical objectivism. He presents the views of the different parties and clarifies his own position:

> The Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites agree that there are things the goodness and evil of which are necessarily known such as the goodness of beneficial truth, of fairness (inṣāf), of doing good (iḥsān) and of thanking the benefactor and [like] the evil of harmful lying, oppression (ẓulm), corruption (fasād), and the imposition of something as obligatory which cannot be fulfilled (taklīf mā lā yuṭāq). There are other things whose goodness and evil is known by deduction from reason, such as the goodness of harmful truth and the evil of beneficial lying. Other things are known by revelation. This does not mean that [revelation] is the cause (<sup>c</sup>illa) of the goodness and the evil, rather it uncovers it....
>
> The Ash<sup>c</sup>arites maintain that both good and evil are standards determined by the law (shar'iyyāt). Thus good is what the Lawgiver commands and evil is what He prohibits, because this knowledge is not reached by reasoning nor by consensus and it is not necessary.[1]

This passage highlights the difference of view between the Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites and the Ash<sup>c</sup>arites.[2] According to Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilite doctrine, good and evil have real existence and are independent of revelation. Through reason, man knows in

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[1] Taslīk, 62r; see also Ma<sup>c</sup>ārij, 121v.

[2] For the Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilite and the Ash<sup>c</sup>arite views on ethical values in general, see G.F.Hourani, "Two Theories of Value in Early Islam," in Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics, by G.F.Hourani (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), esp.57-9; and R.Frank, "Moral Obligation in Classical Muslim Theology," The Journal of Religious Ethics 11 (1983):204-223.

general terms certain primary propositions of good and evil.[3] In regard to acts which are apparently affected by contradictory judgements, man can through reasoning arrive at further conclusions about their status. He may assess the weight of various aspects and thus arrive at a conclusion about the value of the act as a whole.[4] In addition to these two categories, there were certain acts whose goodness cannot be known by reason, and here revelation serves to teach man what he is unable to know by himself. This category contains for instance the acts of worship.[5] Revelation is, thus, understood by al-Ḥillī and the Mu^c^tazilites as a detailed explanation of what man already knows in a general way by reason. It does not determine moral standards but rather reveals them to man. Through revelation, God therefore assists man to gain access to the full knowledge about objective values to which He is subject Himself.[6]

In the Ash^c^arite view, God determines what is good and evil through His command and prohibition. He does so solely on the basis of His will.[7] Man is therefore unable to know what is good and what is evil by reason prior to revelation.[8] God Himself is not bound by any laws or values since He is sovereign above them.

When al-Rāzī discussed the origin of ethical values he differentiated between three different types of good and evil. He states:

> It is important in regard to this question [about the origin of ethical values] to determine the place of disagreement.
> We say there is no disagreement that we know by reason that certain things agree with our nature while others disagree with it. Thus, pleasure

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[3]See also G.F.Hourani, "The Rationalist Ethics of ^c^Abd al-Jabbar," in Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics, by G.F.Hourani (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 103; Frank, "Moral Obligation," 205.
[4]See Hourani, "Ethics," 104.
[5]Al-Ḥillī, Manāhij, 98v.
[6]See Hourani, "Ethics," 101, 104; Frank, "Moral Obligation," 206-7.
[7]Al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.5, pt.9:107. For references to earlier Ash^c^arite texts, see Frank, "Moral Obligation," 207ff.
[8]For references, see ibid., 208.

> (ladhdha) and whatever leads to it agree [with man's nature]; pain and whatever leads to it disagree [with it] and there is no need for the law to recognize this agreement and this disagreement. We know further by reason that knowledge is characterized by the attribute of perfection (kamāl) while ignorance is characterized by the attribute of deficiency (nuqṣān).
> The disagreement concerns, therefore, [the issue] that some acts are connected with blame (dhamm) in this world and punishment ($^{c}$iqāb) in the hereafter while others are connected with merit (madḥ) in this world and reward (thawāb) in the hereafter. Is this so because of an intrinsic characteristic of the act or is it rather the case that this is only the judgement of the law about this or the statement of the people of knowledge about it?
> The Mu$^{c}$tazila maintain that the effector for these judgements (aḥkām) are intrinsic attributes of the act. Our view is that it is determined only by the judgement (ḥukm) of the law.[9]

The first type of ethical values, according to al-Rāzī, applies to human beings only.[10] Whatever suits a person's advantage, such as pleasure or joy, is perceived to be good by this person. Whatever disagrees with it, like pain and grief, is evil from the subjective point of view of this person.[11] Since these values differ in their meaning from person to person, al-Rāzī argued, not even two people could ever agree about the ethical value of a certain act.[12] This type of ethical values does not contain any objective aspect. Nor do they indicate for which act man deserves praise or blame. They are, therefore, not related to the knowledge of ethical values as known by revelation.

In regard to the second type of values, al-Rāzī defined good in terms of perfection and evil in terms of deficiency. This concept, which derived from the philosophical tradition, was of no significance in his discussion on ethics.

In his discussion of the third type of values, al-Rāzī strictly adhered to the traditional Ash$^{c}$arite position of divine subjectivism. God alone determines the

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[9] Arba$^{c}$īn, 246; see also his al-Ishāra fī $^{c}$ilm al-kalām (MS Alexandria 519/2), 32v-33r.
[10] Ma$^{c}$ālim, 86-7.
[11] Ibid., 86-7; Maṭālib, 3:21ff, 289ff.
[12] Ibid., 3:32.

ethical values through His command and prohibition. The subjective standards for good and evil which man knows by reason are unrelated to this type. Man is, therefore, unable rationally to know any of the values laid down by God.[13]

The acknowledgment of merely subjective human standards for good or evil which are not related to the ethical standards as they are determined by God originated from al-Juwaynī who adhered to this view in his *$^{c}$Aqīda*.[14] His position was later adopted by al-Ghazālī.[15]

On the basis of this notion of subjective ethical values, al-Juwaynī, al-Ghazālī and al-Rāzī disagreed with their predecessors why man is obliged to obey the religious law. The earlier Ash$^{c}$arites held that this obligation is founded in the law itself.[16] Al-Juwaynī was the first to reject this view. He argued that because of the subjectivity of his own standards for good and evil man feels the

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[13] *Tafsīr*, vol.7, pt.14:130; vol.13, pt.25:34.

[14] Abū l-Ma$^{c}$ālī al-Juwaynī, *al-$^{c}$Aqīda al-niẓāmiyya* (edited by Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī. Cairo: al-Anwār, 1367/1948), 26, 41, 45ff. In his earlier work, the *Irshād*, al-Juwaynī still adhered to the traditional Ash$^{c}$arite position that good and evil are founded only in God's command and prohibition; see G.F.Hourani, "Juwaynī's Criticisms of Mu$^{c}$tazilite Ethics," in *Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ehtics*, by G.F.Hourani (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 125ff.

[15] See Abū Ḥamīd Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *Kitāb al-Iqtiṣād fī l-i$^{c}$tiqād* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Ḥusayn al-tijāriyya, n.d.), 73ff. The relevant passages have been analysed by G.F.Hourani, "Ghazālī on the Ethics of Action," in *Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics*, by G.F.Hourani (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 137ff.

[16] Abū Bakr Muḥammad al-Bāqillānī, *Kitāb al-tamhīd* (edited by R.McCarthy. Manshūrāt jāmi$^{c}$at al-hikma fī Baghdād, no.1. Beirut: Maktaba sharqiyya, 1957), 105, 116-8, 341-2; Abū l-Ma$^{c}$ālī al-Juwaynī, *Kitāb al-irshād ilā qawāṭi$^{c}$ al-adilla fī uṣūl al-i$^{c}$tiqād* (edited by M.Y.Mūsā and A.$^{c}$Abd al-Ḥamīd. Cairo: al-Khānjī, 1369/1950), 258; see also Hourani, "Ghazālī," 139.

necessity to act according to the law in order to avoid the punishment for disobeying it.[17] This view was adopted by al-Ghazālī[18] and al-Rāzī. The latter argues:

> Do you agree that it is reason which demands precaution (ihtirāz) against punishment or do you say that this obligation is established only by the law?
> If you adhere to the first alternative, you agree that good and evil are established by reason in the visible world (fī l-shāhid).
> If you adhere to the second alternative, man is not obliged to avoid punishment except by another obligation while the meaning of this obligation is again the punishment following upon it. This necessitates an endless chain in the sequence of punishments which is absurd. This proves that reason is the judge for good and evil in the visible world.[19]

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[17]He states (ᶜAqīda, 45): "Our predecessors held that God's command must be obeyed only when it is specifically given, and that it is because of His power and divinity that God's order deserves to be obeyed. But this is an attitude towards which an intelligent person should be cautious, if his aspiration makes him guard against blindly following authority....Rather I say that were it not that the law states the threat of punishment (waᶜīd) for those who fail to do what He orders, man would not understand [that he has] an obligation....Indeed, when a man becomes aware of a threat of punishment, his reason induces him to recognize the obligatory nature of those things for the omission of which he would suffer what is more than unbearable."

[18]See Hourani, "Ghazālī," 139-40.

[19]Maᶜālim, 87; see also Arbaᶜīn, 249; Maṭālib, 3:18, 289-90.

2.The Nature of God's Justice

As a result of their differences regarding the character of ethical values and God's relationship to these values, al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī supported different views about God's relation towards His creation.

Al-Ḥillī maintained that objective ethical standards apply to God as well as to man and so God's justice must be measured in accordance with these values. He therefore defined God as just in the sense that He neither commits any evil nor falls short in His obligations[20] acting only for the purpose of pure goodness and for the benefit of others[21] or, as al-Ḥillī expressed it, because of the "motive of wisdom" (<u>dāᶜī al-ḥikma</u>).[22]

The Muᶜtazilites traditionally argued that God does not commit any evil since He is self-sufficient (<u>ghanī</u>) and omniscient. Thus He does not have any motivation to do evil.[23] Al-Ḥillī argues accordingly when he states:

> The proof of the doctrine chosen by the Muᶜtazila is that God has a motive for the good and no deterrent (<u>ṣārif</u>) from it and He has a deterrent from the evil without any motive for it, while

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[20] <u>Maᶜārij</u>, 122r; for this notion among earlier Muᶜtazilites, see Abū l-Ḥusayn Aḥmad b. Abī Hāshim Mānakdīm, <u>Sharḥ al-uṣūl al-khamsa</u> (edited by ᶜAbd al-Karīm ᶜUthmān as a work of ᶜAbd al-Jabbār. Cairo: Wahba, 1965), 132; ᶜAbd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad b. ᶜAbd al-Jabbār al-Hamadhānī al-Asadābādī, <u>al-Mughnī fī abwāb al-tawḥīd wa-l-ᶜadl</u> (edited by M.Muṣṭafā Ḥilmī et al. Cairo: al-Mu'assasa l-ᶜāmma l-miṣriyya li-l-ta'līf wa-l-anbā', 1961-5), 6/1:177ff; 14:53.

[21] <u>Maᶜārij</u>, 122r; for this notion among earlier Muᶜtazilites, see ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, <u>Mughnī</u>, 6/1:3; 14:53; al-Rāzī, <u>Tafsīr</u>, vol.5, pt.9:143; see also R.Frank, "Reason and Revealed Law: A Sample of Parallels and Divergences in Kalām and Falsafa," in <u>Recherches d'islamologie, recueil d'articles offert à Georges C.Anawati et Louis Gardet par leurs collègues et amis</u> (edited by S.van Riet and R.Arnaldez. Louvain: Bibliothèque Philosophique de Louvain, 1978), 125; idem, "Moral Obligation," 206.

[22] <u>Maᶜārij</u>, 122r.

[23] ᶜAbd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad b. ᶜAbd al-Jabbār al-Hamadhānī al-Asadābādī, <u>Faḍl al-iᶜtizāl wa-ṭabaqāt al-muᶜtazila</u> (edited by Fu'ād Sayyid. Tunis: Dār al-tūnisiyya li-l-nashr, 1393/1974), 348; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, <u>Fā'iq</u>, 80r-v.

having power over everything subject to power; and when power and motive are joined, the act is necessary.
We say so because God is self-sufficient, as need is impossible with regard to Him and He knows the goodness of good and the evil nature of evil. [And] it is necessarily known that from someone who knows evil without needing it, it will not issue. [It is] furthermore [known] that one who knows good over which he has power, will produce it, when it is free from aspects of corruption. The explanation (taḥrīr) of this is that an act is contingent (mumkin) with regard to itself and necessary (wājib) with regard to its cause and every contingent is dependent (mustanid) on a capable agent. Its cause (ᶜilla) becomes complete through the means of capability and the motive. When they are present the means (sabab) is complete, and when the means is complete the existence is necessary.[24]

Al-Ḥillī argues here on the basis of his theory of acts. Acts necessarily occur when motive and power come together and they cannot occur when either power or motive are lacking.[25] Thus God cannot commit evil or fall short in His obligations since He does not have a motive for doing so.

His argument is directly based on Ibn al-Malāḥimī's discussion in which the latter similarly argued that God is a capable agent (qādir) who cannot act without a motive. Since He does not have a motive to commit evil or to fall short in His duties because of His self-sufficiency and His omniscience, He cannot possibly commit evil.

This argumentation differed from of the Bahshamiyya who supported the same position, arguing by analogy from man to God (qiyās ᶜalā l-shāhid).[26] Ibn al-Malāḥimī held that it is redundant to argue on the basis of analogy from man to God once it has been acknowledged that God has no motive to do evil.[27] The reason for this difference is to be found in the differing theories of acts. Ibn al-Malāḥimī and

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[24] Kashf al-murād, 237; see also Manāhij, 97r; Maᶜārij, 122r.
[25] See later.
[26] ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 6/1:177ff, 186; Mānakdīm, 303, 316ff.
[27] Fā'iq, 69r-v.

al-Ḥillī both maintained that a capable agent cannot act without a motive. The Bahshamiyya, in contrast, allowed that a capable agent may produce an act without a motive.[28]

Al-Rāzī differed fundamentally from al-Ḥillī's view on God's relation towards His creation. According to his concept of divine omnipotence, God is the sole creator of everything existing, including every evil.[29] Moreover, since God determines what is good and evil, He Himself is not subject to any ethical values and His acts therefore cannot be judged. For this reason, God is also not obliged to perform any act.[30] Al-Rāzī rejected, therefore, the Mu$^{c}$tazilite view of justice which he considered as an infringement of the principle of divine omnipotence. In doing so he was in agreement with the Ash$^{c}$arite tradition. On this basis, al-Rāzī was concerned to show that God's acts cannot be judged as either evil or good. He argues:

> Know that when it has been established that the judgement of good and evil has no meaning except [in relation to] gaining benefits (jalb al-manāfi$^{c}$) and repelling of harmful matters, this can reasonably be affirmed only in regard to one for whom benefit and harm apply. Since God is exalted above this judgement of good and evil it cannot be affirmed in His regard.[31]

This argument is based on al-Rāzī's concept of rational good and evil. These standards have a meaning only in regard to man and are irrelevant in relation to God who is self-sufficient and therefore exalted above them. Al-Juwaynī[32] and al-Ghazālī,[33] who also affirmed purely human rational values, likewise argued that since good and evil apply only to men, God's acts cannot be judged by these standards.

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[28] See later.
[29] Arba$^{c}$īn, 237ff; Tafsīr, vol.3, pt.5:219.
[30] E.g. Tafsīr, vol.1, pt.2:140; for this notion among earlier Ash$^{c}$arites, see also Hourani, "Juwaynī," 133.
[31] Ma$^{c}$ālim, 87; see also Maṭālib, 3:66, 291 ff; also his "al-Masā'il al-khamsūn," in Majmū$^{c}$at rasā'il (Cairo, 1328H.), 376.
[32] $^{c}$Aqīda, 26, 41.
[33] Iqtiṣād, 74.

Elsewhere, al-Rāzī argued also that God cannot be judged according to the non-rational ethical values known from revelation. Since He determined them and since they are relevant to mankind only, God is not bound by them.[34] In this regard, too, His acts cannot be subject to the standards of good and evil.[35] This second point was traditionally employed by earlier Ashʿarites as an argument that God's acts cannot be judged to be evil.[36]

It is noteworthy that al-Rāzī unambiguously maintained here that God's acts can neither be evaluated as evil nor as good. While this was correct on the basis of Ashʿarite principles, most of his predecessors had in fact argued that since all of God's acts are beyond evaluation and as such cannot be evil, they must be qualified as good.[37]

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[34] Arbaʿīn, 246; Ishāra, 32v-33r.

[35] "Masā'il," 376.

[36] See Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl al-Ashʿarī, "Kitāb al-lumaʿ fī l-radd ʿalā ahl al-zaygh wa-l-bida'," in The Theology of al-Ashʿarī (edited by R.McCarthy. Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1953), §170; Abū Bakr Muḥammad al-Bāqillānī, al-Inṣāf fīmā yajib iʿtiqāduhu wa-lā yajūz al-jahl bihi (edited by ʿUmmād al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Ḥaydar. Beirut: ʿĀlam al-kutub, 1407/1986), 231; idem, Tamhīd, 283, 341-2. See also ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 6/1, 115ff; also Hourani, "Two Theories," 65.

[37] E.g. Abū Bakr b. Fūrak, Mujarrad maqālāt al-Ashʿarī (edited by D.Gimaret. Recherches. Nouvelle Série: A.Langue arabe et pensée islamique, vol.14. Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1987), 130 where all of God's acts are qualified as wise (ḥikma); Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl al-Ashʿarī, "Risāla ilā ahl al-thagr bi-bāb al-abwāb," Ilahiyyat fakültesi mecmuasi 8 (1929):99, where God is labelled as just (ʿādil) in all His actions; ʿAlī b. Muḥammad Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, Statio Quinta et Sexta et appendix libri Mevakif cum commentario Gorgānii (edited by Th.Soerensen. Leipzig, 1894), 148-9 where a similar conclusion is drawn; see also Frank, "Moral Obligation," 213 for further references. Elsewhere, al-Rāzī draws, however, the conclusion in the traditional Ashʿarite way that all of God's acts are good; see Ishāra, 32v, where he maintains that God's actions are all good in the sense that He acts without any obstruction; also Tafsīr, vol.5, pt.9:144-5 where he calls God's acts all wise since He acts in His own property (mulk). Al-Juwaynī was among the few Ashʿarites who pointed out that good and evil, both of which are standards applicable only to man but not to God, cannot be applied to any of God's acts. He states (ʿAqīda, 26): "If it were not that the community of the Truth (ʿuṣbat al-ḥaqq)

In contrast to al-Ḥillī, al-Rāzī further denied that God acts for a purpose[38] and with this he was in agreement with the Ashᶜarite tradition.[39] He therefore rejected the notion that God ever acts either for the purpose of pure goodness or for the benefit of others.[40] As seen above, al-Ḥillī considered these the only admissible motivations for God's actions. In support of his position, al-Rāzī employed the argumentation deriving from the philosophical tradition that God's actions emanate from Him only because of His own essence, not for any extraneous consideration. If God acted for a purpose, this would necessarily imply that God is deficient in Himself and perfecting Himself through this act.[41] However, in contrast to the philosophers who maintained that God is Himself the most perfect goodness so that only goodness emanates from Him, al-Rāzī and the Ashᶜarites held that God acts in accordance with His will (irāda). Men have neither the right to ask, nor the possibility to know, what God's motivations are.[42]

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upheld that God is the creator of good and evil, the doctrine of unity (tawḥīd) would require that one should say that there is nothing among God's actions which is good and evil in relation to (His) divine rule. For all actions are alike in His ruling. Their ranks vary only in relation to men."

[38] Arbaᶜīn, 249ff; Tafsīr, vol.7, pt.14:192; "Masā'il," 377.

[39] See Frank, "Moral Obligation," 209-10 for references.

[40] Tafsīr, vol.5, pt.9:143-4; Maṭālib, 3:71.

[41] Maᶜālim, 88; see also al-Ḥillī, Manāhij, 97r where he notes the philosophical argumentation and its adoption among later Ashᶜarites. By this, he had undoubtedly al-Rāzī in mind.

[42] Tafsīr, vol.12, pt.13:196. See also Abū ᶜAbbās Aḥmad b. ᶜAbd al-Ḥalīm Taqī al-Dīn b. Taymiyya, "al-Iḥtijāj bi-l-qadar," in Majmūᶜat al-rasā'il al-kubrā by Ibn Taymiyya (Cairo: Dār al-kutub al-miṣriyya, 1348-92/1929-72), 2:120-1.

3.God's Obligation to Act in Man's Best Interest (Aslah)

According to the Mu^c^tazilite theory of justice, God acts only out of pure goodness and for the benefit of others. Moreover, having imposed on man a moral obligation as an act of grace, God is obliged to render man every possible facilitation enabling him to fulfil that obligation. On this basis, the question arises whether God's obligation to act in man's interest is restricted to assisting man to fulfil his moral obligation or whether this obligation applies also to purely worldly matters.[43]

Al-Ḥillī held that God's obligation goes beyond the religious sphere affirming that God always acts for man's best interest whenever He knows that His act will result in pure benefit free of any harm. His argument rested on his theory that action must occur when motive and power come together. God thus acts necessarily for man's best interest whenever He has the motive to do so, regardless of whether the act is beneficial to man in regard to the fulfilment of his moral obligation or in any other respect.[44] When al-Ḥillī surveyed the various positions held by his Mu^c^tazilite predecessors, he ascribed the view which he himself favoured to Abū l-Qāsim al-Ka^c^bī (d. 319/931):

> If God knew that if He gave Zayd money he would gain benefit and there was neither cause of corruption (mafsada) nor harm (maḍarra), nor any evil aspect in it, the Baghdadis and Abū l-Qāsim held that God would be obliged to give [Zayd this

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[43]The question of God's obligation to act for man's best interest has been the subject of a number of studies; see in particular R.Brunschvig, "Mu^c^tazilisme et optimum (al-aṣlaḥ)," Studia Islamica 39 (1974):5-23; G.Vajda, "Le problème de l'assistance bienveillante de Dieu, du 'mieux' et de la necessité de la loi révélée selon Yūsuf al-Basīr," Revue des études juives 134 (1975): 31-74; E.L.Ormsby, Theodicy in Islamic Theology: The Dispute over al-Ghazālī's 'Best of all Possible Worlds (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), see index.

[44]Manāhij, 98v.

money] but the Basrans denied this. The former argued that if the motive exists and there is no deterrent, the act is necessary.[45]

The positions of al-Ḥillī's Muᶜtazilite predecessors, however, were not as clear-cut as he presents them.

The view that God is obliged to act in man's best interest in the realm of religion only, which became later associated with the school of Basra, was in fact shared by all of the earlier Muᶜtazilites. They discussed God's obligation to act in man's best interest only in terms of facilitating favours (lutf, pl. alṭāf) which assist man to fulfil his moral obligation.[46] They agreed that God's actions reach the limit of the beneficence He is capable of rendering in this realm.[47] The founder of the early school of Baghdad, Bishr b. al-Muᶜtamir (d. 210/825) who in substance agreed with this view, further refined the Muᶜtazilite position. He pointed out that there is no limit to the beneficence which God is capable of rendering. It is, therefore, absurd to say that God is obliged to act in man's best interest since this implies an obligation for the infinite. He therefore held that although God acts in the most beneficial way for the

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[45] Ibid.

[46] See e.g. Abū l-Ḥasan ᶜAlī b. Ismāᶜīl al-Ashᶜarī, Kitāb maqālāt al-islāmiyīn (edited by H.Ritter. Bibliotheca Islamica, vol.1. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1980), 576-7.

[47] Ibid., 247, 574. To safeguard the notion of divine omnipotence they commonly argued that although God's beneficial actions are the most beneficial He is capable of rendering, He has the capacity of rendering infinite acts of similar beneficial acts (amthāl); see ibid. An exception was Abū l-Hudhayl who differed from the other Muᶜtazilites when he held that the similar beneficial acts God is capable to render are also finite; see ibid., 249, 576-7. Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Khayyāṭ (Kitāb intiṣār (edited by H.Nyberg. Cairo: Dār al-kutub al-miṣriyya, 1925), 16ff) explains that Abū l-Hudhayl's assertion of the finitude of creation resulted from his view that God differs from the contingent in His being infinite. Therefore, nothing other than God can be infinite. See also R.Frank, "The Divine Attributes According to the Teaching of Abu l-Hudhayl al-ᶜAllāf," Le Muséon 82 (1969):473ff; J.van Ess, "Abu l-Hudhayl in Contact: The Genesis of an Anecdote," in Islamic Theology and Philosophy (edited by M.Marmura. Studies in Honor of G.Hourani. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 23ff; also S.Pines, Beiträge zur islamischen Atomenlehre (Gräfenhainichen: A.Heine, 1936), 14-5.

morally-obliged to assist him in the fulfilment of his moral obligation and although He is obliged to do so, God is capable, yet not obliged, of rendering a further facilitation which would induce an unbeliever to become a believer.[48] The generality of the earlier Muᶜtazilites had denied God's capability to do so.[49] Bishr's objection to the view of the other Muᶜtazilites was decisive for the position of Abū ᶜAlī and the Bahshamiyya. Abū ᶜAlī maintained that God's obligation applies only to acts which facilitate man's fulfilment of his moral obligation. In this respect, God acts in the most beneficial manner of which He is capable. Although Abū ᶜAlī disagreed with Bishr when he held that God is incapable of granting a facilitation to someone who is morally-obliged with the object of making him a believer when He knows that he will be an unbeliever,[50] he accepted Bishr's argument that it is absurd to say that God acts in man's best interest in the utmost possible manner. He further elaborated this reasoning arguing that since God is omnipotent, what is subject to His power is infinite. If He were under obligation to act for man's best interest while being capable of providing unlimited benefit in that respect, His obligation would be infinite. To create an infinite number of things, however, is impossible. Moreover, creation could not have had a beginning, since God could always be said to be capable of providing the most beneficial effects before any beginning.[51] Abū ᶜAlī therefore held that although God renders the utmost beneficial facilitations to the morally-obliged to assist him in his fulfilment of the moral obligation, God is

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[48] Al-Ashᶜarī (Maqālāt, 246) reports Bishr's view: "God is capable of a facilitation which, when He would render it to someone whom He knows that he does not believe, would induce him to believe. And it is not obligatory for God to render this [facilitation]....God is not obliged to do the best of things for man. Indeed it is absurd because there is no limit and no term to the beneficence which God is able to perform. He is obliged to do for them only what is best for them in their religion."
[49] Ibid., 247, 574.
[50] Ibid., 247-8, 575.
[51] ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 14:56.

capable of rendering additional favours which would help him to increase his reward. Yet He is not obliged to render these.

The followers of the later school of Baghdad founded by Abū l-Qāsim al-Kaᶜbī (d. 319/931) maintained a different position. They held that God always acts for men's best interest both in religious and worldly matters.[52] In contrast to the Basrans, they moreover held that God does not do so because He is obliged to do so but rather out of generosity (jūd).[53] Presumably in reply to objections by the Basrans that God's acts cannot be the most beneficial He is able to render, the Baghdadis substituted the benefits of the collective for those of the individual. A morally-obliged person may never become a believer but the imposition of moral obligation upon him may still be beneficial as it might induce others to believe.[54]

Al-Ḥillī's statement that Abū l-Qāsim al-Kaᶜbī argued for his view on the basis of the theory that an act necessarily occurs when power and motive come together, is therefore mistaken. With this presentation, al-Ḥillī followed Ibn al-Malāḥimī who first ascribed this view to Abū l-Qāsim and his followers.[55]

Having adopted the view that God necessarily acts for man's best interest when He has the motive to do so, al-Ḥillī was confronted with the Basran objection that God's obligation cannot comprise the infinite. In reply to this, he correctly pointed out that the infinite is not contingent (mumkin) but impossible (mumtaniᶜ); therefore, it does not belong to what is obligatory for God to perform.[56]

Al-Ḥillī's position on God's obligation to act for man's best interest is directly based on the view of Ibn al-Malāḥimī. Maintaining that an act occurs necessarily

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52 Mānakdīm, 134; see also McDermott, 72ff; Brunschvig, 11.
53 Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 146r; McDermott, 73-4.
54 Mānakdīm, 518; McDermott, 73 n.1.
55 See later.
56 Manāhij, 98v; this passage is extremely corrupt in the manuscript.

when motive and power come together, the latter argued that when God has the power for a beneficial act and the motive to do it, He necessarily produces it.[57] Since this principle is not restricted to the realm of what is beneficial for the fulfilment of man's moral obligation, Ibn al-Malāḥimī concluded that God's obligation to act for man's best interest applies equally to worldly matters.[58] He further attempted to show that his view agreed with the position of both the Baghdadis and the Basrans.

He argued that his own principle of the motive and power necessitating the act underlies the position of both schools. Although the Basrans denied God's obligation to act for man's best interest in every respect, they acknowledged, according to Ibn al-Malāḥimī, that a beneficence has to be done in the presence of capacity and motive and the absence of a deterrent even if God is not obliged to do so on account of His justice.[59] Since this is in conflict with the Basran position, he presumably meant here that according to the Bahshamiyya, God often acts out of generosity (jūd) beyond the obligatory which He does out of justice (ᶜadl).

In regard to the Baghdadis, Ibn al-Malāḥimī suggested that they maintained that God acts for man's best interest in every respect owing to the theory of capacity and motive necessitating the act.[60] Since the Baghdadis certainly did not adhere to the principle of power and motive necessitating the act, which was introduced only by Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī into the theological discussion, Ibn al-Malāḥimī's claim is not correct. His conclusion was that the disagreement between Basrans and Baghdadis can be reduced to a mere verbal disagreement (khilāf fī l-ᶜibāra).[61]

Dealing with the Basran objection that God cannot be said to create an infinite number of things, Ibn al-Malāḥimī argued like al-Ḥillī that it is impossible for

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[57] Fā'iq, 146r-v.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid., 147r.
[60] Ibid., 147v.
[61] Ibid.

the infinite to exist. Therefore, it cannot fall under the obligation of a capable agent.[62] According to Ibn al-Malāḥimī, this reply originated with the Baghdadis:

> If they would say 'the motive calls for the act only in so far as its existence is feasible in itself and the existence of the infinite is not feasible in itself; the motive can therefore not call for it', it should be said to them 'the Baghdadis, too, say that the act is obligatory for the agent [only] in so far as it is feasible in itself. The infinite is not feasible in itself, therefore its obligation upon the capable agent is not admissible'.[63]

The position of Ibn al-Malāḥimī which was adopted by al-Ḥillī, differed to some extent from the view of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. There are clear indications that the latter hesitated to support the view that God necessarily acts in every instance in man's best interest. He rather held a position between the Baghdadi and the Basran views. When he was confronted with the objection that God cannot possibly be under obligation to act infinitely for man's best interest, Abū l-Ḥusayn argued that in such cases God may or may not act for man's best interest. Ibn al-Malāḥimī comments:

> As for our master Abū l-Ḥusayn, he maintained that the doing of the most beneficial is only necessary in some of the cases in which the motives for it exist. He said that if [rendering of] the additional amount to the [initial amount of] 1000 contained an evil aspect, it is obligatory that the [initial] 1000 should be given because he [i.e. the agent] has no deterrent from it. If it [i.e. the additional amount] infinitely [repeated] does not contain any evil aspect this is like a deterrent from giving the 1000. He [i.e. the agent] may therefore sometimes render it and sometimes not.[64]

With this answer, Abū l-Ḥusayn did not go as far as the Baghdadis who maintained that God acts in principle always for man's best interest and who would not have considered infinity as a deterrent from giving the additional amount. He did, however, go further than the Basrans who would have

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[62] Ibid., 147r .
[63] Ibid.
[64] Ibid., 147r; see also al-Ḥillī, Kashf al-murād, 270-1.

denied that God is obliged to render the initial amount since this amount would not facilitate the fulfilment of the moral obligation of a morally-obliged.

A further indication that Abū l-Ḥusayn held a view between the Baghdadi and the Basran position is found in al-Rāzī's Maṭālib al-ᶜaliyya and his Tafsīr.[65] Al-Rāzī mentioned Abū l-Ḥusayn in connection with the famous story of the three brothers. This story deals with the fate in the hereafter of a believer, an unbeliever and one who died young. The one who died young and earned a position in heaven below that of the believer complains to God that He let him die early and deprived him thus of the chance to earn a higher position. God answers that He knew that he would sin; so He let him die early. Thereupon the unbeliever asks God from hell why He did not make him die likewise since He must have known that he would not become a believer.[66] This story, as R.Gwynne has shown,[67] was told for the first time by Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī's contemporary ᶜAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1037).

Al-Rāzī reports that Abū l-Ḥusayn dealt with this argument in his Kitāb ghurar al-adilla.[68] Abū l-Ḥusayn is reported to have answered the objection from the point of view of both positions.

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[65] Maṭālib, 3:326-7; Tafsīr, vol.7, pt.13:195-6.
[66] For the various versions of this story, see R.W.Gwynne, "Al-Jubbā'ī, al-Ashᶜarī and the Three Brothers: The Use of Fiction," Muslim World 75 (1985):132-61.
[67] Ibid., 133.
[68] The printed edition (Maṭālib, 3:326-7) has the reading Kitāb al-qadar. No such title is among the books attributed to Abū l-Ḥusayn. The reading Kitāb al-ghurar is confirmed by a manuscript copy of the text (MS Chester Beatty 3114, 141r). This work is lost (see W.Madelung, "Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī," Encyclopaedia of Islam, Suppl.Fasc. 1-2:25). In his Tafsīr, al-Rāzī does not mention his source for Abū l-Ḥusayn's answers. As Gwynne remarks (132), no Muᶜtazilite text known so far mentions this argument. If al-Rāzī's information is correct, Abū l-Ḥusayn's Ghurar al-adilla would therefore be presumably the earliest and as far as is known the only Muᶜtazilite text where this argument is mentioned.

According to the Baghdadis who substituted the best interest of the community for the best interest of the individual, God let only the brother die young who would have caused harm to the community. The other one who turned out to be an unbeliever constituted no harm to the community. There was therefore no need to let him die early.[69]

According to the Basran view, the act of God to let the one brother die young was an act of grace which He was not obliged to perform. The fact that He did perform an act of grace to one person does not mean that He is obliged to do the same to another.[70]

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[69] Maṭālib, 3:327; Tafsīr, vol.6, pt.13:195.
[70] Maṭālib, 3:327-8; Tafsīr, vol.6, pt.13:195.

4.Pain and Compensation

As a Mu^c^tazilite, al-Ḥillī was confronted with the problem that pain inavoidably occurs in the world generated by man and by God. In particular the existence of suffering caused by God gave rise to questions about His justice.

Al-Rāzī as an Ash^c^arite was not concerned with this problem. Since God's acts are above any standards for good and evil God can inflict as much pain as He pleases without being obliged to recompense the sufferer in any way.[71]

Al-Ḥillī enumerated five categories of pain which he considered as good. His list appears to be directly based on Ibn al-Malāḥimī's Fā'iq.[72]

> The Mu^c^tazilites say that it [i.e. pain] is good under [certain] conditions. First, if [the pain] is deserved (mustaḥaqq); secondly, if it results in great benefit exceeding it [i.e. the pain]; thirdly, if it prevents a greater harm; fourthly, if it occurs according to custom like God's act with regard to a living being when we throw him into fire; fifthly, if it is done in self-defence such as when we cause pain to someone who intends to kill us. For if we know that the pain contains one of these aspects, we definitely judge it to be good.[73]

From the elaborations of Ibn al-Malāḥimī in his own discussion, it is evident that cases two and three concern pain inflicted by a person to himself. Ibn al-Malāḥimī referred to the examples of drinking medicine to repel illness and of striving for knowledge to repel ignorance.[74] Case one clearly refers to pain inflicted by God as punishment on a sinner.[75] Case four equally refers to pain

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[71] "Masā'il," 377-8; Tafsīr, vol.8, pt.16:88-9; also Maṭālib, 4:423-4. For this notion among the Ash^c^arites in general, see Mānakdīm, 483; Hourani, "Juwaynī," 113.
[72] Fā'iq, 131v.
[73] Kashf al-murād, 259.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.

inflicted by God such as the burning of a living being in the fire. Since the burning occurs, however, according to custom, God cannot to be blamed for this specific burning.[76]

As for pain inflicted specifically by God, al-Ḥillī stipulated that it must be inflicted for a benefit (*naf$^{c}$*) either for the sufferer or for another person. In the second case, the sufferer must receive a compensation exceeding the pain suffered. God may further inflict pain because it was deserved.[77] This was also the general Mu$^{c}$tazilite view.[78] In contrast to man, God cannot inflict pain with the purpose of removing harm (*daf$^{c}$ al-ḍarar*) even if the latter is greater than the pain. The reason for this is God's omnipotence which enables Him to prevent evil by other means. Moreover, while man may inflict pain on the mere presumption (*ẓann*) that it will either result in a greater benefit or be deserved, this is impossible for God since He is omniscient.[79] Al-Ḥillī's Mu$^{c}$tazilite predecessors adhered to the same position.[80]

When God inflicts pain for a benefit, al-Ḥillī maintained, God is obliged to render the sufferer compensation (*$^{c}$iwaḍ*) exceeding the pain. Moreover, the pain itself must result in a facilitating favour (*luṭf*) either for the sufferer himself or for a morally-obliged person (*mukallaf*).[81] This was also the established position of the Bahshamiyya and Ibn al-Malāḥimī.[82] They all disagreed with Abū $^{c}$Alī who maintained that God may inflict pain upon man for the sake of mere compensation.[83] In arguing against his

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[76] Ibid.

[77] *Taslīk*, 67r; *Manāhij*, 98r.

[78] cAbd al-Jabbār, *Mughnī*, 13:377; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Fā'iq*, 134v; Mānakdīm, 485-6.

[79] *Manāhij*, 98r; *Muntahā al-wuṣūl*, 99r; *Kashf al-murād*, 259.

[80] cAbd al-Jabbār, *Mughnī*, 13:369; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Fā'iq*, 134v; Mānakdīm, 486; see also Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī, *Kitāb al-masā'il fī l-khilāf bayn al-Basriyīn wa-l-Baghdādiyīn* (edited by Ma$^{c}$n Ziyādeh and Riḍwān al-Sayyid. Beirut: Ma$^{c}$had al-inmā' al-$^{c}$arabī, 1979), 169-70.

[81] *Manāhij*, 98r; *Muntahā al-wuṣūl*, 99r.

[82] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Fā'iq*, 133r, 138r; Mānakdīm, 485.

[83] cAbd al-Jabbār, *Mughnī*, 13:390; Mānakdīm, 493.

father's position, Abū Hāshim had admitted that pain ceases to be unjust when it is compensated. Even with compensation, however, it would by itself still be futile ($^{c}$abath)[84] and thus evil and inadmissible for God. Pain inflicted by God thus must result in some kind of benefit (maṣlaḥa) in addition to compensation.[85]

In regard to whether God may inflict illnesses (amrāḍ/asqām) or other calamities (maṣā'ib) upon men because they are deserved, al-Ḥillī, following the position of Ibn al-Malāḥimī, disagreed with the Bahshamiyya.

The discussion originated with Abū $^{c}$Alī who held that illnesses inflicted upon infidels and sinners may serve either as a punishment ($^{c}$iqāb) or a trial (miḥna).[86] This punishment could, in his view, be appropriate in so far as God would render to man there and then some of the punishment he deserves in the hereafter.[87]

Abū Hāshim, in contrast, maintained that every illness inflicted by God on men, regardless of whether they are morally obliged or not, can only have the purpose of a trial and never of a deserved punishment.[88] He supported this view by pointing to the principal difference between undeserved pains (ālām) and deserved punishment ($^{c}$iqāb): men must be content with their illnesses and bear them patiently and they are not allowed to be distressed about them just as in regard to favours (ni$^{c}$am) which God bestows on them. This is, however, not necessary in regard to pains which are a deserved punishment. Owing to these different characteristics, man would therefore be unable to recognize whether a specific illness or calamity is inflicted upon him as a trial or as a deserved punishment. Thus, Abū Hāshim

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[84] $^{c}$Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 13:390.
[85] Ibid., 13:390-2; Mānakdīm, 493.
[86] $^{c}$Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 13:431.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid.

concluded, illnesses can be inflicted by God only for the purpose of trial (miḥnatan/imtiḥānan).[89] This position was generally accepted among his followers.[90]

Ibn al-Malāḥimī and al-Ḥillī allowed that God may inflict illnesses upon a morally obliged person either for a trial or as a deserved punishment (muᶜāqabatan).[91] Al-Ḥillī summarizes the disagreement and states his own view:

> This is the doctrine of Abū l-Husayn al-Basrī. He admitted that illnesses may occur among infidels (kuffār) or sinners (fussāq) as a punishment for the infidel and the sinner, because it is a pain reaching somebody who deserves it. Thus it is possible that it is [for the sake of] punishment. And its advance (taᶜjīl) [i.e. its occurrence in this world] may contain a benefit for some morally obliged persons as it is the case with the Qur'anic punishments (ḥudūd). The chief judge [ᶜAbd al-Jabbār] considered this impossible and affirmed that their illnesses [are inflicted upon them] as trials (miḥan), not as punishments, because they are obliged to be content with them and to bear them patiently, to submit to them and not to be distressed about them. This is unnecessary for them with regard to punishments. [Our] answer is that we deny that this is unnecessary with regard to punishment because 'contentment' (riḍā) is applied in two senses. First, the belief that an act is good. This meaning is shared by punishment and trial. Secondly, that the act should agree with desire (shahwa). This is not subject to capability and this is not obligatory either in trial or in punishment.[92]

Al-Ḥillī's ascription of this view to Abū l-Husayn al-Baṣrī is not verifiable. In his Fā'iq, Ibn al-Malāḥimī fails to mention the position of Abū l-Ḥusayn.

Al-Ḥillī further dealt with the situation where God could either cause a pain comprising a facilitating favour (luṭf) and compensate for it or cause a pleasure (ladhdha) containing the same facilitating favour. He held that it would be evil for God to choose the pain instead of the pleasure. Pain in combination with facilitation and

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[89] Ibid., 13:413-4, 431-2.
[90] Ibid., 13:435.
[91] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 135r.
[92] Kashf al-murād, 259-60.

compensation is only good if there is no alternative way to achieve the purpose without pain.[93] Here, al-Ḥillī adhered to the position of Ibn al-Malāḥimī[94] who stated that this view was also upheld by an unspecified group of Baghdadis.[95]

In contrast, Abū Hāshim had maintained that both options are equally admissible. God could in this case inflict pain instead of pleasure, since such pain would neither be unjust (zulm) nor futile (ᶜabath) as it was neutralized by a facilitating favour and compensation.[96]

Al-Ḥillī stipulated that the compensation (ᶜiwaḍ) God is obliged to render to the victim must be limited in duration (munqatiᶜ).[97] The same view was held by the Bahshamiyya[98] as well as by Ibn al-Malāḥimī.[99] Abū ᶜAlī, had initially maintained that compensation is unlimited in time. Later, he reviewed his position, maintaining that it is limited in time.[100]

In agreement with his Muᶜtazilite predecessors, al-Ḥillī maintained that God is obliged to compensate for pain which He either caused directly or which He had

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93 Manāhij, 98r.
94 Fā'iq, 137r.
95 Al-Mufīd who usually adopted the position of the school of Baghdad backed this position and reported that this view was held by many of the "people of justice;" see McDermott, 183.
96 Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 137r.
97 Manāhij, 98r.
98 Mānakdīm, 494.
99 Fā'iq, 138vff.
100 Mānakdīm, 494; ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 13:508; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 138v.

ordered,[101] madelicit,[102] orcausedthroughconstraint (iljā').[103] In addition, God is also obliged to compensate for pain caused by those who lack reason,[104] that is beasts, animals, the insane and children. Al-Ḥillī supported the latter view by pointing out that God enabled these to inflict pain while withholding from them reason (ᶜaql), which is needed to recognize that pain is evil. Yet it was possible for Him not to enable them to do evil.[105] Here, he followed the view of Ibn al-Malāḥimī[106] in preference to the view of the Bahshamiyya.

The debate originated with some followers of Abū ᶜAlī who maintained that God is obliged to compensate for every harm caused by such creatures because He created their appetites which drive them to commit this harm, while He did not give them reason which would enable them to distinguish between good and evil. According to Ibn al-Malāḥimī, they ascribed this view even to Abū ᶜAlī himself.[107] The Bahshamiyya, however, held that these creatures are in principle responsible for their own acts. Only when God compels them to commit evil does He have to compensate for the resulting harm.[108]

In regard to injustice inflicted by man upon another person, al-Ḥillī, in concord with his Muᶜtazilite predecessors, stipulated that the victim (maẓlūm) must be

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[101] Al-Ḥillī gives the example of slaughtering of a vowed sacrifice (dhabḥ al-mandhūr) (Manāhij, 98r) and of the offering during the minor pilgrimage (hady al-tamattuᶜ) (Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 279). For these examples, see Mānakdīm, 502.

[102] Manāhij, 98r. For this principle among earlier Muᶜtazilites, see ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 13:448ff, 452ff; Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Iqtiṣād, 89; idem, Tamhīd, 236.

[103] Taslīk, 67r. For this principle among earlier Muᶜtazilites, see Mānakdīm, 502; Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Iqtiṣād, 90; idem, Tamhīd, 237; ᶜAlam al-Hudā al-Murtaḍā, "Majmūᶜa fī funūn min ᶜilm al-kalām," in Nafā'is al-makhṭūṭāt, vol.5 (edited by Āl Yāsīn. Baghdad: al-Maᶜārif, 1955), 62-3.

[104] Manāhij, 98r; Taslīk, 67r.

[105] Manāhij, 98r; Taslīk, 67r.

[106] Fā'iq, 140r-v.

[107] Ibid., 140r-v. See also ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 13:475ff where Abū ᶜAlī's view is not mentioned.

[108] Ibid., 13:475.

compensated by the wrongdoer (ẓālim) in a proper way, just as it is when pain is inflicted by God upon man.[109] If no compensation is made on earth, justice must be restored (intiṣāf) in the hereafter by God who enabled men to commit injustice although He could have prevented it. If He failed to do so He would be acting unjustly.[110] This compensation is taken from that which the wrongdoer would have received for pain inflicted by God in this world. In this way, justice between a wrongdoer and his victim is secured.[111]

This principle gave rise to the question of what happens if the wrongdoer does not deserve sufficient compensation to recompense his victim. Al-Ḥillī presents the problem and surveys the views of the different theologians:

> Is it admissible that God enables a certain person to do wrong while this person does not own compensation exceeding his wrongdoing at the time he commits that wrongdoing? The author [Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī] denies this and the people of the truth disagreed about this. Abū Hāshim and al-Kaᶜbī held this to be possible [in principle]. However, they disagreed [in so far] as al-Kaᶜbī maintained that it is possible that [the wrongdoer] may die without owning compensation exceeding his injustice. God would render what is deserved out of generosity and give it to the victim. Abū Hāshim denied this possibility. God must rather prolong [the wrongdoer's] life because the restoration of justice is obligatory and generosity is not obligatory. It is therefore impossible to suspend the obligatory by the possible. Al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā said that the prolongation of the life is likewise a generosity and that therefore the restoration of justice cannot be connected with it. In his view, it is necessary that the compensation is owned [by the wrongdoer] at the time (fī l-ḥāl) [i.e. when the injustice is inflicted]. This is the choice of the author [Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī] according to what we have mentioned.[112]

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[109] Manāhij, 98r; Taslīk, 66v. For this notion among earlier Muᶜtazilites, see ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 13:483ff.

[110] Manāhij, 98r; for this principle among earlier Muᶜtazilites, see ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 13:472, 485, 526ff; Mānakdīm, 505.

[111] ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 13:486, 530; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 141v; Mānakdīm, 505.

[112] Kashf al-murād, 264; see also Manāhij, 98r.

Neither in this text nor in any of his other texts where he considered this problem, can a clear indication of his own position be found and it seems likely that he was undecided about this question. Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī who, like al-Ḥillī, usually followed the views of Ibn al-Malāḥimī or Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī in his theological works, did not do so in this case, but adopted the view of al-Murtaḍā. Ibn al-Malāḥimī adhered to the position of Abū l-Qāsim al-Kaᶜbī.[113] The position of al-Murtaḍā had apparently been upheld before him by Abū ᶜAlī.[114]

It seems that the difference between the position of Abū Hāshim and that of Abū ᶜAlī, al-Murtaḍā and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī was minor. Both rejected the Baghdadi admission that God may compensate the victim instead of the wrongdoer out of grace (tafaḍḍul)[115] on the basis that injustice can be compensated only by the wrongdoer. Since the restoration of justice may be deferred to the hereafter it is of minor importance whether the wrongdoer earns the compensation for his injustice prior to committing it, or whether he earns it later during his life.[116] The position of the Bahshamiyya may be viewed as a mere elaboration out of the doctrine ascribed to Abū ᶜAlī.

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[113] Fā'iq, 141vff.
[114] Khulāṣat al-naẓar (author unknown. MS Bibliothèque Nationale 1252), 36v-37r.
[115] See also ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 13:540.
[116] See e.g. ibid., 13:542.

One of the conclusions deriving from the Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilite view of divine justice is that man is the sole author of his acts. Since God does not commit any evil it must be man who produces his acts both good and evil.[117] Moreover, if man were not the author of his actions, God would be unjust in imposing moral obligation upon him and in rewarding and punishing him for them. Al-Ḥillī firmly adhered to this Mu$^{c}$tazilite principle.[118]

The Mu$^{c}$tazilites disagreed whether it is known compulsorily (bi-l-ḍarūra) or by deduction (bi-l-istidlāl) that man is the author of his actions. Al-Ḥillī reports the different views and states his own position:

> The second investigation [concerning] that we are the producers [of our actions]. Abū l-Husayn al-Basrī and a group [of Mu$^{c}$tazilites] argued that this is compulsory (ḍarūrī) [knowledge] and this is the truth in my view. A group among the Mu$^{c}$tazilites, some of the Imamites and the Zaydis maintained that this is acquired (kasbī) [knowledge]....What supports our view is that every reasonable person knows compulsorily (bi-l-ḍarūra) that it is good to praise for good action and evil to blame for it, and that it is good to blame for evil action. If our knowledge that the act originated from us were not compulsory, this [i.e. the knowledge that it is good to praise and to blame] would not be sound for us.[119]

The principal argument in this proof is that the fact that man is the author of his own actions is the necessary premise for the admissibility of his being praised and blamed for them. The connection between these two elements is based on the Mu$^{c}$tazilite notion of justice which affirms that someone can only be praised or blamed for a deed which he himself performed. Otherwise, the praise and blame would be

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[117] Mānakdīm, 345.
[118] Manāhij, 96v; Ma$^{c}$ārij, 122r.
[119] Manāhij, 96v; see also Taslīk, 63v-64r; Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 94v; Ma$^{c}$ārij, 122r.

undeserved and, as such, evil. Since it is compulsorily known that it is good to blame for wrongdoing and also good to praise for good actions, al-Ḥillī concluded that the premise for this, the knowledge that man is the author of his actions, must equally be known by compulsion.

As al-Ḥillī indicated, he shared this view with Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. Ibn al-Malāḥimī reports his master's reasoning and expresses his agreement:

> Our master Abū l-Ḥusayn said that knowledge of this [i.e. that man is the author of his actions] is compulsory and we choose this opinion. What proves by way of indication (*tanbīh*) that the rational men know by their minds that men are the authors of their actions is that they know compulsorily that it is good to blame and to praise men for them. The knowledge that it is good to blame and to praise them for [their acts] is a branch (*far*ᶜ) of the knowledge that they are the producers of [their acts] because it is impossible that they should know the branch compulsorily (*bi-l-idṭirār*) without knowing the root (*aṣl*) compulsorily.[120]

The alternative position to which al-Ḥillī alluded, that the knowledge of man's being the author of his actions is acquired, was maintained by the Bahshamiyya. They started off from the premise that man's actions depend upon his intention (*qaṣd*) and his motives (*dawā*ᶜ*ī*). This is known compulsorily. If the act were not performed by the one whose motives and intention it reflects, it would not be connected at all with him. This, however, is contrary to what is compulsorily known. ᶜAbd al-Jabbār explains:

> This [i.e. that man is the producer of his actions] is indicated by the fact that if [the action] did not occur on his part [i.e. the person whose intention the act reflects] it would follow that it has no connection with him. This would necessarily contradict our knowledge that his action must occur in accordance with his intention.[121]

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[120] *Fā'iq*, 70r.

[121] ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, *Mughnī*, 8:13; see also R.Frank, "The Autonomy of the Human Agent in the Teaching of ᶜAbd al-Ǧabbār," *Le Muséon* 95 (1982):326 n.7 for further references.

In al-Ḥillī's view, an act necessarily occurs when capability (qudra) and the motive (dāᶜī) for it exist together. To support his point, he employed the principle of causality as it derived from the philosophical tradition. An act is a contingent thing (mumkin) which must necessarily occur when the cause (ᶜilla) for its occurrence exists, which is the combination of power and motive. Al-Ḥillī explains:

> The act is contingent in regard to itself (bi-l-nazar ilā dhātihi) and necessary (wājib) in regard to its cause (bi-l-nazar ila ᶜillatihi). The cause (ᶜilla) of every contingent which depends upon a capable agent (qādir) is completed by the medium of capability (qudra) and motive (dāᶜī). When they are present the means (sabab) is complete, and when the means is complete the existence is necessary.[122]

Power without a motive attached to it is therefore mere potential efficacy which becomes actual as soon as it is joined with a motive. The function of the motive is described as that of the preponderator which necessitates the act (al-murajjiḥ al-mūjib li-l-fiᶜl).[123]

This requirement of both power and motive for the occurrence of an act applied, in al-Ḥillī's view, to both God and man. While he defined a motive in regard to God as knowledge that a certain act is either purely good or beneficial for someone else without comprising any harm,[124] he allowed that man's motive may be his knowledge, his belief (iᶜtiqād) or his presumption (ẓann) that the act contains a benefit either for himself or for another person.[125]

Having produced a motive for a specific act, man develops a longing (shawq) or inclination (mayl) towards it which is his will (irāda) for it.[126] This longing occurs owing

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[122] Kashf al-murād, 237.
[123] Manāhij, 96v; Maᶜārij, 117r.
[124] Manāhij, 98v.
[125] Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Mutahhar al-Ḥillī, Istiqsā' al-nazar fī 'l-qadā' wa-l-qadar (edited by ᶜAlī Khāqānī al-Najafī. Najaf, 1354/1935), 32-3; Taslīk, 31r.
[126] Ḥasan b. Yūsuf b. al-Mutahhar, al-Asrār al-khafiyya fī l-ᶜulūm al-ᶜaqliyya (MS Bankipore 2384), 223 v; Manāhij, 87v, 91v; Taslīk, 31r.

to man's imperfect nature.[127] Since God, because of His self-sufficiency, does not share this characteristic there exists no will in addition to His motive.[128]

With regard to man, al-Ḥillī often treated motive and will as equivalent, describing both as the preponderator (murajjiḥ) for the action.[129]

His notion of the condition for man's acts to occur is largely based on the views of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. According to this school an action cannot occur but for a motive joined to power. Ibn al-Malāḥimī states:

> The capacity is attached to two opposites in such a way that the existence of both is possible.... Neither of the two occurs but for something which specifies (amr mukhaṣṣiṣ) the capacity to produce it. This is the motive (dāᶜī) and this [motive] is a condition for the capacity to effect one of the two [opposites].[130]

The followers of this school distinguished therefore between two meanings of efficacy (ṣiḥḥa) for capacity. Power without a motive attached to it is potentially efficacious either to produce or not to produce an act. As such, it is defined as the mere denial of the impossibility either to produce or not to produce.[131] The actuality of the efficacy to produce a specific act requires the motive attached to it as a further condition (sharṭ).[132]

The function of the motive is described as that of a preponderator; because of this motive a certain act preponderates over another. Taqī al-Dīn states:

> The reality of a capable agent (ḥaqīqat al-qādir) is that doing and failing to do the act and its opposite are equal in so far as he is capable. It

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[127] Asrār, 223v.
[128] Manāhij, 88r; Taslīk, 31r; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 118.
[129] E.g. Taslīk, 24v; Nahj al-Mustarshidīn, 118 where will is called the specificator (mukhaṣṣiṣ) or preponderator. Also Manāhij, 88r where will is said to necessitate the act (irāda mūjiba) when the power for the act exists.
[130] Fā'iq, 122v; see also Muᶜtamad, 510.
[131] Ibid., 184, 229, 511.
[132] Ibid., 229, 511; Fā'iq, 71r, 122v.

is therefore inevitable that the choice of one of the two [alternatives] is caused to preponderate in regard to him by the motive.[133]

Like al-Ḥillī, the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn regarded this principle as valid with regard to man and God.[134] There was disagreement however, whether will (irāda) in regard to man is identical with his motive or not. Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī held the latter view. Since man is a corporeal being he feels for the action for which he is motivated a pleasure (masarra) or longing (ṭalab/ṭaliba) which is his will for this deed.[135] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, in contrast, held that will with regard to both man and God is identical with the motive.[136]

The position of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī was in conflict with that of the Bahshamiyya on a number of points.[137] The latter maintained that power is the efficacy to act and that it is sufficient as such to produce an act even without a motive.[138] Examples for this are the category of unconscious acts,[139] such as the movement of a sleeper[140] or the action of an inattentative agent (sāhī)[141] who acts without

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[133]Taqī al-Dīn, 55; see also Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 17r; idem, Mu^c^tamad, 510. It is noteworthy that Taqī al-Dīn's exposition is not entirely coherent. The opposite of the act in the present discussion is normally considered to be failure to perform it. Taqī al-Dīn's second juxtaposition of "the act and its opposite" is therefore redundant.

[134]See e.g. Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 69r-v, 146r-v where this principle is applied to God.

[135]Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Mu^c^tamad, 240-1, 249; idem, Fā'iq, 22r; Taqī al-Dīn, 221.

[136]Mu^c^tamad, 249; Fā'iq, 22r; Taqī al-Dīn, 220.

[137]For the position of the Bahshamiyya on human actions, see generally Frank, "Autonomy," 323-355; Gimaret, Théories, 39ff. The two authors differ in their conclusions.

[138]R.Frank, Beings and Their Attributes: The Teaching of the Basrian School of the Mu^c^tazila in the Classical Period (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1978), 127 (quoting Abū Rashīd); Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Mu^c^tamad, 510ff.

[139]^c^Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 8:48ff.

[140]Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Mu^c^tamad, 511-2.

[141]Mānakdīm, 337; Abū Muhammad b. Mattawayh, Kitāb majmū^c^ fī l-muḥīt bi-l-taklīf (volume 1. Edited by J.J.Houben as a work of ^c^Abd al-Jabbār. Recherches. Série 1: Pensée arabe et musulmane, vol.25. Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1965. Volume 2. Edited by J.J.Houben and D.Gimaret. Recherches.

apparent motive. Abū l-Ḥusayn and his followers argued that even in such cases there is a motive although the agent does not realize it.[142] The Bahshamiyya apparently considered further futile (ᶜabath) acts to be produced for no motive although the producer acts in a state of consciousness.

Beside these two categories, according to the Bahshamiyya, are the acts that man would not do but for a motive.[143] Although they asserted that motives have an effect upon man's actions,[144] they denied any causal relation between motive and action.[145] Having a motive for an action rather means that man has a better reason to perform it than its opposite. There is no need for a motive, contrary to the view of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, to turn power from potential into actual efficacy to produce a specific action. ᶜAbd al-Jabbār states:

> Motivations are not determinant causes (mūjibāt) but rather they entail (yaqtaḍī) simply that the given action is more appropriate (awlā) than another to be chosen by the one who is able to act.[146]

The view of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī that power cannot produce an effect but for a preponderator, and that with the existence of a preponderator the action necessarily occurs has therefore no parallel among the Bahshamiyya. It is very likely that Abū l-Ḥusayn

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Nouvelle Série: A.Langue arabe et pensée islamique, vol.12. Beirut: Dar el-Machreq, 1981), 1:364; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Muᶜtamad, 511.

[142] Ibid., 511-2.

[143] ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 6/1:186-7; 6/2:109. As Ibn Mattawayh points out (Majmūᶜ, 1:364), this category is divided into two types. When the force of the motive is overwhelming man acts under impulsion (iljā'). Otherwise, he can evaluate his different motives and choose among them. For the notion of impulsion, see D.Gimaret, "La Notion d''impulsion irrésistible' (ilǧa') dans l'éthique mu'tazilite," Journal Asiatique 259 (1971):25-62; M.Schwarz, "Some Notes on the Notion of Iljā' (Constraint) in Mu'tazilite Kalām" Israel Oriental Studies 2 (1972):413-427.

[144] ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 6/1:99.

[145] Ibid., 6/1:189. See also Frank, "Autonomy," 341ff.

[146] Mughnī, 9:93 (translated in Frank, "Autonomy," 348).

al-Basrī was under the influence of Ibn Sīnā when he affirmed that power requires a preponderator (murajjih) in order to produce an action.[147]

The Bahshamiyya asserted, moreover, a meaning of will (irāda) which substantially differed from Abu l-Husayn's notion.

They held that simultaneouly with the motive, a will arises in man through which he is in a state (hāl) of being willing.[148] This state has an effect upon the act in so far as it occurs in a specific manner (wajh).[149] A sleeper, for instance, may utter words without any motive. He is therefore not willing and his words are a simple sequence of words. Someone who has the motive to issue a command (amr) is simultaneously in a state of being willing to command. He therefore utters a certain sequence of words because of his motives, and owing to his state of being willing this sequence has the specific characteristic of a command.[150] In this case, his action is defined as an intentional act.

Al-Hillī agreed with the views of Abū l-Husayn al-Basrī and his followers concerning human acts wherever they were at variance with those of the Bahshamiyya. In comparison with the school of Abū l-Husayn al-Basrī, however, he employed philosophical terminology much more extensively. This difference most likely resulted from the impact of al-Rāzī's notion of human acts which is largely similar to, and most likely based upon, that of the school of Abū l-Husayn but which employed philosophical terminology to a greater extent.

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[147]See e.g. Abū cAlī b. Sīnā, Taclīqāt (in the recension of Bahmanyār b. Marzubān. Edited by cAbd al-Rahmān al-Badawī. Cairo: al-Maktaba al-carabiyya, 1392/1973), 20, 50, 51 where Ibn Sīnā puts forth a notion of human action which bears striking similarity to the notion of Abū l-Husayn.
[148]For the notion of states (ahwāl) according to the Bahshamiyya, see later.
[149]Al-Nīsābūrī, Masā'il, 352-3, 363.
[150]Ibid., 363.

Al-Rāzī maintained[151] that power, without a motive joined to it, is potentially efficacious for an act and its opposite, both of which are equally contingent. However, it is not actually efficacious to produce one act rather than the other.[152] If a motive for a specific act is joined to it, this act necessarily occurs (wājib al-wuqūᶜ) while its opposite becomes impossible (mumtaniᶜ al-wuqūᶜ). He states:

> The occurrence of the act after the coming together of power and motive (majmūᶜ al-qudra maᶜ l-dāᶜī) is necessary (wājib). This is so because (for) the capable, in so far as he is capable, the action instead of failure to perform it and vice versa is possible. With the occurrence of this equality (istiwā') the preponderance of one of the two sides over the other is impossible. If the occurrence of a motive is attached to it, the preponderance of the side of existence occurs. With this, the act must necessarily occur (wājib al-wuqūᶜ). This is the view we have chosen.[153]

Once the motive is joined to power, the cause for the act is the combination (majmūᶜ) of power and motive.[154] Al-Ḥillī agreed with al-Rāzī on this point when he maintained that power and motive together are the cause (ᶜilla) for the occurrence of the act.[155] Here, they differed from Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and his school who defined the motive as only a condition (sharṭ) for the power to turn from potentiality into actuality. The effector (mu'aththir) of the act is only power.[156] This disagreement was minor as all agreed that the act must occur whenever power and motive are present and that it cannot occur when either of the two elements is not present.

In regard to the motive itself, al-Rāzī denied that man might act for the sake of pure goodness (dāᶜiyat al-iḥsān).[157] Al-Ḥillī as a Muᶜtazilite disagreed with al-Rāzī on this

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[151]His doctrine on man's actions has been investigated by Gimaret; see his Théories, 134ff.
[152]Maṭālib, 3:10, 41, 45ff, 55.
[153]Ibid., 9:11. See also Gimaret, Théories, 140ff.
[154]Maᶜālim, 83; Maṭālib, 3:10, 55ff, 73; 9:9.
[155]Al-Rāzī, Maṭālib, 3:10-1; al-Ḥillī, Kashf al-murād, 237.
[156]See also Maṭālib, 3:10-1.
[157]Ibid., 3:21, 65ff.

point. Every action, according to al-Rāzī, is performed because the agent knows, believes, or presumes that it comprises a benefit for himself.[158] This view rests on his notion of rational good and evil which does not include any objective standards.

In addition to the motive and the deterrent, al-Rāzī asserted the reality of will (irāda). As soon as a motive for a certain act occurs in man, he develops a longing (mayl/shawq) for it which is his will (irāda) or decisive decision (ijmā^c jāzim) for the action.[159] Al-Ḥillī's identical terminology to describe man's will was most likely directly adopted from al-Rāzī. Like al-Ḥillī, al-Rāzī also treated will and motive as equivalent when he described either as the preponderator of the act.[160]

Having explained how a human action occurs, al-Rāzī's main concern was to show that man's acts are created by God. With this he supported the Ash^carite view that God is the sole creator of everything which occurs. Man, according to this view, therefore cannot be the producer of his acts. Al-Rāzī started off from the assumption that man's power cannot produce an effect unless a motive is attached to it. Basing his argumentation on the philosophical principle that every contingent needs a cause other than itself and that anything contingent must ultimately be caused by God, the Necessary Existent, al-Rāzī argued that man's motives cannot be produced by himself who is also contingent. They must, therefore, be caused by a Necessary Existence which is God. Al-Rāzī states:

> If the capability is valid both for the act and for failure to perform it, the preponderance of one of the two sides over the other depends either on a preponderator or not. If it depends on a preponderator [reading murajjih for tarajjuh], this preponderator derives either from God or from man, or without an effector.

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[158] Ibid., 9:39.
[159] Ibid., 3:175; 9:40. See also Gimaret, Théories, 146-7.
[160] See ibid., 146.

> In the first case, the act is necessary when the motive occurs and impossible without it, and this is what we wanted to show. If it came from man...the creation of this motive would need another motive and this would necessarily lead to an endless chain. If this motive existed without an effector...this would mean that the contingent does not need an effector. This would necessarily imply the negation of the creator.[161]

Man's motives are therefore created by God either directly or through intermediaries.[162]

On the basis of this assumption, al-Rāzī concluded that although man appears to be a choosing agent as he acts in accordance with his motives, he is in reality compelled in all his actions (mudṭarr fī ṣūrat mukhtār)[163] since his motives do not originate from him. This conclusion was in direct opposition to al-Ḥillī's view of man's free choice.

With this notion of the occurrence of man's actions, al-Rāzī deviated substantially from the traditional Ashᶜarite view of human acts.[164] It is most likely that he adopted Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī's basic notion of man's acts in order to launch an attack against the Muᶜtazilite view of man's free choice. He argued that the view that an act must necessarily occur when the motive for it is attached to power, entails a necessity in action which is incompatible with the Muᶜtazilite notion of free choice. The agent must either act when he has the motive to do so, or it is impossible for him to act in the absence of a motive. Thus free choice has no longer any meaning. Rather, the theory of Abū l-Ḥusayn on human action supports the view that all of man's acts are performed under compulsion. Al-Rāzī concludes:

> It is astonishing that Abū l-Ḥusayn disagreed with his companions in regard to their doctrine that the act of someone capable of two opposites doing one of them but not the other does not depend on a preponderator. Rather, he claimed that it is

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[161] Maᶜālim, 78-9; see also Maṭālib, 3:73.
[162] See ibid., 3:73; 9:13, 42-3; Tafsīr, vol.3, pt.6:220; vol.7, pt.13:15, 128, 197; vol.8, pt.16:23.
[163] E.g. ibid., vol.4, pt.7:142; vol.7, pt.13:89.
[164] See Gimaret, Théories, 138ff.

> necessarily known that this [i.e. the act] depends on the motive. Moreover, he claimed that the occurrence of the action following the motive is necessary. Acknowledging these two premises, he is forced to accept that man is not the author of his act as is our doctrine.[165]

In an attempt to refute al-Rāzī's conclusion, al-Ḥillī correctly pointed out that the same conclusion must apply to God. Since He, too, acts necessarily when He has the motive to do so, He would equally have to be compelled in His acts.[166] Al-Ḥillī's objection is a very serious one. Gimaret pointed out[167] that al-Rāzī was in fact confronted with this objection and that he was unable to offer a satisfactory answer to it.

Al-Rāzī's notion of man's actions and his conclusion that man is compelled in all his actions did not originate with him. The same argument had been presented by Ibn Sīnā whose views on man's actions bear a striking similarity to al-Rāzī's position. In his view, man's power can only effect an act when a motive or a will is attached to it which makes one act preponderate over another.[168] This motive for the act cannot originate from man but comes to him from outside himself (wārid min al-khārij). Therefore it must ultimately have been ordained by God (bi-l-taqdīr min Allāh).[169] Ibn Sīnā drew the same conclusion as al-Rāzī that although man may believe that he is a choosing agent, he is in reality compelled in all his actions (mukhtār fī ḥukm muḍṭarr).[170]

Among al-Rāzī's Ash^c^arite predecessors al-Ghazālī supported a similar view on man's acts in some of his works which led him to the formulation that man is "compelled to choose" (majbūr ^c^alā l-ikhtiyār).[171]

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[165] Al-Jurjānī, 111 (quoting from al-Rāzī's Nihāyat al-^c^uqūl); see also al-Rāzī, Arba^c^īn, 227.
[166] Manāhij, 96v.
[167] Théories, 149ff.
[168] Ibn Sīnā, Ta^c^līqāt, 20.
[169] Ibid., 20.
[170] Ibid., 50, 51, 53.
[171] See B.Abrahamov, "Al-Ghazali's Theory on Causality," Studia Islamica 67 (1988):75-98.

# CHAPTER IV
## PROPHECY

### 1.Purpose of the Mission

On the basis of his view of divine justice, al-Ḥillī disagreed with al-Rāzī about the purpose of the mission of prophets in every respect. Al-Ḥillī upheld the Mu^ctazilite view that man rationally knows ethical values in a general way. Man moreover knows that it is blameworthy to do evil and worthy of praise to do good, but not that God will punish evildoers and reward the obedient in accordance with their actions in the hereafter. Furthermore, besides the acts whose moral value is known to man by reason, there are some which will either hinder or help man to fulfil his moral obligation. Man is not able to discern their value by reason. God therefore dispatches prophets in order to reveal these things to man.[1] With this view, al-Ḥillī followed his Mu^ctazilite predecessors.[2] He states:

> As for the benefits (fawā'id) it [i.e. the mission of the prophets] contains, there are different aspects. First, they [i.e. the prophets] bring certain notification about the occurrence of punishment and reward; because reason points to the desert but not to its actual occurrence. And there is no doubt that this notification contains a benefit by abstention [of the morally obliged] from committing sins; second, reason admits [omitting ba^cd which is redundant] that some of our acts may be beneficial for us and [that they may be] a motive for doing what we are morally obliged to do by reason like fasting and [performing] the prayer; and [it admits] that some of our states may be [harmful] [word missing] for us [like] the drinking of wine. Thus, it is beneficial for us that He should inform us of these benefits and harms through the tongue of someone of our kind;...there are things which are good in themselves yet we do not know their goodness and other things which are

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[1] Taslīk, 68v.
[2] See Mānakdīm, 564ff; ^cAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 6/1:64-5; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 149r-v; al-Murtaḍā, "Majmū^ca," 64; Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Iqtiṣād, 152-3; idem, Tamhīd, 313.

evil while we do not know their evil nature. There must therefore inevitably be a prophet through whom this can be learned.[3]

In agreement with the Ash^c^arite tradition, al-Rāzī considered God as the sole lawgiver. Thus, revelation has the purpose to inform man of what God has determined by His will to be good or to be evil.[4]

Besides the basic purpose of uncovering certain truths to men, al-Ḥillī counted among the additional benefits coming from the mission of prophets their task of confirming what is already known by reason. He states:

> Rational knowledge such as the [doctrine of] unity and the [divine attributes of] knowledge and power are acquired in accordance with reason. With regard to it, revelation has the purpose of confirming [reading li-l-ta'kīd for al-ta'kīd].[5]

The earlier Mu^c^tazilites disagreed as to whether a prophet may be dispatched only to confirm what is already known by reason. Abū ^c^Alī considered such a mission as beneficial.[6] This view was shared by al-Murtaḍā and Shaykh al-Ṭūsī.[7] Abū Hāshim and his followers disagreed. They argued that prophetic mission is only beneficial when it conveys something supplementary to reason. Otherwise, it would be futile (^c^abath) and thus evil.[8]

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[3]Manāhij, 98v; see also Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 101v; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 296.

[4]Arba^c^īn, 328.

[5]Manāhij, 98v; see also Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 101v. For further benefits of the prophetic mission, see Manāhij, 98v.

[6]Al-Jurjānī, 182.

[7]Al-Murtaḍā, "Majmū^c^a," 64; Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Tamhīd, 313. Al-Murtaḍā and Shaykh al-Ṭūsī further allowed that there is a benefit in the mission when a prophet teaches men such matters as languages or the difference between lethal drugs and healthy food which could likewise be known by reason or experience (ibid.). The same view was held by Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī; see al-Qāsim b. Aḥmad al-Muḥallī, Ta^c^līq ^c^alā sharḥ al-imām al-mashhūr bi-Mānakdīm alladhī sharaha bihi al-uṣūl al-khamsa li-Qāḍī al-quḍāt ^c^Abd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad (MS Ambrosiana F192), 174r.

[8]^c^Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 15:20-1; al-Jurjānī, 182. For this disagreement, see also Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 162r-v. Here, Ibn al-Malāḥimī refrains from indicating his own position on this issue.

On account of his view on divine justice, al-Ḥillī argued that God is obliged to send a prophet. Having imposed a moral obligation (taklīf) upon man, He must render him every possible assistance to enable him to fulfil his obligation. The mission of prophets belongs to this category of assistance. He states:

> Concerning the necessity (wujūb) of the mission: the Muʿtazila agreed upon this....Our proof is that it contains a favour (luṭf) in regard to the moral obligation by reason and by revelation (taklīf ʿaqlī wa-samʿī), and a favour is obligatory according to what has previously [been said]. Thus, prophecy is obligatory [upon God].[9]

This argument was traditionally put forth by the Muʿtazilites.[10]

Al-Ḥillī further argued for the obligatoriness of the mission on the basis of his theory of acts. God does by necessity a beneficial act whenever He has the motive for it. A motive for God is His knowledge that a specific act is beneficial and does not contain any harm. Since the mission of prophets is purely beneficial, God must necessarily arrange it. He argues:

> Moreover, when the power and the motive are realized, the mission is obligatory....As for the motive, it [i.e. revelation] contains an aspect of benefit and no evil aspect. As for the former, [the benefit] is the purpose; as for the latter, because the aspects of evil are limited in our view and none of them is established here.[11]

Al-Ḥillī had adopted the basis for this second proof, that is that God must necessarily act whenever He has the motive to do so, from Ibn al-Malāḥimī. It is, however, noteworthy, that the latter did not refer to this principle when he argued for God's obligation to dispatch a prophet. He rather restricted his reasoning to the traditional Muʿtazilite argument.[12]

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[9] Manāhij, 98v; see also Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 101v; Taslīk, 69r; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 296.
[10] Mānakdīm, 564; ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 15:50ff; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 150r; Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Iqtiṣād, 153; idem, Tamhīd, 313; Mītham al-Baḥrānī, 124.
[11] Manāhij, 98v.
[12] Fā'iq, 150r-151r.

Al-Rāzī denied any obligation for God. Arguing against the philosophers who maintained that God is obliged to send a prophet because of His providence (ᶜināya), he states:

> If you mean by necessity (wujūb) when you say "since men need a lawgiver, his existence is necessary" essential necessity (wujūb dhātī), that is impossible. If you mean by it that it is obligatory for God, like the Muᶜtazilites say, that is not [in accordance with] your school doctrine. If you mean by it that it is obligatory on His part because it is a cause of order which is a kind of good, and God is the origin (mabda') of every good, this is likewise wrong because the most beneficial (aṣlaḥ) does not necessarily exist. Otherwise all people would be created innately good since this is the most beneficial.[13]

Since he adhered to the traditional Ashᶜarite notion that God acts only in accordance with His will, al-Rāzī presumably agreed with his predecessors that God might perfectly well not have sent any messenger if He had willed not to do so.[14]

The two theologians furthermore differed on whether the mission of prophets conveys benefits for all men. Al-Ḥillī adhered to the Muᶜtazilite view that God created man and put him under moral obligation for his own benefit. Since man is the producer of his acts he is able to choose either to fulfil or not to fulfil his moral obligation. Revelation is a favour rendered by God equally to all morally obliged which is intended to assist them in this task. Whether they will accept it or not depends entirely on themselves.[15]

Although al-Rāzī claimed that the mission of the prophets is a beneficial act (iḥsān) on the part of God,[16] he categorically denied that God acts for the purpose of man's

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[13]Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Sharḥ al-Ishārāt (Cairo, 1325H.), 2:107-8. Yet in his early philosophical work al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqiyya fī ᶜilm al-ilāhiyyāt wa-l-ṭabīᶜiyyāt (Hyderabad: Dā'irat al-maᶜārif al-ᶜuthmāniyya, 1343H.), 2:523-4, al-Rāzī asserts that God is obliged to dispatch a prophet because of His providence (ᶜināya).
[14]For this Ashᶜarite view, see Ibn Fūrak, 174-5.
[15]Manāhij, 97v.
[16]Tafsīr, vol.5, pt.9:80.

benefit. Moreover, God determines through His will who will be punished in hell and who will be in heaven in the hereafter. Man has no influence upon his eventual fate as he is not the producer of his acts. On the basis of this predestinarian view, al-Rāzī maintained that the mission is beneficial only for the faithful whom God wants to lead towards belief and piety. He states:

> We observe two people who listen to the summons (da^c^wa) of the prophet in the same session by the same word. The speech turns in regard to one of them into a cause (sabab) to obtain guidance and longing and desire [for the true faith]; in regard to the other it turns into a cause of increased impertinence and presumption and to further aversion. It should not be said that this aversion and desire occur through the choice of the morally-obliged. This would be an arbitrary negation of what is perceived because the person who developed aversion finds his heart as if it were compelled (mudṭarr) towards this aversion; and the person who developed the desire finds his heart as if it were compelled towards the desire. When aversion occurs, rebelliousness and opposition necessarily follow. If desire occurs submission and obedience necessarily follow. We know therefore that the fact that the hearing of the summons leads to a desire in regard to one person which necessitates obedience and submissiveness, and to an aversion in regard to the other which necessitates rebelliousness and insubordination is in accordance with God's decision and decree (bi-qaḍā' Allāh wa-qadarihi).[17]

This notion is characteristic of the Ash^c^arite view of the purpose of prophecy.[18] Maimonides correctly observed that in the Ash^c^arite view revelation is in principle useless. Those for whom God has determined a fate in heaven will get there, regardless of whether God sends them a prophet or not.

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[17] Tafsīr, vol.15, pt.30:135-6.

[18] See e.g. Ibn Fūrak (175): "And he [i.e. al-Ash^c^arī] used to say: the benefit of the mission is for man. [God] seeks through [the mission] the benefit of him whom He knows will accept the mission. For the man about whom He knows he will not accept the mission, He seeks through [the mission] his ruin (halāk) and corruption (fasād)...thus what He wanted when He created them will be accomplished in accordance with what is known about what they will be, as far as good and evil, obedience and sin, happiness (sa^c^āda) and misery (shaqāwa) is concerned."

Those who are predestined to be punished eternally do not need revelation, since they are unable to act in accordance with the rules laid down by it.[19]

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[19]Moses Maimonides states (The Guide of the Perplexed (translated with an Introduction and Notes by S.Pines. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1963), 467): "It also follows necessarily from this opinion that what the Laws entail is quite useless; for man for whose benefit every law has come, has not the ability to do anything either to fulfil what he has been commanded or to avoid what he has been forbidden."

2.The Impeccability ($^{c}$Isma) of Prophets

Al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī agreed that a prophet must be impeccable. They disagreed, however, about the extent of this immunity. Al-Ḥillī stipulated that the prophets must not commit grave or light sins either before or after their mission. He states:

> The acts of prophets are of four types. First, [the type] of religious belief; secondly, their religious actions; thirdly, delivery of rules and transmission of laws; fourthly, the actions which are attached to them in world[ly matters]. As for the first part, the rational people are agreed that error in it is not possible [for them]....In regard to the second category, people disagreed. Some allowed that they may commit major sins while others denied this allowing, however, the commission of minor sins. The Imamites denied [that the prophets may commit a sin] in either of the two categories be it intentionally or by inadvertance, before and after the mission. As for the third category, all parties agreed that error is impossible [both] intentionally and by inadvertance. As for the fourth category, most people allowed that inadvertance may occur on their part. The Imamites denied this and this is the truth.[20]

Although al-Ḥillī presented his own position as being generally accepted by the Imamites, the first Shi$^{c}$ite theologian who maintained this strict view was in fact al-Murtaḍā.[21] Their position was at variance with the view of the Mu$^{c}$tazilites who allowed that prophets may commit minor

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[20]Ma$^{c}$ārij, 124v; see also Manāhij, 99v; Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 102r-v; Taslīk, 69v-70r; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 303.

[21]Hishām b. al-Ḥakam (d. 179/796) held prophets, in contrast to Imams, not to be protected from sins, mistakes or negligence (al-Ash$^{c}$arī, Maqālāt, 48). Although Ibn Babūyāh maintained that prophets are prevented from grave and small sins as well as from defilement (danas), he allowed that they may be distracted from prayer (see McDermott, 356-8). Al-Mufīd denied this but allowed that prophets other than Muhammad may commit small sins which do not bring any discredit upon them (ibid., 100-1).

sins.[22] As al-Murtaḍā pointed out,[23] the Mu$^c$tazilite position rested on the principle of mutual cancellation (*iḥbāṭ*).[24] Punishment which is deserved for minor sins is automatically cancelled out by deserved praise exceeding it; thus, the commission of minor sins would not bring any discredit upon them. Since al-Ḥillī and al-Murtaḍā denied mutual cancellation, they could not allow that prophets may commit any sin because they would deserve blame and punishment for it.

Al-Rāzī held that the prophets are infallible in their beliefs; in the transmission of the divine message and in their judgement of matters of religious law they are free from any error, whether intentional or not.[25] This, he says, had been generally agreed among the Ash$^c$arites.[26] It appears, however, that this statement is not correct. Al-Bāqillānī allowed that prophets may commit errors inadvertently or through forgetfulness in the transmission of the message to mankind.[27] When al-Rāzī admitted that they may unintentionally commit minor sins after their mission and grave sins before their mission,[28] he was in agreement with his Ash$^c$arite predecessors.[29]

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[22]Al-Ash$^c$arī, *Maqālāt*, 226; Mānakdīm, 575ff; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Fā'iq*, 151r; see also McDermott, 99.
[23]cAlam al-Hudā al-Murtaḍā, *Tanzīh al-anbiyā'* (edited by Muḥammad Ṣādiq al-Kātibī. Najaf: al-Ḥaydariyya, 1961), 34; see also McDermott, 385-6.
[24]For this principle, see later.
[25]*Arba$^c$īn*, 329; *Tafsīr*, vol.9, pt.17:200-1.
[26]*Arba$^c$īn*, 329.
[27]Al-Jurjānī, 218; Ibn Mūsā al-Yaḥṣubī al-Andalusī al-Qāḍī $^c$Iyāḍ, *Kitāb al-shifā' bi-ta$^c$rīf ḥuqūq al-Muṣṭafā* (edited by Muḥammad Amīn $^c$Alī et al. Damascus, 1972), 2:286.
[28]*Arba$^c$īn*, 330; *Tafsīr*, vol.2, pt.3:8; *$^c$Iṣmat al-anbiyā'* (Homs: al-Islāmiyya, 1969), 3.
[29]E.g. $^c$Abd al-Qāhir b. Ṭāhir al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl al-dīn* (Beirut: Dār al-āfāq al-jadīda, 1401/1981), 167-8; an exception was Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāyīnī who held a much wider extent of impeccability; see W.Madelung, "Al-Isfarāyīnī," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 4:108.

Al-Ḥillī further differed from al-Rāzī in his understanding of impeccability.

Al-Rāzī maintained that a prophet becomes impeccable when God creates for him the motive to obey and not to commit sin. A prophet acts subsequently by necessity in accordance with this preponderating motive.[30] Thus, in accordance with al-Rāzī's notion of man's actions, the prophet is compelled to obey and not to commit a sin. The personal character of the prophet is therefore irrelevant. His view agreed with the traditional Ash<sup>c</sup>arite position that impeccability does not rest on the prophet's quality but on the fact that God does not create for him the power (qudra) to commit a sin.[31]

Al-Ḥillī, in contrast, defined impeccability as a facilitating favour (luṭf) rendered by God because of which the prophet has a motive not to commit a sin. It is, however, the messenger himself who develops the motive not to commit sins. Thus, it is not through constraint from God but owing to the prophet's personal quality that he abstains from committing sins. Al-Ḥillī states this principle and envisages three possibilities why a prophet would abstain from committing a sin:

> Impeccability is a personal quality (kayfiyya nafsaniyya) which induces [its owner] to adhere to obedience and to abstain from committing sins although he has the power for its opposite and although the occurrence of contrary acts from him is possible. It is inadmissible that he is constrained in the act of obedience and in the omission of the act of disobedience. Otherwise [his] desert for reward and punishment would be negated and it would necessarily have to follow what [Muhanna' b. Sinān] - may God prolong his life - said in his question that one of us would deserve more reward than the prophet. This is false by consensus.
> There is no doubt that the prophet is equal to the common people as regards power (qudra) and capacity (mukna) and it may be that he receives a facilitation (luṭf) from God which exceeds those that other morally obliged persons receive. That facilitation is a favour (tafaḍḍul) from God. It is not incumbent upon God. And it is not obligatory

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[30] Tafsīr, vol.11, pt.21:23.
[31] Ibn Fūrak, 109, 122-3; al-Ash<sup>c</sup>arī, "Risāla," 100; al-Jurjānī, 236; al-Baghdādī, Uṣūl al-dīn, 169.

that others share this [favour] with him. It is also possible that the reason for the specification of the facilitation is God's knowledge that the locus [i.e. the prophet] will accept it while another will not. Or it [i.e. the impeccability] can come from themselves in so far as they do not choose disobedience although they have the power for it. Disobedience cannot issue from them because of the abundance of their reason, the plentitude of their knowledge, their persistence in thinking and reasoning and their perseverence in obedience, in contrast to others of mankind.[32]

Al-Ḥillī's view was in agreement with the position of the Muᶜtazilites who equally maintained that the prophet is not prevented from committing a sin, as the Ashᶜarites said, but rather abstains from it.[33]

Al-Ḥillī argued for the impeccability of the prophets on the basis of divine justice. The mission of the prophets is a facilitation by God to mankind which He is obliged to render and which is intended to serve man's benefit. Its desired effect can only be achieved if men accept the prophet and his statements as the commandments of God. If the prophets were to commit sins, men would not trust their statements. This would contravene God's purpose and to allow it would be evil on His part; therefore it is impossible. He states:

> And the proof for the doctrine of the Imamites is that if God were to send somebody who is not impeccable, this would contravene His aim; the consequence is false and likewise the premise. The explanation of the conditional sentence is that the purpose of the mission is the acquisition of reward (thawāb) by obedience to their [i.e. the prophets] orders. This can only be accomplished when men trust their statements. This can only happen after knowledge that sin does not issue from them. Moreover, if he were not impeccable, it would be possible that he ordered what he was not commanded to order or that he failed [to mention] some parts of the law.[34]

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[32] Ajwiba, 74.

[33] ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 13:17; ᶜAlam al-Hudā al-Murtaḍā, Amālī al-Murtaḍā (edited by M.Abū Faḍl Ibrāhīm. Cairo: ᶜĪsā al-Halabī, 1954), 2:347.

[34] Manāhij, 100r; see also Maᶜārij, 124v; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 300.

The same argumentation was traditionally employed by the Mu^c^tazilites.[35]

Al-Ḥillī further supported his view by a number of arguments which do not rest on his Mu^c^tazilite concept of justice. None of these proofs were employed by the Mu^c^tazilites. He says:

> If they were to commit a sin they would be on a lower rank than common people because their punishment would be harder on account of their knowledge about God being more complete. The conclusion is false by agreement and therefore is the premise. Moreover, if they were to commit a sin their testimony (shahāda) would no longer be accepted [reading maqbūlī al-shahāda for maqbūlīn al-shahāda] [by God] because of His words 'if an ungodly man comes to you with a report, investigate' [Qur'an XLIX:6]. Moreover, it would be obligatory [for men] to rebuke them for sinning. Thus, it would not be forbidden to hurt them [reading īdhā'uhum for ايذاؤهم ] [referring to Qur'an XXXIII:57]. Moreover, it would be obligatory not to follow them. The conclusion is false and therefore also the premise.[36]

In order to support his thesis of the impeccability of prophets, al-Rāzī offered a list of fifteen proofs. These consist of purely rational proofs, proofs from the Qur'an, from tradition and from consensus.[37] In employing rational proofs, al-Rāzī differed from his predecessors, who only

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[35] Mānakdīm, 573-4; ^c^Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 15:300, 303, 304-312; al-Murtaḍā, Tanzīh, 6ff; Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Iqtiṣād, 161; Mītham al-Baḥrānī, 125-6. See also T.Andrae, Die Person Muhammeds in Lehre und Glauben seiner Gemeinde (Archives d'études orientales, vol.16. Stockholm: Norstedt, 1918), 139ff.

[36] Manāhij, 100r; see also Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 102v.

[37] ^c^Iṣma, 3-7; Arba^c^īn, 330-334; Tafsīr, vol.2, pt.3: 8-10 where all fifteen proofs are mentioned. See also Tafsīr, vol.2, pt.4:47-8; vol.6, pt.11:44; Muḥaṣṣal, 318-322; Ma^c^ālim, 102-3 where only some of them are mentioned. See also I.Goldziher, "Aus der Theologie des Fachr al-dīn al-Rāzī," Der Islam 3 (1912):238ff. Also al-Jurjānī, 220ff where he quotes al-Rāzī's proofs and criticizes them (ibid., 222-3).

resorted to proofs by revelation[38] or consensus[39] in order to show that impeccability goes beyond the conveying of revelation.

On the basis of reason, al-Rāzī argued that if the prophet were to commit a sin man would either have to follow him or not. Both possibilities, however, are unacceptable.[40] He argued further that since the prophets occupy a higher rank in relation to God and receive greater bounty (ni^c^ma) from Him than others, the punishment they would deserve for a sin would be more severe than that of ordinary men.[41] Al-Rāzī argued further that if the prophets were to commit sins, their testimony (shahāda) would no longer be acceptable to God. This would be in conflict with Qur'an XLIX:6 where men are warned not to accept the witness of a liar.[42] He also argued that if the prophets were to commit sins, men would be obliged to rebuke them on the basis of the Qur'anic obligation of "commanding what is proper and prohibiting what is reprehensible" (al-amr bi-l-ma^c^rūf wa-l-nahy ^c^an al-munkar). This would disagree with Qur'an XXXIII:57 where men are warned not to hurt the prophets.[43]

In view of the striking similarity of these proofs to the non-traditional arguments employed by al-Ḥillī, it is most likely that the latter directly took them from al-Rāzī.

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[38] Such as al-Bāqillānī, see al-Jurjānī, 219.
[39] Al-Baghdādī, Uṣūl al-dīn, 167-8. There was, however, no such consensus among the Ash^c^arites, see W.Madelung, "^c^Isma," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 4:183.
[40] E.g. Arba^c^īn, 331.
[41] E.g. Ibid., 330.
[42] E.g. Ibid., 331.
[43] E.g. Ibid.

3.The Proofs for Muhammad's Prophethood

In addressing the question of how to prove Muhammad's prophetic mission, al-Ḥillī referred to the miracles God created for him in order to manifest his veracity. With this, he was in agreement with the earlier Muᶜtazilites and Ashᶜarites.[44] Among these miracles, he considered the Qur'an the most oustanding one. He states:

> The fourth investigation concerning the proof of Muhammad's prophethood. To this points that he appeared and claimed prophethood and subsequently a miracle appeared on his hand. Whoever is like this, is truly a prophet. As for his claim of prophethood, this is known by widespread reports (tawātur). As for the occurrence of a miracle, there are a number of aspects. First, the Qur'an appeared from him and it is a miracle. The minor premise is the widespread reports. The major premise is that he challenged by it the Arabs who were unable to match it despite their exceeding eloquence....Secondly, he reported about hidden matters as is known by widespread reports and by Qur'anic verses which point to this....And this is definitely a miracle. Thirdly, those miracles which were reported of him by widespread reports in their generality even if the details were not transmitted by widespread reports like the splitting of the moon (inshiqāq al-qamar), the saturation of many people with little food,...and the welling of water (nubūᶜ al-mā') from between his fingers and other [miracles] besides these.[45]

In regard to the miracle which proves the veracity of a claimant to prophethood, al-Ḥillī stipulated that it must follow his claim and must further correspond to it. By this he meant that the claimant requests from God a specific miracle as verification for his claim. If it then occurs the

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[44]E.g. al-Murtaḍā, "Majmūᶜa," 64ff; Mītham al-Baḥrānī, 127; Abū Saᶜd b. Abī Saᶜīd al-Mutawallī, "al-Mughnī fī uṣūl al-dīn ᶜalā ṭarīqat Abī l-Ḥasan al-Ashᶜarī," (edited by Marie Bernand. Supplément aux annales islamologiques, no.7. Cairo: Institut Francais d'Archéologie Orientale, 1986), 50.
[45]Manāhij, 98v-99r; see also Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 101v-102r; Maᶜārij, 123v; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 311-2; Taslīk, 70r-v.

claim is verified but if God created a different miracle this would prove its falsity. The miracle must be created by God and consist of a breach of His custom.[46] These conditions were traditionally recognized by both Mu^c^tazilites and Ash^c^arites.[47] Some miracles such as the Qur'an may furthermore be accompanied by a challenge (taḥaddī) to the people to match it[48] which cannot be met by them. When these conditions are fulfilled, al-Ḥillī argues, the veracity of the prophet is established:

> Everyone to whom this applies, is a prophet because the creation of a miracle on the part of God following the claim of prophethood is equivalent to [the prophet's] verification. For if a man claims to be a messenger of a king and says "Oh king! If I am right in claiming to be your messenger,

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[46] Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 306; Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 108v-109r.

[47] See e.g. Mānakdīm, 569ff; ^c^Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 15:199; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 153rff, 155vff; al-Murtaḍā, "Majmū^c^a," 65; Mītham al-Baḥrānī, 127ff; Mānakdīm (569) reports that Abū Qāsim al-Ka^c^bī allowed that the miracle could precede the claim. For examples of these conditions in Ash^c^arite works, see ^c^Abd al-Qāhir b. Ṭāhir al-Baghdādī, al-Farq bayn al-firaq (edited by M.Muḥyī al-Dīn ^c^Abd al-Ḥamīd. Cairo: Dār al-turāth, n.d.), 344; idem, Uṣūl al-dīn, 171-2; Abū Bakr Muḥammad al-Bāqillānī, Kitāb al-bayān ^c^an al-farq bayn al-mu^c^jizāt wa-l-karāmāt (edited by R.McCarthy. Manshūrāt jāmi^c^at al-ḥikma fī Baghdād. Silsilat ^c^ilm al-kalām, no.2. Beirut: Maktaba sharqiyya, 1958), §§51-56; al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 307ff; al-Isfarāyīnī, 152; al-Mutawallī, 50-1; see also generally R.Gramlich, Die Wunder der Freunde Gottes: Theologien und Erscheinungsformen des islamischen Heiligenwunders (Freiburger Islamstudien, vol.11. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1987), 23-37.

[48] Manāhij, 98v-99r; Taslīk, 70r-v. In his Anwār (184) al-Ḥillī maintains that the challenge is a condition required for every miracle. By the challenge, the prophetic miracle can be distinguished from a non-prophetic miracle. This condition is not stipulated by the Mu^c^tazilites, who rather confined the challenge to the Qur'an. Ash^c^arites, in contrast, usually considered the challenge as one of the required conditions for every prophetic miracle (see P.Antes, Prophetenwunder in der Aš^c^arīya bis al-Ġazālī (Algazel) (Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, vol.2. Freiburg: Klaus Schwarz, 1970), 36-9; Gramlich, Wunder, 28-9; also al-Mutawallī, 51). In their view, the challenge attached to a prophetic miracle distinguishes it from a non-prophetic miracle (see al-Baghdādī, Farq, 344; also Gramlich, Wunder, 41ff). Presumably under the influence of the Ash^c^arites, the condition that a challenge must be attached to a prophetic miracle tended to be accepted by later Imamite theologians (see e.g. al-Miqdād, 307).

> contravene your custom!" and then the king does so, and if the question of the messenger and the act of the king are repeated [reading takarrara for yukarrar], rational people affirm the veracity of the messenger. The same applies here. And everyone whom God shows to be veracious, is veracious, because God Himself is veracious and if He were to show the veracity of a liar, He would not be veracious. Moreover, God does not commit any evil. The manifestation of a miracle for a liar would be an incentive to evil; therefore it is evil.[49]

Al-Ḥillī's concluding argument is based on the Mu^c^tazilite concept of justice according to which God never commits any evil. The analogy he drew to the king and his messenger was apparently not referred to by earlier Mu^c^tazilites. Al-Ḥillī most likely adopted it from the Ash^c^arites who commonly employed it.[50]

In his Manāhij al-yaqīn and Muntahā al-wuṣūl, al-Ḥillī adds a different proof for Muhammad's mission pointing out that he had such superiority in his theoretical (quwwa ^c^ilmiyya) and practical faculties (quwwa ^c^amaliyya) that this was already a sufficient indication for his veracity. He states:

> Secondly, the proof by his character (akhlāq) and his actions for the truth of his statements. The personal perfections are twofold, what is related to the person himself and what is related to the perfection of others. The absolutely perfect is the one who is perfect in regard to the two faculties and who perfects others. Muhammad was from the beginning of his mission until its end [reading ākhirihā for ākhirihi] devoted to good acts and beautiful ethics; after the appearance of his status he perservered [reading mulāziman for mulāzim] in worshipping his Lord while turning [reading mutawajjihan for mutawajjih] to Him totally and renouncing the world. [Moreover], he summoned the people to this...and this is based on the perfection of his practical faculty and his perfection of others in it. As for the theoretical faculty, there is no doubt that in the time of the appearance of the Prophet the Arabs were quarrelling among themselves and of different religions. Some of them worshipped idols, others

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[49] Ma^c^ārij, 123v; see also Manāhij, 99r; Taslīk, 70r.
[50] E.g. al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 313; al-Jurjānī, 181; see also Antes, 36 n.4, 80, 95.

the stars [and they also adhered to] other false religions. [The Prophet] spread among them divine sciences and inquests of knowledge including [those about] God's unity, the denial of anthropomorphism, justice and other questions relating to the truth and he clarified in their regard what had been obscure to them. He commanded them to meditate and to strive towards the truth. This is utmost perfection for him in his theoretical faculty and the perfection of others.[51]

It is almost certain that al-Ḥillī adopted the latter proof from al-Rāzī. The latter similarly argued that people are of three classes; first, the ordinary people who are deficient in their practical and theoretical faculties; secondly, those who are perfect in both faculties but unable to lead anybody else to this stage. These are the saints (awliyā'). The third class are those who are perfect in both qualities and able to perfect the deficient (mukammil). These are the prophets.[52] Like al-Ḥillī, al-Rāzī maintained that men can rationally judge the veracity of a prophet by the mere consideration of his superb qualities.[53] However, when al-Ḥillī considered this proof as an equivalent to the traditional proof, he did not follow al-Rāzī's view in his later works Maṭālib al-ᶜaliyya and Maᶜālim uṣūl al-dīn and in his Tafsīr where he preferred this proof to the traditional proof by a miracle. Al-Rāzī says:

> Those who uphold prophethood are two groups: one of them are those who say that the appearance of a miracle on the part of a prophet proves his veracity....This claim is the "first path" and most people of the various religions adhere to it. The second opinion is that we say that we [should] know first what the [right] position is in beliefs and what the sound view about acts is. If we know this and then see someone calling mankind to the true religion and if we see that his speech has a strong impact in diverting mankind from falsehood to the truth we know that he is a veracious prophet who has to be followed. This path is nearer to reason and doubts are fewer in it.[54]

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[51] Manāhij, 99r; see also Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 102r.
[52] Tafsīr, vol.9, pt.17:120; Maṭālib, 8:104; Maᶜālim, 93.
[53] Tafsīr, vol.5, pt.9:81-2; vol.9, pt.17:120; Maᶜālim, 94-5; Maṭālib, 8:103.
[54] Ibid., 8:103; see also Maᶜālim, 94-5; Tafsīr, vol.9, pt.17:121. In his Muḥaṣṣal (301-2), al-Rāzī still considers this proof as equivalent to the traditional proofs. Moreover,

Al-Rāzī claimed that al-Jāḥiẓ and al-Ghazālī in his Munqidh had already referred to the character of the prophet as a safe criterion for his veracity.[55] With regard to the latter, this can be confirmed from his Munqidh min al-ḍalāl where he maintains that miracles are an uncertain criterion for the veracity of a prophet[56] and that it is safer to ascertain it by considering the character traits and states of the prophet.[57] Al-Ghazālī supports his view by comparison with professionals:

> If you know medicine and law, you can gain knowledge about the lawyers and the doctors by considering their conditions and by listening to their speech....Likewise if you understand the meaning of prophecy and if you frequently consider the Qur'an and the tradition, you will necessarily know that Muhammad is in the highest rank of prophecy.[58]

Al-Rāzī, followed by al-Ḥillī, shared with al-Ghazālī the supposition that man knows enough to be able to consider and to evaluate the personal qualities of a claimant to prophethood and to ascertain prior to revelation and without God's help that he is veracious.

Ibn al-Malāḥimī was acquainted with a view similar to al-Ghazālī's which he ascribed to "someone (or some people) indulging in philosophy" (ba^c^ḍ al-mutafalsifa).[59] In his refutation he pointed to the shortcomings of this position. Its supporters maintained that man should investigate the laws of the prophet as to their agreement with the general interest (maṣlaḥa).[60] They justified this procedure by comparison with a craftsman whose veracity in his claim of craftsmanship is known best by investigation of his

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he does not elaborate this argument in this work as he does in his Maṭālib, the Ma^c^ālim and in his Tafsīr.

[55] Muḥaṣṣal, 302.

[56] Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl (edited by Jamīl Ṣalībā and Kāmil ^c^Ayyād. Beirut: Dār al-Andalus, 1401/1981), 147-50.

[57] Ibid., 148.

[58] Ibid., 148-9.

[59] Fā'iq, 153v-155v.

[60] Ibid., 153v.

products.[61] Ibn al-Malāḥimī rejected this comparison, pointing out that man, prior to revelation, does not have sufficient knowledge of the law to evaluate the prophet.[62] They further argued that if someone applied the laws of the claimant of prophecy and discovered that they help him to discipline his soul and to develop piety, he would experience the veracity of this prophet.[63] Ibn al-Malāḥimī countered that people are not obliged to follow the law of a claimant of prophecy whose veracity is not yet known to them. Not having any motive to apply it, they would not do so and therefore would not arrive at the knowledge of his veracity.[64]

Neither al-Rāzī nor al-Ḥillī dealt with these objections.

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[61] Ibid., 154v-155r.
[62] Ibid., 155r.
[63] Ibid., 155r-v.
[64] Ibid.

## 4. The Miraculous Character of the Qur'an (I$^c$jāz al-Qur'an)

Al-Ḥillī considered the Qur'an as the principal miracle of the Prophet.[65] This view was shared by almost all theological schools.[66] The proof of its miraculous character was men's inability to match the Qur'an despite the challenge to do so.[67] The question was why they were unable to match it. Al-Ḥillī maintained that the miraculous aspect of the Qur'an consists in its incomparable eloquence (faṣāha) which man is unable to match.[68]

His main concern was to refute the position of those who maintained that the miraculous character of the Qur'an is not due to its intrinsic quality but to God's preventing mankind from matching it. This position was known as the doctrine of prevention (ṣarfa). Al-Ḥillī summarizes the different views of its proponents:

> The advocates of the doctrine of prevention disagreed among themselves. Some held that God deprived them of the power for this [i.e. matching the Qur'an]. Others said that God deprived them of the motive for this together with the occasion (sabab) necessitating its existence. Others held that He deprived them of the knowledge by which they would have been able to match it. This is the position of the Sayyid al-Murtaḍā.[69]

The first position, that God deprived the people of the power to match the Qur'an, is usually ascribed to Abū Isḥāq al-Naẓẓām (d. around 221/836).[70] The second view, as will be

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[65] See supra, p.148.

[66] The only exceptions are $^c$Abbād b. Sulaymān and Hishām al-Fuwaṭī who denied the miraculous character of the Qur'an and that it is a proof of the prophet or of God; see al-Ash$^c$arī, Maqālāt, 225-6; Abū Bakr Muhammad al-Bāqillānī, I$^c$jāz al-Qur'ān (edited by Aḥmad Ṣaqr. Dhakhā'ir al-$^c$arab, no.12. Cairo: Dār al-ma$^c$ārif, 1954), 99.

[67] Manāhij, 98v-99r; Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 101v-102r; Taslīk, 70r-v; see also Mānakdīm, 586ff; Ibn al-Malāhimī, Fā'iq, 164rff.

[68] Manāhij, 99v; see also al-Miqdād, 309.

[69] Manāhij, 99v; see also Kashf al-murād, 281.

[70] E.g. al-Ash$^c$arī, Maqālāt, 225; see also R.C.Martin, "A Mu$^c$tazilite Treatise on Prophethood and Miracles Being

seen, was most likely al-Rāzī's explanation. Al-Ḥillī's ascription of the third view to al-Murtaḍā is not quite accurate. Although al-Murtaḍā often defended the doctrine of prevention against the upholders of the doctrine of eloquence,[71] he allowed in a number of his works that the miraculous aspect of the Qur'an may be either its eloquence or the prevention from matching it.[72] Moreover, when he defended the doctrine of prevention, he maintained at times

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Probably the Bāb ᶜalā l-nubuwwah from the Ziyādāt al-sharḥ by Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī." (Ph.D.diss., New York University 1975), 37 (quoting Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī). J.Bouman has pointed out (Le Conflict autour du Coran et la Solution d'al-Bāqillānī, Amsterdam 1959, 23) that according to the accounts of al-Ashᶜarī, al-Khayyāṭ and al-Baghdādī, al-Naẓẓām did not maintain that prevention of matching the Qur'an was a miracle. This was ascribed to him first by al-Bāqillānī. According to the earlier accounts his main concern was to explain why there were no imitations of the Qur'an although its style was imitable.

[71] In his Masā'il al-rassiyya al-ūlā (MS Princeton Yehuda 2751, 140r-141v), al-Murtaḍā defends this doctrine against an unidentified follower of the Bahshamiyya whom Martin tentatively identifies as Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī or ᶜAbd al-Jabbār (Martin, 91). Moreover, in his Ziyādāt al-sharḥ, Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī argues against al-Murtaḍā on the question of the miraculous aspect of the Qur'an presenting al-Murtaḍā as a staunch defender of the doctrine of prevention. (See ibid., 95ff for an analysis of this discussion. Martin's analysis is based on MS British Museum 8613 (fol.1-69) which he identifies as a portion of Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī's Ziyādāt al-Sharḥ (ibid., 7ff). For a description of this MS, see A.S.Tritton, "Some Muᶜtazilite Ideas about Religion," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 14 (1952):612-22. W.Madelung suggested ("Abū Rašīd al-Nīsābūrī," Encyclopaedia Iranica, 1/1:367) that this text is more likely a supercommentary of a later unknown author on Abū Rashīd's Ziyādāt al-sharḥ.) In his Jumal al-ᶜilm wa-l-ᶜamal (edited by Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī. Najaf: al-Ādāb, 1387H.), 40-1, al-Murtaḍā further refers to another work of his entitled Kitāb al-ṣarf. This work is lost and nothing is known about its contents. A.Aleem ("'Ijazu 'l-Qur'an," Islamic Culture 7 (1933):227), Bouman (23), al-Ḥimṣī ("Ta'rīkh fikrat iᶜjāz al-Qur'ān," Revue de l'Académie Arabe de Damas 28 (1953):69ff) and Martin (37 n.25) further support the view that al-Murtaḍā adhered to the doctrine of prevention by the evidence of a passage in MS Ahlwardt 4977 (4v) which is ascribed to al-Murtaḍā. McDermott (387 n.3) has shown, however, that this passage was not written by him.

[72] "Majmūᶜa," 68; see also Jumal, 41 (transl. in McDermott, 387 n.3) where prevention is equally not his only explanation.

that God deprives men of the knowledge which is required to match the Qur'an, whereas elsewhere he is reported to have held that God rather deprived men of their motives to match it.[73]

Al-Ḥillī rejected the doctrine of prevention arguing that if God had prevented mankind from matching the Qur'an, this act of prevention rather than the Qur'an would be the miracle.[74] Moreover,

> if the miracle were the prevention the Qur'an would necessarily have to be at the height of weakness [in eloquence], since prevention from matching weak speech is a greater miracle than prevention from matching eloquent speech.[75]

He further pointed out that if the Arabs were prevented from matching the Qur'an they would have produced something equal to the Qur'an in pre-Islamic times. But nothing like this is known.[76]

Al-Ḥillī's arguments against this doctrine were not original but had already been employed by earlier defenders of the doctrine of eloquence such as the Basran Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites[77] and the Ash<sup>c</sup>arite al-Bāqillānī who played a leading role in the discussion on the miraculous eloquence of the Qur'an.[78]

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[73] Al-Murtaḍā, Masā'il, 140v (quoted in Martin, 91-2); there he holds that God deprived men of their knowledge required to match the Qur'an. According to Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī, al-Murtaḍā rather held that God deprived men of their motives to match the Qur'an; see Martin, 93. Neither in his "Majmū<sup>c</sup>a" (68) nor in his Jumal (41) does al-Murtaḍā indicate how he defined ṣarfa.

[74] Manāhij, 99v; Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 102r.

[75] Manāhij, 99v; see also Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 102r.

[76] Manāhij, 99v.

[77] See Martin, 85; for <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Jabbār's arguments against the doctrine of prevention, see his Mughnī, 16:322-328.

[78] See generally G.E.von Grunebaum, A Tenth-Century Document of Arabic Literary Theory and Criticism (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950), XVIII; Bouman, passim; also Aleem, 224ff. For al-Bāqillānī's arguments against the doctrine of prevention some of which were used by al-Ḥillī, see al-Bāqillānī, I<sup>c</sup>jāz, 41ff.

In upholding the view that the eloquence is the sole miraculous aspect of the Qur'an, al-Ḥillī disagreed with his contemporary Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī who considered all doctrines on its miraculous character as acceptable.[79]

In his Nihāyat al-Ījāz[80] and in some instances in his Tafsīr, al-Rāzī also rejected the doctrine of prevention in favour of the doctrine of eloquence.[81] The arguments he puts forward in order to defend this view against the doctrine of prevention agree with al-Ḥillī's.[82] In addition he argues against this position that

> the forgetting of acquired skills in a short time points to a lapse of minds (zawāl al-ᶜuqūl). But it is known that the minds of the Arabs did not lapse after the challenge.[83]

This argument is apparently meant to counter a statement attributed to al-Naẓẓām that God deprived the people of their minds in order to prevent them from matching the Qur'an.[84]

Elsewhere, however, al-Rāzī maintained that eloquence is not the only miraculous aspect of the Qur'an. In his Tafsīr he approves the view that the reports of the Qur'an about hidden matters (ghuyūb) as well as about religious matters (umūr dīniyya) are aspects of its miraculous quality.[85]

Elsewhere in his Tafsīr,[86] he admits that the Qur'an may be a miracle either by its intrinsic miraculous character or because God prevented mankind from matching it.[87]

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[79] "Tajrīd," 281; "Qawāᶜid al-ᶜaqā'id," 73-4.
[80] Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Nihāyat al-Ījāz fī dirāyat al-iᶜjāz (edited by Bakrī Shaykh Amīn. Beirut, 1985), 79ff, 82.
[81] Tafsīr, vol.9, pt.17:203.
[82] Nihāya, 79-80; Tafsīr, vol.9, pt.17:203.
[83] Nihāya, 80; the same argument was also used by ᶜAbd al-Jabbār; see his Mughnī, 16:325.
[84] See Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, al-Itqān fī ᶜulūm al-Qur'ān (edited by Muhammad Abū l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm. Cairo: al-Mashhad al-Ḥusaynī, 1387/1967), vol.2, pt.4:6-7.
[85] Tafsīr, vol.9, pt.17:100.
[86] Ibid., vol.11, pt.21:55; also ibid., vol.14, pt.28:259.
[87] Ibid., vol.11, pt.21:55.

Al-Rāzī's notion of prevention is based on his theory of acts. Although the people had the power and motives to match the Qur'an which under normal circumstances necessitates their action, they were prevented from doing so. Al-Rāzī states:

> Concerning the clarification of the miraculous character of the Qur'an, men have two opinions about this. Some say that the Qur'an is a miracle in itself. Others say that it is not a miracle in itself but that, when God removed the motives [of the people] to match [reading ityān for ithbāt] the Qur'an although these motives were strong, this prevention was a miracle. Our choice in this matter is to say that the Qur'an is either a miracle in itself or it is not; in the first case, what we seek to show has been achieved. If [the Qur'an] is not a miracle [in itself], and they [i.e. the people] had the capacity and abundant motives to match it and there was [nothing] to deter and to prevent them, the matching necessarily follows. The fact that this matching did not occur in spite of the considerations mentioned, is a breach of the custom. Thus, it is a miracle.[88]

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[88] Ibid., vol.11, pt.21:55.

5.Non-prophetic Miracles

In agreement with their respective school traditions, al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī maintained that miracles are created by God not exclusively for prophets but also for non-prophets. The occurrence of miracles of saints was disputed between and even within the various schools. Al-Ḥillī summarizes the different views and argues for his own position:

> On the question of miracles of saints (karāmāt). The generality of the Mu^ctazilites denied them except Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. The generality of the Ash^carites considered them to be possible except for Abū Isḥāq [al-Isfarāyīnī]. This is also the doctrine of the philosophers. The proof for [the possibility of non-prophetic miracles] are the miracles which appeared on the part of Mary and for the seven sleepers (aṣḥāb al-kahf).[89]

The positions of the various groups were not as clear-cut as al-Ḥillī presents them.

Among the Mu^ctazilites, Abū Hāshim was the staunchest opponent of the possibility of non-prophetic miracles. His opposition was based on his view of the significance of a miracle as a sign for prophethood. He defined a miracle as an indication for a prophet "by way of elucidation and specification" (ṭarīq al-ibāna wa-l-takhṣīṣ).[90] By this he meant that a prophet must necessarily appear together with a miracle; a miracle, in turn, cannot signify anything but prophethood and it is impossible for it to occur for any other purpose. This implies that it does not simply prove the veracity of a claim, otherwise any claim could be verified by a miracle. ^cAbd al-Jabbār explains Abū Hāshim's view:

> Our master Abū Hāshim mentioned in many of his books that miracles signify prophethood by way of elucidation and specification, not in the way other signs signify, because they must occur and must signify someone's prophethood. This necessity does not apply to other signs. Moreover, if they were to

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[89] Manāhij, 100r; see also Ma^cārij, 124v-125r.
[90] ^cAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 15:217, 234; also Taqī al-Dīn, 267-8; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 159r-v.

become numerous they would cease to be an indication. This is not the case with other signs.[91]

Among Abū Hāshim's followers, this view aroused criticism. Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī and apparently already Abū ᶜAbd Allāh al-Basrī had rejected the view that miracles exclusively signify prophethood, holding that their purpose is rather to verify the claim to prophethood.[92] Having made this distinction, Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī apparently accepted the possibility of miracles of saints.[93] As evidence, he referred to traditions which support their actual occurrence.[94]

Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī definitely broke with the view of Abū Hāshim by admitting the possibility of miracles of saints both on grounds of reason and tradition.[95] His view was generally accepted among his followers.[96] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, therefore, differentiated between various types of miracles.[97] First are those which are preceded by a claim to prophethood and which are therefore exclusive to prophets; secondly, non-prophetical miracles which are intended to prove the veracity of a claim to righteousness (ṣalāḥ); thirdly, non-prophetical miracles which occur as an honour (ikrām) to the person who receives them. Each type may only occur, however, if a benefit (maṣlaḥa) for men is attached to it.[98]

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[91] Mughnī, 15:217.
[92] For Abū ᶜAbd Allāh al-Basrī, see ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 15:222. For Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī, see Martin, 68, 77ff. His analysis is based on MS British Museum OR 8613. For the identification of this manuscript, see supra, p.155 n.71.
[93] Martin, 78-9.
[94] Ibid., 79.
[95] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 158v.
[96] Taqī al-Dīn, 266ff.
[97] Fā'iq, 160r. Gramlich (Wunder, 98) identifies him erroneously as the famous commentator of the Qur'an, Abū l-Qāsim al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144).
[98] Fā'iq, 160r. Among the earlier Muᶜtazilites, Ibn al-Ikhshīd, who apparently was a follower of Abū ᶜAlī strongly opposed to Abū Hāshim's views (Madelung, "Imāmism," in Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam (by W.Madelung. London: Variorum Reprints, 1985), 29 (addenda to p.24)), accepted on rational grounds the possibility of miracles of saints. (ibid., 24; Gramlich, Wunder, 98) However, on grounds of scriptural

Moreover, in contrast to the Bahshamiyya, the Baghdadis accepted the possibility of miracles as premature signs heralding a prophet still to come.[99] This was also allowed by Ibn al-Malāḥimī.[100] Al-Ḥillī followed him in this respect.[101]

In respect to the Ash$^c$arites, al-Ḥillī correctly stated that the possibility of miracles of saints was generally accepted among them. An exception was Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāyīnī (d. 418/1027) who held that non-prophetic miracles do not reach the degree of prophetic miracles,[102] an opinion also held by Abū $^c$Abd Allāh al-Ḥalīmī (d. 403/1012).[103] The Ash$^c$arites argued for the possibility of non-prophetic miracles that in view of God's omnipotence the creation of miracles for non-prophets is possible.[104] Moreover, scriptural evidence points to their actual occurrence.[105] A number of Ash$^c$arite theologians allowed that God may create a miracle in order to verify the claim of its recipient.[106] They further asserted the possibility of miracles as premature signs heralding a prophet still to come.[107]

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evidence he denied the possibility of their actual occurrence. (Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 158v, 160v).

[99] Ibid., 160v.

[100] Ibid., 160v-161r.

[101] Ma$^c$ārij, 124v.

[102] W.Madelung, "Al-Isfarāyīnī," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 4:108; Gramlich, Wunder, 98-9.

[103] Ibid., 98-9; L.Gardet, "Karāma," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 4:616.

[104] Al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 319; al-Jurjānī, 243.

[105] The usual examples from the Qur'an are the story of Mary (XXVIII:9ff) and the story of the seven sleepers (XVII:40ff); see al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 320; al-Mutawallī, 50-1; al-Rāzī, Arba$^c$īn, 385-6; idem, Tafsīr, vol.11, pt.21:82ff, 86ff; see also Gramlich, Wunder, 74ff for the various Qur'anic miracles and ibid., 81ff for the different proofs from traditions.

[106] E.g. al-Baghdādī, Uṣūl al-dīn, 185; al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 316, 319.

[107] Al-Jurjānī, 178.

Another group which espoused the possibility of non-prophetic miracles were the Sufis[108] who, like the Ash^c^arites, stressed God's omnipotence which includes the creation of miracles of saints.[109] In agreement with the defenders of non-prophetical miracles among the Mu^c^tazilites and the Ash^c^arites, they allowed that these may either serve to verify a claim to righteousness (<u>ṣalāḥ</u>) or sainthood (<u>wilāya</u>),[110] or as an honour for a saint (<u>walī</u>).[111]

In view of their doctrine of the Imamate, the Imamite theologians, too, traditionally affirmed the possibility of non-prophetic miracles.[112] However, in contrast to the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, the Ash^c^arites, and the Sufis, they held that miracles serve only to verify a claim. Al-Murtaḍā explains:

> What points to the truth of our view is that miracles indicate the veracity of a claim corresponding to it. If a claimant makes a claim to prophethood with a miracle it signifies his prophethood. If he makes a claim to the Imamate, it signifies his being an Imam. If he makes a claim to righteousness (<u>ṣalāḥ</u>), excellence, and station, it indicates his veracity in this [claim]. Thus,

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[108] Al-Ash^c^arī, <u>Maqālāt</u>, 438-9.

[109] E.g. Abū l-Qāsim ^c^Abd al-Karīm al-Qushayrī, <u>al-Risāla al-Qushayriyya fī ^c^ilm al-taṣawwuf</u> (Bulak, 1287/1870), 206; Abū l-Ḥasan ^c^Alī b. ^c^Uthmān al-Hujwīrī, <u>Kashf al-maḥjūb li-arbāb al-qulūb</u> (translated by R.A.Nicholson. E.J.W.Gibb Memorial, vol.17. London: Luzac, 1911), 218; see also Gramlich, <u>Wunder</u>, 95ff for further references.

[110] Most Sufis held that a saint should not be allowed to claim sainthood in public because this could endanger his psychological state; see al-Rāzī, <u>Tafsīr</u>, vol.11, pt.21:93; see also Gramlich, <u>Wunder</u>, 43-9 on this issue.

[111] Al-Hujwīrī (212-3) says: "The passages [of the Qur'an and traditions on the exalted position of the saints in relation to God] show that God has saints (<u>awliyā</u>) whom He has specially distinguished by His friendship and whom He has chosen to be the governors of His kingdom and has marked out to manifest His actions and has peculiarly favoured with diverse kinds of miracles (<u>karāmāt</u>) and has purged of natural corruptions...." See also R.Hartmann, <u>Al-Kushairīs Darstellung des Ṣūfītums</u> (Türkische Bibliothek, vol.18. Berlin: Mayer & Müller, 1914), 154-5.

[112] An exception were the Banū Nawbakht who denied this possibility under the influence of the Mu^c^tazilite position. See Madelung, "Imāmism," 16.

there must inevitably be a clear or conclusive claim corresponding to all [three types of miracles].[113]

This definition excludes the possibility of non-prophetic miracles which are not preceded by a claim and which serve simply to honour their receiver. On the basis of their restriction of miracles to the purpose of verification, the Imamites did not distinguish between the terms mu^c^jiza and karāma but used the term mu^c^jiza for both prophetic and non-prophetic miracles.[114]

Within these different views about non-prophetical miracles, al-Ḥillī's position had more in common with the doctrine shared by the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, the Ash^c^arites and the Sufis than with the position of his Imamite predecessors. In arguing his view he did not resort to the doctrine of the Imamate but rather referred to the scriptural evidence from the Qur'an.[115] Moreover he distinguished between the terms mu^c^jiza and karāma and admitted that a non-prophetical miracle may either serve to verify a claim to righteousness or to honour a righteous person in which case they are not preceded by a claim.[116] It is therefore very likely that al-Ḥillī followed in this question the position of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and his followers.

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[113]"Majmū^c^a," 66-7; see also Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Iqtiṣād, 158-9; idem, Tamhīd, 318; idem, Talkhīṣ al-shāfī (edited by Ḥusayn Baḥr al-^c^Ulūm. Najaf: al-^c^Alamayn, 1383/1963), 1:143.

[114]See Khulāṣat al-naẓar, 68v; also Gramlich, Wunder, 39.

[115]Manāhij, 100r (quoted supra, p.159); Ma^c^ārij, 124v-125r; Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 108r. Following the text of Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm b. al-Nawbakhtī, al-Ḥillī refers to the function of the non-prophetical miracle in regard to the concept of the Imamites in his Anwār, 186-7.

[116]Manāhij, 100r; Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 108v; Ma^c^ārij, 125r. See also Gramlich, Wunder, 39 about this differentiation among later Shi^c^ites.

In his concept of non-prophetic miracles al-Rāzī was distinctly influenced by the Sufi tradition.[117] Besides using scriptural evidence,[118] he argues in his Tafsīr on the basis of the concept of sainthood (wilāya). He begins with a definition of a saint (walī) as a friend of God who commits no sin, either because of his own saintly nature or because God guards him.[119] He further allows that God may create for such a saint a miracle (karāma) which may or may not be preceded by a claim.[120] After these preliminary definitions, al-Rāzī proceeds to put forth his proofs for the possibility of such karāmāt which he designates as rational. These may be summarized as follows.[121] When a saint is fully devoted to God, God will also be fully devoted to him and create miracles for him.[122] God bestows upon the saint much greater favours such as His love and knowledge of Himself[123] and if He loves him He becomes the face, hearing and seeing of the saint.[124] If the saint reaches such a close relation to God, how can God fail to create for him a mere trifle like a miracle?[125] Moreover, the soul of the obedient saint becomes so strong that it loses any connection with the corporeal world and instead receives the light of the world of majesty. Being thus strengthened, the soul of the saint is able to perform miracles.[126]

Al-Ḥillī was decisively influenced in the question of non-prophetic miracles by the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. Thus, he agreed with al-Rāzī on all those basic points where the latter's view was in agreement with the position of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. Yet

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[117] For al-Rāzī's discussions on non-prophetic miracles, see his Arbaᶜīn, 384-8 and esp. his Tafsīr, vol.11, pt.21:85-93; this passage has been translated by R.Gramlich ("Faḫr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzīs Kommentar zu Sure 18, 9-12," Asiatische Studien 33 (1979):99-152).
[118] Tafsīr, vol.11, pt.21:86ff; Arbaᶜīn, 385ff.
[119] Tafsīr, vol.11, pt.21:85-6.
[120] Arbaᶜīn, 387; Tafsīr, vol.11, pt.21:86.
[121] See also Gramlich, Wunder, 94-5.
[122] Tafsīr, vol.11, pt.21:90.
[123] Ibid., 90-1.
[124] Ibid., 91.
[125] Ibid., 91.
[126] Ibid., 92.

al-Rāzī's elaborations of the issue based on mixing theological and Sufi concepts did not have any impact on al-Ḥillī.

# CHAPTER V

# DIVINE ATTRIBUTES

## 1. God's Essential Attributes and Their Referent

One of the fundamental disagreements between the Mu$^c$tazilite and the Ash$^c$arite theologians concerned the relationship of God's essential attributes to His essence.

The Ash$^c$arites held that God's essential attributes are neither entailed by, nor identical with, His essence. Rather, they are entailed by eternal essences (*dhawāt*) or entitative determinants (*ma$^c$ānī*) which subsist in God's essence (*qā'ima bi-dhātihi*).[1] Thus, God's being knowing and powerful etc. are founded upon a knowledge (*$^c$ilm*) and a power (*qudra*) which inhere in His essence.[2] These entitative determinants are described as being neither identical with, nor other than God.[3]

The Mu$^c$tazilites rejected the existence of such entitative determinants as inconsistent with God's unity (*tawḥīd*). They held that the notion of eternal attributes in God which are not entailed by His essence must necessarily negate the oneness of God's essence by affirming the existence of external essences besides it.[4] They also considered as absurd the formula of the upholders of such entitative attributes (*ṣifātiyya*) that these are neither identical with, nor other than God. Against the view of the *ṣifātiyya*, the Mu$^c$tazila maintained that the divine

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[1] Al-Shahrastānī, *Milal*, 1:95; al-Baghdādī, *Farq*, 334.

[2] Al-Ash$^c$arī, *Luma$^c$*, §§18ff; al-Shahrastānī, *Milal*, 1:94ff; al-Isfarāyīnī, 146; al-Mutawallī, 21; al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 90.

[3] Sa$^c$d al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ...al-Taftazānī $^c$alā matn al-$^c$aqā'id* (Istanbul, 1326/1908), 77; al-Mutawallī, 31; Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Bazdawī, *Uṣūl al-dīn* (edited by H.Ṗ.Linss. Cairo, 1383/1963), 35-6; al-Isfarāyīnī, 147; see also Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Fā'iq*, 37r.

[4] cAbd al-Jabbār, *Faḍl*, 347; see also al-Shahrastānī, *Milal*, 1:46; al-Isfarāyīnī, 60; al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 90.

attributes of essence are entailed by the essence itself.[5] They commonly expressed this by the formula that God is eternally knowing (ᶜālim), powerful (qādir) and living (ḥayy) etc. by His essence (li-nafsihi) rather than by entitative attributes of knowledge, power, life etc.[6]

This formula, however, gave rise to other difficulties. If these different attributes are equally founded in God's unitary essence, the question arises of how they relate to, and differ from, one another.[7] Moreover, the Qur'an speaks of God's knowledge (ᶜilm)[8] and power (quwwa)[9] so that reducing these two attributes to the divine essence was open to objection on scriptural grounds.[10] The Muᶜtazila had, therefore, to find a conceptual framework analysing the ontological quality of the attributes and their relation to His essence which would do justice to the notion of unity and which at the same time would avoid those difficulties.

Al-Ḥillī fully supported the traditional Muᶜtazilite notion that God's essential attributes are entailed by His essence (li-dhātihi). He states:

> The Ashᶜarites maintain that God is knowing through a knowledge, powerful through a power, living through a life etc. The Muᶜtazilites deny this. They hold that God is knowing through His essence, not through an entitative determinant subsisting in His essence. [They maintained the same] with regard to His remaining attributes. And this is the truth.[11]

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[5]There was no strictly defined list of essential attributes recognized by the Muᶜtazila. Disagreement arose, for instance, in regard to the attributes of hearing (samᶜ) and seeing (baṣar); see later.
[6]E.g. al-Ashᶜarī, Maqālāt, 486, 503, 505; ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, Faḍl, 347.
[7]Al-Baghdādī, Uṣūl al-dīn, 91-2; al-Isfarāyīnī, 67.
[8]E.g. Qur'an IV:166; II:255.
[9]E.g. Qur'an LI:58; XLI:15.
[10]See e.g. al-Bazdawī, 37. Owing to these considerations, the Muᶜtazilites were often accused of denying any attributes of God on principle; see e.g. al-Baghdādī, Farq, 334; al-Bazdawī, 35; Abū l-Maᶜālī al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn, (edited by R.Frank. Wisdom of Persia, no.27. Tehran: Ḥaydarī Press, 1360/1981), 80.
[11]Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 215; see also Taslīk, 54v.

Although he denied that the attributes exist in addition to God's essence al-Ḥillī guarded himself against the view of the philosophers that the attributes are not existential matters. He clarifies:

> He [i.e. al-Ḥillī in his *Nuẓum al-barāhīn*] said, "Abū l-Ḥusayn and the philosophers said that these attributes are not existential (*laysat wujūdiyya*). Others said that they are existential. And this is the truth."....I [i.e. al-Ḥillī in the *Ma$^{c}$ārij*] say, people disagreed whether God's attributes are existential or not. The Ash$^{c}$arites maintained that they are existential matters (*umūr wujūdiyya*). This is likewise the view of the bulk of the Mu$^{c}$tazilites. The philosophers and Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī denied this.[12]

The philosophers' notion of attributes with no existential reality arose from their view of God as the primary mover. They denied that God, whose sole activity consists in self-reflection, can be described by attributes which are additional to His essence.[13] When one describes God as knowing, willing or powerful etc., all these descriptions merely signify His self-reflection which is the cause of the emanation of the world.[14] Attributes are ascribed to God either in negation (*salb*) of the opposite, or as signifying a relation (*iḍāfa*) of contingent things to God, or in a combination of both aspects.[15] To describe God, for instance, as eternal (*qadīm*) is to negate non-existence, the quality of being caused, and the quality of having a beginning from God.[16] He is a creator (*khāliq*) in the sense that the creation

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[12] *Ma$^{c}$ārij*, 121r; see also *Taslīk*, 54r.
[13] Abū $^{c}$Alī b. Sīnā, *al-Risāla al-$^{c}$arshiyya fī ḥaqā'iq al-tawḥīd wa-ithbāt al-nubuwwa* (edited by Ibrāhīm Hilāl. Dirāsāt fī l-Islām, no.2. Cairo, 1980), 21ff. This treatise has been analysed by E.Meyer, "Philosophischer Gottesglaube: Ibn Sīnās Thronschrift," *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 130 (1980):226-77. See also Abū Ḥamīd Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut al-falāsifah* (edited by M.Bouyges. Bibliotheca Arabica Scholasticorum, Série arabe, no.2. Beirut: Imprimerie catholique, 1927), 163.
[14] Ibn Sīnā, *Ta$^{c}$līqāt*, 18-9; idem, *Risāla*, 24ff, 28-9; Abū Ḥamīd Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *Maqāṣid al-falāsifah* (edited by S.Dunyā. Cairo: Dār al-ma$^{c}$ārif, 1961), 241.
[15] Ibn Sīnā, *Risāla*, 23-4; idem, *Shifā' (Ilāhiyyāt)* (edited by Ibrāhīm Madkūr et al. Cairo: 1380/1960), 2:367-8; also Meyer, 245-6; al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut*, 153; idem, *Maqāṣid*, 224ff.
[16] Ibn Sīnā, *Risāla*, 24.

of everything is related to Him in so far as He is its ultimate cause. Were it not for the world produced by Him, God would not be described by any attribute.

The evidence provided by Ibn al-Malāḥimī does not corroborate al-Ḥillī's claim that Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī shared the philosophers' view of attributes not having any existence in addition to God's essence.

Describing the reality of God's attributes, al-Ḥillī employed the philosophical notion of mental existentiality in contrast to existence in the external world; God's attributes are additional to His essence in ratiocination (zā'ida ᶜan al-dhāt fī l-taᶜaqqul). It is, however, not permissible to reify these mental concepts and to ascribe to them any reality besides His essence in the external world (fī l-khārij).[17]

When discussing the ontological foundation of the essential attributes, al-Ḥillī maintained that they are founded in God's essence which differs by itself from all other essences. He rejected the position of the Bahshamiyya who held that God's essence is distinguished from others not because of itself but owing to an attribute of essence attached to it. Al-Ḥillī presents their view and expresses his disapproval of it:

> The third investigation: concerning the attribute of essence (sifa dhātiyya). Know that Abū Hāshim maintained that God has an attribute of essence through which He differs from whatever He differs, like the atomicity (jawhariyya) of the atom. Moreover, [he held] that He has four other attributes which are His being eternal (qadīm), living (ḥayy), knowing (ᶜālim) and powerful (qādir). These attributes are entailed by the attribute of essence (sifāt muqtaḍāt ᶜan sifat al-dhāt)....This view is foolish...because it is based on the false principle that essences are equal.[18]

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[17] Maᶜārij, 121r-v; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 222; Taslīk, 54r. In his Manāhij (92v) he designates the attributes as mental conceptions (iᶜtibārāt dhihniyya) which are in contrast to things existing externally (umūr khārijiyya).

[18] Manāhij, 90v; see also ibid., 94v; Maᶜārij, 120r.

With the rejection of the notion of the attribute of essence, al-Ḥillī closely followed the position of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and his school. They held that essences differ from each other by virtue of themselves and do not require an attribute of essence.[19] Thus, God is distinguished by His distinctive essence (dhāt mutamayyiza) which sets Him apart from others.[20] By His essence (li-dhātihi) He is capable and knowing.[21]

Ibn al-Malāḥimī, therefore, held that the divine attributes have a reality as qualities of God's essence. Yet he denied that they have an independent reality in addition to it. He states:

> [Our statement that He is powerful and knowing] is an assertion of His essence (ithbāt li-dhātihi) together with a[n additional] qualification (amr) which is included in [His] being described by these attributes.[22]

The Bahshamite concept of the attribute of essence was based on the concept of states (ḥāl, pl. aḥwāl). The notion of states[23] as it was developed by the Bahshamiyya was one attempt to create a conceptual framework for analysing the

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[19] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 42r; also al-Shahrastānī, Milal, 1:85.
[20] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 36v, 42r; Taqī al-Dīn, 148ff.
[21] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 35r, 36r-v, 41r-v, 43v; Taqī al-Dīn, 148, 173.
[22] Fā'iq, 38r; also ibid., 37r, 39r, 42v
[23] Abū Hāshim's theory of states has been the subject of thorough investigation by R.Frank on which the following discussion will largely be based. See mainly his Beings; also his "Abu Hashim's Theory of 'States': its Structure and Function," in Actas do Congresso de Estudos Árabes e Islâmicos (Coimbra, Lisboa 1 a 8 septembro de 1968. Leiden: Brill, 1971):85-100; and his "Hāl," Encyclopaedia of Islam, suppl.fasc.5-6:343-348. For earlier investigations on this issue, see M.Horten, "Die Modus-Theorie des abū Hāschim," Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 63 (1909):303-324; idem, "Neues zur Modus-Theorie des abū Hāschim," in Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters. Supplementband 1913 (Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie: Festgabe Clemens Baeumker), 45-53; D.Gimaret, "La Théorie des Aḥwāl d'Abū Hāšim al-Ǧubbā'ī d'après sources ašʿarites," Journal Asiatique 258 (1970):47-86.

ontological quality of God's attributes and their relation to His essence within the established Mu$^{c}$tazilite view of divine attributes.[24]

For this purpose, Abū Hāshim adapted the concept of state (*ḥāl*, pl. *aḥwāl*) employed by the grammarians for a complement in the case of the accusative occurring in a sentence which consists of a subject and a form of *kāna* (to be) as a complete verb. In this case, the accusative cannot simply be taken as a predicate to *kāna* as it would be if *kāna* were incomplete and transitive; it must rather be understood as a *ḥāl*.[25]

On this foundation, Abū Hāshim elaborated a system of five different categories of states which he applied to both God and man. These categories are distinguished by the different ontological basis which brings forth their actuality.[26]

The first category is the attribute of essence (*ṣifa dhātiyya*/ *ṣifat al-dhāt*/ *ṣifat al-nafs*) through which the essences (*dhawāt*) differ from each other.[27] The atom (*jawhar*), for instance, is described as an atom not through its essence but through its attribute of essence. The same applies to God who does not differ from other essences through His mere essence, but rather through His attribute of essence.[28]

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[24]Frank, *Beings*, 5.
[25]Ibid., 20ff.
[26]According to Abū Hāshim, a state is not an entity or a thing (*dhāt*, *shay'*) and can thus neither be said to be existent (*mawjūd*) nor non-existent (*ma$^{c}$dūm*) (ibid., 26-7). Not being entities themselves, the states can likewise not be known in isolation. Rather, the essence is known to be qualified through them (Mānakdīm, 184). Thus, Abū Hāshim speaks of the actuality (*taḥṣul*) of the states and their initiation (*tajaddud*) while he refrains from asserting for them a coming to be (*ḥudūth*) which would imply their coming into existence (R.Frank, "Ḥāl," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, suppl.fasc.5-6:345).
[27]Al-Nīsābūrī, *Fī l-tawḥīd*, 590; $^{c}$Abd al-Jabbār, *Mughnī*, 7:83; Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, "Muqaddima," in *al-Dhikrā al-alfiyya li-l-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī* (Mashhad, 1391/1970), 2:204; Taqī al-Dīn, 156ff; Frank, *Beings*, 53-5; also ibid., 55 n.1 for the different technical terms used for the attribute of essence.
[28]Ibn Mattawayh, *Majmū$^{c}$*, 1:153.

The second category of states are the essential attributes (*ṣifāt muqtaḍāt $^{c}$an ṣifat al-dhāt*) which are by necessity entailed by the attribute of essence as soon as it becomes existent.[29] The attribute of essence of being an atom which is attached to an essence entails the spatiality of the atom whenever it exists. Thus, occupying a space is an essential attribute of an atom. In regard to God, the specific divine quality of His attribute of essence entails His essential attributes. These are His being powerful, knowing, living and existing.[30] Thus, God must necessarily and eternally be described by these attributes which cannot cease as long as His eternal attribute of essence lasts.[31]

Man's attributes of being powerful, knowing and living differ in their quality from the corresponding attributes in God. They belong to the third category of states which gain actuality through an entitative determinant (*ma$^{c}$nā*) or cause ($^{c}$*illa*) in the subject.[32] Thus, the qualification of these attributes in man differs from the corresponding attributes in God.[33] Since man's states are caused by entitative determinants, he cannot be described as permanently or necessarily powerful, knowing etc. Moreover, since these determinants inhere in parts of man's body, he needs his

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[29]Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, "Muqaddima," 205; Frank, *Beings*, 58-64. It seems that this was not agreed upon by all followers of Abū Hāshim. Some of them are reported to have maintained that essential attributes may be asserted of the essence in the state of its non-existence; see Taqī al-Dīn, 106-7. Abū $^{c}$Abd Allāh al-Baṣrī is said to have asserted the essential attribute of an atom, i.e. its spatiality (*taḥayyuz*), in the state of its non-existence, yet in no space (*ghayr ḥāṣil fī jiha*); see ibid., 107; al-Rāzī, *Muhassal*, 84.

[30]Ibn Mattawayh, *Majmū$^{c}$*, 1:162. A number of writers list instead of "existent" (*mawjūd*) the attribute of being eternal (*qadīm*); e.g. ibid., 162, 152, 153; also Taqī al-Dīn, 148; al-Hillī, *Manāhij*, 90v. As Ibn Mattawayh explains (ibid., 160) *qadīm* is in principle identical with *mawjūd* whenever it is characterized by the quality of being necessary. By this he means that God's attribute of existence is an essential attribute which cannot cease, since it is entailed by His attribute of essence which cannot cease. Thus, the quality of His existence is such that He is eternal.

[31]Ibn Mattawayh, *Majmū$^{c}$*, 1:162.

[32]Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, "Muqaddima," 206; Mānakdīm, 391; Frank, *Beings*, 107-8.

[33]Ibid., 69, 87 n.63.

limbs as tools for his actions and his heart in order to know. The determinant itself is therefore not sufficient to actualize man's being powerful and knowing. Further conditions like the health of heart and limbs have to be fulfilled for them to serve as tools in carrying out actions.[34] Thus, the realms of man's power and knowledge are limited by the natural deficiencies of his body. God, in contrast, is unconditionally powerful and knowing since His attributes of being powerful and knowing are essential attributes which do not inhere in any locus and, thus, do not require any limbs.[35] Yet, the Bahshamiyya applied this category to God when they asserted that God is willing or disapproving through a determinant which is His will or His disapproval. Since it is impossible that a determinant may inhere in God, they maintained that God is willing or disapproving through a determinant which does not inhere in a substrate (lā fī maḥall).[36]

The fourth category of states are those which are actualized by the action of an agent (bi-l-fā^c^il), in particular the existence of a temporal thing which is founded in its producer's capability.[37] This category is inadmissable in God. While the existence of all created beings is considered as belonging to this category, God's existence is counted as an essential attribute entailed by His attribute of essence.[38]

The fifth category are states which gain actuality neither by virtue of the essence nor by an entitative determinant (lā li-l-dhāt wa-lā li-ma^c^nā). To this category belongs the attribute of 'being perceiving' (kawnuhu mudrikan) which is entailed by the perceiver's being living.[39]

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[34] Ibn Mattawayh, Majmū^c^, 1:160.
[35] Ibid., 1:157.
[36] See later.
[37] Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, "Muqaddima," 205; Frank, Beings, 124ff.
[38] See R.Frank, "Al-Ma^c^dūm wal-Mawjūd: the Non-Existent, the Existent and the Possible in the Teaching of Abū Hāshim and his Followers," Mélanges de l'Institut Dominicain d'Etudes Orientales du Caire 14 (1980):198.
[39] Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, "Muqaddima," 205; Mānakdīm, 170; al-Nīsābūrī, Fī l-tawḥīd, 562, 564; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Mu^c^tamad, 215; Frank, Beings, 153ff. Frank ("Ḥāl," Encyclopaedia of Islam,

In regard to God, it gains actuality when the condition (shart) of the presence of the perceptible is fulfilled.[40] Man, in order to perceive, must possess healthy senses in addition to the existence of the perceptible.[41] This is not required for God whose being alive is an essential attribute. Thus, He perceives without senses.[42]

Al-Ḥillī, following the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī,[43] rejected the notion of states. In his view, the states imply an inadmissible reification of the divine attributes. He considered the position of the Bahshamiyya to be very close to that of the Ash$^{c}$arites who viewed the divine attributes as eternal determinants additional to God's essence.[44] The same objection had been put forth against the school of Abū Hāshim by Abū l-Ḥusayn and his followers.[45]

The Bahshamiyya were confronted with the objection of the opponents that on the basis of the Mu$^{c}$tazilite view of God's attributes there is no way to distinguish between them. They responded by developing a concept of characteristics (ḥukm, pl. aḥkām) of attributes, which was adopted by the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and by al-Ḥillī.

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suppl.fasc.5-6:345) seems to have doubts whether this category was introduced by Abū Hāshim or only by his followers.

[40] Mānakdīm, 170, 173; al-Nīsābūrī, Fī l-tawḥīd, 562ff, 564; $^{c}$Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 5:242.

[41] Mānakdīm, 173; Ibn Mattawayh, Majmū$^{c}$, 1:131; $^{c}$Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 4:51, 55.

[42] Al-Nīsābūrī, Fī l-tawḥīd, 562, 564-5; Ibn Mattawayh, Majmū$^{c}$, 1:130-1.

[43] Taqī al-Dīn, 162; al-Muḥallī, 72r; al-Shahrastānī, Milal, 1:85.

[44] Manāhij, 92r-v; Kashf al-murād, 229-30; Nihāyat al-marām fī $^{c}$ilm al-kalām (MS Mar$^{c}$ashī 254), 75r-v.

[45] Taqī al-Dīn, 162.

The Bahshamiyya defined a hukm as the manifest characteristic of an attribute or state through which it is possible to recognize the attribute.[46] We recognize, for instance, a person's being capable only through the characteristic of this state, namely the feasibility (sihha) of a simple act by that person.[47]

God's attributes may equally be known through their characteristics. Thus, the characteristic of His attribute of essence is that it entails the four attributes of His being powerful, knowing, living and existing.[48] By the feasibility of the occurrence of a well-wrought act (sihhat wuqūᶜ al-fiᶜl al-muhkam) on His part He is recognized to be knowing[49] just as the feasibility of a simple act (sihhat al-fiᶜl) points to His being powerful.[50] That He is not incapable of being knowing and powerful indicates His being alive.[51]

Al-Hillī, following Ibn al-Malāhimī and possibly Abū l-Husayn al-Basrī, affirmed these characteristics in regard to God. However, in contrast to the Bahshamiyya, Ibn al-Malāhimī and al-Hillī denied that these characteristics are entailed by or indicate any states or attributes in addition to God's essence. Rather, they are entailed by and point to God's essence which is qualified as being knowing and powerful. Al-Hillī states:

> We say that there must inevitably be an additional qualification (amr zā'id) in the conceptualization [of God's attributes]....Why should this additional qualification not be the characteristics which are effected by God's essence like the feasibility of a simple act [reading sihhat al-fiᶜl for hissat al-ᶜaql] which is included in the knowledge that

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[46]Al-Nīsābūrī explains (Fī l-tawhīd, 287): "We infer the attribute from its characteristic; for when the attribute is not perceptible nor found by intuition (mawjūda min al-nafs), it can be reached only through its characteristic." See also Frank, Beings, 61.
[47]Mānakdīm, 165; al-Nīsābūrī, Fī l-tawhīd, 488; Ibn Mattawayh, Majmūᶜ, 1:157; Shaykh al-Tūsī, "Muqaddima," 207.
[48]Ibn Mattawayh, Majmūᶜ, 1:162.
[49]ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 5:219; 12:14, 21.
[50]Ibid., 13:267; Ibn Mattawayh, Majmūᶜ, 1:157.
[51]ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 5:219. For the distinguishing characteristics of the various attributes, see also Frank, Beings, 62ff; Shaykh al-Tūsī, "Muqaddima," 207-8.

> God is powerful; and His awareness (*tabayyun*) of what is subject to knowledge, and His connection (*ta$^{c}$alluq*) with it which is included in the knowledge that He is knowing?[52]

Al-Ḥillī disagreed with the Bahshamite definition of the characteristic of God's being knowing by describing it as His awareness of what is subject to knowledge and His connection with it. Here, he followed the definition of Ibn al-Malāḥimī.[53] The first term merely designates His potential omniscience, while the term connection (*ta$^{c}$alluq*) designates the actual relation between Him and the objects of His knowledge.

The notion of connection between God's essence and the object of His knowledge as a distinctive characteristic of His being knowing was apparently introduced into Mu$^{c}$tazilite *kalām* by Ibn al-Malāḥimī.[54] The Bahshamiyya apparently did not consider this connection as a distinctive characteristic (*ḥukm*) of God's state of being knowing.[55] Ibn al-Malāḥimī reports, however, that they employed a concept of connection which they defined as the connection between God's state of being knowing and its objects.[56]

Ibn al-Malāḥimī refrained from asserting a similar connection between God's essence and the objects of His power. In his view, the attribute of power is basically confined to the capable agent who is described as able to do, or to refrain from, acts under certain conditions.[57] These conditions are in turn confined either to the act insofar as

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[52] *Manāhij*, 92v.
[53] Al-Ḥillī's account is most likely directly based on Ibn al-Malāḥimī's *Fā'iq* (42v).
[54] *Mu$^{c}$tamad*, 201, 205, 206. Abū l-Ḥusayn designated this connection as a *ḥāla*, but not as a *ḥukm*. See ibid., 200-1, 205; al-Muḥallī, 63v.
[55] The only instance I could find where the notion of the connection as a characteristic is referred to is Shaykh al-Ṭūsī's "Muqaddima," 207. There al-Ṭūsī affirms that the characteristic of an attribute to which a connection is attached is this specific connection (*al-ta$^{c}$alluq al-makhṣūṣ*). He applies this to belief (*i$^{c}$tiqād*), presumption (*ẓann*), will (*irāda*) and disapproval (*karāha*).
[56] *Mu$^{c}$tamad*, 200-1.
[57] Ibid., 206.

it needs to be feasible, or to the agent in so far as he needs to have a motive for the act. Thus, the ability to act or not to act is the characteristic of a capable agent.[58]

In his *Ma$^{c}$ārij* al-Ḥillī affirms a connection between God's essence and the objects of His knowledge and is undecided whether this notion may similarly be affirmed in regard to other attributes.[59] In his other works, however, he draws the parallel between knowledge and power. He affirms a connection between God's essence and the objects of His knowledge as well as the objects of His power.[60] In this, he presumably was secondarily influenced by al-Rāzī and earlier Ash$^{c}$arites.[61]

Al-Rāzī agreed with the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī that God's essence differs from other essences by itself.[62] He defended this notion especially against the Bahshamiyya.[63]

He further adopted the view of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn that God's distinctive essence (*dhāt makhṣūṣa*) entails His attributes of being knowing and powerful.[64] He defined these as connections (*ta$^{c}$alluqāt*) between God's essence and the objects of His knowledge and power.[65] With his affirmation of connections between God's essence and the objects of His knowledge and power, he is only partly in agreement with Ibn al-Malāḥimī who asserted such a connection only between God's essence and the objects of His knowledge. Al-Rāzī rather followed his Ash$^{c}$arite predecessors in this

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[58] It is noteworthy that later representatives of the school draw the parallel from knowledge to power when they asserted a connection between God's essence and His potentials; e.g. Taqī al-Dīn, 127. Moreover, later authors sometimes held that Abū l-Husayn and Ibn al-Malāḥimī themselves drew this parallel between God's knowledge and His power. See e.g. $^{c}$Abd Allāh b. Zayd al-$^{c}$Ansī, *Kitāb al-maḥajja al-bayḍā' fī uṣūl al-dīn* (MS Munich Glaser 148), 28v-29r.

[59] *Ma$^{c}$ārij*, 121r-v.

[60] E.g. *Manāhij*, 92r-v; *Nihāyat al-marām*, 79v-80r; *Taslīk*, 56r.

[61] See later.

[62] *Arba$^{c}$īn*, 96; *Ma$^{c}$ālim*, 47; *Maṭālib*, 1:315, 317.

[63] *Arba$^{c}$īn*, 96ff; *Maṭālib*, 1:313ff.

[64] *Ma$^{c}$ālim*, 58.

[65] *Arba$^{c}$īn*, 155; *Maṭālib*, 3:223.

respect who asserted connections also for other attributes.[66] In some instances, al-Rāzī substituted the philosophical term *iḍāfa* and the term *nisba* for the term *ta$^{c}$alluq*.[67] However, his notion of *iḍāfa* and *nisba* in this context fully agrees with the theological concept of *ta$^{c}$alluq* and has nothing in common with the philosophical notion of *iḍāfa*.

Having adopted Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī's and Ibn al-Malāḥimī's concepts of attributes, al-Rāzī repudiated the view that God's essential attributes are entailed by entitative determinants.[68] Moreover, he rejected the view of those Ash$^{c}$arites who adhered to the notion of states (*aḥwāl*), presumably having al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī in mind.[69] As al-Rāzī presents their view, they held that the entitative determinants of power or knowledge entail the states (*ḥāla*) of God being powerful and knowing. Between these states and the objects of His knowledge and power, they affirmed a connection (*ta$^{c}$alluq*).[70]

Al-Rāzī, in contrast, maintained that God's distinctive essence directly entails connections (*ta$^{c}$alluqāt*) or relations (*iḍāfāt/ nisab*) between His essence and the objects of His being knowing and His being powerful.[71]

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[66] Al-Ghazālī, *Iqtiṣād*, 39ff; Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī, *Ghāyat al-marām fī $^{c}$ilm al-kalām* (edited by Ḥasan Maḥmūd $^{c}$Abd al-Laṭīf. Cairo, 1391/1971), 85; see also Ormsby, 151-2.
[67] *Arba$^{c}$in*, 155.
[68] *Maṭālib*, 3:233-4. In some of his more traditional works, however, he affirmed entitative determinants; e.g. "Masā'il," 366-7.
[69] See *Arba$^{c}$īn*, 155-6; there, he attributes the notion of states to al-Bāqillānī. In his two extant works, the *Tamhīd* and the *Inṣāf*, al-Bāqillānī rejects the validity of this theory. However, in later works, especially his *Hidāyat al-mustarshidīn* which is only partly extant in manuscript, he appears to have adopted a theory of states which shares only some elements with the theory of the Bahshamiyya. See R.Frank, "Ḥāl," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, suppl.fasc.5-6:346; al-Āmidī, 27; also Gimaret, "*Aḥwāl*," 76ff. His notion of states was later adopted by al-Juwaynī; see Frank, loc.cit., 346ff.
[70] *Maṭālib*, 3:223-4; *Ma$^{c}$ālim*, 56; *Arba$^{c}$īn*, 155-6.
[71] Ibid., 155.

Yet on the basis of the notion of connection, al-Rāzī defended the traditional Ashᶜarite position that God's attributes have a reality of their own other than His essence. He identified the connection or relation between the essence and the objects of His being knowing and powerful as knowledge (ᶜilm) and (power) and further pointed out that this connection is other than the essence. From this he concluded that God has a knowledge which is distinct from His essence. Thus, whereas al-Ḥillī considered God's attributes and their characteristics as additional to God's essence merely in ratiocination without any separate existence, al-Rāzī fully reified them. He states:

> Know that we do not assert in this question more than that what is understood by God's being knowing, powerful and living is not the same as what is understood by His essence. Rather, it is a matter which differs from His essence. If the Muᶜtazilites go along with us to this extent, accord has been reached and disagreement ceases ....We say, whoever knows a certain matter, there must inevitably occur a specific relation (nisba makhṣūsa) or a specific relationship (iḍāfa makhṣūṣa) between the knowledge and the object of knowledge. The theologians call this specific relation "connection" and they say that the knowledge is connected to the object of knowledge. In our view, this knowledge is an expression for this connection itself and for this specific relationship (iḍāfa) itself and we claim that this relationship (iḍāfa) and relation (nisba) is different from the essence.[72]

Al-Ḥillī further disagreed with al-Rāzī about which divine attributes are essential. Whereas he affirmed only God's being knowing, powerful and living as essential attributes, al-Rāzī, following the Ashᶜarite tradition, also counted the attributes of speech[73] and will.[74]

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[72] Arbaᶜīn, 155; see also Maṭālib, 3:223; Maᶜālim, 56.
[73] Ibid., 61; "Masā'il," 368-9.
[74] See later.

2.God as Existent (Mawjūd)

In his notion of existence (wujūd) al-Ḥillī followed the Avicennan tradition.

According to Ibn Sīnā and his followers, God who exists necessarily by virtue of Himself (wājib al-wujūd) is the primary, absolute and perfect existence,[75] or pure existence (mujarrad al-wujūd)[76]/(wujūd maḥḍ).[77] It is, therefore, the strongest form of existence. Contingent things require an effector for their existence as they are, in contrast to God, unable to necessitate their existence by virtue of themselves.[78] Thus, their existence is not pure and of a much weaker kind than God's existence.[79] Owing to this difference, the existence of God and of the contingents is not the same in a univocal manner (bi-l-tawāṭu') but it can be said to be the same only by analogy (bi-l-tashkīk).[80]

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[75]Abū ᶜAlī b. Sīnā, Kitāb al-najāt (edited by Mājid Fakhrī. Beirut: Dār al-āfāq al-jadīda, 1405/1985), 261, 265, 266; for this view in al-Ḥillī's writings, see Maᶜārij, 112v; Taslīk, 51r.

[76]Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, 2:347.

[77]Al-Ghazālī, Maqāṣid, 251-2, 289.

[78]Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, 2:347; idem, Najāt, 261; al-Ghazālī, Maqāṣid, 289; for this view in al-Ḥillī's writings, see Maᶜārij, 79r.

[79]Al-Ḥillī, Īḍāḥ al-maqāṣid, 5-6. For Ibn Sīnā's view on existence, see also generally E.Behler, Die Ewigkeit der Welt. Problemgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu den Kontroversen um Weltanfang und Weltendlichkeit im Mittelalter. Teil 1: Die Problemstellung in der arabischen und jüdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters (München: 1965), 95ff, 98. The relevant passages on existence of Ibn Sīnā's principal works have been translated by G.Hourani, "Ibn Sīnā on Necessary and Possible Existence," The Philosophical Forum 4 (1972):74-86.

[80]Abū Fatḥ Allāh Muḥammad b. ᶜAbd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī, Muṣāraᶜat al-falāsifa (edited by Suhayr Muḥammad Mukhtār. Mu'allafāt al-Shahrastānī, no.1. Cairo, 1976), 45; see also W.Madelung, "Aš-Šahrastānīs Streitschrift gegen Avicenna und ihre Widerlegung durch Naṣīr ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī," in Akten des VII.Kongresses für Arabistik und Islamwissenschaft (Göttingen, 1974. Edited by A.Dietrich. Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Phil.-hist. Klasse, dritte Folge, 98. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1976), 253. For this notion in al-Ḥillī's writings, see Maᶜārij,

God's existence, according to Ibn Sīnā, is identical with His essence (māhiyya) itself[81] while the existence of contingent beings is other than their essence.[82] The relationship between their essence and existence is described in such a way that existence is accidental to the essence.[83]

Al-Ḥillī presents the views of the philosophers together with other positions and states his own preference:

> People disagreed about existence. Is it an additional matter or not?
> The generality of the philosophers held that existence as such is applied by analogy (bi-l-tashkīk) to [omitting juz' which is superfluous] all existent things which are specified each by an essence in the sense that they differ in it [i.e. existence], either through precedence (taqaddum) or posteriority (ta'akhkhur), like the existence of cause and effect, or through priority (awwaliyya) and its non-existence, like these two mentioned existences [reading wujūdayn for wujūd]; or through greater intensity (ashaddiyya) and greater weakness (adᶜafiyya) like the existence of the necessary and the existence of the contingent. Whatever is asserted of them by analogy cannot possibly be either a[n integral] part of them or themselves. For the essence itself or a part of it is not subject to disparity. Rather, it [i.e. existence] is an accidental matter to it [i.e. essence].
> As for the existences which are specific to each single essence, they are additional to this [reading tilka for dhālika] essence, except for the existence of the Necessarily Existent which is specific to Him. For, it is, in their view, identical with His reality itself (nafs ḥaqīqatihi) ....As for the theologians, most of the Muᶜtazilites and Ashᶜarites held that existence is additional to the essence in regard to the Necessarily Existent and all contingent matters besides Him.
> Others, among them Abū l-Husayn al-Basrī, maintained that existence is identical with the essence both in regard to the Necessarily Existent and the contingent things.

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113r; Manāhij, 93r; Nihāyat al-marām, 12r; Kashf al-khafā', 34v-35r.

[81] Ibn Sīnā, Risāla, 18-9; Ilāhiyyāt, 2:344; al-Ghazālī, Maqāṣid, 252, 289. For this view in al-Ḥillī's writings, see Asrār, 208v; Manāhij, 79v, 93r.

[82] Al-Ghazālī, Maqāṣid, 289. For this view in al-Ḥillī's writings, see Asrār, 172v; Manāhij, 79v, 93r; Taslīk, 6r.

[83] Ibn Sīnā, Risāla, 19; al-Ghazālī, Maqāṣid, 289.

If you have recognized this, we say: The opinion which we choose [reading nadhhabu for yadhhabu] is that existence in regard to the Necessarily Existent is identical with His essence.[84]

Essence (māhiyya) was understood by al-Ḥillī, again like Ibn Sīnā,[85] as a concept which is not attached to individual entities as long as existence is not attached to it. When existence is attached to it, the essence inheres in the individual entities (kā'ina fī l-a$^{c}$yān) and can be discerned through consideration of the existent being.[86] Thus, individual things occur only when existence is attached to the essence.[87] Moreover, the essence cannot be discerned in the external world (fī l-khārij) when existence is not attached to it. This is only possible in ratiocination.[88] Essence itself is neither existence nor non-existence.[89] The existent entity is, therefore, to be understood as a sample of the essence which occurs in the external world.[90]

Having adopted the Avicennan notion of existence, al-Ḥillī was in disagreement with his Mu$^{c}$tazilite predecessors. With the Bahshamiyya, he differed on a number of points. They held that an attribute of essence is necessarily attached to every essence (dhāt). This is not conditional on existence but is asserted prior to it. The same applies to God. His state of being existent is understood to be an essential attribute which is entailed by

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[84] Ma$^{c}$ārij, 112v-113r.
[85] For Ibn Sīnā's notion of essence and existence, see the studies of F.Rahman, "Essence and Existence in Avicenna," Medieval and Renaissance Studies 4 (1958):1-16, and P.Morewedge, "Philosophical Analysis and Ibn Sīnā's 'Essence-Existence' Distinction," Journal of the American Oriental Society 92 (1972):425-435.
[86] Nihāyat al-marām, 9v.
[87] Ibid., 8v-9r.
[88] Ibid., 15r.
[89] Ibid., 9v; also Rahman, 9; Morewedge, 432.
[90] Nihāyat al-marām, 15r, 18r; see also Rahman, 7, 11; Morewedge, 432.

His attribute of essence.[91] Thus, His existence is not identical with His essence. This was unacceptable for al-Ḥillī.

In respect to beings other than God, the Bahshamiyya asserted that they have an individual reality prior to their existence owing to the attribute of essence.[92] Al-Ḥillī disagreed holding that things gain individual reality only when they occur. A non-existent (maᶜdūm) can, therefore, not be asserted to be a thing.[93]

He further disagreed with them as to whether existence is the same in regard to all existent beings in a univocal manner or by analogy. Although the followers of Abū Hāshim considered existence as an attribute which in man is caused by an agent (bi-l-fāᶜil) and in God by virtue of His attribute of essence,[94] existence as such was in their view univocal with regard to all.[95] They argued that the characteristic (ḥukm) of existence is in regard to everything that it constitutes the condition (sharṭ) for the actuality of the essential attributes.[96] Al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī summarizes this difference:

> The philosophers, Abū Hāshim and his followers among the Muᶜtazila and the generality of the Ashᶜarites held the second view [i.e. that existence is a shared meaning (ishtirāk maᶜnawī)] for all existent beings. Then they disagreed. The philosophers said that it is predicted by analogy to the existent things which fall under it. The Bahshamiyya and Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī held that it is applied univocally (bi-l-tawāṭu') [to all existent beings]. The author [i.e. al-Ḥillī] and al-Muḥaqqiq [Naṣīr al-Dīn] al-Ṭūsī chose the position of the philosophers.[97]

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[91] See supra, p.210.
[92] See Frank, "Non-Existent," 205ff.
[93] Asrār, 172v-173r; Īḍāḥ al-maqāṣid, 20ff; Nihāyat al-marām, 8v-9r, 18r.
[94] See supra, p.173.
[95] See Frank, "Non-Existent," 197.
[96] Ibn Mattawayh, Majmūᶜ, 1:135-6; also ibid., 137 where Ibn Mattawayh argues further that existence cannot differ since it is not connected to anything (lā mutaᶜallaq lahā).
[97] Al-Miqdād, 38-9; see also al-Ḥillī, Kashf al-khafā', 34v-35r. Al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī's account of Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī's view seems to be mistaken. In his Hidāyat al-ḥikma, the latter maintained the Avicennan view on existence. God's existence which is essentially necessary is absolute (muṭlaq)

Al-Ḥillī equally disagreed with Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī on a number of points. Repudiating Abū Hāshim's notion of states, the latter affirmed that "thing" (shay') or "essence" (dhāt) and "existent" (mawjūd) are identical.[98] Thus, God's being existent is not an additional attribute above His essence. Rather, it is identical with His essence.[99] So far, al-Ḥillī agreed.

Yet in contrast to al-Ḥillī, Abū l-Ḥusayn did not envisage the philosophical notion of essence. Thus, the existence of a thing also constitutes its characteristics. The difference of the things is, therefore, founded in their existence only. Thus, the existence of any existent entity must differ from the existence of everything else. The existences of the things have, therefore, nothing in common but their name.

Thus, whereas al-Ḥillī held that the meaning of existence is by analogy shared by all existent entities (ishtirāk ma^cnawī), Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī maintained that only the term is shared (ishtirāk lafẓī).[100]

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and therefore different from the existence of contingent things. Existence can therefore be asserted of them only by analogy (tashkīk); see Ḥusayn b. Mu^cīn al-Dīn Kādīmir Maybudhī, Commentary on al-Abharī's Hidāyat al-ḥikma (Constantinople, 1283/1867), 106-7.

[98] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 24r, 49r; Taqī al-Dīn, 118; al-Muḥallī, 71r. Abū l-Ḥusayn is usually said to follow in this matter the Basran theologian Abū Isḥāq al-Naṣībīnī (or: al-Naṣībī) (d. 408/1017); see Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Mu^ctamad, 254. (For al-Naṣībī's position, see Abū l-Ma^cālī al-Juwaynī, al-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn (edited by A.S.al-Nashar et al. Alexandria: Mansha'at al-ma^cārif, 1969), 124-5, 134; J.van Ess, Die Erkenntnislehre des ^cAdudaddīn al-Īcī (Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur. Veröffentlichungen der orientalischen Kommission, vol.22. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1966), 199). According to Ibn al-Malāḥimī's Fā'iq (24r), however, Abū l-Ḥusayn rather followed Abū Isḥāq b. ^cAyyāsh. This must be a mistake since Abū Isḥāq b. ^cAyyāsh is known to have held a view similar to Abū Hāshim's, see al-Ḥillī, Nihāyat al-marām, 18r; Taqī al-Dīn, 106.

[99] Ibid., 104-5; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Mu^ctamad, 254ff.

[100] Manāhij, 79v; Kashf al-khafā', 33v-34r.

With his notion of existence, al-Ḥillī not only disagreed with the earlier Muᶜtazilites but equally with Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. The latter held that existence is additional to essence both in regard to man and God. Since this view was not shared by earlier Ashᶜarites,[101] al-Ḥillī had presumably al-Rāzī in mind when he ascribed this view to the Ashᶜarites.[102] Al-Rāzī summarizes the different views and states his own preference:

> To speak about God's existence must necessarily be understood in one of the following three ways:
> The first is to say that the term "existence" which applies to the Necessary by itself and to the contingent by itself does not convey a single meaning which is shared by both categories. Rather, only the term is shared.
> The second view is to say that the term "existence" has a single meaning. However, in respect to the Necessarily Existent by Himself it is pure existence [reading wujūd mujarrad for wujudan mujarradan], i.e. an existence with the condition that it is not accidental to any essence but rather an existence which subsists in itself. On that consideration, God's existence is identical with His reality itself (nafs ḥaqīqatihi).
> The third view is to say that the existence is one of the attributes of the reality (ḥaqīqa) of God and one of the qualities (naᶜt) of His essence (māhiyya). On that consideration, God's existence is other than His essence.
> Each of the three positions was upheld by a multitude of people. The first one is the doctrine of a large group of theologians such as Abū l-Ḥasan

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[101] The traditional Ashᶜarite view was that "thing" (shay') and "existent" (mawjūd) are synonymous and that the non-existent (maᶜdūm) cannot be defined as a real thing; see Ibn Fūrak, 252ff; al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, 15; al-Baghdādī, Farq, 170; al-Juwaynī, Shāmil (edited by A.S.al-Nashar), 124, 610; see also van Ess, Erkennnislehre, 198-9. Thus, they did not treat God's existence as an attribute. Al-Ashᶜarī apparently adhered in his Muᶜtazilite period to the view that a thing is a thing prior to its existence and wrote a treatise in support of this position. Later, he repudiated it. See O.Pretzl, Die frühislamische Attributenlehre (München: Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1940), 60; D.Gimaret, "Bibliographie d'Ašᶜarī: un réexamen," Journal Asiatique 273 (1985):256 no.49.

[102] Maᶜārij, 113r (quoted supra, p.181-2). The editor of al-Miqdād al-Suyūrī's Irshād suggests that by the Ashᶜarites, al-Bāqillānī and al-Juwaynī are meant (al-Miqdād, 33 n.3). This is evidently wrong, since both asserted that thing (shay') and existent (mawjūd) are identical. Al-Miqdād, like al-Ḥillī, had undoubtedly al-Rāzī in mind.

al-Ash^c^arī and Abū l-Husayn al-Basrī. The second position was chosen by Abū ^c^Alī b. Sīnā in all of his works. The third is the doctrine of a large group of theologians and we have backed it in most of our books.[103]

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[103]Matālib, 1:290-1. Al-Rāzī upheld the same position in his Arba^c^īn (100), his Mulakhkhas (85v) and his Mabāhith al-mashriqiyya (1:31). See, in contrast, his Ishāra (10v) and his "Masā'il" (345ff, 348) where he refrains from taking a position. In his Tafsīr (vol.6, pt.12:182-3) al-Rāzī argues in traditional Ash^c^arite terms when he says that God's existence is identical with His essence (^c^ayn dhātihi).

3.The Range of God's Power

All parties basically agreed that God has power over everything which is subject to power.[104] For al-Rāzī as an Ash<sup>c</sup>arite, this principle was self-evident since in their view everything which occurs is solely dependent on God's power.[105] The Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites, on the other hand, were confronted with a problem arising from their view of justice. If God has power over everything which may be subject to power, this applies necessarily also to man's acts. However, if God had power over man's acts there would be no way to ascertain whether these acts are performed by man's power or rather created by God's power as affirmed by the Ash<sup>c</sup>arites.

Upholding that God, in view of His omnipotence, has power over everything which is subject to power,[106] al-Ḥillī affirmed that the specific acts of man are also subject to God's power.[107] With this view, al-Ḥillī adhered to the position of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and his followers who drew the same conclusion.[108]

Most of the earlier Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites denied that God has power over acts subject to man's power. Al-Ḥillī summarizes the different positions of the earlier Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilite theologians:

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[104]An exception among the Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites was al-Naẓẓām who held that God does not have the power to do evil. His view has recently been investigated by J.van Ess ("Wrongdoing and Divine Omnipotence in the Theology of Abū Isḥāq an-Naẓẓām," in Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy (edited by T.Rudavksy. Synthese Historical Library. Texts and Studies in the History of Logic and Philosophy, vol.25. Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster: Reidel, 1985):53-67) and R.Frank ("Can God do What is Wrong?" ibid., 69-79).
[105]Ma<sup>c</sup>ālim, 52ff; Tafsīr, vol.15, pt.30:53.
[106]Manāhij, 90v.
[107]Manāhij, 91r.
[108]Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 45r.

> Al-Ka$^{c}$bī held that God does not have power over the like of what is subject to man's power (mithl maqdūr al-$^{c}$abd) because what is subject to his power is either obedience or foolishness or... [reading unclear] and these are negated [reading manfiyya for muthbata] in regard to God.... Abū $^{c}$Alī, Abū Hāshim and their followers maintained that God has no power over the very acts of men (nafs maqdūr al-$^{c}$abd). Abū l-Hudhayl, Abū l-Husayn and the Ash$^{c}$arites allowed this....Abū $^{c}$Alī and his son argued that [if God had power over man's acts], it would necessarily follow that two capable agents would have jointly power over a single possible act. And this is impossible.[109]

The principal difference between the Baghdadis and the Basrans, then, was that the former argued that God has no power over all classes (ajnās) of acts which are subject to man's capability.[110] The Basrans, in contrast, argued that since God enabled men to perform various classes of acts, He must likewise have power over these. Thus, they affirmed that God in principle has power over an infinite number of the class (jins) of acts which man is capable of performing. They maintained, however, that God does not have power over the specific acts which are subject to man's capability (a$^{c}$yān al-af$^{c}$āl).[111] Their principal argument for denying God's power over the acts of man was, as al-Ḥillī pointed out, that a possible act (maqdūr) cannot be subject to the power of two capable agents.[112]

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[109] Manāhij, 91r. For Abū Hudhayl's view on God's omnipotence, see Frank, "Attributes," 473ff.
[110] Al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.15, pt.30:53.
[111] Mānakdīm, 375-6; also al-Ash$^{c}$arī, Maqālāt, 199-200; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.15, pt.30:53.
[112] $^{c}$Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 4:254ff; Mānakdīm, 375ff.

4. God as Knowing

a. The Proofs of God's Being Knowing

Al-Ḥillī puts forth two proofs for God's being knowing:

> The proof for God's being knowing is that God performed well-wrought and perfect acts. Everyone who is like this is necessarily knowing. Thus, God is knowing.[113]

This proof which is based on man's witnessing God's well-wrought acts was commonly employed by the earlier Muᶜtazilite and Ashᶜarite theologians.[114] Al-Ḥillī goes on to put forth his second proof:

> [There is] a second proof for God's being knowing. Its elaboration is that God is powerful and every powerful [agent] is knowing....As for the major premise, the powerful [agent] is he who acts by means of the motive (dāᶜī) and the intention (qaṣd) for one side rather than the other. The intention for one side is necessarily conditional on knowledge. Thus, power is only complete with knowledge.[115]

This proof was apparently first introduced by Ibn al-Malāḥimī.[116] He had argued[117] that the fact that an agent is knowing may be deduced from a single act regardless of whether it is well-wrought or not. The argument is based on the view that a capable agent cannot perform an act without having a motive for it. Here, Ibn al-Malāḥimī differed from the Bahshamiyya who allowed that a capable agent can perform

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[113] Maᶜārij, 116r; see also Asrār, 210r; Manāhij, 91r; Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 81v; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 194; Taslīk, 51v.

[114] For its use among Muᶜtazilites, see Ibn Mattawayh, Majmūᶜ, 1:113ff; al-Nīsābūrī, Fī l-tawḥīd, 493. For its use among Ashᶜarites, see al-Ashᶜarī, Lumaᶜ, §13; al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, 26; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.15, pt.30:58.

[115] Maᶜārij, 116r; see also Asrār, 210r; Muntahā al-wuṣūl, 81v; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 194; Taslīk, 51v.

[116] From the texts of Ibn al-Malāḥimī, there is no indication that Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī had already employed this proof.

[117] Fā'iq, 18r; Muᶜtamad, 198.

an act without a motive.[118] On this basis, Ibn al-Malāḥimī argued that God, since He creates nothing without a motive and since His motive must be based on knowledge of the reality of the thing He creates, must necessarily be knowing.[119] Since al-Ḥillī shared the view of Ibn al-Malāḥimī that an agent does not act but for a motive, he could similarly employ the latter's proof for God's knowledge.

Al-Rāzī also referred to two proofs in order to show that God is knowing. The similarity of his proofs to those employed by Ibn al-Malāḥimī suggests that al-Rāzī was influenced by the latter's reasoning. He states:

> The creator of the world is knowing because His acts are well-wrought and perfect as is indicated by observation and because the doer of a well-wrought, perfect act must be knowing. This is known by immediate insight.
> Moreover, God acts by choice and a choosing agent is one who intends the production of a certain kind. The intention to create a certain kind is subject to the condition that [the agent] conceives that essence. Thus it is established that God conceives some essences and the essences by themselves undoubtedly require the stability of some qualities and the non-existence of others. And the conception of what requires necessitates the conception of what is required. Thus, from God's knowledge of these essences follows His knowledge of their concomitants and effects.[120]

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[118] See supra, p.129-30.
[119] Fā'iq, 18r.
[120] Maᶜālim, 50-1; see also Arbaᶜīn, 133-4; Maṭālib, 3:107ff; see also ibid., 117ff where he expresses his preference for the second proof.

b. God's Knowledge of the Non-Existent

Al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī were confronted with the position of the philosophers who held that God knows the universals (kulliyāt) but not particulars (juz'iyyāt). The argument underlying the philosophical position was that particulars are subject to constant change and if God knew them He, too, would be subject to constant change. This, however, was unacceptable.[121] Al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī, who upheld the theological view of divine omniscience which includes universals and particulars, disagreed. Thus they were required to counter this argument.

Of special relevance to al-Rāzī and al-Ḥillī was the philosophical objection that God cannot be aware of the change when something either gains existence or ceases to exist. If He knew that something comes into existence or ceases to exist at this moment, this knowledge would require a change in His essence as well. God's knowledge of the temporals must be timeless and cannot be subject to change. Al-Ḥillī reports the view of the philosophers referring to the example of God's knowledge of the occurrence of a lunar eclipse:[122]

> This is the objection of the philosophers. They claim [ لـا reading unclear] that God does not know particulars. By particulars they mean that He does not know whether something subject to [His] knowledge existed in the past, whether it will exist in the future or whether it exists now. He is in fact able to know something that is connected with its cause and with time but not whether it occurred in the past or whether it will occur in the future. He knows for instance that when the sun reaches a certain limit, the earth is in a middle position between the sun and the moon. Thus, the eclipse occurs. This knowledge is present to Him prior to the eclipse, after it and with it. But He

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[121] The question of how Ibn Sīnā in particular understood God's universal knowledge in contrast to man's knowledge has been the subject of a study by M.Marmura, "Some Aspects of Avicenna's Theory of God's Knowledge of the Particulars," Journal of the American Oriental Society 82 (1962):299-312.

[122] For this example among the philosophers, see ibid., 310-1.

does not know whether the eclipse occurred already, whether it will occur in the future or whether it occurs at this moment. This is the elaboration of their argument.[123]

Al-Ḥillī rejected this argument. It is not the attribute of knowledge which changes but the connection (ta<sup>c</sup>alluq) between God's essence and the object of His knowledge.[124] Therefore, when a thing is non-existent, there exists a relation between it and God's essence in so far as it is non-existent. Once it gains existence, a new connection replaces the former one between God's essence and this object of His knowledge. In some of his works, al-Ḥillī substitutes the term idāfa for the term ta<sup>c</sup>alluq.[125]

With this view, al-Ḥillī followed Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī who rejected the philosophical objection in the same way. He states:

> We have already clarified that knowledge has no meaning but that of a relation (idāfa) between the knower and the object of his knowledge. Accordingly, we say that if the object of knowledge changes that relation must inevitably change [too] because the reality and constancy of any relationship is connected with two related matters. If one of the two changed in the aspect in which it is related while the relationship did not change, it would suggest that the relationship is independent in itself [from the two related matters]. Thus, the relation would not be a relation; rather [knowledge would perhaps be] something else to which the relation is accidental. This is impossible. However, a change like this does not require a change [in His essence] [word missing] because what entails God's knowing that Zayd is in the house is either His essence or a determinant which subsists in His essence with the condition that Zayd is in the house. If Zayd leaves the house, the condition for this relationship does not endure. Thus it [i.e. the relationship] is interrupted and the condition for the stability of another relationship exists which is the knowledge that he has left the house. Thus, the first [relationship] is certainly negated and the second exists without any need for a change. This case is like that which our people agreed upon that God's power is connected with a thing when it comes into

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[123] Ma<sup>c</sup>ārij, 116v; see also Asrār, 225r; Manāhij, 91r.
[124] Nihāyat al-marām, 80r.
[125] Asrār, 225r; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 198; Nihāyat al-marām, 80r; Taslīk, 56r.

being. When it has become permanent the connection (taᶜalluq) of the power is interrupted. When He annihilates it the connection of the power to it recurs. From this it does not follow that He needs something which changes....The same applies here.[126]

With this answer, al-Rāzī followed the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī who offered a similar reply when they were confronted with the same objection.[127] They argued that God knows by His essence from eternity that He is one and that He will create the creation. However, the connection (taᶜalluq) of God's knowledge with the existence of a thing, which is also necessitated by His essence, occurs only when the thing exists.[128]

Thus, God knows a thing before its existence in its reality and how it will be when it occurs but He does not know it as existent.[129] Once the condition of the existence of the thing is fulfilled, the connection of God's knowledge with the existence of a thing is initiated (tajaddada

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[126] Ishāra, 15v; see also Maᶜālim, 51-2; Maṭālib, 3:155ff, 157; Mulakhkhaṣ, 343vff.
[127] See Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 46vff; Taqī al-Dīn, 253ff.
[128] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 46r-47r.
[129] Ibid., 47v.

al-ta^c^alluq).[130] According to Ibn al-Malāḥimī and Taqī al-Dīn,

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[130]Fā'iq, 47v.

In contrast to Ibn al-Malāḥimī's efforts to confine the change to the connection between God's knowledge and its object, al-Ḥillī reports in his Manāhij that Abū l-Ḥusayn and his followers argued that God's knowledge is in fact subject to change in accordance with the changes occuring in temporal objects of knowledge. This argumentation is not mentioned by Ibn al-Malāḥimī and evidently is not based on the latter's position since it does not refer to the connection between God's knowledge and its object.

Al-Ḥillī states (Manāhij, 91r): "It was said against them [i.e. the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn], 'knowledge is an attribute of essence, so that change is not permissible for it'. They answered: 'Change in an attribute of essence is not permissible if it is absolute. However, if it is subject to a condition, [change] is permissible. The clarification of this is that God is from eternity capable of the creation of the world and this is an essential attribute. It is not absolute, however, but subject to the condition of the non-existence of the world. When it [i.e. the world] exists, the endurance of the capability is impossible. Otherwise, the production of the existent would be necessary. We say the same about perception. For God is from eternity perceiving, but on the condition of the existence of the perceivable object in contrast to God's essence which is necessitating in an absolute way. Likewise God's being knowing a thing is subject to the condition that the thing is an object of knowledge in this manner. When that which He knew would exist comes into being, the possibility of being subject to knowledge that it will exist may remain and this leads necessarily to ignorance. Or it does not remain, but rather it ceases being subject to knowledge that it will exist after [having come into] existence and He knows that it exists. Thus, you have acknowledged a change of the condition, namely the change of the object of knowledge. From this follows necessarily a change of the subject of the condition [i.e. the attribute]'."

This account apparently derives from the teaching of later representatives of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn, most likely from the Kitāb al-Kāmil of Taqī al-Dīn. When the latter mentions the different theological opinions about how God knows the non-existent (ibid., 252ff), he points out that the view of Abū ^c^Alī, Abū l-Qāsim al-Ka^c^bī and Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī must necessarily lead to the possibility of change in God (ibid., 253). Against the position of Abū Hāshim, Taqī al-Dīn puts forth his own argumentation that God's knowledge is in fact subject to change (ibid., 259-60). He does not resort to the notion of connection, but maintains that God's knowledge itself changes. In affirming that this is permissible, he puts forth the same reasoning as it is reported by al-Ḥillī. Some attributes, like God's being powerful and perceiving, are subject to conditions in order to become actual. The same applies to knowledge. If something occurs in a specific manner, the condition is fulfilled for

the same answer had been offered by Abū ᶜAlī and Abū l-Qāsim al-Kaᶜbī to a similar objection.[131]

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God to know its existence in this specific manner. If the existence or some other aspects of it change, God's knowledge changes accordingly (ibid., 259-60). Taqī al-Dīn does not ascribe this argumentation to any earlier theologian and his presentation gives the impression that it was he who introduced it.

[131] Ibn al-Malāḥimī reports (Fā'iq, 46v): "Our master Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī reported in the [Kitāb] al-taṣaffuḥ about the master Abū ᶜAlī and Abū l-Qāsim al-Kaᶜbī that they held...that when a thing comes into existence after [its] non-existence its connection (taᶜalluq) with God's knowledge and His awareness (tabayyun) that it gained existence is renewed (tajaddada). The connection of the knowledge with that the thing will exist differs from [its] connection with that it has come into existence." See also Taqī al-Dīn, 253.

The position of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and his followers provoked accusations by later authors that they had returned to the views of Hishām b. Ḥakam and Jahm b. Ṣafwān (for their views, see later); see al-Shahrastānī, Milal, 1:85; idem, Nihāya, 221; Kamāl al-Dīn Aḥmad b. Ḥasan al-Bayāḍī, Ishārāt al-marām min ᶜibārāt al-imām (edited by Yūsuf ᶜAbd al-Razzāq. Cairo, 1368/1949), 127-8; al-Muḥallī, 76r. However, Ibn al-Malāḥimī drew a clear line between the position of Hishām b. Ḥakam and his own. He pointed out that the latter, in contrast to his own thesis, did not allow that God knew that the things will exist (Fā'iq, 47v).

According to Taqī al-Dīn,[132] and al-Ḥillī,[133] Ibn al-Malāḥimī differed from Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī in one aspect of their theory. While the latter maintained that the newly arising connection of God's knowledge is added to its former connection with the object, Ibn al-Malāḥimī held that it replaces it so that the former knowledge vanishes. Al-Ḥillī supported the position of Ibn al-Malāḥimī.[134]

The position of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī was not shared by most of the earlier Muᶜtazilites. According to Ibn al-Malāḥimī, the Bahshamiyya held that God's knowledge of a thing is always connected with its existence regardless of whether it will exist in the future, exists now, or existed in the past. There is only a difference of expression (ᶜibārāt) in relation to the three cases. Thus, if a thing will exist in the future, God knows its existence and that it will be in the future. In the case of a past thing, God will likewise know its existence and that it existed in the past. Ibn al-Malāḥimī reports Abū Hāshim's position:

> His knowledge does not change because of this [i.e. the turning of a thing from non-existence into existence] and He does not depart from the attribute of essence [i.e. His being knowing] because the knowledge that the thing will exist and the knowledge that it has come into existence is one knowledge. Only the expressions change in accordance with the change of the thing known. If its existence is in the future, the knowledge is described as knowledge that it will exist. If it exists the knowledge is described as knowledge of

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[132] Taqī al-Dīn, 261; also ibid., 127.
[133] Manāhij, 91r; Nihāyat al-marām, 79v-80r.
[134] Ibid.

its existence. If it ceases to exist it is described as knowledge [reading $^{c}$ilm for $^{c}$ālim] that it did exist.[135]

Abū Hāshim's main concern therefore was to rule out any change in God's essential attribute of being knowing. If God knows a thing before its existence and it enters existence, God's knowledge apparently must either be adjusted to this new situation, thus requiring a modification of His knowledge, or it is not adjusted and turns into ignorance.[136] By tying God's knowledge closely to the existence of the thing, Abū Hāshim sought to avoid these unacceptable alternatives.[137]

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[135] Fā'iq, 46v. For Abū Hāshim's view, see also al-Ḥillī, Nihāyat al-marām, 79v. Al-Ḥillī's account appears to be directly based on the Fā'iq.

[136] Taqī al-Dīn, 252; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 46r-v.

[137] Ibn Mattawayh states (Majmū$^{c}$, 1:118): "The state of the object of knowledge does not differ in its being the object of knowledge in the [state of] existence and non-existence. Thus, nothing is initiated which could be made a condition."

It is interesting to note that the issue of how God knows things in their state of non-existence and existence was already discussed among earlier theologians. The problem, however, was different.

Most of the early theologians identified "thing" (shay') and "existent" (mawjūd). This raised for those who held that the object of all knowledge was things, the problem whether and how God knows the non-existent which is not a thing. Some early answers were radical.

Al-Ash$^{c}$arī reports (Maqālāt, 489) the position of a group whom he regularly calls the "eternalists" (azaliyya). They held that since God eternally knows all things, they must necessarily exist eternally. Van Ess suggests that the azaliyya were an anonymous group holding non-Islamic views comparable to the dahriyya (Erkenntnislehre, 193). The Ikhwān al-Ṣafā', in fact, called the dahriyya by the name azaliyya, presenting them as those who believe in the eternity of the cosmos (See I.Goldziher and A.M.Goichon, "Dahriyya," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2:95.)

Apparently in direct response to this position (al-Ash$^{c}$arī, Maqālāt, 489), Hishām b. $^{c}$Amr al-Fuwaṭī (d. before 218/833) drew the opposite conclusion. Since things cannot be eternal it is not possible to say that God knew them from eternity. To maintain that God knows things eternally would be to assert their eternity. God can be said to be eternally knowing, according to al-Fuwaṭī, only with respect to His knowledge that He is one (ibid., 158). A similar conclusion was drawn by Jahm b. Ṣafwān (d. 128/745) who also identified "thing" with "existent" (ibid., 494-5; W.Madelung, "The Shiite and Khārijite Contribution to the

5.God as Hearing and Seeing

Al-Ḥillī accepted on scriptual grounds that God is hearing and seeing. Moreover, he affirmed that nothing from the point of view of reason stands against this. He states:

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Pre-Ash^carite Kalām," in Islamic Philosophical Theology (edited by P.Morewedge. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979), 125). Hishām b. Ḥakam (d. 179/796) also maintained that God knows only existent things. If He knew things eternally this would necessitate the eternity of things (al-Ash^carī, Maqālāt, 493-4; Madelung, "Contribution," 123).

The possibility of God's knowledge of things prior to their existence was asserted as soon as the theologians differentiated the term "thing". Al-Shaḥḥām appears to have been the first who offered such a distinction. Prior to their existence, things may be known by God although they become real things only when they occur. (See van Ess, Erkenntnislehre, 192-3) Abū ^cAlī envisaged a similar differentiation when he taught that things are not things prior to their existence since existence (kawn) means being found (wujūd) (al-Ash^carī, Maqālāt, 162). However, a thing may be called a thing and may be known prior to its existence insofar as it is possible to make a statement about it (ibid., 161; see also ibid. for further meanings in which a thing can be said to be a thing prior to its existence).

Owing to their notion of states, the Bahshamiyya were not confronted with the issue whether a thing may be known prior to its existence. The attribute of essence through which it is what it is is always attached to it, regardless of whether the thing exists or not.

The school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī repudiated the notion of states and offered a solution similar to that of Abū ^cAlī. They affirmed two meanings for the term "thing" (Ibn al-Malāhimī, Fā'iq, 49r). In the first sense, "thing" means an existent object, i.e. an essence (dhāt). In the second sense, something non-existent may be called "thing" insofar as it is possible to make a statement about it.

Al-Ḥillī employed the philosophical notion of existence in the mind in contrast to existence in the external world; he held that it is possible to know the non-existent in ratiocination (Manāhij, 79v-80r).

Thus, the problem that gave originally rise to the question of how God knows the non-existent, i.e. that a thing cannot be asserted to be a thing prior to its existence, was no longer a problem. The main concern of the later theologians was rather to assert God's omniscience without, however, allowing any change to occur in His essence. (For a systematic outline of the dispute among the early theologians, see van Ess, Erkenntnislehre, 192ff).

> There is no impediment from the point of view of this reason from describing God as perceiving. Moreover, the Qur'an [describes Him so] [word missing]. If [reading *idha* for *idhan*] [the Qur'an] describes Him [reading *yaṣifuhu* for *yuṣifuhu*] as such, it is necessary to adhere to this view, unless a rational indication made it impossible to apply [reading *iṭlāquhu* for [illegible]] [this attribute] to Him, when it would be necessary to interpret [the scriptural evidence metaphorically].[138]

This passage reflects al-Ḥillī's general hesitation to explain what he meant by God's being perceiving. Among the earlier Mu^c^tazilites, the following two views were most favoured which he summarizes:

> Abū Hāshim and his followers maintained that the meaning of God's being perceiving is that it is not impossible for Him to perceive the perceivable whenever it exists. Likewise, God is eternally described as being capable of hearing (*samī^c^*) and capable of seeing (*baṣīr*). He made perception a matter additional to knowledge.
> The Baghdadis explained it as meaning that God is knowing what the living among us hear and see. They denied anything in addition to this.[139]

The Bahshamiyya maintained that God's capability of hearing and seeing is entailed by His being alive. Whenever a perceivable object exists the condition for perception is fulfilled.[140] Thus, God is eternally described as capable of hearing and seeing (*samī^c^*/ *baṣīr*). Yet only when the condition for the actual perception is fulfilled, may He be called actually hearing and seeing (*sāmi^c^*/ *mubṣir*). This distinction between the transitive and the intransitive meaning of hearing and seeing originated with Abū ^c^Alī.[141]

The Baghdadis, in contrast, reduced God's perception to His knowledge. To say that God is hearing (*samī^c^*) and seeing (*baṣīr*) can only mean that He knows what man perceives through his senses.[142]

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138 *Manāhij*, 92r.
139 Ibid.
140 Al-Nīsābūrī, *Fī l-tawḥīd*, 562ff, 564; ^c^Abd al-Jabbār, *Mughnī*, 5:242.
141 Al-Ash^c^arī, *Maqālāt*, 176.
142 Ibid., 168, 175; al-Baghdādī, *Farq*, 166, 181; idem, *Uṣūl al-dīn*, 96; Mānakdīm, 168; see also McDermott, 145.

The school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī was divided on this issue. Abū l-Ḥusayn himself is usually reported to have supported the school of Baghdad.[143] The reliability of these reports is not certain. He had put forward an argument supporting the view of the Baghdadis which appeared to invalidate the position of the Basrans.[144] He refrained, however, from explicitly stating his support for the view of the Baghdadis.[145]

Although Ibn al-Malāḥimī accepted Abū l-Ḥusayn's objection to the Basran view, he ultimately supported the Basran position.[146]

In most of his works, al-Ḥillī surveyed the arguments of both positions refuting them all.[147] He refrained from stating his own preference while asserting that the only safe indication for God's being perceiving is scriptural evidence.[148] Only in his Ma^c^ārij, he states that the reduction of God's perception to His knowledge is the most acceptable explanation.[149]

Al-Ḥillī followed al-Rāzī in his cautious approach in this question. The latter maintained that God must be said to be hearing and seeing because these are attributes of perfection (ṣifāt al-kamāl) while their opposites would be attributes of deficiency (ṣifāt al-nuqṣān). He further referred to scriptural evidence. Yet he acknowledged that

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143 E.g. al-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 248; Mītham al-Baḥrānī, 90; al-Ḥillī, Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 205; idem, Taslīk, 52v; al-Miqdād, 206. Al-Muḥallī (66v), in contrast, reports that Abū l-Ḥusayn, like Ibn al-Malāḥimī, supported the position of the Bahshamiyya.

144 Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 19r; idem, Mu^c^tamad, 215.

145 Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 19r. See also al-Rāzī, I^c^tiqādāt, 42, where he states that Abū l-Ḥusayn was undecided on this issue.

146 Fā'iq, 19r-v; Mu^c^tamad, 212ff, esp.217ff. For the views of Abū l-Ḥusayn and Ibn al-Malāḥimī, see also Taqī al-Dīn, 196-7; W.Madelung, "The Theology of al-Zamakhsharī," in Actas del XII Congresso de la U.E.A.I. (Madrid, 1986), 490-1.

147 Manāhij, 92r; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 205-6; Taslīk, 53r.

148 Ibid., 53r.

149 Ma^c^ārij, 118r.

this is valid only as long as there is no definite proof that God cannot literally be said to be hearing and seeing. He states:

> Concerning the clarification that God is described by hearing and seeing.
> The proof for this is that hearing and seeing belong to the attributes of perfection while their opposites belong to the attributes of deficiency. Moreover, the Qur'an affirms them for God....Since there are numerous passages reporting [these attributes for God], they must be asserted for God, unless the opponents put forth a proof that the reality of these two states is conditional on a condition whose realization is impossible in regard to God. In that case it would be necessary to interpret [these verses metaphorically].[150]

Like al-Ḥillī, al-Rāzī went on to refute the arguments of both those who affirm hearing and seeing as separate attributes to God[151] and those who deny this.[152]

It is most likely that al-Ḥillī's argument that God is hearing and seeing on scriptural grounds, and that nothing from the point of view of reason stands against this is directly based on al-Rāzī's Arbaᶜīn or another work by him.

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150 Arbaᶜīn, 170.
151 Ibid., 170ff.
152 Ibid., 172ff.

6.God as Willing

Al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī disagreed about the nature of God's will.

In accordance with his determinism, al-Rāzī held that God's will is an essential attribute. God is qualified by an eternal will (irāda qadīma).[153] Through His eternal will, God has predestined everything that happens. Therefore, nothing can occur that He did not eternally wish to happen.[154]

Al-Ḥillī, following the Muᶜtazilite tradition,[155] denied that God has determined things eternally and that He wills through an eternal will. However, although the Muᶜtazilites were united in their opposition to determinism, they disagreed among themselves about the nature of God's being willing. Al-Ḥillī identified God's will with His motive (dāᶜī) for an act. Whenever God knows that an act would benefit His creation and is free from any evil aspects, this knowledge is His motive to perform this act. Will has no meaning beyond this motive in regard to God.[156]

Here, al-Ḥillī disagreed with those Muᶜtazilites who considered God's will as a separate attribute of act which is additional to His knowledge of the beneficial nature of the act. He summarizes the various views on the nature of God's being willing:

> Although the Muslims agree that God must be described as willing, they disagree about [the nature of God's] will. A group of theologians maintained that will is an expression for the motive [for the act] which consists in the knowledge of the benefit of an act; and that disapproval is an expression for the deterrent (ṣārif) [from the act] which consists in the

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[153] Arbaᶜīn, 153-4; Maᶜālim, 58-9.
[154] Arbaᶜīn, 244ff; Maᶜālim, 89-90.
[155] An exception was Bishr b. Muᶜtamir who maintained that God's willing is an attribute of essence as well as act. See al-Ashᶜarī, Maqālāt, 190; ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 6/2:3.
[156] Manāhij, 91v; Asrār, 223v; Taslīk, 31v.

> knowledge of the harmfulness of the act. Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī held that will and disapproval consist of knowledge [of the benefit and harm of the act] in regard to God, but they are additional in regard to us [men]. The majority of the Mu$^{c}$tazilites and the Ash$^{c}$arites affirmed that [will] is additional [to knowledge] in regard to us and to God....Al-Ka$^{c}$bī maintained that God's will for His own acts means that He knows them. [His will] in regard to our acts [reading _af$^{c}$ālinā_ for _af$^{c}$ālihā_] means that He commands them.[157]

By the majority of Mu$^{c}$tazilite theologians who maintained that God's will is additional to His motive, al-Ḥillī meant the school of Basra prior to Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. He presents their position and refutes it:

> The third investigation about God's being willing by virtue of His essence (_li-dhātihi_). The two Jubbā'īs held that God is knowing through a temporal will (_irāda ḥāditha_) which does not inhere in a substrate (_lā fī maḥall_)....[This is false] because the subsistence of a will by itself (_qiyām al-irāda bi-dhātihā_) is not reasonable, and because its occurrence would require another will. This would lead to an endless regress.[158]

The position of the Basran Mu$^{c}$tazilites originated with Abū l-Hudhayl.[159] He denied that God's will to create a thing can be identified with His creation of it.[160] Rather, God's will of a thing together with the creative imperative "be" (_kun_) addressed to it constitute His creation.[161] God's will of the acts of others cannot be identified with His command of them.[162] This affirmation of a temporal divine attribute of will raised the question of its origin and locus.

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[157] _Ma$^{c}$ārij_, 117r; see also _Taslīk_; 52r-v.

[158] _Nahj al-mustarshidīn_, 218.

[159] For Abū l-Hudhayl's view on God's will, see generally Madelung, _Al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm_, 165; Frank, "Attributes," 494ff. It is noteworthy that later writers usually mention Abū l-Hudhayl among those theologians who denied that God's will has a specific reality of its own; see e.g. Ibn al-Malāḥimī, _Mu$^{c}$tamad_, 240; idem, _Fā'iq_, 22r; Taqī al-Dīn, 202; al-Jurjānī, 57. Ibn al-Malāḥimī seems to be the first source which attributes this view to Abū l-Hudhayl.

[160] Al-Ash$^{c}$arī, _Maqālāt_, 189, 364.

[161] Ibid., 190, 363, 510; also ibid.,363, 366 where creation (_khalq_) is defined as _qawl_ and _irāda_.

[162] Ibid., 510.

Abū l-Hudhayl maintained that God is willing through a will which is created in a metaphoric sense (fī l-majāz).[163] By this he presumably meant that if it were created, its creation would require another will. This would lead to an endless regress. He further stipulated that this will is in no place (lā fī makān).[164] With this, he attempted to avoid a conflict between his notion of God's temporal will and the common doctrine that nothing temporal may inhere in God. Abū l-Hudhayl's view was shared by Abū ᶜAlī.[165]

Abū Hāshim followed Abū l-Hudhayl and Abū ᶜAlī in holding that God wills in a manner comparable to man.[166] Thus, His attribute of willing is a separate attribute of act.[167] Since nothing may inhere in God he, like his predecesors, stipulated that His will subsists in no substrate (lā fī maḥall).[168]

The assertion of accidents which do not inhere in a substrate was one of the peculiarities of the theology of the Basrans prior to Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. The latter denied the possibility of this.[169] Al-Ḥillī followed him in this regard.[170]

In another respect, too, al-Ḥillī followed the doctrine of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī concerning God's will. They identified God's will and disapproval with His motives and deterrents. His knowledge that an act is beneficial constitutes His motive to perform it and His knowledge that an act is harmful constitutes His deterrent from performing it.[171]

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[163] Ibid., 366, 189.
[164] Ibid., 190, 363; al-Baghdādī, Farq, 127; al-Shahrastānī, Milal, 1:51, 53; see also ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 6/2:4 where Ibn ᶜAyyāsh is quoted asserting that Jaᶜfar b. Harb introduced this formula.
[165] Al-Ashᶜarī, Maqālāt, 510.
[166] Mānakdīm, 434.
[167] ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 6/2:140ff.
[168] Ibid., 6/2:149ff.
[169] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Muᶜtamad, 133-4.
[170] Manāhij, 88v; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 91.
[171] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Muᶜtamad, 240; Taqī al-Dīn, 203; al-Muḥallī, 150v; Mītham al-Baḥrānī, 88.

In his presentation of the view of Abū l-Qāsim al-Ka<sup>c</sup>bī and his school, al-Ḥillī correctly stated that they held that God's will in regard to man's acts consists in His command. Yet when he presented their view on God's will of His acts as virtually identical with the position of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, both reducing it to His knowledge of His acts, al-Ḥillī was mistaken. The Baghdadis rather reduced His will for His own acts to His creation of them.[172] With this wrong presentation, al-Ḥillī followed the usage of a number of earlier writers who maintained that Abū l-Ḥusayn followed al-Ka$^c$bī in his notion of the nature of God's will.[173]

The basis for the Baghdadi position was laid by al-Naẓẓām.[174] In his doctrine, God's attribute of will virtually disappears as he identified it with three different meanings.[175] With regard to His own acts, God's will is identical with their creation.[176] With regard to the acts of His servants, His will is identical with His command (amr).[177] God may also be said to will an event in the future such as

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172 Mānakdīm, 434; al-Ash$^c$arī, Maqālāt, 191, 509; al-Baghdādī, Farq, 181-2; al-Shahrastānī, Milal, 1:55, 78.

173 Taqī al-Dīn, 202; al-Jurjānī, 57; al-Rāzī, Arba$^c$īn, 147; idem, Maṭālib, 3:179. In his article "L'attribut divin d'irāda (volonté) d'apres une source inexploité," Studia Islamica 31 (1970):257-268, G.Vajda offered a translation of a passage on God's will from an anonymous Ash$^c$arite fragment, preserved as MS 1259 in the Bibliotheque Nationale (see Vajda and Sauvan, 3:131). This fragment is undoubtedly a portion of al-Rāzī's Maṭālib al-$^c$aliyya; see Maṭālib, 3:173-182, for the text which corresponds to Vajda's translation.

174 Al-Shahrastānī, Milal, 1:55. For his view on God's will, see generally al-Ash$^c$arī, Maqālāt, 190-1, 365, 509-10; Mānakdīm, 434; $^c$Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 6/2, 3-4; also Madelung, Al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm, 165-6; J.van Ess, "Göttliche Allmacht im Zerrbild menschlicher Sprache," Mélanges de l'Université Saint-Joseph 49 (1975-6):670-1.

175 It is noteworthy that al-Naẓẓām usually avoids the term irāda employing the term al-waṣf bi-annahu murīd instead; see e.g. al-Ash$^c$arī, Maqālāt, 190-1, 509-10.

176 Ibid., 190-1, 365, 509-10.

177 Ibid.

the day of resurrection. In this case, al-Naẓẓām identified His will with His deciding (ḥākim) the event and announcing it.[178]

Al-Ḥillī mentioned a disagreement among the Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilite theologians about man's will.[179] Is it identical with his motives for the act or does it have a meaning beyond these? This question did not pose itself for the Bahshamiyya who upheld a separate attribute of will in man in the context of their theory of states. The followers of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn, however, disagreed among themselves about this point. Abū l-Ḥusayn allowed the existence of a will in addition to the motive for the act in man.[180] Once man has the motive for a certain act, he develops a wish (ṭalab/ muṭālaba) for it. This wish, which is possible only for a corporeal being with appetites but not for God, is called by Abū l-Ḥusayn "will".[181] Ibn al-Malāḥimī disagreed with his master in rejecting the reality of will even in man. In his opinion, will and disinclination can be reduced with regard to both man and God to the motives for, and deterrents from, the act.[182]

Al-Ḥillī followed the view of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. Once man has the motive for an act, he develops an inclination (mayl) toward the act which differs from his motive.[183] Al-Rāzī developed a concept of man's will for his acts which bears great resemblance to Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī's and al-Ḥillī's position.[184]

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[178] Ibid.
[179] Ma<sup>c</sup>ārij, 117r (quoted supra, p.202-3).
[180] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Mu<sup>c</sup>tamad, 240; idem, Fā'iq, 22r; Taqī al-Dīn, 203; al-Muḥallī, 150v.
[181] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Mu<sup>c</sup>tamad, 240-1, 249.
[182] Ibid., 249; idem, Fā'iq, 22r; see also al-Muḥallī, 150v.
[183] See supra, p.127-8.
[184] See supra, p.133.

CHAPTER VI

PASSING AWAY (FANĀ') AND RESTORATION (I^cĀDA)

1.God's Obligation to Restore Man to Life

Al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī agreed that God will restore men after having caused their passing away. However, they disagreed whether God is obliged to do so or not.

In view of his notion of divine justice, al-Ḥillī supported the position that God is obliged to restore men. He comments on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's argumentation with which he fully agreed:

> The author [Naṣīr al-Dīn] argued for the absolutely obligatory nature of the restoration from two aspects. First, God promised reward and threatened punishment, while the death of the morally obliged is witnessed. Thus, their return is necessary in order for His promise and threat to be fulfilled. Secondly, God has morally obliged [men] and inflicted pain and this requires reward (thawāb) and compensation (^ciwaḍ). Otherwise, God would be oppressive, but God is exalted far above this. We have already clarified His wisdom, and there is no doubt that reward and compensation will reach the morally obliged in the hereafter because of their negation in this world.[1]

He stipulated further that the restoration of the following groups is incumbent upon God:

> The restoration of the morally obliged who deserve compensation (^ciwaḍ) either from God or from somebody else, or from whom another being deserves compensation, is known by reason to be obligatory. As for the first category, this is because of the negation of injustice on His part. As for the second, this is because God is obliged to establish justice (intiṣāf). As for the third, the same [principle] applies. The restoration of the

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[1]Kashf al-murād, 320; see also Manāhij, 103r; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 407. For the identical Mu^ctazilite arguments that God is obliged to restore men to life, see Taqī al-Dīn, 322; Abū Muḥammad b. Mattawayh, al-Tadhkira fī aḥkām al-jawāhir wa-l-a^crāḍ (edited by Sāmī Naṣr Luṭf and Fayṣal Badīr ^cAwn. Silsilat nafā'is al-fikr al-islāmī, no.1. Cairo: Dār al-thaqāfa, 1975), 244-5; also al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.9, pt.17:20ff.

infidels and of the children of the believers is obligatory [only] because of scriptural evidence since there is no disagreement among the Muslims [about this] while no rational proof points to their restoration. The restoration of someone who deserves reward is rationally obligatory because of the necessity that he receive what he deserves. Moreover, scriptural evidence also points to this. The restoration of [living beings] other than these is not obligatory.[2]

With this classification, al-Ḥillī was in agreement with his Mu$^{c}$tazilite predecessors.[3]

Al-Rāzī, as an Ash$^{c}$arite, denied in principle that God is subject to any obligation. However, when he argued that restoration will actually take place, he not only resorted to the traditional scriptural evidence[4] and to consensus,[5] but he also added two rational proofs based on principles which do not easily agree with his traditional Ash$^{c}$arite position. In his first proof, he ascribed to man's life in this world the purpose of gaining reward in the hereafter. If this were not the case, life in this world would be futile ($^{c}$abath) and foolish (safah). He states:

> We see in this world people who obey, people who disobey, people who do good, and people who do evil. We moreover see that the obedient dies without any reward reaching him in this world, while the disobedient dies without any punishment. If there were no congregation (hashr) and restoration (nashr), when the good person receives his reward and the evildoer his punishment, this worldly life would be futile, nay folly.[6]

This argument implies that God created the world for man's benefit and that He is obliged to bring about congregation and restoration. Both principles are in conflict

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[2]Manāhij, 103v; see also Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 407; Taslīk, 77v-78r.
[3]E.g. Ibn al-Malāhimī, Fā'iq, 222r-v; Ibn Mattawayh, Majmū$^{c}$, 2:310-1; $^{c}$Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 11:464ff.
[4]Tafsīr, vol.1, pt.2:134; vol.9, pt.17:29, 32; vol.13, pt.26:113; vol.15, pt.29:22; Ishāra, 63v-64r. For earlier Ash$^{c}$arite references to scriptural evidence, see Ibn Fūrak, 145; al-Baghdādī, Uṣūl al-dīn, 237.
[5]Ishāra, 63v-64r; see also al-Baghdādī, Uṣūl al-dīn, 232, who equally referred to consensus.
[6]Arba$^{c}$īn, 293-4.

with with al-Rāzī's view of God's relation towards His creation. It also implies that the moral quality of man's acts is the cause for his fate in the hereafter. As will be seen in the discussion on reward and punishment, this principle also does not agree with al-Rāzī's Ash^carite position.

In his second argument, he argued further on the basis of non-Ash^carite principles. He stated that God created man for the purpose of his comfort (rāḥa) and pleasure (ladhdha). This purpose cannot be reached in this world since there exists no real pleasure. Pleasure in this world is only the repulsion of harm (daf^c al-ḍarar). Therefore, he concluded, God will cause man's restoration in the hereafter so that he may experience real pleasure. If this were not the case, it would contradict God's description as beneficent (muḥsin), as compassionate (raḥīm) and as self-sufficient (ghanī). He states:

> God created creation either for comfort or hardship (ta^cab) and pain or neither for comfort nor for hardship. It is not permissible that He created them for hardship and pain since this is not appropriate for the Beneficent, the Compassionate, the Self-sufficient who does not need the creation. Likewise it is not permissible to say that He created them neither for [their] comfort nor for hardship and pain because this was the case when they were non-existent. This indicates that He created them only for their comfort. Then we say that this comfort occurs either in this world, because what man assumes [to be] pleasure in this world is not pleasure but rather the repulsion of harm. Eating, for instance, is not really a pleasure but rather the repulsion of the pain of hunger....Since it has been established that the living being has been created for the purpose of pleasure and comfort and that this does not occur in this world, it must inevitably be affirmed that there exists another world after this in which this purpose will be accomplished. This is the hereafter.[7]

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[7]Ibid., 294-5.

Like in the first proof, al-Rāzī's assertion that God created men for their comfort and pleasure and that He is obliged to ensure that they will receive this, contradicts his Ash^c arite notion that God does not act for a purpose but by His arbitrary will.

2.The Nature of Passing Away and Restoration

Discussing the nature of passing away, al-Ḥillī presents two contrasting views and indicates his own choice:

> Abū Hāshim and his followers affirmed that the passing away is an entitative determinant (maᶜnā). The remaining [theologians] denied this; and this is the truth. They [i.e. the Bahshamiyya] argued that the atoms endure while non-existence is possible for them. This is not possible except with the affirmation of the [accident of] passing away (fanā')....As for [the stipulation that] this requires the affirmation of [an accident of] passing away, [this is so] because the annihilation (iᶜdām) occurs either because of the essence [of the thing which passes away]. This is impossible. Or it is due to an agent. This is [likewise] impossible because the effectiveness (ta'thīr) [of an agent] is for production (ījād) not for annihilation (iᶜdām), since effectiveness means the production of an effect (ījād al-athar). Or it results from the occurrence of the opposite which is the [accident of] passing away....As for the ancients (awā'il), since they maintained that production and annihilation may equally be dependent on the effector, they are not bound by this impossibility [i.e. of non-existence being caused directly by an agent]....The truth is the position of the ancients.[8]

As indicated in this passage, the position of the Bahshamiyya was an attempt to assert the possibility of passing away without infringing two other vital notions of the school.

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[8]Manāhij, 88v.

One of these was that all atoms (jawāhir)[9] and most accidents (a$^{c}$rād)[10] endure by themselves. Here they disagreed with the Baghdadis who maintained that accidents last only for one instance so that they always need to be recreated.[11] Passing away simply consists, according to this latter view, in the failure of God to recreate the accidents.[12] The Bahshamiyya had to find a different solution. The second notion which they had to take into consideration was that an agent may effect only production (ījād) but not annihilation (i$^{c}$dām). This also applies to God. Thus, He can undo something only through the creation of its opposite.[13] The solution of the Bahshamiyya, therefore, was that God causes the passing away of the atoms through the creation of a single accident of passing away (fanā'). This accident is the opposite of all atoms and, thus, is capable of annihilating

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[9] Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 212; idem, Majmū$^{c}$, 2:288ff; $^{c}$Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 11:441ff.

[10] The Basran Mu$^{c}$tazilites considered the following types of accidents as stable: colours (alwān), tastes (tu$^{c}$ūm), smells (rawā'ih), hotness (harāra), coldness (burūda), wetness (rutūba), dryness (yubūsa), life (hayāt), and composition (ta'līf); see Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 41. The following accidents were not considered as enduring: pains (ālām), joys (ladhdhāt) (ibid., 326-7), voices (aswāt) (ibid., 335), and pressure (i$^{c}$timād) (ibid., 554-6).

[11] Al-Ash$^{c}$arī, Maqālāt, 358, 367; Ibn al-Mattawayh, Majmū$^{c}$, 2:290; Taqī al-Dīn, 289; al-Baghdādī, Usūl al-dīn, 231; see also Pines, 24.

[12] Taqī al-Dīn, 289. Underlying this notion was the Baghdadi view that an atom must necessarily have an accident of every genus of accidents that it is capable of having (Frank, Beings, 94). When God therefore fails to recreate an accident, the atom necessarily passes away.

[13] Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 212, 215-6; idem, Majmū$^{c}$, 2:293ff; $^{c}$Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 11:442-3.

any atom.[14] It must itself be existent (mawjūd),[15] but it cannot inhere in a substrate (lā fī maḥall).[16] Furthermore it does not endure.[17]

This theory provoked much criticism among opponents and later Mu$^c$tazilites. The Ash$^c$arites correctly objected that once God creates the accident of passing away all atoms are annihilated. He is therefore unable to cause the annihilation of only some of the atoms.[18] The followers of the school of

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[14]Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 231ff; idem, Majmū$^c$, 2:297-8; $^c$Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 11:444; also al-Baghdādī, Farq, 197; idem, Uṣūl al-dīn, 231; al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 86-7. Al-Ḥillī reports (Manāhij, 88v) that Shaykh al-Ṭūsī was undecided about this point. From al-Ṭūsī's available works, this can not be verified; see e.g. his "Muqaddima," 187-8.

[15]Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 219.

[16]Ibid., 218ff. This condition was introduced by Abū l-Hudhayl who described passing away (fanā') as God's will of it together with His uttering of the command "pass away". Endurance and passing away, he held, do not subsist in a place (lā fī makān). For his position, see al-Ash$^c$arī, Maqālāt, 366-7; Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 217-8, 243; Taqī al-Dīn, 290.

[17]Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 224-5. Most of the points of this concept had been introduced already by Abū $^c$Alī. However, Abū Hāshim disagreed with his father on a number of points. In his earlier works, Abū $^c$Alī is reported to have maintained that there are different types of passing away each of which causes the annihilation of only the corresponding type of atoms. In a later version of his Naqḍ al-tāj, he is reported to have revised his position, stating that only one passing away is required for all atoms (see Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 231; also Gimaret, "Matériaux," 292). Abū $^c$Alī further maintained that it is reason which indicates that the atoms will in fact pass away. Abū Hāshim and his followers disagreed. If it were not for scriptural evidence, there would be no indication that the passing away will actually occur (see Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 209; Taqī al-Dīn, 289). Abū $^c$Alī further rejected on principle that anything which does not subsist in a substrate may be defined as an accident. Thus he refrained from classifying passing away as an accident. Abū Hāshim and his school admitted a category of accidents which do not inhere in a substrate (see Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 218). For the different categories of accidents in relation to the substrate according to the Bahshamiyya, see ibid., 36.

[18]Abū l-Qāsim al-Anṣārī, Sharḥ al-irshād (MS Princeton University Library, ELS 634), 131r; idem, al-Ghunya fī uṣūl al-dīn (MS III Ahmet 1916), 94r; al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 140; al-Kāmil fī ikhtiṣār al-shāmil (by an unknown author. MS III Ahmet 1322), 73v-74r. Before having revised his position that there are different types of passing away each of which causes the annihilation of only the corresponding type of

Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and the Ashᶜarites also objected to the idea that the accident of passing away does not inhere in a substrate. It is one of the peculiarities of the Bahshamiyya that they allowed that certain accidents do not inhere in a substrate.[19]

The second position mentioned by al-Ḥillī, which he approved, is founded on the philosophers' view that a contingent matter requires an effector because of its contingency and not merely for its occurrence.[20] It is defined as contingent by virtue of itself (mumkin li-dhātihi) regardless of whether it exists or not. Thus, having gained existence it is still essentially contingent by itself. No essentially contingent existent may endure by itself. Rather it depends on its effector even when it exists.[21] In relation to the capability of its effector, the choosing agent, existence and non-existence of the effect are equally possible. He may therefore choose either to undo the effect or to cause its endurance.[22] Since God is in al-Ḥillī's view a choosing agent, He may undo the world through a direct act if He wishes to do so.[23]

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atoms (see supra, p.213 n.17), Abū ᶜAlī held that God can choose to annihilate only some atoms; see Gimaret, "Matériaux," 292; Ibn al-Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 231.

19 See e.g Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Muᶜtamad, 133-4; al-Ḥillī, Manāhij, 88v; idem, Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 91; al-Baghdādī, Farq, 197.

20 E.g. Ibn Sīnā, Najāt, 249-50.

21 Asrār, 205r, 212v; Manāhij, 79r, 88v; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 164; Nihāyat al-marām, 48v. See also Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 218r, 225r-226v, where the author attacked this view while defending the traditional Muᶜtazilite position that existing things exist by virtue of themselves and do not require an effector.

22 Manāhij, 84v.

23 Ibid., 88v; Maᶜārij, 129r; Taslīk, 76r.

This possibility was rejected by most of his Mu^c^tazilite predecessors, who maintained that an effector is required only in order to produce things.[24] Once it exists, it endures by itself.[25]

Having adopted the philosophers' concept of endurance and annihilation, al-Ḥillī disagreed, however, with their doctrine of the eternity of the world. In their view, since God is a necessitating agent, it is impermissible that He may undo any of His effects. If He were to annihilate His creation, the motive to annihilate would be substituted for the motive to create. Yet God is eternal and acts only in accordance with His perfect essence which is not subject to any change. It is, thus, impossible that He may undo at some time what He effected at another time. Therefore, the world, like God, must be eternal.[26] Al-Ḥillī envisaged God as a choosing agent who acts on the basis of His motives arising from His knowledge of the beneficial results of His acts for His creation. He therefore allowed that God may annihilate His creation if He has the motive for doing so.[27]

However, when discussing the nature of restoration, he denied that the non-existent may be restored. He states:

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[24]An exception was Abū l-Husayn al-Khayyāṭ who maintained that the passing away of the world occurs through its direct nullification (i^c^dām) by God (see Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 212; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 217v; Taqī al-Dīn, 290; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.15, pt.30:53). According to Ibn Mattawayh (Tadhkira, 212), the same position was held by Abū l-Hafs al-Khallāl al-Basrī (d. 377/987). Ibn al-Malāḥimī in principle approved al-Khayyāṭ's explanation but eventually rejected it since no scriptural or rational proof indicates that God would do so; see Fā'iq, 218v, 219v; see also Taqī al-Dīn, 290.
[25]Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 218r, 226r.
[26]Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 84ff; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 225rff.
[27]Manāhij, 103r; Ma^c^ārij, 129r; Taslīk, 76r-v; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 396.

The second investigation about the restoration of the non-existent (iᶜādat al-maᶜdūm). People disagreed about this. The critical investigators (muhaqqiqūn) denied [its possibility] while others affirmed it. The former argued that of whatever passes into non-existence, no identity (huwiyya) remains. Thus, it is not possible to affirm its contingency. Moreover, if it were to be restored it would have to be restored together with its time [i.e. of the initial creation]. It therefore would be at the same time initiated and restored. [Moreover, if it were to exist after its restoration] it could not be distinguished from its like if it existed....We investigated the arguments of both groups in the Kitāb al-nihāya. The reliable view is that the first position must be considered as necessary.[28]

He shared these arguments with the philosophers and with Ibn al-Malāḥimī, who also denied that the non-existent may be restored.[29]

Ibn al-Malāḥimī rejected the possibility of the restoration of the non-existent[30] because, following Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, he repudiated the position of the Bahshamiyya that a non-existent is a thing prior to its existence. The latter maintained that an essence (dhāt) together with the attribute of essence attached to it has a reality prior to existence. Thus, an essence which passed into non-existence is still real (thābit).[31] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, in contrast, held that if God let any bodies pass into non-existence their individual essences would likewise cease to be. In this case, it would be impossible for the individual bodies to be restored.[32] Any bodies which He would create at the restoration could merely be similar to the individual bodies of this world.[33] This, however, is inconceivable since the restored person who receives reward, compensation or punishment in the hereafter must be identical

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[28]Ibid., 393; see also Īḍāḥ al-maqāṣid, 23ff; Asrār, 173v-174r; Manāhij, 103r-v.
[29]For the arguments of the philosophers, see al-Jurjānī, 246ff.
[30]Fā'iq, 217rff, 224rff. Al-Ḥillī ascribed this view already to Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (Maᶜārij, 129r). Ibn al-Malāḥimī does not report Abū l-Ḥusayn's position on this issue.
[31]Frank, "Non-Existent," 204-8.
[32]Fā'iq, 224r; also Taqī al-Dīn, 324-5.
[33]Fā'iq, 224r; also al-Ḥillī, Maᶜārij, 129r.

with the person in this world who deserves them. Otherwise, restoration, punishment, compensation and reward would be unjust on the part of God.[34]

For the Bahshamiyya, this problem did not arise. When they asserted that by the accident of passing away the existence of the bodies will be nullified, it was still possible for God to restore the former individual bodies, since their essence together with the attribute of essence would not vanish with the passing away of their existence.[35] Thus, they defined the restoration of the bodies as a second initial creation by God, comparable to His first one.[36]

Ibn al-Malāḥimī's solution was that bodies do not really pass into non-existence. Rather, they die and their parts (ajzā') become dispersed (tafarruq).[37] At the time of the

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[34] Fā'iq, 224r-225v.

[35] Taqī al-Dīn presents the Basran position as follows (329-30): "Then they maintain that these atoms pass away into non-existence. Non-existence means for them only that [the atoms] are no longer characterized by the attribute of existence while the reality of [their] essence (ḥaqīqat al-dhāt) remains since it [i.e. the atom] is described by its essential attribute. Then it is restored to existence. This restored existence is different from the existence it had before. Then it receives the recompense it deserves." See also Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 224v; al-Jurjānī, 244.

[36] cAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 11:456ff; Ibn Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 237. The Basrans maintained that a thing must fulfil certain conditions for its restoration to be possible. Ibn Mattawayh enumerates these conditions (Majmūc, 2:305): "That for which it is proper to be restored must be[long to the category of the] enduring (bāqī), it must be [the product of] an act of God to the exclusion of anybody else, and it must have been [produced by] an initial act (mubtada'). If these three conditions are fulfilled, the restoration of the entity is possible, regardless of whether it belongs to the type (jins) [of act] of which men are capable or it does not belong to that type but the Eternal one has specific power over it." In contrast, Abū cAlī had held that God may not restore anything which belongs to the category of what is subject to man's capacity (Ibn Mattawayh, Majmūc, 2:305; idem, Tadhkira, 238, 243-4; Taqī al-Dīn, 322).

[37] Fā'iq, 217v, 220v, 221r, 224r; see also Taqī al-Dīn, 325, 333; al-Jurjānī, 244.

restoration, God reunites these parts so that the individual bodies which existed before will again exist.[38] This view, Ibn al-Malāḥimī states, was backed by al-Jāḥiẓ.[39]

Confronted with objections of the philosophers that the physical parts of a living being are subject to constant change and therefore cannot constitute its individual personality, Ibn al-Malāḥimī defined his notion of a living being. It consists of basic parts which remain without modification during the whole life. These constitute the individual. Changes occur only in the additional parts which do not constitute the individual. The restoration applies therefore only to the basic parts.[40]

Al-Ḥillī closely followed Ibn al-Malāḥimī in his view of passing away and restoration. He agreed with him that a living being consists of basic parts (ajzā' aṣliyya) which are not subject to change and additional parts which are. When it dies its parts are dispersed. At the time of its restoration, God reassembles only the basic parts of the living being. Having adopted Ibn al-Malāḥimī's concept of man, al-Ḥillī argued against the view of the philosophers and some theologians that man consists of a body and a rational soul (nafs nāṭiqa).[41] This does not prevent him from dealing theoretically with restoration on the assumption that man consists of a soul and a body. In this case, the body would indeed pass into non-existence. After the restoration, the soul which did not pass into non-existence would be united with a different body. He states:

> The author [i.e. al-Ḥillī] adheres to this position [i.e. of Ibn al-Malāḥimī]. And since the prophets consistently agreed upon restoration (iᶜāda), which in literal meaning is applied to the production of something which was deprived of the attribute of existence and metaphorically is applied to something else, it is necessary to turn this word

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[38] Fā'iq, 221r, 224r.
[39] Ibid., 217r; for al-Jāḥiẓ' position, see also Abū Muhammad ᶜAlī b. Aḥmad b. Ḥazm, al-Fiṣal fī l-milal wa-l-ahwā' wa-l-niḥal (Beirut, 1405/1985), 5:62.
[40] Fā'iq, 223r-224r.
[41] Asrār, 154r; Maᶜārij, 128r; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 387; Taslīk, 45v.

to its metaphoric meaning. This means either the reassembling of the parts [of the body] after their dispersal if we adhere to the view that man consists of the basic parts in this body. Or it means the restoration of the soul to a different body after the passing away of the first body, on the assumption that we adhere to [the view that man consists of a body and] the rational soul.[42]

Like al-Ḥillī, al-Rāzī allowed that God may annihilate the world through a direct act.[43] He argued accordingly that a contingent requires an effector either to exist or not to exist; by virtue of itself, existence and non-existence of a contingent are equally possible. The effectiveness of an agent which is related to its contingency may thus either create or undo something.[44] Here, he was at variance with the position of the earlier Ashᶜarites who denied that an agent may undo something.[45] Like al-Ḥillī, he also disagreed with

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[42] Maᶜārij, 129r.
[43] Arbaᶜīn, 279; Maᶜālim, 116-7.
[44] Ishāra, 38r; Arbaᶜīn, 79. On the basis of the principle that a contingent always requires an effector for its existence or non-existence, al-Rāzī differed with his predecessors on the question of endurance. This also applies to his view on the endurance of accidents. While the Ashᶜarites traditionally maintained that accidents cannot endure by themselves (Ibn Fūrak, 230, 237, 337; al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 139), al-Rāzī affirmed this possibility. Accidents are contingent (mumkin al-wujūd). If they gain existence, they endure as long as their effector endures. Were they to vanish at every moment, this would mean that they turned from contingency to essential impossibility by virtue of themselves (al-imtināᶜ al-dhātī). This is impossible according to the rules of contingency; see Maᶜālim, 34.
[45] Al-Anṣārī, Sharḥ, 130vff; idem, Ghunya, 92v; al-Kāmil fī ikhtiṣār al-shāmil, 74r-v. However, being forced by the arguments of his opponents, al-Bāqillānī is reported to have allowed that God may annihilate the bodies through a direct act; see al-Kāmil fī ikhtiṣār al-shāmil, 74r; al-Anṣārī, Ghunya, 73v; idem, Sharḥ, 103r; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.15, pt.30:53; for his other explanations of passing away, see later. Al-Ghazālī in his Tahāfut (90-1) maintains that God as a capable agent may either produce or undo something in accordance with His will. On this basis he sought to defend the possibility of the annihilation of the world created by God against the philosophers.
Al-Ashᶜarī's notion of passing away was founded on the assumption that nothing may last for more than one instance. Thus, all atoms and bodies require for their endurance an accident of endurance (baqā') inhering in them. This accident similarly lasts only for one instance and, thus, is

the philosophers who denied that God may undo His creation. It is very likely that al-Ḥillī was directly influenced by

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constantly recreated by God. (Ibn Fūrak, 238) God endures similarly through an attribute of endurance which lasts. (ibid., 237). Passing away is caused by the failure of God to recreate the accident of endurance. (ibid., 230, 338; al-Baghdādī, Uṣūl al-dīn, 230; al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 88).

Although al-Bāqillānī initially agreed with al-Ashᶜarī's notion of endurance (see F.Kholeif, A Study on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and His Controversies in Transoxania (Recherches. Série 1: Pensée arabe et musulmane, vol.31. Beirut: Dar al-machreq, 1984), 105 n.6) he is reported to have rejected it later (see al-Kāmil fī ikhtiṣār al-shāmil, 74v; al-Anṣārī, Ghunya, 92r). His doubts arose in regard to God's eternal attributes. Do they require an accident of endurance or not? If they require an accident of endurance this would contradict the view that no accident may inhere in God and His attributes (for the impossibility of this according to the Ashᶜarites, see e.g. al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 44). Al-Ashᶜarī is reported to have held that His attributes endure because of His endurance. (Ibn Fūrak, 43, 237, 326-7, 337) In al-Bāqillānī's view, this would lead to the conclusion that on principle anything may endure by itself. (Al-Anṣārī, Ghunya, 92r; al-Kāmil fī ikhtiṣār al-shāmil, 74v) Holding on to the Ashᶜarite principle that accidents do not endure, he apparently argued that atoms do not require an accident of endurance but exist as long as at least one representative of each genus of accidents inheres in it (al-Anṣārī, Ghunya, 93v). Thus, he explained passing away as the withholding of any genus of accidents. (ibid.) In his argumentation he usually chose to say that an atom passes away when the genus kawn is removed in order to make his position valid for the Bahshamiyya (al-Anṣārī, Sharḥ, 130r-v; idem, Ghunya, 93v; Taqī al-Dīn, 289; see also Ghazālī, Tahāfut, 88-9 where he reports this view as a position held by a 'a group of Ashᶜarites'). The latter maintained that an atom may exist without any accident attached to it, except for a kawn (see Frank, Beings, 94; also al-Ḥillī, Manāhij, 82r; see also Kholeif, Rāzī, 105 n.5ff where he expresses his doubts about the authenticity of the attribution of this modified view to al-Bāqillānī by later authors. Especially on the basis of the evidence from al-Anṣārī's Sharḥ and his Ghunya, there does not remain serious justification for doubts). There are other reports that al-Bāqillānī came to the conclusion that there is no reason why accidents should not endure by themselves. On that basis he put forth a second explanation of passing away defining it as the direct annihilation of bodies by God.

Although rejecting this last possibility, al-Juwaynī shared al-Bāqillānī's modified view on endurance of atoms (Irshād, 140-1). Accordingly, he explained passing away as the withholding of any genus of accidents from the atom. In contrast to al-Bāqillānī, he did not mention the akwān specifically. Al-Juwaynī's view may well be an elaboration of al-Bāqillānī's position.

al-Rāzī in regard to these points.

Yet, al-Ḥillī clearly disagreed with al-Rāzī, when the latter affirmed that the non-existent may be restored by God. According to al-Rāzī, God is able to recreate individuals even though their specific essence (dhāt makhṣūṣa) was annihilated when they passed into non-existence. On this point, he was in agreement with his Ashᶜarite predecessors. They defined restoration as a totally new creation of beings which is comparable to their first creation. It is within God's omnipotence to create the individual beings a second time although their essence vanished during their non-existence.[46]

Al-Rāzī presents the view of his predecessors and states his own argument for it:

> Our companions maintain that, when a thing passes into non-existence, its essence is void and it becomes pure negation and sheer non-existence. In the state of non-existence, no identity or specification remains of it. Despite this view they argued that it is not impossible in God's power to restore it identically. No group among the rational people affirm this view except our companions. The proof for its soundness is that when a thing becomes non-existent, it remains something feasible to exist (jā'iz al-wujūd), and God has power over all contingencies. From this follows by necessity that God has power to restore it identically after its non-existence.[47]

Evidently under the influence of Ibn al-Malāḥimī, al-Rāzī at the same time affirmed that God is able to reunite the parts of the bodies after their dispersal.[48] In some of his works it is not clear which of the two views of the restoration he preferred. In his Ishāra,[49] however, he expressed his preference for the position that God disperses the bodies rather than annihilates the world. Confronted with

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[46]Al-Anṣārī, Ghunya, 213v-214r; Ibn Fūrak, 55, 111, 240, 242-3; al-Baghdādī, Uṣūl al-dīn, 233-4; al-Rāzī, Muḥaṣṣal, 338; idem, Tafsīr, vol.9, pt.17:32; al-Jurjānī, 244.
[47]Arbaᶜīn, 275; see also Ishāra, 63r; Maᶜālim, 116; Muḥaṣṣal, 338; Tafsīr, vol.1, pt.2:136; vol.13, pt.26:109.
[48]Arbaᶜīn, 288; Muḥaṣṣal, 339; Tafsīr, vol.1, pt.2:134-5; vol.9, pt.17:29.
[49]Ishāra, 63v.

arguments of the philosophers that the parts of a living body are subject to infinite change and therefore cannot constitute its individual personality, he replied with the same answer as Ibn al-Malāḥimī. A living being consists of basic parts (ajzā' aṣliyya) which are not subject to change and of additional parts (ajzā' zā'ida/ ajzā' fāḍila) which may change. For the restoration, it is sufficient that God will reunite the basic parts of a being.[50] Although mentioning some other possible answers to the philosophers' objection, he made clear that he preferred this one.[51] It seems that he favoured Ibn al-Malāḥimī's view that the human bodies are merely dispersed at death and will be reassembled at the restoration although, unlike him and al-Ḥillī, he did not exclude the possibility of their passing into non-existence prior to the restoration.

It is important to note here that al-Rāzī differed from al-Ḥillī in his concept of man. Man consists in his view of a body and a rational soul.[52] While the body passes into non-existence the soul remains.[53] Al-Rāzī did not mention the soul in his discussions of restoration.[54] However, since he generally held that the soul does not pass away, his indecision about the nature of the passing away and restoration of the body is of minor significance.

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[50] Arba^cīn, 291; Ishāra, 63v; Tafsīr, vol.13, pt.26:109-10.
[51] Arba^cīn, 291; Ma^cālim, 118.
[52] Ma^cālim, 106-8; Mulakhkhaṣ, 311r.
[53] Ma^cālim, 112-3.
[54] See also al-Jurjānī, 251 where he omits to list al-Rāzī among those theologians who asserted the restoration of the body and the soul.

CHAPTER VII

PROMISE AND THREAT (AL-WA^c^D WA-L-WA^c^ĪD)

1.Reward and Punishment

The views upheld by al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī in regard to the relation between man's acts and his reward or punishment in the hereafter are closely linked to their opposing positions in the question of God's justice.

Al-Ḥillī maintained that man deserves reward and punishment by his acts of obedience and disobedience respectively. God is obliged to render to him all the reward and punishment he deserves for his actions unless He pardons him or the Prophet intercedes on his behalf. In this case he will not be punished.[1] This close link between acts of obedience and reward and between acts of disobedience and punishment is founded on the concept of man's moral obligation (taklīf) which al-Ḥillī shared with the Mu^c^tazilites. God puts man under such moral obligation that he is able to obey and to abstain from disobedience despite the hardship imposed by this obligation. The purpose of this imposition of moral obligation is to enable man to reach a higher degree of reward than he might otherwise achieve.[2] On this basis al-Ḥillī argued for the indispensible link between the acts of obedience which man fulfils under moral obligation and the reward he deserves for this:

> The proof that reward is deserved for an act of obedience is that it is a hardship which God has imposed upon the morally-obliged. If this were not for a purpose it would be oppressive and futile, and this is an evil which does not issue from the Wise. If it is for a purpose it is either for causing harm which would be oppression, or for a benefit [reading li-naf^c^ for al-naf^c^]. This benefit may either be granted initially or not. The first alternative is wrong, for otherwise the

[1] Manāhij, 104r; Ma^c^ārij, 129v-130r.
[2] Kashf al-murād, 249.

[imposition of] moral obligation would be futile. The second alternative is what we sought to prove. That benefit is what is deserved by virtue of obedience accompanying [reading al-muqārina for al-muqārin] magnification (ta$^{c}$ẓīm) and glorification. It would be evil to render this benefit initially [i.e. without imposing moral obligation] since magnification of someone who does not deserve it is evil.[3]

On account of their different understanding of God's justice, the Ash$^{c}$arites basically disagreed with the view shared by the Imamites and the Mu$^{c}$tazilites in this question. God, according to the Ash$^{c}$arites, is rationally not obliged to render reward or punishment. They rejected the formulation that man deserves (yastaḥiqq) reward or punishment for his actions which God is obliged to render to him.[4] They preferred to say that it is generosity (faḍl/tafaḍḍul) on the part of God to reward man for his acts of obedience and His just right ($^{c}$adl/ḥaqq) to punish him for his acts of disobedience.[5] On the basis of scriptural evidence, however, they affirmed that God has promised always to reward acts of obedience.[6] Since it is inconceivable that God would lie, this promise is a safe indication that God will not act otherwise.[7] With this they admit that God's arbitrariness cannot be absolute.

On the surface, the Ash$^{c}$arite view appears to agree with the Mu$^{c}$tazilite assertion of a necessary link between man's actions and divine reward and punishment. However, a second

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[3]Kashf al-murād, 323; see also Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 411; Manāhij, 104r; Ma$^{c}$ārij, 130r.
[4]Al-Ghazālī, Iqtiṣād, 84; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.6, pt.12:180; vol.7, pt.13:19-20; also Frank, "Moral Obligation," 213.
[5]See al-Bāqillānī, Inṣāf, 74-5; idem, Tamhīd, 351; al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 381, 392; al-Anṣārī, Ghunya, 214v; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.4, pt.7:143; vol.5, pt.10:180-1; vol.7, pt.14:10; vol.9, pt.17:33; vol.15, pt.29:337; also L.Gardet, Dieu et la destinée de l'homme (Etudes musulmanes, vol.9. Paris: Vrin, 1967), 293.
[6]Al-Bāqillānī, Inṣāf, 75; al-Mutawallī, 58; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.3, pt.6:41; vol.4, pt.7:51; vol.11, pt.22:229; also Frank, "Moral Obligation," 214.
[7]Bāqillānī, Inṣāf, 75; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.5, pt.9:19-20; vol.7, pt.13:169.

principle connected with theodicy was involved in the question of reward and punishment which set Ash^c arite and Mu^c tazilite thought on it fundamentally apart. The Mu^c tazilite theory of moral obligation and of degrees of punishment and reward which man can achieve by acting under it was founded on the assumption that man is the author of his own acts. God does not predetermine whether a person will be a believer or an infidel, an obedient or a disobedient servant. Thus, man's own action is the only basis for the reward and punishment he will ultimately receive.[8] The Ash^c arites, in contrast, maintained that man is not truly the author of his acts but that his acts are rather created by God.[9] Moreover, God preordains a person's fate in the hereafter.[10] There is, therefore, no necessary link between man's acts and his final destiny as the Mu^c tazilites understand it.[11] At best, some Ash^c arites allow the formulation that man's acts serve as an indication of the destiny which God has ordained for him.[12] This indication, however, is not always reliable since God may wish to pardon all the sins of a sinner.[13] It is similarly possible that the belief which a person displays during his lifetime

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[8]Al-Miqdād, 413; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.6, pt.11:10, 16; idem, Arba^c īn, 388. According to the Mu^c tazilites, man is only entitled to reward and punishment when three conditions are fulfilled: that he has the capability for his act (mutamakkin min fi^c lihi), that he is free to choose the act (mukhallā baynahu wa-baynahu), and that he does not act under compulsion (iljā'); see ^c Abd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 14:308 and passim.

[9]Al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.7, pt.14:13; see also Frank, "Moral Obligation," 210ff for references.

[10]This Ash^c arite principle finds its expression in their concept of muwāfāt, which according to them meant that God eternally loves or hates a person. If He loves him, he will die as a believer and has always during his lifetime been a believer even if this was not obvious to men (Ibn Fūrak, 161-2; al-Anṣārī, Ghunya, 228v-229v). On the different interpretations of muwāfāt, see E.Kohlberg, "Muwāfāt Doctrines in Muslim Theology," Studia Islamica 57 (1983):47-66; for the Ash^c arite interpretation, ibid., 50ff.

[11]Ibn Fūrak, 163; see also Gardet, Dieu, 300.

[12]See al-Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, 351; idem, Inṣāf, 75; also Frank, "Moral Obligation," 214.

[13]Ibn Fūrak, 163; Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, 351; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.4, pt.7:143.

may not be genuine and therefore be a false indication if he eventually dies as an unbeliever.[14] Thus, neither indications for punishment nor for reward in the hereafter are in fact reliable signs for the ultimate fate of a person.

Al-Rāzī followed closely the traditional teaching of his school. Anyone obedient will eventually be rewarded by God. This is known not because man's actions are the reason for this reward, since nothing is incumbent upon God,[15] but rather because He has notified mankind that He will reward obedience.[16] Therefore, God's reward for man is nothing but generosity (tafaḍḍul) on His part.[17] Since al-Rāzī clung firmly to the Ashᶜarite position that man is not the author of his acts and that it is God who creates his belief or disbelief,[18] he also denied a necessary link between man's actions and his fate in the hereafter. On this basis, he argued that God is not obliged to render to man any reward for his actions. He states:

> This is so because man's act depends upon will and this will is created by God. If God creates that will, he [i.e. man] obeys and if He creates the other kind of will, he disobeys. Thus, man's obedience is from God and his disobedience is also from God. However, an act of God does not oblige Him to [do] anything at all. Thus, neither does obedience make a reward obligatory, nor disobedience punishment. Everything rather comes from God by virtue of His divinity, His conquering force, and His power. Thus what we have asserted is sound; that if He wanted to punish all those who are near to him, this would be good on His part. And if He wanted to have mercy on all pharaohs this would [likewise] be good on His part.[19]

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[14] Ibn Fūrak, 161-2; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.1, pt.2:140.

[15] Arbaᶜīn, 388; Tafsīr, vol.1, pt.2:140; vol.7, pt.14:129; vol.15, pt.29:263; Maᶜālim, 121-2.

[16] "Masā'il," 378-9; Tafsīr, vol.1, pt.2:137; vol.7, pt.13:170; vol.7, pt.14:87; vol.15, pt.29:12.

[17] Ibid., vol.7, pt.14:87; vol.13, pt.25:11, 33, 66; vol.15, pt.29:157; vol.15, pt.30:263.

[18] For al-Rāzī's position that belief and infidelity are created by God, see his Maṭālib, 9:101-110, 379-389; "Masā'il," 375; Tafsīr, vol.5, pt.10:131, 165; vol.7, pt.13:145ff, 154-5, 158-9, 180, 191-2, 241-2; vol.7, pt.14:160; vol.15, pt.30:263.

[19] Ibid., vol.4, pt.8:241; see also ibid., vol.5, pt.10:78, 180; vol.8, pt.15:21-2, 63-4.

## 2. The Question of the Muslim Grave Sinner

While al-Ḥillī agreed with the Mu$^{c}$tazilite position that reward and punishment are deserved by man because of his actions and owed by God by virtue of His justice, he disagreed with them, following the Imamite tradition, on the final destiny of some offenders. This led him to partial agreement with al-Rāzī.

While all parties agreed upon the eternal punishment of the infidel (*kāfir*),[20] there was disagreement about the final state of the grave sinner (*fāsiq*) who affirmed his faith of Islam.

The Mu$^{c}$tazilites held that a person's fate in the hereafter is founded on mutual cancellation (*taḥābuṭ*) of his acts of obedience and disobedience. If a person commits more acts of disobedience than of obedience the reward deserved for the latter is outweighed and, therefore, cancelled by the punishment deserved for his acts of disobedience. In this case he deserves eternal punishment. If his acts of obedience

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[20] Al-Ḥillī, *Manāhij*, 104v; idem, *Ma$^{c}$ārij*, 129v; idem, *Nahj al-mustarshidīn*, 423; idem, *Kashf al-murād*, 328; al-Rāzī, *Ma$^{c}$ālim*, 123-4; idem, *Tafsīr*, vol.2, pt.3:153; vol.5, pt.10:75; idem, *Muḥaṣṣal*, 346. For the general Shi$^{c}$ite position, see $^{c}$Alam al-Hudā l-Murtaḍā, "al-Uṣūl al-i$^{c}$tiqādiyya," in *Nafā'is al-makhṭūṭāt* (edited by Āl Yāsīn. Baghdad: al-Ma$^{c}$ārif, 1954), 82; Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, *Iqtiṣād*, 126; idem, *Tamhīd*, 273; Mītham al-Baḥrānī, 160; also McDermott, 251ff. For the general Mu$^{c}$tazilite position, see Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Fā'iq*, 232v; $^{c}$Abd al-Jabbār, *Faḍl*, 209; For the general Ash$^{c}$arite position, see al-Baghdādī, *Farq*, 348; al-Rāzī, *Tafsīr*, vol.7, pt.14:80; Ibn Ḥazm, 4:80. See also generally al-Ash$^{c}$arī, *Maqālāt*, 474.

outweigh his acts of disobedience the punishment deserved for the latter will be cancelled[21] and so he deserves eternal reward.

These rules apply only when the acts of disobedience belong to the category of minor sins (saghā'ir) and thus are of equal weight as acts of obedience. If a person commits a major sin (kabīra) this cancels the reward deserved for all of a person's acts of obedience[22] and it is impossible for a major sin to be outweighed by any number of acts of obedience. One who commits a major sin can escape his deserved punishment only by repentence (tawba)[23] and unless he repents he will inevitably be punished eternally.[24] The Mu<sup>c</sup>tazilites thus draw a sharp line of distinction between minor and major sins.[25]

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[21] Mānakdīm, 624ff; Ibn al-Malāhimī, Fā'iq, 204r-v, 206rff; also al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.4, pt.7:53-4; vol.4, pt.8:213-4; vol.8, pt.16:91. Abū ᶜAlī and Abū Hāshim disagreed about how this cancellation works. The former maintained that the smaller amount of reward or punishment will simply be cancelled by the larger amount, while Abū Hāshim adhered to the principle of muwāzana which means that the smaller amount will be deducted from the larger; see Mānakdīm, 627ff; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.3, pt.6:40; vol.4, pt.8:209; Abū Hāshim's position was usually preferred by later Muᶜtazilites. See e.g. Ibn al-Malāhimī, Fā'iq, 208r-v.

[22] Al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.4, pt.7:50.

[23] See later.

[24] ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, Faḍl, 211, 350; also al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.4, pt.7:114, 197, 237-8; vol.5, pt.9:119; vol.5, pt.10:75, 244; vol.6, pt.11:223; vol.7, pt.14:87; vol.8, pt.15:142; vol.15, pt.29:293; vol.15, pt.30:165.

[25] Ibn al-Malāhimī, Fā'iq, 206r; also McDermott, 256ff. It should be noted that despite this sharp distinction between major and minor sins, man, according to the Muᶜtazilites, is unable to know if a specific act of disobedience is a major or a minor sin; see ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 14:393; Mānakdīm, 635, 801; also McDermott, 257 n.2. This view was at variance with the generally accepted view on major and minor sins in Islam. Although there was no definite list of major sins, the Qur'an clearly defines minor and major sins and offers numerous examples for each class (see A.J.Wensinck and L.Gardet, "Khaṭī'a," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 4:1107). In the ḥadīth literature, further lists of major sins may be found. Moreover, Abū ᶜAlī composed a book entitled al-Ikfār wa-l-tafsīq (see Gimaret, "Matériaux," 282 no.6) which apparently dealt with the question of when a person is to be classified as an infidel or as a grave sinner. A book with the same title was included in ᶜAbd al-Jabbār's Mughnī (this part is not included in the edited text, see Gimaret,

The Mu^c^tazilite principle of mutual cancellation was based on the definition of faith (Īmān) which included the performance of all religious duties (farā'id).[26] On this basis they maintained that performance of the religious duties, i.e. faith, deserves eternal reward while failure to perform them, i.e. deficiency in faith, deserves eternal punishment even if the grave sinner confesses his belief in the basic principles of Islam.[27] Since they denied the possibility of temporary punishment they resorted to the principle of mutual cancellation (taḥābut).[28]

Yet although they held that the grave sinner ceases to be a believer and deserves eternal punishment, he does not belong to the same category as the unbeliever. Rather, he is in a position between faith and infidelity (manzila bayn al-manzilatayn).[29] By this they sought to avoid the position

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"Matériaux," 282). The authors must have had a clear idea of what constitutes a grave sin. (A work entitled Kitāb al-baḥth ^c^alā adillat al-takfīr wa-l-tafsīq by the Zaydite Abū l-Qāsim al-Bustī (a student of ^c^Abd al-Jabbār) which is extant would presumably offer further information on this question. I did not have a chance to consult this work. For the author, see W.Madelung, "Bosti, Abū 'l-Qāsem," Encyclopaedia Iranica 4:388-9). Thus, ^c^Abd al-Jabbār's claim that man is basically unable to know whether a certain sin is minor or major is strange. It may be that he put forward this claim in order to defend the doctrine of mutual cancellation. Thus he argued that if man knew a certain sin to be minor, he would recognize that because of mutual cancellation he would not be punished for committing this sin. This might encourage him to commit this sin. See Mānakdīm, 635.

[26] Mānakdīm, 707-8, 802; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 246r-v; also al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.15, pt.29:336; Gardet, Dieu, 357-8. This was the position of Abū ^c^Alī and Abū Hāshim. Abū l-Hudhayl and ^c^Abd al-Jabbār maintained that supererogatory works (nawāfil) are also included in faith. However, since they did not hold the person who fails to perform these to be deficient in his faith, the significance of this disagreement appears to be minor; see McDermott, 234.

[27] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 207r, 244rff; al-Ash^c^arī, Maqālāt, 474; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.5, pt.9:148-9, 236; vol.5, pt.10:75.

[28] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 206r-v.

[29] Mānakdīm, 697; ^c^Abd al-Jabbār, Faḍl, 350.

of the Khārijites who considered the Muslim grave sinner an infidel (*kāfir*) as well as the position of the Murji'ites who affirmed that the Muslim grave sinner is a believer (*mu'min*).[30] With regard to punishment, the Mu$^{c}$tazila held that for the sinner (*fāsiq*) it would be eternal but lighter than for the infidel.[31]

The Mu$^{c}$tazilite position was contested by both al-Ḥillī[32] and al-Rāzī.[33]

The Shi$^{c}$ite tradition did not include the performance of religious duties in its definition of faith. Rather, it defined it as conviction (*taṣdīq*) of the heart consisting in the knowledge (*ma$^{c}$rifa*) of the basic principles of religion. In order to be valid, this conviction must rest upon rational proofs leading the believer to knowledge of the basic principles.[34] Al-Ḥillī fully adhered to this concept of faith.[35] With this definition of faith, which stresses the element of knowledge (*ma$^{c}$rifa*) to the exclusion of the performance of religious duties, the Shi$^{c}$ites were close to the position which was commonly associated with the Murji'a.[36]

Al-Ḥillī further stipulated that faith is sufficient to merit reward only on condition that the knowledge of God is complete. This condition is fulfilled when the believer knows all other basic principles of religion as well. He states:

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[30] Mānakdīm, 701; $^{c}$Abd al-Jabbār, *Faḍl*, 159ff; al-Ka$^{c}$bī, 115. For the positions of the Kharijites and the Murji'ites, see A.J.Wensinck, *The Muslim Creed. Its Genesis and Historical Development* (London: Frank Cass & Co), 38ff; also McDermott, 233-5. For the origin of the Mu$^{c}$tazilite concept of *manzila bayn al-manzilatayn*, see Madelung, *Al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm*, 10ff.
[31] Al-Bazdawī, 131.
[32] *Ajwiba*, 72-3.
[33] *Tafsīr*, vol.4, pt.7:54ff.
[34] See Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, *Iqtiṣād*, 140; idem, *Tamhīd*, 293; Mītham al-Baḥrānī, 170; *Khulāṣat al-naẓar*, 57v.
[35] *Manâhij*, 104r; *Anwār*, 180; *Ajwiba*, 54.
[36] See al-Ash$^{c}$arī, *Maqālāt*, 132-141; generally for the position of the Murji'ites on faith, see McDermott, 234-5; Wensinck, 132ff.

It is permissible that reward is dependent upon a condition. If this were not the case, a person who knows God (al-ʿārif bi-llāh taʿālā) and ignores the Prophet would deserve reward since knowledge of God is an act of obedience independent in itself.[37]

He stipulated further that the reward for an act of obedience depends upon the condition (sharṭ) of muwāfāt, that is that the person will die as a believer.[38] In his Maʿārij,[39] he further clarifies what he means by this. Muwāfāt is the indication (ʿalāma) for the continuity of faith (istimrār ʿala l-īmān) during a person's lifetime. A believer who becomes an infidel, therefore, does not deserve any reward for his former belief. Thus, he stresses, it is not the muwāfāt that is the reason (sabab) for man's meriting of reward, but his continuity in faith.

Among his predecessors, al-Murtaḍā, following his teacher Shaykh al-Mufīd,[40] had adhered to a concept of muwāfāt which he defined as the impossibility for infidelity to follow upon belief.[41] Al-Ḥillī's concept of muwāfāt clearly differs. This is evident from his statement that al-Murtaḍā did not consider muwāfāt a condition for man to deserve praise for his faith[42] although he was aware of al-Murtaḍā's view that belief cannot be followed by unbelief.[43] He fails, however, to mention that al-Murtaḍā called this principle muwāfāt.

In most of his works, al-Ḥillī does not indicate whether he considered it possible for a believer to become an infidel and he refrains from elucidating his own position in

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[37] Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 418; see also Kashf al-murād, 326; Manāhij, 104r. See also Kohlberg, 64-5.
[38] Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 419; Kashf al-murād, 346-7; Taslīk, 79r.
[39] Maʿārij, 130r.
[40] For al-Mufīd's position on this question, see McDermott, 240-2; Kohlberg, 53ff.
[41] See Kohlberg, 55 n.1 for references; see also al-Ḥillī, Ajwiba, 21-2. Al-Murtaḍā's position was adopted also by his pupil Shaykh al-Ṭūsī; see Kohlberg, 55 n.2 for references.
[42] Ajwiba, 21-2; see also al-Majlisī, Biḥār, 69:214-5ff.
[43] Ajwiba, 22

the Ajwibat al-masā'il al-muhanna'iyya[44] where he reports al-Murtaḍā's view. In his Maᶜārij,[45] however, he implies that this is possible. Moreover, the fact that he maintained that muwāfāt, the state of being a believer at the point of death, is a condition for the reward of prior acts of obedience, suggests that he considered it possible for man to change from belief to unbelief.

In his Ajwibat al-masā'il al-muhanna'iyya[46] al-Ḥillī states that an unspecified group of Imamite scholars considered it possible for unbelief to follow belief. They also upheld the principle of the cancellation of deserved reward by deserved punishment (iḥbāṭ) and of muwāfāt, presumably considering it a condition for the reward.[47] It is possible that he associated himself with the view of these scholars rather than the position of al-Murtaḍā in the question of whether unbelief may follow belief.

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[44]Ibid., 21-2; here, he merely refers to a more extensive discussion in his Nihāyat al-marām. The manuscript of the Nihāya does not include this section.
[45]Maᶜārij, 130r.
[46]Ajwiba, 22.
[47]The only Imamite group which is known to have held such views were the Banū Nawbakht. They upheld the Muᶜtazilite thesis of mutual cancellation of acts of obedience and disobedience, and of reward and punishment. They further asserted that a believer may become an infidel; see McDermott, 24. It is not known whether they considered muwāfāt a condition for man's meriting reward. Since they allowed, however, that a believer may become infidel, they may well have considered it to be a condition. In his Masā'il al-Ṭarābulusiyyāt, al-Murtaḍā refers to Imamites who consider it possible to follow unbelief as "those who do not believe in muwāfāt." I am indebted to Prof. Kohlberg for this reference.

Al-Rāzī did not include the performance of religious duties in his definition of belief.[48] Like al-Ḥillī, he maintained that it is impossible for a true believer to believe in God but not in the Prophet. If this occurred, it would only show that the person's belief in God is also not true.[49]

Al-Rāzī does not discuss his view of muwāfāt in his theological works. In various passages of his Qur'an commentary, however, he sometimes accepts and sometimes rejects the stricter Ash^c^arite position that belief displayed during a person's lifetime is not genuine if he does not die as a believer.

In the following passage, al-Rāzī deals with the problem that somebody who at first believed and subsequently became an infidel would theoretically deserve eternal reward and eternal punishment. After refuting at length the principle of mutual cancellation (taḥābuṭ),[50] al-Rāzī concludes:

> If this is established, two positions may be singled out as answers. First, the position of those who take [the principle of] muwāfāt into consideration. This means that the condition for the occurrence of faith is that he [i.e. the person] will not die as an unbeliever. If he died as an unbeliever, we would know that his previous conduct was unbelief. This position is obviously false. Second, man does not deserve reward for his obedience and punishment for his disobedience on the basis of rational necessity. This is the view of the people of tradition and [it is] our choice.[51]

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[48] Ma^c^ālim, 127-8; Muḥaṣṣal, 347.
The tradition of the Ash^c^arite school was divided about the definition of faith. Al-Ash^c^arī himself in his Luma^c^ defined faith as conviction (taṣdīq) without mentioning the performance of religious duties. In his Ibāna and the Maqālāt, in contrast, he defined faith as consisting of speech and works. L.Gardet argues that al-Ash^c^arī's position gave rise to the later Ash^c^arite doctrine, that the act of conviction constitutes the "formal constituent" of faith, while the fulfilment of religious duties intervenes to perfect it; see L.Gardet "Īmān," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 3:1170-1; idem, Dieu, 371; see also McDermott, 235-6.

[49] Tafsīr, vol.4, pt.8:197; vol.7, pt.13:77.

[50] Ibid., vol.1, pt.2:139-40.

[51] Ibid., vol.1, pt.2:140.

Here he denies the relevance of the discussion concerning the *muwāfāt* maintaining that man's obedience and disobedience are not the reason for God's reward and punishment. Elsewhere, however, he affirmed that the faith of a person which he displayed during his lifetime is genuine only when the condition of *muwāfāt* is fulfilled, that is, when he dies as a believer.[52] Here, he was in agreement with the stricter Ash$^{c}$arite position.

The definition of faith as belief to the exclusion of acts upheld by both theologians meant that faith cannot be impaired by any act of disobedience. The reward for the faith of a person, in their view, cannot be outweighed by any sin. Thus, although a believer must expect punishment for his sins, either, as al-Ḥillī would say, because he deserves it, or, as al-Rāzī would say, because he was told so by God, the punishment cannot be eternal. Both theologians, therefore, distinguished sharply between the destiny of a believing sinner and of an infidel. While the former, unless he repents or is pardoned, will be temporarily punished for his sins and then be eternally rewarded for his belief, the infidel will be eternally punished in hell.[53]

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[52] He states (Ibid., vol.3, pt.6:38-9): "Thus it is established ...that if [someone] was a believer and then disbelieved, this former faith, even if we thought that it was faith, was no faith in the eyes of God. Therefore, it is clear that *muwāfāt* is a condition for faith to be [genuine] faith and for the unbelief to be [genuine] unbelief." Further evidence that al-Rāzī basically backed the stricter Ash$^{c}$arite position is found in his *Tafsīr* (vol.8, pt.15:125-127) where he rejects the view that the *istithnā'* formula (if God wills) is unnecessary when someone says "I am a believer," since his belief at this moment is genuine (ibid, 127). Al-Rāzī insists on the requirement of adding the *istithnā'* (ibid., 127) arguing that man cannot be sure that his present state of belief will last (ibid., 126). Generally for the significance of *istithnā'*, see Kohlberg, 51-2.

[53] For references to the views of al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī, see later. This view was shared by the earlier Imamite and Ash$^{c}$arite theologians. For the Imamite position, see *Khulāsat al-naẓar*, 52v, 58r. Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, *Iqtisād*, 117 (Shaykh al-Ṭūsī is reported to have at first upheld the Mu$^{c}$tazilite position of the eternal punishment of the grave sinner before adopting the common Imamite position; see M.Nallino, "Abū Ǧa'far al-Ṭūsī e un nuovo manoscritto del suo 'Kitāb

Al-Ḥillī argues on the basis of reason against the eternal punishment of a believing sinner making the following points:

> First, the doctrine of the eternal punishment of a sinner (fāsiq) implies injustice. Thus, it does not issue from God. The explanation of the minor premise is that the doctrine of cancellation is false, as we have shown. Thus, the sinner deserves reward for his obedience and for his belief and this must inevitably reach him. According to consensus, this cannot take place before the punishment. Thus it must happen after it, and this is what we sought to prove. Secondly, the doctrine of eternal punishment of the sinner leads to absurdity in so far as it would be equal to the state of the infidel despite the difference in the gravity of their sins and despite the fact that faith may be connected with sinfulness (fisq) and is incompatible with infidelity. Thirdly, it would be evil on the part of the Mighty (al-ᶜaẓīm) that, if someone worshipped Him for a hundred years and then sinned once, He should cancel all those acts of obedience because of this. Fourthly, the sin of a sinner (fāsiq) is finite and so he does not deserve infinite punishment by it. This is not contradicted by [the case of] infidelity which is the gravest of sins, equalling infinite sinning.[54]

Al-Rāzī argues for the same position:

> Our doctrine is that even though God punishes the sinners from among the Muslims (ahl al-ṣalāt) He will not leave them eternally in hell-fire but will take them out to paradise....What we rely upon in this question is that this sinner will either not deserve punishment, or he will deserve it while he is [also] entitled to reward. If the matter is like this the punishment must necessarily not be permanent.[55]

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al-istibṣār'," Rivista degli studi orientali 22 (1947):13; cf. Madelung, "Imāmism," 28 n.1); Mītham al-Baḥrānī, 160; also Madelung, "Imāmism," 16, 20, 24, 27, esp.28; McDermott, 387-9. For the Ashᶜarite position, see al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 386; Bāqillānī, Tamhīd, 349-50; idem, Inṣāf, 83; al-Baghdādī, Farq, 348; al-Bazdawī, 131ff; Ibn Fūrak, 164; al-Mutawallī, 58; al-Ashᶜarī, Maqālāt, 474; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.4, pt.7:144, 237-8; vol.4, pt.8:211; vol.5, pt.9:99; vol.5, pt.10:106-7; vol.6, pt.11:228; vol.6, pt.12:74; vol.8, pt.16:9-10.

[54] Manāhij, 104v; see also Maᶜārij, 129v; Taslīk; 80v-81r; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 423; Kashf al-murād, 328-9.

[55] Arbaᶜīn, 413; also Tafsīr, vol.4, pt.7:197-8; vol.6, pt.11:56; vol.9, pt.18:64; vol.2, pt.3:155; "Masā'il," 381-2; Maᶜālim, 124ff; Muḥaṣṣal, 343ff.

In accordance with their repudiation of the Mu^c^tazilite principle of mutual cancellation (taḥābuṭ), Ash^c^arites and Imamites denied the sharp distinction drawn by the Mu^c^tazilites between major and minor sins. They viewed all sins as major in so far as they constitute disobedience to God. There are degrees of gravity of sins in relation to each other but this does not affect their general status as major sins.[56] Al-Ḥillī[57] and al-Rāzī[58] approved this position.

On the basis of the difference between the fate of the Muslim sinner envisaged by the Mu^c^tazilites on the one hand and by al-Ḥillī and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on the other, further disagreement arose about other ways in which the sinner's punishment might be cancelled.

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[56]Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Tamhīd, 291; al-Mutawallī, 59; al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 391. See also McDermott, 258; A.J.Wensinck and L.Gardet, "Khaṭī'a," Encyclopaedia of Islam, 4:1107.
[57]Kashf al-murād, 328; Manāhij, 104r; Ma^c^ārij, 129v.
[58]Tafsīr, vol.15, pt.29:9.

3.Divine Forgiveness (ᶜafw)

One of these ways is God's forgiveness (ᶜafw) for a sinner who died without repenting. The Muᶜtazilites denied the possibility of God forgiving an unrepentant sinner, arguing that since God has notified mankind that He will punish the sinner it would be inadmissable for Him not to carry out this threat.[59] Al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī, each of them following his own school tradition, rejected the Muᶜtazilite position.

Al-Ḥillī maintained that to pardon a sinner is certainly good on the part of God and nothing from the point of view of reason speaks against it. Furthermore, he referred to scriptural evidence as a proof that God actually forgives some sinners.[60] Al-Rāzī also admitted God's forgiveness for a sinner but he relied exclusively on consensus and scriptural evidence to support his position.[61]

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[59] Mānakdīm, 644. See also al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.4, pt.7:10; vol.5, pt.10:7.
[60] Maᶜārij, 129v; Manāhij, 104v; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 427; Taslīk, 80r. Generally for the Imamite position, see Khulāsat al-naẓar, 53r; al-Murtaḍā, "Uṣūl," 81; Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Iqtiṣād, 126.
[61] Arbaᶜīn, 406; Tafsīr, vol.6, pt.12:58; vol.10, pt.19:95. Generally for the Ashᶜarite position on ᶜafw, see al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.5, pt.9:40, 67, 99, 151-2; vol.6, pt.11:95; also Gardet, Dieu, 305; Frank, "Moral Obligation," 214.

4.Intercession (Shafā[c]a)

Closely related to the question of God's pardon is that of the Prophet's intercession (shafā[c]a) on behalf of Muslims. The Mu[c]tazilites affirmed that intercession is permissible only on behalf of those who deserve reward in the hereafter so that the benefits to which they are entitled shall be increased.[62]

Al-Ḥillī[63] and the Imamite tradition[64] denied this. They held that intercession was reasonable only in behalf of Muslim grave sinners so that their deserved punishment would be cancelled. In their view, it was inadmissible that the prophet would intercede for the purpose of increasing the benefits of those who already deserve reward.[65]

In contrast to his Shi[c]ite predecessors,[66] al-Ḥillī did not expressly ascribe an intercessory function to the Imams but only to the prophets. It is, however, unlikely that he would have denied this cardinal Shi[c]ite belief.

The cancellation of punishment was also the principal purpose of intercession according to Ash[c]arite doctrine.[67] In opposition to the Imamites, however, some Ash[c]arites maintained that the Prophet might intercede either for the cancellation of punishment of sinners or for the purpose of

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[62] Ibn al-Malāhimī, Fā'iq, 230v; [c]Abd al-Jabbār, Faḍl, 207; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.2, pt.3:59; vol.4, pt.7:76; vol.5, pt.9:148-9; vol.1, pt.22:160, 225.

[63] Ma[c]ārij, 129v; Manāhij, 105r; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 427.

[64] Al-Murtaḍā, "Uṣūl," 81; Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Iqtiṣād, 126; Khulāṣat al-naẓar, 54rff.; also Madelung, "Imāmism," 16, 20, 27.

[65] Khulāṣat al-naẓar, 54r.

[66] For the general position of the Imamites, see Madelung, "Imāmism," 28.

[67] Al-Mutawallī, 59; al-Baghdādī, Farq, 348; Bāqillānī, Inṣāf, 82, 231; idem, Tamhīd, 374-5, 365ff; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.2, pt.3:59ff; vol.4, pt.7:137; vol.5, pt.9:152; vol.6, pt.12:145; al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 394-5; al-Ash[c]arī, Maqālāt, 474.

increasing the benefits of those deserving reward.[68] Al-Rāzī admitted both purposes in some of his works[69] but rejected the second one in others.[70]

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[68]See Mītham al-Baḥrānī, 166-7 who presents this as the usual Ashᶜarite doctrine. See also Ibn Fūrak, 167; he maintains that the prophet intercedes even for the repentant sinner so that his repentance will be accepted.
[69]E.g. Arbaᶜīn, 419.
[70]E.g. Tafsīr, vol.2, pt.3:65; vol.4, pt.7:76; vol.5, pt.9:148-9; Maᶜālim, 126-7; "Masā'il," 382-3.

5.Repentance (Tawba)

The third way to escape deserved punishment is repentance (tawba). All schools agreed that repentance was the only way for an infidel to avoid eternal punishment in hell-fire.[71] They differed, however, as to the degree of necessity for a Muslim grave sinner (fāsiq) to repent.

The Muᶜtazilites held that repentance is necessary for the grave sinner to free himself from eternal punishment and to gain salvation. If he fails to do so he will certainly be punished. The Imamites and Ashᶜarites did not consider repentance as indispensable for the final salvation of a believer. If the sinner fails to repent, God may either punish him temporarily or He may pardon him. On account of his faith, however, the grave sinner will eventually be rewarded eternally.[72]

In regard to the elements of valid repentance, all schools agreed that it must consist of regret (nadam) for the sin committed and of the resolve (ᶜazm) to abstain from it in the future.[73]

Adhering to the traditional positions of their schools, al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī disagreed with the Muᶜtazilites on a number of details.

With regard to the effectiveness of repentance, the Muᶜtazilite school of Basra affirmed that if man repents the punishment for his sin lapses automatically. They argued that

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[71] Al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.3, pt.5:142; vol.4, pt.7:137; Gardet, Dieu, 311.

[72] See al-Murtaḍā, "Uṣūl," 81-2; Mītham al-Baḥrānī, 165.

[73] Mītham al-Baḥrānī, 168; al-Ḥillī, Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 430; Mānakdīm, 791; al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.4, pt.8:239; vol.5, pt.10:3; vol.8, pt.16:180-1. Ibn al-Malāhimī, on the other hand, maintained that repentance consists only of regret while the resolve for the future is neither a part nor a condition for its validity. If someone has the motives for regret these motives will induce him to abstain from the sin in the future. Thus, a separate resolve for the future is superfluous. (See Fā'iq, 209rff).

if a sinner regrets his sin in a valid manner and is determined not to repeat it, it would be evil that he should still deserve punishment for it. Thus, God is obliged to cancel punishment for a sin for which the sinner is penitent.[74] They further argued that if the remission of sins upon repentance were not incumbent upon God, it would be evil on His part to put a grave sinner (fāsiq) under moral obligation since he has no means left to him to gain reward.[75]

The school of Baghdad agreed that the deserved punishment will lapse if the sinner repents. This, however, does not occur because of the act of repentance itself but it is rather due to God's generosity (tafaḍḍul) by which He accepts the repentance and cancels the just punishment.[76]

Like the school of Baghdad, the Imamites rejected the Basran doctrine that God is obliged to remit sins on repentance and held that God does so only out of generosity (tafaḍḍul).[77] Al-Ḥillī backed their doctrine:

> Does the cancellation of punishment upon repentance follow necessarily or is it due to generosity? The Muᶜtazilites hold the first position, while the Murji'ites and a group of people (jamāᶜa) maintain the second opinion. And this [i.e. the second opinion] is the more likely (al-aqrab).
> Our proof is that if the cancellation were necessary this would be due either to the obligation to accept it [i.e. the repentance] or to the increase of reward through it. Both sections are false. As for the first section, it would necessarily follow that if someone did the greatest harm to another person and then apologized to him, the injured party would be obliged to accept his apologies. The conclusion is false by consensus and so is the premise. As for the second section, [this is false] because of what has previously been said about the falseness of [the principle of] mutual cancellation (taḥābuṭ).[78]

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[74] ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 14:337ff; Mānakdīm, 790-1; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 214v.
[75] ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 14:339ff; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 213v-214r; also al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.5, pt.10:2; vol.8, pt.15:190.
[76] Mānakdīm, 790.
[77] Khulāṣat al-naẓar, 53v; Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, Iqtiṣād, 124-5; idem, Tamḥīd, 271; Mītham al-Baḥrānī, 168.
[78] Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 431; see also Maᶜārij, 130r; Taslīk, 80r. In the manuscript of his Manāhij (105r),

The latter argument of al-Ḥillī is out of place since the Mu$^{c}$tazilites did not hold that the principle of mutual cancellation is involved in the remission of sins upon repentance.[79] His first argument, however, directly counters the common Mu$^{c}$tazilite explanation of why God is obliged to accept man's repentance. The Basrans in fact asserted that an apology (<u>i$^{c}$tidhār</u>) made in a proper way must inevitably result in a state where it would be evil to continue to blame the offender.[80]

Both arguments of al-Ḥillī have been traditionally employed by Imamite[81] and Ash$^{c}$arite scholars[82] to refute the Mu$^{c}$tazilite position. Some writers even claimed, either by mistake or in order to buttress their argument, that the Mu$^{c}$tazilites based their position on the principle of mutual cancellation (<u>taḥābuṭ</u>).[83]

Al-Rāzī,[84] following the Ash$^{c}$arite tradition, affirmed that God is not obliged to cancel the just punishment of a repentant sinner and He will do so only because of His promise.[85] The argument of the Ash$^{c}$arites was based on their dogma that nothing is incumbent upon God since He as the ruler of the universe is not subject to any obligation. Moreover, like the Imamites they rejected the principal Mu$^{c}$tazilite argument that a proper apology (<u>i$^{c}$tidhār</u>) must be accepted.[86]

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al-Ḥillī appears to back the Mu$^{c}$tazilite rather than the Murji'ite position. Since this is highly unlikely, it may be presumed that the text is corrupt.

[79] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, <u>Fā'iq</u>, 214v.

[80] cAbd al-Jabbār, <u>Mughnī</u>, 14:312ff, 319, 337.

[81] Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, <u>Iqtiṣād</u>, 125; idem, <u>Tamhīd</u>, 272; <u>Khulāṣat al-naẓar</u>, 53v.

[82] Al-Mutawallī, 60-1.

[83] For a Shi$^{c}$ite example, see <u>Khulāṣat al-naẓar</u>, 53v.

[84] <u>Tafsīr</u>, vol.2, pt.3:23; vol.5, pt.10:2-3; vol.16, pt.31:175; <u>Ma$^{c}$ālim</u>, 131.

[85] For the general Ash$^{c}$arite position, see al-Mutawallī, 60-1; Ibn Fūrak, 166; al-Bazdawī, 227; al-Juwaynī, <u>Irshād</u>, 403-4; al-Rāzī, <u>Tafsīr</u>, vol.3, pt.5:143, 198; vol.5, pt.10:3; vol.8, pt.15:15, 190, 225; Ibn Ḥazm, 4:107; also Frank, "Moral Obligation," 214.

[86] Al-Mutawallī, 61; al-Juwaynī, <u>Irshād</u>, 403.

Al-Rāzī put forward a further argument basing it on the Ashᶜarite doctrine that all acts of man are created by God. This being so, it would be meaningless to say that repentance, which is an act of God, obliges Him to perform another act, that is to accept it. He states:

> Man's capability in relation to repentance and failure to repent is either equal or it is not. If it is equal, repentance will not preponderate over failure to repent without a preponderator (murajjih). If this preponderator occurred without a producer it would lead to the denial of the Creator. If it were produced by man, the [former] division would recur. If it is produced by God, man proceeds to repentance by God's help and strengthening. Thus, this repentance is an act of kindness from God to man. An act of kindness of the Lord to His subject does not make it incumbent upon Him [i.e. the Lord] to perform a further act of kindness to him. Thus, the occurrence of repentance in man does not make it obligatory for God to accept it. If man's capability were not suited for failure [to repent] and for the act [of it], it would even more necessarily lead to compulsion (jabr). In this case the assertion that it is obligatory [for God] to accept [repentance] is even more obviously false and wrong.[87]

The opinion that repentance is created by God is in conflict with the view of al-Ḥillī for whom, as a Muᶜtazilite, repentance is an act of man only.[88]

There was minor disagreement among the theologians whether, and on what grounds, repentance is incumbent upon man for all his sins. Abū ᶜAlī is reported to have held that a sinner is always, by virtue of reason and scriptural evidence, obliged to repent for major and minor sins.[89] Abū Hāshim, on the other hand, considered repentance as obligatory only for the grave sinner (ṣāḥib al-kabīra). In respect to minor sins, he denied that repentance is

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[87] Tafsīr, vol.5, pt.10:3; see also ibid., vol.2, pt.3:22; vol.4, pt.8:239; vol.8, pt.16:180-1; Maᶜālim, 130. For the general Ashᶜarite position that repentence is created by God, see al-Rāzī, Tafsīr, vol.5, pt.10:69; vol.4, pt.8:239.

[88] For the general Muᶜtazilite position, see ibid., vol.5, pt.10:69.

[89] Mānakdīm, 789; ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, Mughnī, 14:393; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 213r.

rationally obligatory[90] and held that scriptural authority also does not definitely indicate this obligation.[91] He compared repentance for a minor sin with a supererogatory act (<u>nāfila</u>) which is not obligatory in itself. It is, however, good to perform it since it helps man to perform his duties or, in this case, to repent for his major sins. ᶜAbd al-Jabbār argued that since man is unable to distinguish between major and minor sins, he is in fact obliged to repent for all of his sins.[92] Ibn al-Malāḥimī adhered to the position of Abū ᶜAlī affirming that repentance is equally obligatory for every sin. He argued that repentance is due because of the evil of a certain sin. The characteristic of evil, however, applies to every act of disobedience, regardless of whether it constitutes a minor or a major sin.[93]

Al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī maintained that man's obligation to repent for his sins equally applies to every sin.[94] They differed, however, as to why man is obliged to repent.

Al-Ḥillī argued for man's obligation to repent principally with rational arguments which were also employed by the Muᶜtazilites.[95] In his commentary on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's <u>Tajrīd al-ᶜaqā'id</u> he elaborates the arguments of the latter:

> The author [Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī] argued for the obligation to repent with two points. First, it [i.e. repentance] repels harm, namely the punishment or the fear [of it], and the repulsion of harm is obligatory. Secondly, we definitely know the obligation to repent of doing evil or of the failure to do what is obligatory. When you recognize this, we say that it [i.e. repentance] is obligatory with regard to every offence since it is obligatory for an act of disobedience because of

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[90] Mānakdīm, 789; ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, <u>Mughnī</u>, 14:394; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, <u>Fā'iq</u>, 212v-213r; also al-Rāzī, <u>Tafsir</u>, vol.2, pt.3:22-3.

[91] ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, <u>Mughnī</u>, 14:394. See, in contrast, Mānakdīm, 789, where Abū Hāshim is reported to have held that repentance for minor sins is obligatory because of scriptural evidence.

[92] ᶜAbd al-Jabbār, <u>Mughnī</u>, 14:393.

[93] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, <u>Fā'iq</u>, 213r.

[94] Al-Ḥillī, <u>Manāhij</u>, 105r; al-Rāzī, <u>Maᶜālim</u>, 131.

[95] E.g. Mānakdīm, 789.

its being an act of disobedience, and with regard to failure to do something obligatory because of its being such. This applies in general to every offence and [to every] failure to do that which is obligatory.[96]

Al-Rāzī referred only to scriptural evidence.[97] In this he was in agreement with the Ashᶜarite tradition.[98]

Al-Ḥillī and al-Rāzī agreed in rejecting the position of Abū Hāshim that it is impossible to repent of some sins while still carrying on with others when the penitent is aware of the evil nature of the acts with which he is persisting. Abū Hāshim is reported to have argued[99] that man repents because of the evil nature of the major sin in question. Since the characteristic of evil is shared by all major sins it would be inadmissable that one repents only of some major sins because of their evil while carrying on with others which are of the same gravity. With this position, which was also adopted by ᶜAbd al-Jabbār,[100] Abū Hāshim disagreed with Abū ᶜAlī who admitted the possibility of repenting of some sins while carrying on with others.[101] The only condition Abū ᶜAlī made was that the sin repented and that which was continued must not be of the same kind (jins). It would, therefore, be impossible to repent of drinking wine from one pot while continuing to drink it from another, whereas it would be possible to repent of drinking wine while at the same time carrying on with adultery.[102]

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[96] Kashf al-murād, 331; see also Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 430-1. In his Manāhij (105r), al-Ḥillī, too, refers to scriptural evidence.
[97] Maᶜālim, 131 (referring to Qur'an LXVI:8).
[98] E.g. al-Mutawallī, 60 (referring to Qur'an XXIV:31); he also refers to consensus (ijmāᶜ); al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 404; he refers only to consensus.
[99] Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 210v; Mānakdīm, 794-5; also Ibn Ḥazm, 5:69.
[100] Mānakdīm, 794.
[101] Ibid., 794-5; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 210v.
[102] Mānakdīm, 794-5; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, Fā'iq, 210v.

Al-Ḥillī agreed with Abū Hāshim that penitence is only valid when it is done because of the evil nature (qubḥ) of the offence but he distinguished between general evil shared by all sins and specific evil which applies only to some. On this basis, he rejected Abū Hāshim's conclusion. He summarizes the dispute:

> Is it possible to repent only of some evil? Abū ᶜAlī allowed this and claimed consensus for his position. Abū Hāshim denied it....Abū Hāshim's argument is that evil is avoided [reading yutraku for turika] only because of its evil nature. The avoidance of everything which shares its cause is then obligatory. Just as [when] someone says "I do not eat this pomegranate because of its sourness," it follows necessarily that he does not eat any sour pomegranates. Abū ᶜAlī argued that it is possible by consensus to do [reading ityān for ithbāt] some obligatory thing to the exclusion of another, because [if] a person fasts but does not pray his fasting is valid. The clarification of the condition is that just as it is necessary to repent of anything evil because of its evil nature it is likewise necessary to do what is obligatory because of its obligatory nature. If, from the fact that evil matters share their cause it follows that repentance of some only is impossible, then since obligatory matters also share their cause it must follow that [to perform only] some of them is invalid. Abū Hāshim replied that there is a difference in the view of rational men between doing and failure to do something. The one who fails [to eat] the pomegranate because of its sourness avoids [eating] all [pomegranates], while the one who eats it because of its sourness will not eat [reading ākilan for ākil] all of them. This example is clear, because what prevents the eating in the case of failure to eat is the sourness and because of that it applies to all cases, while in the case of acting [i.e. eating] it is not the sourness alone which entails the act but [that sourness] together with [other] motives. Thus, it does not apply to all cases.
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> Know that Abū Hāshim's argument is cogent (lāzim) and that one cannot escape it except by maintaining that repentance is obligatory for anything evil because ot its evil nature [in general] and because of the [particular] aspect of its evil. There is no doubt that evils are not alike in the [specific] aspects of their nature even if they are alike in their [general] evil character.[103]

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[103] Manāhij, 105r.

Al-Ḥillī's discussion appears to be based directly on Ibn al-Malāḥimī's argument in the Fā'iq.[104] The latter affirmed in principle the correctness of Abū Hāshim's position when arguing that the repentant sinner must abstain from all sins for which the motive for abstention is the same as for the sin actually repented. However, he goes on to explain that this applies only if there is no difference in any aspect of these sins. Moreover, even if the motives for abstention from some sins are the same there may in some cases be additional deterrents (ṣawārif) which are missing in others. On this basis, Ibn al-Malāḥimī concluded that repentance for only some sins is permissible while at the same time upholding the principle that repentance is obligatory in general because of the evil nature of every sin. Against Abū Hāshim's position as reported by al-Ḥillī, Ibn al-Malāḥimī also maintained that abstention and action are in fact comparable with respect to their lack of general application. The motives for evil do not apply equally to all sins but depend mainly on man's individual longing (shahwa) and pleasure (ladhdha) and the same is true of the deterrents which drive him to repent of certain sins more strongly than of others.[105]

Al-Rāzī also rejected Abū Hāshim's position[106] in agreement with Ashᶜarite tradition.[107] The argument he employed to refute Abū Hāshim's view seems likewise to be based directly on Ibn al-Malāḥimī's Fā'iq.[108] He states:

> Most [theologians] maintain that repentance of some sins while persisting with others is valid. Abū Hāshim held that it is not valid. The proof of the former is that a Jew if he extorts a habba [i.e. 1/60 of a dīnār] and then repents of Judaism while persisting with the extortion of the habba, then people unanimously agree that this repentance is valid. The proof of Abū Hāshim is that if he repents for that evil [act] for its pure evil it is necessary that he repents for all evils. If he repents for it for a purpose other than its pure evil, his repentance is not valid. The answer [to this] is: Why is it not possible that he repents

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[104] Fā'iq, 211r-v.
[105] Ibid., 211v.
[106] Maᶜālim, 131-2.
[107] Al-Mutawallī, 61; al-Juwaynī, Irshād, 405ff.
[108] Fā'iq, 211v.

for that evil because it is that [particular] evil, just as a man may have appetite for a [specific] food not because of the general [characteristic] of its being food but because it is that [specific] food?[109]

Al-Ḥillī was asked by his disciple Muhanna' b. Sinān[110] whether the recurrence of a sin after repentance nullifies the validity of this repentance. Al-Ḥillī denied this in principle arguing that a valid repentance cannot be nullified under any circumstances. He states:[111]

> Repentance cancels all acts of disobedience which have preceded it. If he [i.e. the repentant sinner] returns to the act of disobedience that repentance is not annulled, nor do these previous acts return after they were cancelled by repentance.

It is likely that al-Ḥillī would apply this view to the related question whether repentance has to be renewed whenever the penitent remembers the sin of which he had repented. Al-Ḥillī's following discussion of the different positions seems again to be directly based on Ibn al-Malāḥimī's account in the Fā'iq:[112]

> People disagreed over the act of disobedience: if a person repents of it and remembers it later, is [renewed] repentance for it obligatory [reading tajib for sahha]?
> Abū Hāshim said that it is not obligatory while the others made this obligatory. Abū Hāshim argued that the person had performed what is obligatory. Thus, any restriction on it is void. The others argued that if the person remembers it, and if he then finds in himself the continuation of it, [he is then required to repent]. And this is possible only by a renewal [reading bi-tajdīd for tajdīd] of his repentance. Thus, its renewal is obligatory. If he does not find [reading yajid for yajib] in himself this continuation, it [still] is obligatory to renew the repentance because the repentant sinner does not know whether the punishment has been nullified by it. There is some weakness in this.[113]

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109. Ma^cālim, 131-2.
110. Al-Ḥillī, Ajwiba, 29.
111. Ibid.
112. Fā'iq, 213v.
113. Manāhij, 105r.

It is not entirely clear from the text whether al-Ḥillī considered the whole position of the opponents of Abū Hāshim weak or if this applies only to the second argument put forward by this group.[114] Al-Ḥillī's answer in the Ajwibat al-masā'il al-muhanna'iyya, which shows that he maintains the absolute effectiveness of repentance, suggests that he agreed with Abū Hāshim.

The argument of continuation, which backs the position that the renewal of repentance is obligatory, had been put forward by Ibn al-Malāḥimī.[115] With this, he seems to have agreed with Abū ᶜAlī who likewise maintained that the renewal of the repentance is obligatory.[116]

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[114] See also Kashf al-murād, 335-6, where al-Ḥillī merely reports the different positions without expressing any opinion of his own.
[115] Fā'iq, 213r.
[116] Al-Ḥillī, Kashf al-murād, 335.

# CONCLUSION

The impact of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī upon al-Ḥillī's theological views was formative and in all issues where they disagreed with the Bahshamiyya, al-Ḥillī followed them closely.

In the realm of justice, he adopted their view that a capable agent cannot commit an act without a motive and he therefore repudiated the Bahshamiyya tenet which held that simple actions can be performed by a capable agent without a motive. Having applied this mechanism of the occurence of an act also to God, he further followed Ibn al-Malāḥimī's view that God is obliged to act for man's best interest in every respect, whenever He has the motive to do so. In respect to some minor points of disagreement regarding the issue of compensation, al-Ḥillī preferred the views of Ibn al-Malāḥimī to those of the Bahshamiyya.

In the question of divine attributes, he closely followed Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī in rejecting the notion of states (ahwāl) as developed by the Bahshamiyya, upholding only the notion of the characteristics (aḥkām) of the divine attributes. With regard to God's will, al-Ḥillī again followed Abū l-Ḥusayn who repudiated the view of the Bahshamiyya that God wills through a temporal will which inheres in no substrate insisting instead that God's will must be identified with His motives to act. Regarding the question whether God's knowledge is subject to change following the change in temporal things, al-Ḥillī adhered to the view of Abū l-Ḥusayn and his school that this change is restricted to the connection (ta$^{c}$alluq) between His essence and the object of His knowledge. He also followed their view that God is powerful over all possible acts, including the specific actions of man.

He also followed Abū l-Ḥusayn in rejecting the position of the Bahshamiyya which asserted the reality of essences and attributes of essence in the state of non-existence. In his view, the non-existent (*ma$^{c}$dūm*) cannot be asserted to be a thing (*shay'*). On this basis, al-Ḥillī also adopted Ibn al-Malāḥimī's view on passing away (*fanā'*) and restoration (*i$^{c}$āda*). Since things have no reality in the state of non-existence, God does not annihilate the body, except in a metaphoric sense when He disperses its parts. This dispersal occurs through a direct act on the part of God and restoration subsequently consists in the reassembling of these parts by God.

As for the issue of promise and threat, al-Ḥillī held on to the specific Imamite position which traditionally differed from the Mu$^{c}$tazilite view. On account of the Imamite concept of belief, he rejected the Mu$^{c}$tazilite notion of the intermediate position and eternal punishment of the grave sinner. He adhered to the Imamite doctrine of intercession (*shafā$^{c}$a*) and the possibility of divine forgiveness (*$^{c}$afw*) for a grave sinner. Yet in regard to the doctrine of repentance, of which at least some elements were shared by Mu$^{c}$tazilites and Imamites, al-Ḥillī preferred the opinion of Ibn al-Malāḥimī to those of Abū Hāshim whenever his Imamite perspective was not in basic conflict with the Mu$^{c}$tazilite view.

Al-Ḥillī also followed Abū l-Ḥusayn and his followers whenever they disagreed with the Bahshamiyya in regard to natural philosophy. He agreed with the former in his rejection of the notion of entitative determinants entailing states. While the Bahshamiyya, for instance, defined *kawn* as the entitative determinant which causes an atom to be in a certain position,[1] al-Ḥillī explained *kawn* simply as the occurrence of the atom in a position.[2] This difference of definition extended also to the four kinds of *kawn*, movement

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[1]Frank, *Beings*, 98.
[2]*Manāhij*, 82v; *Nahj al-mustarshidīn*, 69. For the view of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, see Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Mu$^{c}$tamad*, 86ff.

(*ḥaraka*), rest (*sukūn*), contiguity (*ijtimāᶜ*) and separation (*iftirāq*).[3] He further denied the possibility that an accident may subsist outside a substrate (*lā fī maḥall*)[4] and the possibility that one accident may subsist in two substrates.[5] Among the former category of accidents, the Bahshamiyya counted God's will, His disapproval and annihilation. In the latter category, they classified the accident of composition (*ta'līf*) which inheres in two adjacent atoms. By this inherence it causes them to be conjoined as a single thing.[6]

Apart from this formative impact of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, the theology of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī had a significant influence on al-Ḥillī's theology. Such influence can be detected most often in technical details in the various fields where al-Rāzī developed original views, such as his proofs of the impeccability of the prophets, or his proofs for the veracity of the claimant of the prophetic office and other details. Al-Rāzī's views, however, were especially influential in shaping al-Ḥillī's thinking wherever parallels between al-Rāzī's positions and the positions of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī existed.

It has been seen that al-Rāzī's theology developed under the major influence of the doctrine of Abū l-Ḥusayn and his followers. Owing to the influence of philosophy on his thought, al-Rāzī further developed these views through freely mixing theological concepts with philosophical notions and terminology. This fusion was facilitated by the fact that quite a few of Abū l-Ḥusayn's views had affinities with philosophical views. Al-Rāzī's amalgamation of philosophical and theological concepts had a distinct impact on al-Ḥillī's thought. Some examples follow.

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[3] *Manāhij*, 83r; *Nahj al-mustarshidīn*, 69-70. For the view of the Bahshamiyya, see Frank, *Beings*, 98-9.
[4] *Manāhij*, 88v; *Nahj al-mustarshidīn*, 91. For the view of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn, see Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Muᶜtamad*, 133-4.
[5] *Manāhij*, 88v; *Nihāyat al-marām*, 100r. For the view of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn, see Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Muᶜtamad*, 133-4.
[6] Frank, *Beings*, 104.

Al-Rāzī agreed with Abū l-Ḥusayn that will is additional to the motive for an action in the visible world. He did not, however, use Abū l-Ḥusayn's terminology but rather drew upon that of the philosophers in stating that man's motive generates a longing (shawq/mayl) which is his will (irāda). Al-Ḥillī adopted this modified terminology.

When dealing with the connection (ta$^{c}$alluq) between God's essence and the objects of His attributes, al-Rāzī substituted the philosophical terms of relation (iḍāfa/ nisba) for the theological term connection, without, however, modifying the meaning of the latter term as used by the theologians. Al-Rāzī's terminology is evident in al-Ḥillī's writings.

Al-Rāzī, moreover, also adopted a number of philosophical notions which had no direct parallel in the thought of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. Here, he was also followed by al-Ḥillī. Al-Rāzī adopted, for instance, the philosophical notion of contingency. This led to a modified terminology in a wide range of issues which equally had direct parallels in al-Ḥillī's writings. On this basis, al-Rāzī, followed by al-Ḥillī, allowed that God may equally undo or create. This view, which led to direct disagreement with those earlier theologians who denied that God may undo something through a direct act, was also shared by al-Ḥillī. Regarding the passing away of the body, al-Rāzī and al-Ḥillī therefore maintained that God may simply undo it. This possibility had been rejected by earlier theologians who were forced to find a different explanation of the way in which God causes the body to pass away.

Yet despite the impact of al-Rāzī's concepts and terminology on al-Ḥillī's theology in a large number of details, the latter strictly repudiated al-Rāzī's Ash$^{c}$arite views whenever they were in conflict with his Mu$^{c}$tazilite principles.

In sum, except for the issue of God's promise and thread to mankind where al-Ḥillī followed the Shī$^{c}$ite tradition which differed here from the doctrine of the Mu$^{c}$tazilites, his theology can be said to be primarily based on the

doctrine of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and to be secondarily influenced by the formulations of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī whenever these did not disagree with his basic theological views.

An exception was his treatment of essence (māhiyya) and existence (wujūd) where al-Ḥillī, independently from these two major influences on his thought, closely followed the Avicennan tradition.

These conclusions apply to al-Ḥillī's doctrine as set forth in his theological works. Since he was, however, equally well-trained in philosophy and wrote a number of philosophical works, it must be asked to what extent his theological works are representative of his personal convictions, and whether he held different views in his philosophical works. This question is of special interest since al-Ḥillī's teacher, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, was a philosopher rather than a theologian although he did write a few theological treatises in which he was, like al-Ḥillī, influenced by Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī's and al-Rāzī's views. From Naṣīr al-Dīn's autobiographical report,[7] it is known that he began with the study of traditional religious sciences and theology but soon became dissatisfied with the views and methods of the kalām theologians who, in his view, did not sincerely seek the truth. He then turned to the teaching of the philosophers and found that they sought the truth on the basis of reason alone without blindly following any authority. His deep commitment to the views of the philosophers is evident especially in his refutation of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's critical commentaries on the works of Ibn Sīnā.[8] Although Naṣīr al-Dīn joined for some time the

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[7] Majmūᶜa-yi rasā'il-i Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn (edited by Mudarris Riḍawī. Tehran, 1335sh), 36ff.
[8] These are especially his commentary on al-Rāzī's Sharḥ al-ishārāt, and his Talkhīṣ al-muḥaṣṣal.

Isma^c^ilis he ultimately proved to be a true philosopher.[9] His few concise theological treatises, therefore, cannot be considered as representative of his thought.

There are a number of safe indications that al-Ḥillī, in contrast to Naṣīr al-Dīn, was primarily a theologian who repudiated philosophical doctrine in both his theological and philosophical works whenever it disagreed with his theological views.

From his few extant works on philosophy, only two are relevant for an evaluation of the present question, the Asrār al-khafiyya, presumably written before 680/1281, and his commentary on al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī's Ḥikmat al-^c^ayn, the Īḍāḥ al-maqāṣid fī sharḥ ḥikmat al-^c^ayn. In the third part of the Asrār which treats with theology, al-Ḥillī is severely critical of philosophical notions whenever they disagree with his theological views. This impression is supported by occasional remarks in the Īḍāḥ where he states his criticism of al-Kātibī's view and usually refers the reader to more extensive discussions in his Asrār. In these two works he radically rejected the philosophical notion of emanation.[10] God is not a necessitating cause (mūjib) from whom an effect inevitably emanates because of His self-reflection; rather, He is a choosing agent who acts whenever He has the motive to do so.[11] Thus al-Ḥillī repudiated the philosophical view that God does not act for a purpose other than His self-reflection.[12] He also held the philosophical view that God's knowledge does not include particulars to be false.[13] He attacked the philosophical view that since God and His

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[9]Evidence for this can be found in his Maṣāri^c^ al-muṣāri^c^ which is a refutation of the Kitāb al-muṣāra^c^a by al-Shahrastānī (d. 548/1153) in which he defends Ibn Sīnā's positions against the objections of al-Shahrastānī who argued from an Isma^c^ili point of view. For this work, which he evidently wrote after he left the Isma^c^ilis, see Madelung, "Streitschrift," 250-259, esp.258-9.

[10]Asrār, 216r, 219r; Īḍāḥ al-maqāṣid, 113-4, 224.

[11]Asrār, 210r; Īḍāḥ al-maqāṣid, 83, 234; also Ajwiba, 152.

[12]Asrār, 215v; Ajwiba, 152.

[13]Asrār, 225r-v.

knowledge of the best order of things, which necessitates their emanation from Him, are eternal, and since change is inadmissible in Him, the world is a necessary concomitant of God and as such co-eternal with Him.[14] He equally rejected the philosophers' view that the world cannot pass away into non-existence since God, who is the primary cause of the world, does not vanish.[15] Having rejected the notion of emanation, al-Ḥillī maintained that God is capable of creating an infinite number of things. He does so through a direct act of creation.[16] He further rejected the philosophical notion of divine attributes and defended the theological view that God's attributes have a reality in themselves. They are existential yet they have no separate existence except in the mind.[17]

A further indication that al-Ḥillī considered himself primarily as theologian may be the fact that most of his remaining philosophical writings are lost. It is likely that he wrote them as teaching books for his students. They were therefore of little originality and not considered worth copying by later students and scholars.

In his Ajwibat al-masā'il al-muhanna'iyya, which contain his answers to questions by his student Muhanna' b. Sinān covering a wide range of topics, al-Ḥillī clearly stated that he considered the upholders of the eternity of the world as infidels (kāfirūn).[18] Since this collection of answers was written at a late stage of al-Ḥillī's life (between 719/1319-20 and 720/1320) and was not meant to be a specifically theological book, this further suggests that even during later life he firmly held on to his basic theological position.

This overall impression is corroborated by a comparison of al-Ḥillī's theological works with the theological treatises by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. It appears that

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14 Asrār, 212v; Īḍāḥ al-maqāṣid, 231-3.
15 Ibid., 83.
16 Ibid., 113-4; 222; Asrār, 216r.
17 Ibid., 210r.
18 Ajwiba, 88-9.

al-Ḥillī displayed in his kalām works a quite conservative attitude even in regard to questions which did not directly touch theological issues and in which Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī fully adopted the philosophical position. Al-Ḥillī, in contrast, left them either undecided, or tended to follow the traditional positions of the theologians.

Naṣīr al-Dīn adhered in his theological writings to the philosophical notion of man consisting of a soul (nafs) which is attached to a body (badan).[19] Al-Ḥillī, in contrast, seems to have been undecided between the view of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī who defined man as consisting of basic parts (ajzā' aṣliyya) and the position originating with the philosophers. Although in most of his theological and philosophical works he put forward arguments against the concept of the existence of a soul in addition to these basic parts,[20] he usually hesitated to reject it outright. In his Maᶜārij, he concludes his discussion by stating that both positions, that of the school of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and that of the philosophers, are strong.[21] He expresses similar views in his Asrār.[22] In his Taslīk, he states that although the proofs for the existence of the soul must be rejected, equally there are no proofs for the impossibility of its existence. Therefore it must be considered as possible.[23] An indication that he tended rather to the position of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī is found in his discussion on passing away and restoration. Holding on to the view that man consists of basic parts without a soul attached, he maintains that God does not annihilate the body but only disperses its parts. Only in his Maᶜārij, he explains passing away and restoration on the assumption that man consists of body and soul. In this case, the body only would pass away into non-existence. When God wished to restore man, another body

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[19] Tajrīd, 138ff; Fuṣūl, 21-2; see also al-Miqdād, 389.
[20] Asrār, 154rff; Maᶜārij, 128r; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 387; Taslīk, 45v.
[21] Maᶜārij, 128r. In his Manāhij (89r-v), he offers objections to both without indicating his preference; he concludes, however, saying that both views are very close to the truth.
[22] Asrār, 153r-v.
[23] Taslīk, 46r-v.

would be attached to the soul which did not pass away. Al-Ḥillī offered this explanation, however, on the theoretical assumption that man consists of body and soul without expressing his approval of this view. In some of his refutations of the philosophers' objections to the theological dogma of the annihilation of the world and restoration of the human body, he expressly denied that man consists of a soul and a body.[24]

In regard to atomism al-Ḥillī preferred in most of his theological works the theological concepts of jawhar and $^c$araḍ, defining the former as an atom occupying space (mutaḥayyiz) and the latter as an accident inhering in a body occupying space (ḥāll fī l-mutaḥayyiz).[25] He also favoured the theological definition of a body (jism) as a compound of atoms.[26] He does, however, not take sides in the discussion of the theologians as to how many atoms constitute a body.[27] In his philosophical works he rather adopted the philosophical concepts of jawhar and $^c$araḍ, defining jawhar as substance, i.e. that which does not exist in a subject (mawjūd lā fī mawḍū$^c$), and $^c$araḍ as that which exists in a subject (mawjūd fī mawḍū$^c$).[28] He, therefore, differed from Naṣīr

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[24] Ibid., 77v.

[25] Ma$^c$ārij, 110r; Manāhij, 80v; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 25. In his Taslīk (9v-10v), he only reports the positions of the theologians and the philosophers without indicating his own position.

[26] Ma$^c$ārij, 128r; Manāhij, 81r; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 29; Taslīk, 12r.

[27] Manāhij, 80v; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 29.

[28] Asrār, 175v; Kashf al-khafā', 16r, 58r. The philosophical views on accidents had nevertheless some influence on al-Ḥillī; this can be found in both his theological and philosophical works. Examples of this influence are his view that an accident may subsist in an accident (qiyām al-$^c$araḍ bi-l-$^c$araḍ) which was unanimously rejected by the theologians with the exception of the early Mu$^c$tazilite Mu$^c$ammar b. $^c$Abbād al-Sulamī (d. 215/830), but which was generally accepted among the philosophers. (Manāhij, 88v; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 130; Ma$^c$ārij, 115v; for the view of the Bahshamiyya, Ibn al-Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 274-5; for the position of the philosophers, Ibn Sīnā, Ilāhiyyāt, 1:58) Having accepted this principle, al-Ḥillī was able to define a letter (ḥarf) like the philosophers as an accident which subsists in the accident of voice (ṣawt) (Manāhij, 84r; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 85) while the earlier theologians defined a

al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī who adopted the philosophical concepts of jawhar and ᶜarad both in his philosophical and theological writings.[29]

The different approaches of al-Ḥillī and Naṣīr al-Dīn are also apparent in regard to the question of whether God may be said to experience pure intellectual pleasure. The theologians traditionally denied that God could be described as experiencing either pain (alam) or pleasure (ladhdha), arguing that this is possible only for corporeal beings. The philosophers, in contrast, asserted that God does experience a kind of pure intellectual pleasure. They argued that, since He perceives through self-reflection the most perfect being, that is His own essence, He experiences delight.[30] While Naṣīr al-Dīn admitted this possibility in his Tajrīd, al-Ḥillī expressed doubts. The application of the expression "enjoying" (multadhdh) to God would only be justifiable if there were permission by revelation (idhn sharᶜī).[31]

It seems, therefore, safe to conclude that whereas Naṣīr al-Dīn's importance was as a philosopher, al-Ḥillī was primarily a theologian who was only marginally influenced by philosophical concepts and terminology. As such, he displayed considerable conservativism in issues where he could have adopted the philosophical position without contradicting any of his theological views. Naṣīr al-Dīn

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letter usually as a kind (jins) or part (juz') of voice. (Ibn al-Mattawayh, Tadhkira, 362ff) In regard to the accident of colour (lawn), al-Ḥillī did not follow the Bahshamiyya that there are five simple pure kinds of colours, namely black, white, red, green and yellow. Rather he followed in his Nahj al-mustarshidīn (74-5) the position of the majority of the philosophers that the only real, pure colours are white and black while all other colours occur because of different mixtures of these two colours. In his Manāhij (83v), he refrains from taking a position about this question. When he discussed the accident of pressure (iᶜtimād), he usually pointed out that it corresponded to the accident of inclination (mayl) in the usage of the philosophers. (Taslīk, 17r; Manāhij, 84r).

[29] Tajrid, 100.

[30] Ibn Sīnā, Najāt, 281-2.

[31] Kashf al-murād, 229; see also Asrār, 211v; Manāhij, 94v; Nahj al-mustarshidīn, 233.

al-Ṭūsī was therefore of greater importance than al-Ḥillī for the subsequent fusion of theology and philosophy in Imamite thought, which was moreover mixed with elements of the philosophy of illumination of al-Suhrawardī (d. 586/1190) and the Sufi thought developed by Ibn al-ᶜArabī (d. 638/1240). The first major representative of this tendency was Ibn Abī Jumhūr al-Aḥsā'ī (d. after 904/1499).[32] At a later stage, a far-reaching substitution of philosophy for Imamite theology was achieved by ᶜAbd al-Razzāq al-Lāhījī (d. 1092/1661).[33] This current of thought, however, had only a limited impact upon the Shiᶜism.[34] In the long run, traditional theology as represented by al-Ḥillī was more important.

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[32]See W.Madelung, "Ibn Abī Ǧumhūr al-Aḥsā'ī's Synthesis of Kalām, Philosophy and Sufism," in La signification du Bas Moyen Age dans l'histoire et la culture du monde musulman: Actes du 8ème Congrès de l'Union européenne des arabisants et islamisants (Aix-en-Provence, 1978), 147-156; also idem, "Šīᶜa," 367.
[33]Ibid., 367.
[34]Ibid., 367.

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
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